The Discriminating Mental Factor, the Opponent of Ignorance in Vaibhashika

Although all cognitions include a discriminating mental factor, not all cognize in terms of a view. According to Vasubandhu, Autocommentary to “A Treasure Trove of Special Topics of Knowledge” (Chos mngon-pa’i mdzod-kyi bshad-pa, Skt. Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyā) (Gretil 029.17-18, Derge vol. 140, 47B), there are eight types of mental factors that cognize with a view:

The five such as a disturbed view toward a transitory network and so on, mundane right views, a (right) view of those needing further training and (a right) view of those needing no further training – this group of eight constitutes the views that are (included in) the constituent component that is all knowable phenomena. There is no (other) view that is left over (outside of these eight). 

(Skt.) /pañca satkāyadṛṣṭyādikā dṛṣṭayaḥ laukikī samyag dṛṣṭiḥ śaiṅkṣī dṛṣṭiraśaikṣī dṛṣṭirityayamaṣṭaprakāro dharmadhāturdṛṣṭiravaśiṣṭo na dṛṣṭiḥ /

(Tib.) rnam pa brgyad, 'jig tshogs la lta ba la sogs pa la lta ba lnga dag dang, 'jig rten pa'i yang dag pa'i lta ba dang, slob pa'i lta ba dang, mi slob pa'i lta ba ste, chos kyi khams rnam pa brgyad po 'di dag ni lta ba yin no, lhag ma ni lta ba ma yin no

A constituent component (khams, Skt. dhātu) is a class of phenomena, and the constituent component that is all knowable phenomena (chos-kyi khams, Skt. dharmadhātu) is the class of phenomena that can be validly cognized by a mind consciousness.

The eight views concerning the topics of the four noble truths are:

• The five disturbed views (lta-ba nyon-mongs-can, Skt. kliṣṭadṛṣṭi) – incorrect views that occur only doctrinally based
• Mundane (‘jig-rten-pa’i, Skt. laukikī) right views – right views that occur with constructive minds of ordinary beings who have not yet attained a seeing pathway of mind (a path of seeing).
• Right views of those needing further training (slob-pa’i, Skt. śaikṣī) – right views that occur with the minds of aryas with a seeing pathway of mind or an accustoming pathway of mind (a path of meditation).
• Right views of those needing no further training (mi-slob-pa’i, Skt. aśaikṣī) – right views that occur with the minds of arhats and Buddhas. 

The five disturbed views, as defined by Vasubandhu, are those held by the five disturbing mental factors that cognize their objects with a view, defined in the previous chapter. They occur only in mental cognitions. Concerning them, we shall limit our discussion to their occurrence just on the plane of sensory objects of desire (desire realm). 

• A disturbed view toward a transitory network 

• Taking (a transitory network) to exist as one of two extremes 
• Taking a disturbed view to be supreme
• A distorted view 
• Taking disturbed morality or conduct to be supreme.

An apprehending of an object (rtogs-pa, Skt. adhigama) is one that cognizes its object both accurately and decisively. 

• Cognitions that cognize with one of the five disturbed views do not apprehend their objects because, although they are decisive (otherwise, they would be indecisive wavering tending toward what is untrue), they are inaccurate. The anti-knowing that is congruent with such cognitions stupefies the mind consciousness and mental factors with which it is congruent, thereby obstructing them from cognizing accurately the topics of the four noble truths,
• Cognitions that cognize with mundane right views apprehend their objects, but do not bring about the acquiring (thob-pa, Skt. prapti) of a true cessation of anti-knowing.
• Cognitions that cognize with the right views of those needing further training bring about the acquiring of a true cessation of some, but not all occurrences of anti-knowing. With a seeing pathway of mind (a path of seeing), they bring about the acquiring of a true cessation of the anti-knowing that occurs with one of the five disturbed views. With an accustoming pathway mind (a path of meditation), they bring about the acquiring of a true cessation of a portion of the anti-knowing that occurs either by itself or congruent with a disturbing mental factor without a view.
• Cognitions that cognize with a shravaka or pratyekabuddha arhat’s right view needing no further training bring about the acquiring of a true cessation of all anti-knowing. 

Cognizing some object with one of these eight views occurs only with a mind consciousness and never with a sense consciousness. Vasubandhu states, A Treasure Trove (I.41cd) (Gretil ed., Derge Tengyur vol. 140, 3B): 

A cognition that arises together with (one of) the five (types of sense) consciousness is not one with a view because it lacks an assessment. 

