Truly Established Existence in the Tenet Systems

One of the most confusing terms is “true existence” (bden-par grub-pa, Skt. satyasiddha). First of all, we have to understand that, in this entire discussion of impossible ways of existing, we are not really talking about the way of existing itself. We’re talking about what establishes that something exists. What proves that it exists. What demonstrates that it exists. This is primarily the Gelug way of understanding the word in the term for “establish” – drubpa (grub-pa, Skt. siddha). On the other hand, many non-Gelug systems understand drugpa in some contexts as meaning “establish” in the sense of creating the existence of something. Let’s stay with the Gelug presentation.

True existence, the way that it’s defined in Vaibhashika, Sautrantika (Skt. Sautrāntika) and Chittamatra (Skt. Cittamātra) is literally “truly established existence.” It really exists; it is validly established as being true. From the Madhyamaka (Skt. Mādhyamaka) point of view, truly established existence does not exist at all. We imagine it truly exists, but it doesn’t. It’s actually false. 

Now, for Vaibhashika, what truly establishes that something exists is that its existence is established from its own side. Vaibhashika considers this mode of existence as equivalent to substantially established existence (rdzas-su grub-pa), which is existence established by something’s having the ability to perform a function. For Vaibhashika, the existence of both static and nonstatic phenomena is truly established in this sense because, even though static phenomena like space do not do anything; nevertheless, they function as an object of the cognition of them.  

The Gelug monastic textbooks present two different assertions of truly established existence according to Sautrantika: 

• The Jetsunpa textbooks accept the Vaibhashika definition of truly established existence as equivalent to substantially established existence but reject its meaning of existence established from something’s own side. Based on that, only nonstatic phenomena have truly established existence because only they actually produce a result. They are objective phenomena (rang-mtshan) and exist before any cognition of them. Static phenomena such as space, categories and even the lack of an impossible “soul” of a person do not have truly established existence by this definition. They are metaphysical phenomena (spyi-mtshan) whose existence can only be established as the referent objects of the concepts with which they are conceptually labeled or as the referent objects of the words with which they are conceptually designated. 
• The Panchen textbooks accept the Vaibhashika definition of truly established existence as existence established from something’s own side but reject its equivalency to substantially established existence. Based on that, both nonstatic and static phenomena have truly established existence.

Now we get into the Mahayana systems, and please be patient, I’m just giving you the main points of these systems according to the Gelug presentations of them. Obviously, we could spend many years studying these systems and the variant ways in which the different Tibetan traditions and the different masters within them assert the details. These are not simple, but let’s look at just the main points, so you get a little bit of a taste.  

Chittamatra – and again, this is Gelug Chittamatra – defines truly established existence differently from Sautrantika and Vaibhashika. Phenomena that have truly established existence are only those that are known as “ultimate phenomena” (don-dam-pa). An ultimate phenomenon is one that appears to the total absorption of an arya (Skt. ārya). 

The total absorption of an arya is not just focused on voidness; it has two alternating phases – an uninterrupted pathway mind (bar-chad-med lam) and a liberated pathway mind (rnam-grol lam). With an uninterrupted pathway mind, an arya focuses on the unawareness and disturbing emotions associated with one of the 16 aspects of the four noble truths and applies the understanding of voidness to it. With a liberated pathway of mind, the arya’s mind is liberated from the portion of emotional obscuration (nyon-sgrib) associated with that unawareness. Thus, both nonstatic phenomena and voidnesses are ultimate phenomena because they both appear to an arya’s total absorption and therefore both have truly established existence.  

Chittamatra asserts two levels of the voidness of all phenomena. The coarser voidness is that, in sensory cognition, the object and the ways of being aware of it – so the sensory consciousness and all its accompanying mental factors, both of which have truly established existence – are devoid of coming from different natal sources (rdzas). They both come from the same natal source, a karma tendency or seed (sa-bon). 

All Buddhist tenet systems except Vaibhashika assert that when we are aware of something, actually what arises in our cognition is a mental hologram – literally, a mental aspect (rnam-pa) of some object – and that this mental hologram is produced by the mind. Even from a Western point of view, we’d have to accept that. From a Western point of view, when we see something, photons enter the eye, there is the firing of neurons, and so on, and what we actually cognize is like a mental hologram. 

Sautrantika asserts that the natal source of the object part of the hologram is an external object that objectively exists before the cognition of it, and each of the cognitive components comes from its own individual tendency. Chittamatra refutes that such cognitive objects can be established as existing externally before cognition of them. How could you prove that without cognition of them or some device recording or measuring them? The only way to establish the existence of any object that is cognized with our senses is in relation to the mind that cognizes it. Thus, Chittamatra is the Mind-Only school.  

