Four Prasangika Lines of Reasoning for Refuting True Existence

Why have Prasangika proponents adopted the use of absurd conclusions for debating with proponents of self-established existence – the so-called materialists (dngos-po smra-ba) such as proponents of the Svatantrika view? According to the Gelug explanation, it is because Prasangika does not accept even the conventional existence of self-established objects. Therefore they cannot debate syllogisms that contain items that they consider nonexistent. To debate such syllogisms would be like debating whether it is correct that Santa Claus has a flying sled led by Rudolf the Red-nosed Reindeer, because Rudolf’s red nose lights the way to the homes of all children. 

What is self-established existence, usually translated as “inherent existence.” According to the Gelug presentation, Svatantrika – specifically, Sautrantika-Svatantrika – asserts that all validly knowable phenomena have self-established existence in terms of their conventional truth. This means that their conventional existence is established by their self-establishing natures (rang-bzhin, Skt. svabhāva) within the context of conceptual labeling. In terms of deepest truth, however, all validly knowable phenomena are devoid of self-established existence.

In more detail, the conventional existence of something, such as a clay jug, can only be established in terms of mental labeling. In other words, there can only be such a thing as a clay jug if there is the mental label “clay jug.” A mental label is an object category (don-spyi) – in this case, the category of “clay jugs” – and it is designated with the name “clay jugs.” 

In non-technical language, this category would be called “the concept of clay jugs.” There can only be such a thing as a clay jug if there is the concept of clay jugs. In other words, people have agreed that there are certain similar objects that all fit into an individual category of objects based on a set of defining characteristics that they have decided upon. They have made up a name for these objects, “clay jugs,” and have adopted the convention of calling them that. 

The concept of “clay jugs,” then, refers to an assortment of whole material objects, made of clay, that can perform the function of holding water. Regardless of its size, shape or color, each item in this assortment has the defining characteristic marks of a flat bottom, a bulging belly, a neck and a handle. Each one, then, is a member of the category “clay jugs,” and the assortment of them are what the concept of “clay jugs” refers to. This assortment of objects constitutes the referent object (btags-chos) of the concept of “clay jugs.”

Each clay jug has various sense qualities – a visible form with a front, back and bottom that can be seen, a tactile sensation that can be felt when held in our hand, and a smell that can be sensed. In addition, until it breaks, each maintains its conventional identity over a period of time. When we see a clay jug, however, we only cognize its sight and only the sight of part of it, for instance the front, and only a moment at a time. Yet, we say that we cognize a clay jug as a whole object that extends over all its sense qualities and over all its moments. Such a clay jug, as a whole material object, is called a “commonsense clay jug” (‘jig-rten-la grags-pa’i bum-pa) – literally, a “clay jug well-known in the world.” The part that we see is the common locus (gzhi-mthun) of the defining characteristic marks both of itself and of the clay jug as a whole commonsense object. Because of that, this part is the basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi) the clay jug as the referent object of the concept of “clay jugs.” 

According to Svatantrika, a whole commonsense clay jug is devoid of having truly established existence (bden-par grub-pa). This is existence established outside of the context of conceptual labeling. It is also devoid of existence established by its defining characteristic mark (rang-mtshan-gyis grub-pa, Skt. svalakṣaṇasiddha). This is existence established merely by the power of the defining characteristic mark alone or merely by the power of conceptual labeling alone. Conventionally, the existence of a whole commonsense clay jug is established by the power of the defining characteristic mark in conjunction with conceptual labeling. If we consider the defining characteristic mark to be like a barcode on the side of a clay jug and a conceptual label to be like a barcode reader, then the existence of this item as a clay jug can only be established by the barcode in conjunction with a barcode reader. It cannot be established by either the barcode alone or the barcode reader alone.

When we see one moment of the visible form of the front of the clay jug with a whole commonsense clay jug labeled on it, what we see appears to be truly established as a clay jug independently of conceptual labeling. It appears as though it actually exists like that and that its existence like that is established merely by the power of its defining characteristic mark alone. This is because, in terms of its conventional truth, it actually is a whole commonsense clay jug. It has the self-establishing nature of a clay jug and, so, conventionally, it has self-established existence as a clay jug. 