(Skt.) pañcavijñānasahajā dhīrna dṛṣṭiratīraṇāt //

(Tib.) rnam shes lnga dang mtshungs skyes blo, nges rtog med phyir lta ma yin

In the Vaibhashika system, the Sanskrit term dhī (Tib. blo) is used as a general term for a cognition, both sensory and mental. A cognition includes a type of consciousness and a cluster of accompanying mental factors, including discriminating. The term dhī also has a more restricted meaning as a term for sensory cognitions and all mental cognitions that are without a view. 

In this passage, the Tibetan translators rendered the Sanskrit term for an assessment, tīraṇa (Tib. rtog) with one of its synonyms nges-rtog (Skt. nitīraṇa; a conclusive assessment).

Vasubandhu, Autocommentary (Gretil 029.22-030.01, Derge 47B), explains what a mental factor that cognizes with a view is and why it can only be with mental cognition. He also indicates that cognizing with a view does not occur in all cognitions with mind consciousness, only in some:

A view, then, is a decisive assessor because of it being something that has been inaugurated from a close analysis (of its object). And because of that, the discriminating mental factor that arises simultaneously with (one of) the five (sense) consciousnesses is not (a discriminating with a view). For this very reason, other discriminatings as well, whether disturbed or non-disturbed, are also not with a view.

(Skt.) // santīrikā hi dṛṣṭirupadhyānapravṛttattvāt / na caivaṃ pañcavijñānasahājā prajñā / tasmādsau na dṛṣṭiḥ / ata eva cānyā 'pi kliṣṭā 'kliṣṭā vā prājñā na dṛṣṭiḥ /

(Tib.) rtog par byed pa ni lta ba yin te, nges par sems pa la zhugs pa dag lta ba yin na rnam par shes pa lnga dang lhan cig skyes pa'i shes rab ni de lta ma yin te, de lta bas na 'di ni lta ba ma yin no, de nyid kyi phyir shes rab nyon mongs pa can nam nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa gzhan yang lta ba ma yin no.

Here, Vasubandhu uses santīrika (decisive assessor) a Sanskrit derivative of saṃtīraṇa (decisive assessment) as another synonym of tīraṇa (assessment). The Tibetan translator renders santīrika as rtog-par byed-pa (assessor), which omits translating the Sanskrit prefix sam. 

Jinaputra Yashomitra, The Clarified Meaning (Gretil 79, Derge 74A), glosses this passage: 

“Because it lacks an assessment” (means) because it lacks a decisive assessment. Furthermore, a decisive assessment is one that is preceded by a close analysis of an object, leading to certainty (about it). 

As for an elaboration of “for this very reason, other (discriminatings) as well” (means) for this very reason, because they lack a decisive assessment, other discriminatings with mind (consciousness), whether disturbed – (ones that are) congruent with longing desire and so on – or non-disturbed – (ones that are congruent with) the cognizing of a state of depletion or of a state of non-arising – or (ones that are congruent with) an unobscured unspecified cognizing of something are not with a view.   

(Skt.) atīraṇād iti asaṃtīraṇāt. saṃtīraṇaṃ punar viṣayopanidhyānapūrvakaṃ niścayākarṣaṇaṃ. ata eva cānyāpīti vistaraḥ. ata evāsaṃtīraṇād anyāpi mānasī kliṣṭā rāgādisaṃprayuktā akliṣṭā vā kṣayānutpādajñānānivṛtāvyākṛtā prajñā na dṛṣṭiḥ

(Tib.) nges rtog med pa'i zhes bya ba ni rtog pa med pa'i phyir te/ rtog pa ni yul la nges par dpyod pa sngon du 'gro ba'i nges par 'dren pa yin no/ / de nyid kyi phyir shes rab nyon mongs pa can nam zhes bya ba rgyas par 'byung ba ni rtog pa med pa de nyid kyi phyir yid kyi shes rab 'dod chags la sogs pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa nyon mongs pa can nam nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa zad pa dang mi skye ba shes pa dang [ma] bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa gzhan yang lta ba ma yin no/ 

The cognizing of a state of depletion (zad-pa’i shes-pa, Skt. kṣayajñāna) cognizes the state of depletion of all the disturbing mental factors. The cognizing of a state of non-arising (mi-skye-pa’i shes-pa, Skt. anutpādajñāna) cognizes the state of the non-arising ever again of the disturbing mental factors. They are both acquired with the attainment of liberation, and although arhats have a right view needing no further training, arhats do not need to make a close analysis in order to determine whether they have depleted all their disturbing mental factors such that they will never arise again. 