When I work with my students on this, I challenge them to prove, for example, that we’re all sitting in the same room. We can’t actually prove that. If we each took a Polaroid camera picture of this room, we would have – if there are 50 people here – 50 different pictures. It’s not the same room. 

This coarse voidness, then, refers to only nonstatic phenomena, which in the Chittamatra system are called “dependent phenomena” (gzhan-dbang), sometimes translated as “other-powered phenomena.” They arise dependently on or under the power of causes and conditions. They include forms of physical phenomena, ways of being aware of something, and nonstatic imputation phenomena such as age and persons. They all are ultimate phenomena and thus have truly established existence. 

As I said, in Chittamatra, what establishes that something truly exists is that it appears to a mind of an arya in total absorption, non-conceptually. These are ultimate phenomena. These ultimate phenomena have a defining characteristic mark (mtshan-nyid) on their own sides that establishes, by its own power, their existence as individual validly knowable phenomena independently of their being the referent objects of the concepts with which they are conceptually labeled and their being the referent objects of the names or words with which they are conceptually designated. This defining characteristic mark establishes that these phenomena truly exist and that they are not just totally conceptional phenomena (kun-brtags-pa), like static categories. Totally conceptional phenomena, such as categories, lack such a defining characteristic mark and can only be established as existing in the context of their being imputed in conceptual cognition. Truly established existence, then, means truly unimputed existence. 

We need to be careful here, however, since there are also nonstatic phenomena that are imputation phenomena, such as persons and age. They have truly established, unimputed existence since they can be validly cognized both conceptually and non-conceptually. Totally conceptional phenomena are static phenomena, like categories and space, that can only be cognized conceptually.

This is a lot of jargon. It’s not easy. Let me try to make it a bit more understandable: We think of an elephant through the totally conceptional static category “elephant.” The category “elephant” is imaginary, but please don’t conceive of it as some findable thing sitting somewhere inside our imagination. It only exists in the context of it being mentally labeled in a conceptual cognition on a mental hologram that represents an elephant to us when we picture one. The category and the conceptual representation are just projected by the mind. 

The conceptual representation of an elephant, however, being a subtle form of physical phenomenon, has a defining characteristic on its side that establishes it as an individual validly knowable object, but that defining characteristic does not have the power to establish this mental hologram as being an elephant. The mental hologram is devoid of that impossible way of existing. That’s the other type of voidness here, subtle voidness. The mental hologram is devoid of being a platform on which a mental label, concept or name can be affixed and can thereby establish the mental hologram as actually being what the label, concept or name refers to.  

Contrast this with seeing an elephant. If we see an elephant, we can’t establish that the elephant exists somewhere out there before we see it, or before anybody sees it, or before a video camera records it; there’s no way to establish it that way, so it doesn’t have externally established existence. However, when we see it, although the source of that cognition of the elephant, of our seeing that elephant, comes from a seed of karma to see an elephant, what we see is not just totally imaginary. We’re not just projecting an imaginary elephant; we’re actually seeing an elephant. It’s truly an elephant, and there is some definable characteristic on the side of this object, this mental hologram, that establishes it, by its own power, not only as a validly knowable object but also as an individual elephant. It’s the same thing with the voidness of this elephant, that absence of the appearance coming from a natal source different from that of the cognition of it. That voidness of external existence also has an individual defining characteristic on its own side that truly establishes its existence as both a validly knowable object but also as a voidness. An arya non-conceptually cognizes that voidness. It is called a “thoroughly established phenomenon” (yongs-su grub-pa). It is a static fact; it doesn’t do anything. 

In short, in this system, both dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly existent. They are not imaginary; they are not like the static category “elephant” involved in imagining an elephant. The existence of dependent phenomena and of thoroughly established phenomena is established unimputedly and solely by the power of their individual defining characteristic marks on their own sides. 

However, a voidness is not the same type of ultimate phenomenon as is a dependent phenomenon. This is because although, like a dependent phenomenon, it has a defining characteristic mark on its own side that by its own power establishes its existence, a voidness lacks the same essential nature (ngo-bo) as a dependent phenomenon has. An arya’s focus on dependent phenomena is not what brings liberation or enlightenment; it’s only an arya’s focus on voidness that does. 

Furthermore, dependent phenomena lack the type of existence that totally conceptional phenomena have. This is because dependent phenomena have a defining characteristic mark on their own side that establishes their existence. On the other hand, totally conceptional phenomena, such as conceptual categories, lack such a defining characteristic mark. Their existence can only be established by their occurrence in conceptual cognitions, where they are mentally labeled on conceptual representations of items that belong to these categories. 