A self-established clay jug is called a referent “thing” (btags-don). It is the focal support (dmigs-rten) of our visual cognition of this moment of the visible form of the front part of the clay jug. It is what our grasping for truly estabished existence is focused on when we look at this item, as if there were a referent “thing” that was present as a concrete support holding up the clay jug that is the referent object of the concept of “clay jugs.”

In terms of our analogy, the reason why, at the checkout counter, this object can be established to exist as a clay jug by the power of its barcode and the barcode reader is because it actually is a clay jug. In terms of its conventional truth, it is self-established as a clay jug, though in terms of its deepest truth, it is devoid of this impossible way of establishing its existence.   

Self-established objects constitute the items in a syllogism, such as “sound is impermanent because it is produced, as in the case of a clay jug and not in the case of space.” In debates, Svatantrika proponents refute opponents that also use syllogistic logic by finding flaws in their logic and then establishing an alternative thesis by using correct logic.

In order to accept the Svatantrika use of syllogisms in a debate, both parties need to accept that self-established phenomena, such as the items in the syllogisms, conventionally exist and that they appear to and are validly cognized by valid cognition of conventional truth. On the basis of that shared assertion, then if the Svatantrika proponent finds a flaw in the opponent’s logic, the opponent needs to accept that it is a flaw and agree that the Svatantrika line of reasoning correctly establishes the thesis. The reason why Prasangika proponents are unable to debate with Svatantrika opponents, however, is not because of a disagreement concerning logic. The reason is more fundamental than that.  

According to the Gelug presentation, Prasangika accepts that the habits of grasping for self-established existence give rise to the appearance of self-established phenomena and also give rise to the valid cognition of what these phenomena appear to be and how they appear to exist. But their appearance and valid cognition do not establish that self-established phenomena, as referent “things” and focal supports, actually exist in terms of conventional truth. Prasangika does not accept even the conventional existence of self-established phenomena. The existence of conventional phenomena is established merely by their being the referent objects of concepts. Because of that, Prasangika has no shared basis for debating with Svatantrika.

That does not mean that Prasangika does not accept the three components (tshul-gsum) of a syllogism. Prasangika accepts that to establish to Svatantrika proponents in a debate the thesis that self-established sound is impermanent because it is something produced:

• Being something produced needs to be a property of self-established sound
• Being something produced needs to be a property of all homogenous items, such as a self-established clay jug
• Being something produced needs to never be a property of any heterogenous item, such as self-established space. 

However, because Prasangika does not accept that there is such a thing as a self-established sound, this syllogism does not establish for them that self-established sound is impermanent. Proponents of Prasangika accept these three components for themselves only in order to use them to refute Svatantrika. They do this by employing “the four lines of reasoning for refuting truly established existence” (bden- grub ’gog-pa’i gtan-tshigs bzhi):

• Inferential cognition well-known to others (gzhan-la grags-pa’i rjes-dpag)
• Absurd conclusions that express contradictions (’gal-ba brjod-pa’i thal-’gyur)
• Equalization by a congruence of causes (rgyu-mtshan mtshung-pa’i mgo-snyoms)
• Non-establishment due to a tautology of the property to be established and the reason that establishes it (sgrub-byed sgrub-bya dang mtshungs-pa’i ma-grub-pa).

“Truly established existence,” here, is used as a synonym of self-established existence. With these four, Gelug Prasangika draws out the absurd conclusions and self-contradictions that follow from Svatantrika’s acceptance of syllogisms comprised of self-established items. 

“Inferential cognition well-known to others” uses a syllogism well-known to and accepted by an opponent in a debate in order to lead them to question their beliefs. With this prasanga method, both parties need to accept as valid both the subject of a thesis (the property-possessor) and the reason, but not the property to be proven or the pervasion of the property to be proven and the reason. Consider the example of a Prasangika proponent debating with a Svatantrika opponent who asserts, “A sprout is devoid of truly established existence because it arises dependently.” Both parties accept the words (sgra-ba) of the syllogism, but they do not agree on their meaning (don). 