Vasubandhu affirms this point in, A Treasure Trove (VII.1b) (Gretil ed. Derge 21B): 

A mind (cognizing) a state of depletion or a state of non-arising is not (one with) a view.

(Skt.) kṣayānutpādadhīrna dak

(Tib). zad dang mi skye'i blo lta min  

An unobscured unspecified cognition (ma-bsgribs lung-ma-bstan, Skt. anivṛtāvyākṛta) is a cognition that is unobscured by anti-knowing and that Buddha did not specify as being either destructive or constructive. An example is the cognition of a chair when we go to sit down on it. Such cognition does not require a close analysis and decisive assessment of the chair.

Note that in the passage from Vasubandhu’s Autocommentary cited above, the Tibetan translators rendered the Sanskrit term upadhyāna (close analysis) as nges-par sems-pa (decisive thinking).  Here, however, the Tibetan translators rendered it as nges-par dpyod-pa (decisive examination). 

These Tibetan translations of the Sanskrit technical terms in these passages that entail the Tibetan words rtog-pa in relation to an assessment and dpyod-pa in relation to an analysis may be confusing since these two Tibetan terms are also used to translate the Sanskrit terms for the mental factors of gross detection (vitarka) and subtle discernment (vicāra) respectively. They occur in all cognitions, not just in those that cognize with a view. To avoid confusion, let’s look at their definitions.

Jinaputra Yashomitra defines cognizing something with gross detection and with subtle discernment in The Clarified Meaning (Gretil 64, Derge 59A):

Suppose you ask what cognizing something with gross detection is. As an attribute of cognizing something with an urging and a discriminating cognizing of it, it is the cognizing of something with an investigative mental probing of it, which is a coarse state of mind. Suppose you ask what cognizing something with a subtle discernment of it is. [Tib. adds: As an attribute of cognizing something with an urging and a discriminating cognizing of it,] it is, similarly, the cognizing of something with an analytical mental probing of it that is a subtle state of mind. 

(Skt.) vitarkaḥ katamaḥ. paryeṣako manojalpaḥ cetanāprajñāviśeṣaḥ yā cittasyaudārikatā. vicāraḥ katamaḥ. pratyavekṣako manojalpas tathaiva yā cittasya sūkṣmatā. 

(Tib.) rtog pa gang zhe na/ kun tu rtsol ba yid kyi brjod pa de sems pa dang shes rab kyi khyad par gang sems rting ba'o/ /dpyod pa gang zhe na/ so sor rtog pa yid kyi brjod pa ste sems pa dang shes rab kyi khyad par de bzhin du gang sems zhi ba ba'o 

The term yid-kyi brjod-pa (Sanskrit manojalpa) literally means “mental chatter,” and in non-Vaibhashika systems it suggests verbal conceptual cognition, which is only with mind consciousness and words. Vaibhashika, however, does not assert conceptual cognition. Here, yid/manas refers to both sense consciousness and mind consciousness, and brjod-pa/jalpa refers to the non-verbal feature of probing something in order to be able to cognize it in a specific way. 

An urging (sems-pa, Skt. cetanā), like a discriminating, is one the ten great mental factors grounded in all cognizing minds. It is the dynamic mental factor in a cognition that prods the consciousness and other mental factors to focus on an object and that drives them while thinking, doing or saying something about or to the object. The gross detection that is congruent with the urging probes the object, investigating in general (kun-tu rtsol-ba, Skt. paryeṣa) whether the urging is making a concerted effort to direct the consciousness and mental factors to this specific object. The subtle discernment that is congruent with the urging probes the object, being individually attentive (so-sor rtogs-pa, Skt. pratyavekṣa) to each moment to ensure that it is continuing to direct the consciousness and mental factors to this specific object. The gross detection and subtle discernment that are congruent with the discriminating cognizing of an object perform the same functions. The discriminating cognizing of an object, as we have learned, differentiates it from other objects. 

All discriminating cognizings of something are congruent with gross detection and subtle discernment; however, only discriminating cognizings that are cognizings with a view are congruent with a decisive assessment of its object that was preceded by a close analysis of it. 