In summary, from these points of view, dependent phenomena are devoid of existing in the way that totally conceptional phenomena exist, and thoroughly established phenomena are devoid of existing in the way that dependent phenomena exist. I point this out – although this is rather difficult to understand, hearing it just once like this – because this structure appears again in some of the other-voidness presentations. 

By the way, I’m following the traditional way of explaining, which is that all the sessions up to now were relatively fairly easy to understand. I’ve saved all the really difficult stuff for this last session, so be patient. Almost always when we hear explanations from Tibetan lamas, particularly about topics like voidness, and they’re from teachers like His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the last session is the most difficult one to follow and understand. His Holiness will go through difficult material the most quickly because, even if he went through it slowly, most people wouldn’t understand it anyway. And for the people who could understand it – like the senior teachers who are present at the teachings – this helps them so that later they can explain the material much more slowly to the other students. This is the method here, so I’m following that. 

Now let’s look at the Svatantrika (Skt. Svātantrika) assertions about truly established existence, and again according to the Gelug interpretation. Svatantrika is a subdivision within Madhyamaka. 

Up until now, we have seen that Vaibhashika defines truly established existence as existence established from something’s own side and equates it with existence established by something’s ability to produce an effect. According to Vaibhashika, all phenomena, both nonstatic and static, have truly established existence. The Jetsunpa textbooks assert that Sautrantika accepts only the part of the Vaibhashika assertion that truly established existence is existence established by something’s ability to produce an effect. By this definition, only nonstatic phenomena are truly established. The Panchen textbooks assert that Sautrantika accepts only the part of the Vaibhashika assertion that truly established existence is existence established from something’s own side. By this definition, both nonstatic and static phenomena have truly established existence.

Chittamatra defines truly established existence as existence established by appearing to the total absorption of an arya. By using this definition, Chittamatra rejects the Jetsunpa Sautrantika assertion that all static phenomena lack truly established existence and asserts that not only nonstatic phenomena, but also, among static phenomena, voidnesses have truly established existence, although the other static phenomena lack it. Thus, Chittamatra rejects the Panchen Sautrantika assertion as well, that all static phenomena have truly established existence.

Svatantrika, then, defines truly established existence as existence established merely by the power of a defining characteristic mark findable on the side of an object. By using this definition, Svatantrika rejects the Chittamatra assertion that nonstatic phenomena and voidnesses have truly established existence. Nothing has truly established existence because there is no such thing. Svatantrika also rejects the Chittamatra assertion that static phenomena other than voidnesses have existence established merely by the power of being the referent object of conceptual labels and words. Nothing has existence established merely by the power of being the referent object of a conceptual label (in other words, a concept) and by the power of being the referent object of a word, because also there is no such thing. Instead, Svatantrika asserts that the existence of all phenomena, both nonstatic and static, is established by a combination of the power of an individual defining characteristic mark findable on their own side and the power of their being the referent object of a conceptual label and word. 

In other words, the existence of something is not established just by an individual defining characteristic mark on the side of it, but there has to be that individual defining characteristic mark in conjunction with it being what a mental label refers to when conceptually labeled on that defining characteristic mark. In short, the existence of something is not established merely by it being what a mental label refers to, and it’s not established merely by an individual defining characteristic mark on the side of the object that allows for a valid labeling of it, but it’s established by the combination of the two. 

So, there has to be a defining characteristic mark on the side of the object. Let’s say “me,” there has to be something that makes me “me” and not “you” on the side of me. Chittamatra said there’s something on the side of me that makes me “me,” regardless of the me being what the word “me” or any name we are given, like Sasha or Lena, refers to. Whereas Svatantrika is saying, no, we agree that there is this defining characteristic mark on the side of an object, but we have to also bring in the relation with the mind; so, it is what a word or concept refers to, based on it being labeled on this hook, on this individual defining characteristic mark. 

Prasangika rejects the Svatantrika assertion that the existence of phenomena can only be established by the power of their being the referent object of a mental label, concept or category conceptually labeled on the basis of a findable individual defining characteristic mark on the side of an object, or by the power of being the referent object of a word designated on the basis of such a defining characteristic mark. Prasangika rejects that there is a findable individual defining characteristic mark on the side of any object and asserts instead that the existence of a phenomenon can only be established merely by its being the referent object of a mental label, concept or category conceptually labeled on a basis for labeling, or merely by its being the referent object of a word designated on a basis for designation. For Prasangika, truly established existence is equivalent to existence established by an individual defining characteristic mark on the side of an object either by its own power alone or by its own power in conjunction with mental labeling or designation.