Both Prasangika and Svatantrika assert voidness as a non-implicative negation (med-dgag) of truly established existence. They agree that there is no such thing as truly established existence, but they disagree on the definition of truly established existence. 

• Prasangika defines truly established existence as a synonym for self-established existence. In terms of both conventional and deepest truth, all phenomena are devoid of both truly established and self-established existence. 
• Svatantrika defines truly established existence as existence established outside the context of conceptual labeling. Although, in terms of both conventional and deepest truth, all phenomena are devoid of truly established existence, they do have self-established existence in terms of conventionl truth. 

Similarly, both parties know the words “dependent arising” and accept them, but they disagree about the conventional existence of dependently arising phenomena: 

• Prasangika asserts that dependently arising phenomena, in terms of both conventional and deepest truth, are devoid of both truly established and self-established existence.
• Svatantrika asserts that dependently arising phenomena, in terms of deepest truth alone, are devoid of truly established and self-established existence. In terms of conventional truth, they are devoid of only truly established existence and not devoid of self-established existence. 

Because of these different ways of understanding the meaning of the words of the syllogism, the Prasangika proponent uses this first prasanga line of reasoning, “inferential cognition well-known to others” to influence their Svatantrika opponent to question their assertions and to discover by themselves that the Prasangika assertions make better sense. The Prasangika proponent does this without making any assertions themselves. 

Let us look at how such a debate unfolds. The Prasangika proponent challenges the Svatantrika opponent, “You say that cause and effect function only if things are self-established, but in fact cause and effect function only because things are not self-established.” The Prasangika proponent would go on to argue, “If a cause must be self-established to produce an effect, it should do so independently of conditions. Yet, you say that the existence of something as a cause is both self-established by a self-establishing nature and established as well by the power of its defining characteristic mark in conjunction with conceptual labeling. But that is self-contradictory. How can one phenomenon be both independent (self-established) and dependent (on the condition of conceptual labeling)? Furthermore, all phenomena we observe only arise in dependence on other factors. Thus, since your assertion of self-established phenomena contradicts not only your own Svatantrika assertions, but even everyday observation of physical cause and effect, we must conclude that cause and effect could not function if phenomena were self-established.” 

In this way, this first line of reasoning uses an opponent’s own accepted premises to lead them into seeing its self-contradictions. Even if they do not yet accept the pervasion, asserted by Prasangika, that dependent arising implies the voidness of existence established not merely by conceptual labeling alone, this line of reasoning well-known to others leads them to discover it. 

If we apply this line of thinking in analytical meditation, we would contemplate, “This object I perceive appears to exist from its own side. But if it had self-established existence, it could not arise in dependence on causes, parts, or conceptual labeling. Yet I see that it does depend on them. Therefore, it cannot be self-established.” 

This first Prasangika line of reasoning avoids the fault of the fourth line where there is a tautology of the property to be established and the reason that establishes it. This is because the property to be established  (devoid of truly established existence) and the reason that establishes it (dependent arising) are distinct conventionally accepted phenomena. Although they are synonymous, they do not constitite a tautology where both terms are the identical conventionally accepted phenomenon. 

The second line of reasoning, “absurd conclusions that express contradictions,” is the method of reductio ad absurdum. Rather than presenting a syllogistic proof to refute an opponent’s assertion, it begins by provisionally accepting an opponent’s own premise, especially concerning self-established existence, and then draws out the self-contradictions inherent in it and the absurd consequences (thal ’gyur, Skt. prasaṅga) that follow from it. Even if the opponent does not immediately recognize that their position is self-contradictory and that it leads to absurd consequences, they will reflect upon it and eventually realize that their position is untenable.

A classic example of this prasanga line of reasoning is: “If the existence of phenomena were self-established by something findable on their own sides, then cause and effect could not operate. Yet, obviously, causes do produce effects.” The point is not to deny causality, but to show that the belief in self-established existence contradicts cause and effect relationships. Something with self-established existence would be fully self-enclosed, fixed, and independent. Causes and conditions would not be necessary for their arisings and they would be incapable of interacting with anything else to produce effects. But this contradicts both common experience and the shared Buddhist acceptance of dependent arising. Similary, if destrucitve behavior had self-established existence, it could not result in the experience of suffering. This would undermine the entire Buddhist presentation of ethics that a Svatantrika opponent accepts.  