Vaibhashika, then, asserts that the mental factor of anti-knowing is not what Vasubandhu calls a “bad discriminating” (shes-rab ngan-pa, Skt. kuprajñā). By its own force, it does not discriminate with a disturbed view. Vasubandhu explains why in Treasure Trove (III.29b-d) (Gretil ed., Derge vol. 140, 8A): 

If you say (anti-knowing) is a bad discriminating, it is not, [1] because of (a bad discriminating) being a viewing, [2] because of (discriminating with a disturbed) view’s being congruent with it (with anti-knowing, and) [3] because of the teaching about discriminating and subsidiary disturbing mental factors.

(Skt.) kuprajñā cenna darśanāt / dṛṣṭestatsaṃprayuktatvāt prajñopakleśadeśanāt /

(Tib.) gal te shes rab ngan pa'o min lta phyir, lta ba de dang mtshungs ldan phyir, shes rab nyon mongs bstan phyir ro //

Vasubandhu explains in Autocommentary (Gretil 141.08 - 20, Derge 132A):

Just as a bad wife is called a “mis-wife” and a bad son a “mis-son,” shouldn’t an “anti-knowing” be like that? (Shouldn’t it be a “misknowing?) (No). “If you say (an anti-knowing) is a bad discriminating, it is not, [1] because of (a bad discriminating) being a viewing.” This means, “Because a reviled discriminating (is) a deluded one, it has the self-nature of (being) a cognizing with a view,” so it is not fitting (for it to be) an anti-knowing. (If it were fitting), then something that is not a (cognizing with a deluded) view (namely, an anti-knowing) would become (a cognizing with a deluded view). But that (anti-knowing) is not fit to become one. What is the reason? 

[2] “Because of a (cognizing with a deluded) view’s being congruent with it (with the anti-knowing).” If the anti-knowing were a discriminating, it could not have come about (in the same cognition as a cognizing with a deluded view). A (cognizing with a deluded) view would not be fitting to be made congruent with it (with an anti-knowing) because of the noncongruence of two substantial entities (with both being) discriminatings. 

[3] As is said in a sutra, “A mind that is disturbed by longing desire is not yet liberated; a discriminating that is disturbed by anti-knowing is not yet purified.” This means, “And that discriminating is indeed not suited to be a disturbing (variant) of that discriminating.” Just as the disturbing mental factor of longing desire is of a separate class (of phenomena) that is other (than the classes of the rest of the components) of the mind, so too is an anti-knowing (a separate class of phenomena that is other than the class of phenomena) of discriminating. Why, then, would it not be accepted in the same way? 

(Skt.) yathā tarhi kubhāryā abhāryetyucyate kuputraścāputraḥ / evamavidyā 'pyastu / kuprajñā cenna darśanāt / kutsitā hi prajñā kliṣṭā / sā ca dṛṣṭisvabhāvā iti nāvidyā yujyate / yā tarhi na dṛṣṭiḥ sā bhaviṣyati / sā 'pi bhavituṃ nārhati / kiṃ kāraṇam / dṛṣṭestatsaṃprayuktatvāt avidyā cet prajñā 'bhaviṣyanna dṛṣṭistayā yujyate saṃprāyokṣyata / dvayoḥ prajñādravyayorasaṃprayogāt / itaśca prajñopakleśadeśanāt // "rāgopakliṣṭaṃ cittaṃ nāvamucyate avidyopakliṣṭā prajñā na viśudhyatī"tyuktam sūtre / na ca saiva prajñā tasyāḥ prajñāyā upakleśo yukta iti / yathā cittasyānyo bhinnajātīya upakleśo rāga evaṃ prajñāyā avidyā / kiṃ punarevaṃ neṣyate /

(Tib.) 'o na ni dper na chung ma ngan pa la chung ma ma yin zhes bya ba dang, bu ngan pa la bu ma yin pa zhes bya ba ltar ma rig pa yang de dang 'dra'o, gal te, shes rab ngan pa'o min lta phyir, smad pa'i shes rab ni nyon mongs pa can yin na de yang lta ba'i rang bzhin yin pas ma rig pa yin par mi rung ngo, 'o na ni gang lta ba'i rang bzhin ma yin pa de yin par 'gyur ro, de yang yin par mi 'os so, de ci'i phyir zhe na, lta ba de dang mtsungs ldan phyir, gal te ma rig pa shes rab yin par gyur na shes rab kyi rdzas nyid mtshungs par mi ldan pa'i phyir lta ba de dang mtshungs par ldan par mi 'gyur ro, zhes bya ba 'di las kyang 'grub ste, mdo las, 'dod chags kyis nye bar nyon mongs pa can du gyur pa'i sems ni rnam par mi 'grol lo, ma rig pas nye bar nyon mongs pa can du gyur pa'i shes rab ni rnam par mi 'dag go zhes gsungs te, shes rab de nyid shes rab de'i nyon mongs pa 'dod chags rigs pa ma yin pas ji ltar sems kyis nye bar nyon mongs pa 'dod chags rigs tha dad pa gzhan yin pa ltar shes rab kyi ma rig pa yang de dang 'dra'o, 