In addition, all the less sophisticated tenet systems assert that all phenomena have self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa), often translated as “inherent existence.” This is existence established by something being the findable referent “thing” (btags-don), established from the side of an object by a self-establishing nature (rang-bzhin). This referent “thing” is imagined to be the focal support (dmigs-rten) backing up or holding up the referent object (btags-chos) of a conceptual labeling with a mental label, concept or category, or of a designation with a word or a name. Prasangika uses “truly established existence” as a synonym for self-established existence as well and considers existence established by an individual defining characteristic mark as existence established by a self-establishing individual defining characteristic mark.

For example, what is love? All one can say is that love is what the word “love” refers to on the basis of certain emotions that certain classes of sentient beings experience. Well, we can look up in the dictionary the definition of love and find a defining characteristic, but that was made up by somebody. It was not self-established already on the side of love. Each of us experiences what we call “love” quite differently. What I experience and what I call “love” isn’t quite the same as what you might experience and call “love,” and each time I experience it, it could be different. What’s on the side of the emotion that makes it love? The only thing that establishes the existence of love is the word “love,” which, after all, is just a combination of meaningless sounds that somebody decided is a word and gave it meaning and a definition that somebody also made up. 

Is there such a thing as love? Yes. Well, what is it? All we can say is that it’s what the word or concept “love” refers to. They refer to something. We experience it, but there is nothing that corresponds to this word or concept that’s sitting somewhere in our heads – or who knows where – as a referent “thing” encapsulated in plastic, with a definition typed on it, and there it is, that’s love. But this is what a dictionary implies, doesn’t it? There are all these little categories like little boxes in our heads, and here’s the box called “love,” here’s the one called “kindness,” and here’s the one called “happiness.” Things don’t exist in boxes like that, established there by the power of something findable on their own sides. It’s an impossible way of existing that the referent “thing” in this box exists by itself, independently of anything, and that it just sits there by its own power, making something what it is. 

Surely most of us think that there must be something inside us that makes me “me.” This whole idea that “I’m special.” Or “you’re special,” when we are infatuated with someone, that there’s something on the side of you that makes you “you” and makes you so special – there’s no such thing. Nevertheless, everyone and everything is individual. That’s not so easy to understand that everything retains its individuality, but its individuality is not established by something on the side of the object. 

We can see from this progression of more and more refined definitions of truly established existence and more and more subtle analyses of how things exist and of how they don’t exist that our understanding of voidness, the absence of what’s impossible, gets more and more subtle. Obviously, we have to work with this a tremendous amount of time to be able to actually recognize the grasping for these impossible ways of existing that each of us automatically has. For this endeavor to succeed, as I’ve emphasized before, we need to build up an enormous store of positive force dedicated with bodhichitta (Skt. bodhicitta) to our attainment of enlightenment. 

Gelug Svatantrika Presentation 

Now on to the next point that we have to add to this, which is the difference between what’s called denumerable ultimate phenomena (rnam-grangs-pa’i don-dam) and non-denumerable ultimate phenomena (rnam-grangs ma-yin-pa’i don-dam). This differentiation comes in Svatantrika. “Denumerable” means that it can be counted among those things that can appear and be known conceptually; “non-denumerable” means it cannot be counted among those things that can appear and be known conceptually. 

We’re talking about ultimate phenomena, so in Gelug Svatantrika we’re talking only about voidnesses. When we focus conceptually on the voidness of truly established existence, a conceptual representation of a voidness appears like a conventional object, with a defining characteristic mark on its own side, somewhat like a hook. This findable defining characteristic mark has the power to establish the existence of voidness as a conventional object in conjunction with it being conceptually labeled with the category “voidness” and accurately designated with the word “voidness.” 

• The category “voidness” is accurately conceptually labeled on this conceptual representation of a voidness because of this hook-like defining characteristic mark. 
• The word “voidness” can be accurately conceptually designated on this conceptual representation of a voidness because this hook-like defining characteristic mark is the definition of the word “voidness.” 

Thus, conceptually cognized voidness is a denumerable ultimate phenomenon; it can be counted among things that can appear and be known conceptually and be designated with words. 

When we focus on voidness non-conceptually, no appearance arises of voidness as a conventional object having a findable defining characteristic mark. Just a total absence arises and appears, and no conventional objects. This total absence has no findable defining characteristic mark on its own side that has the power to establish the ultimate existence of voidness in conjunction with it being accurately conceptually labeled with the category “voidness” and accurately designated with the word “voidness.” It has no “hook” on which to the category “voidness” can be conceptually labeled or one which the word “voidness” can be conceptually designated. Therefore, non-conceptually cognized voidness is a non-denumerable ultimate phenomenon; it cannot be counted among things that can appear and be known conceptually and be designated with words. It is beyond concepts and beyond words.

When we import the terms “denumerable ultimate” and “non-denumerable ultimate” into the Prasangika presentation of conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness, it can help us to understand the difference between the Gelug and the non-Gelug presentations.

Prasangika Presentation 

A major difference between the Gelug and non-Gelug Prasangika assertions about voidness concern the object to be negated. Both agree that this object is a conceptual fabrication (spros-pa) and that both the non-conceptual cognition of voidness and the voidness that is cognized non-conceptually are parted from conceptual fabrication (spros-bral). Both also agree that conventional objects appear to have truly self-established existence. We have already explained the Gelug definition of truly self-established existence. For non-Gelug, the coarse level of truly self-established existence refers to a duality of cognized objects and the minds that cognize them being established independently of each other by the power of a self-establishing nature (rang-bzhin) findable on each of their own sides. 

In the context of cognition, Gelug differentiates the appearance of what conventional objects are and of their mode of existence – truly self-established existence – although in the context of how phenomena exist, the two are inseparable. Non-Gelug asserts that the two are inseparable also in the context of cognition. Because of this difference, Gelug asserts that conceptual fabrication refers only to truly self-established existence and not to the accurate appearance of what conventional objects are. Non-Gelug asserts that conventional objects taken as a whole – so, the appearance of what they are and their truly self-established existence – are conceptual fabrications. Thus, for Gelug, voidness negates only truly self-established existence and not conventional objects, whereas for non-Gelug, voidness negates the existence of conventional objects that are anything other than merely conceptual fabrications. This is the subtle level of truly self-established existence.

In the context of conceptually cognized voidness, Gelug explains that a conceptual representation of a voidness appears, and it appears to have truly self-established existence. The implied object (zhen-yul) of the conceptual representation of truly self-established existence does not exist. There is no such thing as truly self-established existence; it is just a conceptual fabrication. On the other hand, the implied object of what the voidness appears to be is the same as what non-conceptually cognized voidness appears to be; it is not a conceptual fabrication. Because of that, Gelug Prasangika asserts that there is no difference between conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness.

In the context of conceptually cognized voidness, the non-Gelug traditions in general explain that a conceptually fabricated voidness as a conventional object arises. Its implied object does not exist. Because of that, non-Gelug Prasangika asserts that conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness are not the same.

Both Gelug and non-Gelug agree that object categories (don-spyi) such as the category “voidness” are equivalent to what can be called “concepts” – the concept of “voidness.” They also agree that categories or concepts are the basis for the designation of words, such as the word “voidness,” and that non-conceptual cognition does not involve categories, concepts or words. Since Gelug asserts no difference between conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness, Gelug does not assert a voidness that is beyond words and beyond concepts. Since non-Gelug asserts non-conceptually cognized voidness as different from conceptually cognized voidness, non-Gelug asserts non-conceptually cognized voidness as being beyond words and beyond concepts.

In our pursuit of a grand unified theory of these Buddhist assertions, I would postulate that the Gelug assertion of the voidness of findable referent “things” that are the focal support of the referent objects of mental labeling is equivalent to the non-Gelug assertion of the voidness of conventional objects that are anything other than merely conceptual fabrications. A conventional object that is not merely a conceptual fabrication would be a findable referent “thing,” and both presentations of voidness could be called “the voidness of truly self-established existence.” This theory, however, needs to be analyzed further.

A crucial issue for all tenet systems and the Tibetan traditions’ interpretations of them is how to go from a conceptual cognition of voidness to a non-conceptual cognition of it. To understand the various assertions, we need to know that, in general, all presentations of Prasangika assert the voidness of four extremes (mtha’-bzhi): (1) the voidness of truly self-established existence, (2) the voidness of that voidness, (3) the voidness of both truly self-established existence and the voidness of that voidness, and (4) the voidness of neither truly self-established existence nor the voidness of that. All the Tibetan traditions also assert that conceptually cognized voidness appears like a conventional object and thus with truly self-established existence. With these points in mind, let’s examine the Gelug assertion and the assertion of some of the masters of some of the non-Gelug traditions.

Gelug Prasangika explains that conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness are the same. Since conceptually cognized voidness appears with truly self-established existence, the conceptual cognition of the voidness of this voidness does not leave any self-established existence that can then be cognized. Having conceptually cognized the voidness, one by one, of the four extremes, the conceptual cognition simultaneously of the voidness of all four extremes gives access to an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption on voidness, which has no appearance of self-established existence.