The Sanskrit prefix for negation “a-” can negate what it is prefixed to in several different ways. When applied to the Sanskrit words for wife (bhāryā) and son (putra), it makes the words “abhāryā” and “aputra,” which mean a “bad wife” and a “bad son.” It is like the prefix “mis-” in English which, when applied to words such “management,” makes “mismanagement,” meaning “bad management.” Thus, in the context of Dharmakirti’s presentation of ignorance, we have translated “avidyā” as “misknowing something,” since he identifies “misknowing something” with a bad discriminating cognizing of something. Vasubandhu, however, argues that the analogy with “bad wife” does not hold for avidyā. This is because it is not a bad discriminating cognizing of something. He gives three reasons for this.

[1] A bad discriminating refers to a discriminating with one of the five disturbed views. The disturbed view adds an identity to the object of the cognition – for instance, the body as being in the nature of happiness. This view that decisively assesses the body to have this nature is based on having made a close analysis of the bodily feelings one experiences. When a discriminating mental factor cognizes the body with this disturbed view, it differentiates between the body being in the nature of suffering or of happiness and, with certitude, views it to be in the nature of happiness. Thus, the bad discriminating has the self-nature of being a viewing (lta-ba, Skt. darśana). It views objects in terms of a disturbed view.

If anti-knowing were a disturbed discriminating, it too would have the self-nature of being a viewing, so it too would have to decisively assess its object, based on a prior close analysis of it. But because anti-knowing has a self-nature of stupefying the mind, it cannot possibly decisively assess its object based on a prior close analysis. 

[2] Vaibhashika does not assert cognition of external focal objects (dmigs-pa, Skt. ālaṃbana) via an aspect (rnam-pa, Skt. ākāra) of them reflected in the mind, somewhat like a mental hologram. Nor does it assert conceptual cognition. Instead, it asserts that both sensory and mental cognition cognize their object directly via an aspect of an external focal object reflected on a physical cognitive sensor (dbang-po, Skt. indriya) such as the photosensitive cells of the eyes. In such cognitions, anti-knowing shares five congruent features (mtshungs-ldan, Skt. saṃprayukta) with the consciousness and other mental factors that it accompanies in a cognition in which it occurs. They are all congruent in the sense that they share a common:

• Focal object
• Cognitive sensor 
• Cognizable aspect
• Time (dus, Skt. kāla)
• Substantial entity (rdzas, Skt. dravya). 

As explained in a previous chapter of this series, sameness of substantial entity means that each is the only substantial entity in the cognition from its homogenous class (ris-mthun, Skt. sajāti). A homogenous class is the class of all items that share the same self-nature. For example, from the homogenous class of all discriminating cognizings, there can only be one discriminating in a cognition. 

If an anti-knowing were also a bad discriminating, it could not be in the same cognition as the great mental factor of discriminating. This is because if it were, then there would be two discriminatings in one cognition, which is not possible. 

[3] Here, Vasubandhu uses upakleśa (Tib. nye-bar nyon-mongs; subsidiary disturbing mental factor) as a general term that includes both the ten disturbing mental factors and the twenty subsidiary mental factors. 

The statement from a sutra, “A discriminating that is disturbed by anti-knowing is not yet purified,” makes no sense if anti-knowing were a bad discriminating. If it were, the statement would be, “A discriminating that is disturbed by a bad discriminating is not yet purified.” A bad variety of something cannot be congruent with another variety of itself because each component in a cognition must be from its own homogenous class of phenomena, separate and distinct from the classes of phenomena of the other components of the cognition. 

Thus, for these three reasons, anti-knowing is not a type of faulty discriminating. Anti-knowing, however, always accompanies faulty discriminating when the faulty discriminating is that of a deluded view toward a transitory network. By accompanying it, the anti-knowing stupefies the mind and thus prevents discriminating with a correct view. But once discriminating with a correct view is generated – and specifically when it is generated with a seeing pathway of mind – this doctrinally based anti-knowing ceases; it cannot coexist with such a mind.