Non-Gelug Prasangika explains that conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness are not the same. As mentioned before, Nyingma calls the non-conceptually cognized voidness as being “beyond words and concepts”; Jonangpa calls it “beyond existence and nonexistence.” Conceptual cognition of the voidness of each of the four extremes, whether one by one or all simultaneously, gives rise to the conceptual fabrication of a voidness as a conventional object. Some non-Gelugpas, such as the Nyingma master Mipam (‘Ju Mi-pham ‘Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho), assert that both the conceptual cognition one by one of the voidness of each of the four extremes and the conceptual cognition simultaneously of the voidness of all four extremes without conceptually cognizing them one by one – both of these gives access to an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption on voidness. Other non-Gelugpas, such as the Sakya master Gorampa (Go-rams-pa bSod-nams seng-ge), assert that even the conceptual cognition simultaneously of the voidness of all four extremes does not give access to an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption on voidness. Although such conceptual cognition is prerequisite, one must use additional methods to access the deep awareness of this total absorption.

There are several different views of self-voidness and other-voidness found in the non-Gelug traditions – specifically, in the Nyingma, Karma Kagyu, Rime, and Jonang traditions. However, not all Nyingma and Kagyu masters assert other-voidness, and those that do assert it do not all assert it in the same way. We do not have time to go through all the variant assertions individually in detail, so I’ll just mention a few salient points.

Other-voidness systems do not refute self-voidness. They assert the validity of both self-voidness and other-voidness. 

• Some of these systems assert both voidnesses as being equivalent.
• Some assert that self-voidness applies to other-voidness, and some assert that it does not apply.
• Some assert that self-voidness is what is cognized during the phase of an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption and other-voidness is what is cognized during the phase of an arya’s non-conceptual subsequent attainment.
• Some assert both voidnesses as being of definitive meaning (nges-don).
• Some assert self-voidness as being of interpretable meaning (drangs-don). Self-voidness needs to be understood first and then that leads to other-voidness as the teaching of definitive meaning.   

Gelug does not assert self-voidness and other-voidness. Therefore, it is inappropriate to consider the Gelug Prasangika assertion of the voidness of truly self-established existence as being the self-voidness asserted by the non-Gelug systems, especially since some non-Gelug masters call the Gelug Prasangika assertion “false self-voidness.”

• Some non-Gelug systems assert self-voidness to be the voidness of conventional objects being truly self-established as conventional objects – in other words, the voidness of conventional objects being anything other than conceptual fabrications.
• Some assert self-voidness to be the voidness of a duality of cognized objects and the minds that cognize them being established independently of each other by the power of a self-establishing nature findable on each of their own sides.
• Some assert the above two positions to be two levels of self-voidness. 

As for the various assertions of other-voidness, one important point to keep in mind is that even if many of the non-Gelug systems assert a difference between conceptually cognized voidness and non-conceptually cognized voidness, none of them call the non-conceptually cognized voidness that is beyond words and concepts or beyond existence and nonexistence “other-voidness.” They call the clear-light mind or rigpa that non-conceptually cognizes this voidness “other-voidness.” However, they assert that both the clear-light mind or rigpa and the voidness that it cognizes are both non-denumerable ultimate phenomena. They constitute the “womb for a Thusly Gone One” (de-bzhin snying-po, Skt. tathāgatagarbha) – in ordinary language, “Buddha-nature.” The non-Gelug systems also all assert that the clear-light mind or rigpa is replete with all good qualities. 

Karma Kagyu differentiates two types of assertions of other-voidness: sphere other-voidness (dbyings gzhan-stong; “expanse other-voidness”) and clarity other-voidness (gsal-ba gzhan-stong; “luminosity other-voidness”). This classification can be applied to all the various other-voidness views. The two types of assertions, however, are not mutually exclusive.

• Expanse other-voidness explains the clear-light mind as a sphere of reality (chos-dbyings, Skt. dharmadhātu) that is devoid of conceptual fabrication. 
• Clarity other-voidness explains the clear-light mind or rigpa as a level of mind that is devoid of fleeting stains, which are all extraneous to it and other than it. 

Among the various presentations of clarity other-voidness:

• Some assert the fleeting stains as being grosser levels of mind. 
• Some adapt the Chittamatra terminology of three types of characterized phenomena – totally conceptional, dependent, and thoroughly established. They assert that other-voidness clear-light mind is thoroughly established and devoid of the fleeting stains that are totally conceptional phenomena and dependent phenomena.
• Some assert the fleeting stains as being the unawareness that duality is totally conceptional and therefore false.   

So, we can see from all this that there is a great variety of self-voidness and other-voidness assertions. There are also many critiques of these various assertions. 

• Some are made by those who do not assert other-voidness themselves and some by those who do assert it. 
• Some critiques are directed at Gelug as if its assertions were those of a false self-voidness and a false other-voidness.
• Some critiques are directed at the assertions of other-voidness proponents.

One of the most well-known critiques are those directed at clarity other-voidness systems that adapt the Chittamatra terminology of three types of characterized phenomena. You recall, Chittamatra asserts that dependent phenomena are devoid of being like totally conceptional phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena are devoid of being like dependent phenomena. In Gelug Prasangika, we can use these terms with reference to one phenomenon. In terms of this phenomenon, what is thoroughly established is its voidness (that’s its deepest truth); what is dependent is its conventional truth or relative truth, and what’s totally conceptional is its appearance of truly self-established existence. But all three are devoid of truly self-established existence. 

The other-voidness systems that adapt this Chittamatra terminology employ it in accord with the non-Gelug Chittamatra presentation. Each of the three types of characterized phenomena includes a type of mind and the objects it cognizes. Dependent phenomena are devoid of being totally conceptional. Totally conceptional phenomena are things that we can cognize only conceptually and the conceptual minds that cognize them. 

Dependent phenomena are things that we can cognize non-conceptually and the non-conceptual minds that cognize them. The ones that we can cognize non-conceptually arise from causes and circumstances. They are non-static and not like the things that we can cognize only conceptually, which are static. When we are cognizing a dependent phenomenon – something that arises from causes and conditions, like our hand – we’re seeing it non-conceptually, so it’s devoid of conceptual thought and categories. 

The clear-light mind in such other-voidness systems is thoroughly established. It’s devoid of even these dependent phenomena – in other words, it is devoid of even our grosser levels of mind that have non-conceptual cognition, like when seeing the hand with eye consciousness. Now that’s okay and no one – not even those who do not assert other-voidness – disputes that the clear-light mind is like this.

However, such an other-voidness view becomes controversial when instead of it being asserted from only an epistemological point of view – in other words, from the point of view of clear-light mind being devoid of certain ways of knowing and their objects – it is asserted instead also from an ontological point of view – in other words, from the point of view of clear-light mind being devoid of the ways of existing that these grosser levels of mind project and cognize. 

As we have seen, the non-Gelug Prasangika systems assert the voidness that is beyond words and concepts as a non-denumerable ultimate phenomenon. Such a voidness is beyond the voidness of the four extremes – the voidness of truly self-established existence, the voidness of the voidness of truly self-established existence, the voidness of both truly self-established existence and the voidness of it, and the voidness of neither truly self-established existence nor the voidness of it. In this context, there are two levels of truly self-established existence that are refuted:

• Coarse truly self-established existence is the duality of cognized objects and the minds that cognize them being established independently of each other. Such a duality is what is cognized by conceptual minds, and both these minds and this duality are totally conceptional.
• Subtle truly self-established existence is the existence of conventional objects as being truly established as conventional objects. Such truly established conventional objects are what are cognized by non-conceptual minds, and both these minds and these conventional objects, truly established as conventional objects, are dependent phenomena.

The controversial other-voidness systems assert the manner of existence of the clear-light mind is beyond the four extremes. It is beyond being devoid of both levels of truly self-established existence, it is beyond being devoid of being devoid of both levels of truly self-established existence, and so on. So, how does it exist? It’s way of existing is non-denumerable, it can’t be included in any of these extremes. It must be a way of existing that is beyond all these extremes, and, since clear-light mind is experienced in meditation by yogis, we cannot say that it is totally non-existent.

To avoid the extreme of nihilism, these controversial other-voidness systems assert that the clear-light mind is truly existent. But “truly existent,” here, does not mean truly existent in either the Gelug Prasangika way of defining it or in the two non-Gelug Prasangika ways of defining it. The clear-light mind is truly existent because, unlike totally conceptional and dependent phenomena which cannot withstand analysis – when analyzed, they cannot be found – the clear-light can withstand analysis. It is found to be static, unchanging, stable, eternal, and a reflexive deep awareness that is replete with all good qualities. It is beyond dependent arising in the sense that it is beyond arising dependently on causes and conditions – it is devoid of being a dependent phenomenon.

The big objection here with this other-voidness position is that it is usually explained unclearly. Because it’s not explained clearly, one implication is that there is a truly existent, transcendent realm – the realm of transcendently existing clear light mind – and everything else doesn’t really exist. This reduces the system basically to Vedanta – Brahman truly exists and everything of our relative world, which is misconceived as being separate from Brahman, is an illusion; it doesn’t exist at all. 

This controversial other-voidness view is held by Jonangpa, Rime and present-day Karma Kagyu. Because Gelug finds their explanations unclear, Gelug accuse them of asserting that the clear-light mind is truly existent in terms of the Gelug Prasangika definition of truly self-established existence. The only acceptable other-voidness view is one that accepts that the clear-light mind is self-void, but in the sense of being devoid of what Gelug asserts as truly self-established existence.  

Both Karma Kagyu and Jonangpa also differentiate a correct and an incorrect other-voidness view. Karma Kagyu says, “We don’t hold an incorrect view, the Jonangpa view is incorrect other-voidness.” The Jonangpa view is incorrect because Jonangpa asserts that the clear-light mind, as Buddha-nature, is identical on the basis level in limited beings and on the resultant level of Buddhas. Karma Kagyu says that if that were the case, then limited beings would not be limited, they would already be Buddhas. This is absurd. 

The Jonangpas say, “We don’t hold an incorrect view. Only non-Buddhists hold incorrect views.” That’s like the Buddhists accusing the Bonpos of animal sacrifice, and the Bonpos saying, “We never did that. That was something that only the shamans did in Tibet before Bon.” 

These are some of the issues involved with self- and other-voidness. As I said in the very beginning, we have to be a little bit careful, particularly when we deal with other-voidness views, because often, as His Holiness the Dalai Lama points out, the way in which it is described by the great masters in the texts is often a bit unclear and confusing. Their meditation experience might have been very valid, but their way of writing was not the best. 

I’ve left out one large piece of the whole discussion, but we don’t really have time, and it is even more complicated than what I’ve just been discussing – and this has to do with negation phenomena (dgag-pa). But that will have to wait for another time. 

That topic deals with different types of objects and how we know them. There’s quite a difference between knowing that “this is a cup” and, when I hold up my watch, “this is not a cup.” How do we know it’s not a cup? This is this topic of negation phenomena, and that’s very relevant to the discussion of “not truly existent.” How in the world do we know that? This whole issue of negation phenomena is, as I say, also very essential to the whole debate about self-voidness and other-voidness.

If we look in a non-prejudiced way at the various views of self-voidness and other-voidness, acknowledging (as everybody does) that there is, in fact, an incorrect view of other-voidness – and nobody will say that that’s what they believe – and we look at what the various correct views of other-voidness are, then despite their differences, there’s no problem in describing what we need to understand, what we need to achieve in order to attain enlightenment. All the views accept that to attain enlightenment, we need to manifest a clear-light mind with a non-conceptual cognition of voidness. This is the case, regardless of how we describe the attributes of that clear-light mind and how we specify the voidness that it needs to cognize.

To sum up, let us go back to some points that I made in the very first lecture. If our attitude toward this topic that we have been discussing – particularly this last session – is, “This is too much. I can’t understand this. Why is it so complicated?” then we’re not yet ready to understand voidness. As the great Indian masters have said, we’ve got to love this topic and love all the intricacies about it in order to have a mind that is open enough to really investigate it and understand it. Otherwise, we have no interest whatsoever in meditating on voidness. But, if we have a strong enough motivation, we understand that it really is necessary to understand all of this. It’s not so simple, but if we really want to eliminate not just our suffering but also help to eliminate everybody else’s suffering, we need to understand that. Then, by building up more positive force, by thinking more about the beginning topics (impermanence and stuff like that), and with inspiration from a spiritual teacher, then eventually, we will develop a strong enough interest and state of mind that’s receptive enough to really delve deeply into this topic. 

Please try to avoid what everybody identifies as an incorrect other-voidness point of view, which is to make the clear-light mind (or some pure land, or some transcendent realm) a lazy man’s realm, and then all we need to do is pray hard enough or find the great guru who has superpowers, and then we just immediately get transferred to this transcendent paradise, and everything will be perfect and nice. That’s a myth. As the saying goes, “Resistance is futile!” There is no easy, lazy man’s way out of samsara (Skt. saṃsāra). 

One last question. 

Do all schools agree that emptiness is beyond conceptual thought? 

No, they don’t. All schools agree that it’s necessary to have a non-conceptual cognition of voidness. As I was explaining with these denumerable and non-denumerable ultimate phenomena, some say that the voidness that we understand conceptually and non-conceptually is the same voidness, and some say it’s not. However, everybody agrees that we have to understand voidness non-conceptually. Even those schools that speak about voidness beyond words and concepts, one has to have – and it’s totally essential – conceptual cognition of voidness first in order to have the non-conceptual cognition of voidness beyond that. This is where the negation phenomenon comes in; in order to know “not a cup,” we first have to know “a cup.” 

Let us end here with a dedication. We think whatever understanding, whatever positive force has come from all this discussion, may it go deeper and deeper and act as a cause for understanding this topic deeply and fully, and eventually non-conceptually, so that we can actually gain liberation and enlightenment for the benefit of all.