There are many such examples of contradictions that emerge from the assertion of self-established existence. The most commonly cited ones include:

• If something had self-established existence, it would be immutable and unaffected by other factors. It could never undergo change, and thus would be static and eternal. This contradicts our observation of impermanence, such as with our health.
• If the self existed by the power of its self-establishing nature, it could never change. This contradicts the development of the self through the graded path to enlightenment.
• If an eye had self-established existence, it would be unable to function and see anything because it could not be relied upon by eye consciousness. This contradicts our common experience. 
• If fire and fuel had self-established existence, they would have independent identities and could not interact with each other. This also contradicts our everyday experience.

If we apply this line of thinking in analytical meditation, we would contemplate, “If my body had self-established existence, it could never change. Yet I see that it gets tired, feels hungry and aches when I sit for too long. Therefore, my assumption that it has self-established existence must be mistaken.”

The third line of reasoning, “equalization by a congruence of causes,” points out that if things have self-established existence, then items that share the same self-establishing nature and the same defining characteristic marks would have to constitute one self-established entity. 

In more detail, Svatantrika asserts that all validly knowable phenomena have, on their own sides, self-establishing natures that establish their conventional existence. They also have on their own sides defining characteristic marks that, in conjunction with conceptual labeling, also establish their conventional existence. As with the line of reasoning “parted from being either singular or plural,” if self-establishing natures and defining characteristic marks have themselves self-established existence, there would have to be either only one or many of each. If there is only one such self-establishing nature and several items all have it, and if their conventional existence is established by the power of these natures and defining characteristic marks, then they must constitute just one self-established entity, which contradicts experience. 

Examples cited in the literature include: 

• If fire’s conventional existence and identity as fire came from the power of its having the self-establishing nature and defining characeristic mark of fire, then since all fires have the same self-establishing natures and defining characeristic marks, all instances of fire should be identical, independent of their fuel.
• If the locus of the defining characteristic mark of all persons is the same and these marks are all on the side of mind consciousness in every person (as Sautrantika Svatantrika asserts) and they all have the power, in conjunction with conceptual labeling, to establish the conventional existence of persons, then all persons would constitute just a single individual person.
• If each moment of consciousness has the identical self-establishing nature as the immediately preceding moment of consciousness, then they are not distinguishable as moments. Thus, continuity in time, which relies on a difference in moments, becomes impossible.
• If all whole objects, such as clay jugs, had self-established existence and the locus of their defining characteristic marks was in their parts (a round belly, narrow neck and handle), then every whole object with the same parts would be the same item.

If we apply this line of thinking in analytical meditation, we would look at our hand, for instance, and contemplate, “If this object I perceive had self-established existence, and its identity as a hand came from its parts – five fingers and a palm – then every item with five fingers and a palm should be identical. But this is not the case. Therefore, what makes this a unique item and ‘my hand’ is merely conceptual labeling.” This leads to the insight that uniqueness and individuality are not found in the object itself, but in the mind that labels it with a category and designates it with a word.

With this fourth line of reasoning, “non-establishment due to a tautology of the property to be established and the reason that establishes it,” a Prasangika proponent points out that when a Svatantrika opponent gives a reason to prove a thesis where the reason is indistinguishable in meaning from the thesis itself, it is circular reasoning and a tautology. It does not prove anything. Examples include the syllogisms: 

• The deepest truth of all phenomena is voidness because all phenomena are devoid of self-established existence. 
• All phenomena produced by effort are nonstatic (impermanent) because they change from moment to moment.

A valid reason must not merely restate the thesis that is to be proven; it must lead the opponent to infer the property to be established. Inference must teach the opponent something; it must make known something that was not known before. Even if the reason and the thesis to be proven are not verbally identical, the reasoning fails if it has the same meaning as the thesis. For example, “All phenomena are like an illusion because their mode of appearance is not the same as their mode of existence.” Because the syllogism in this example does not lead, by itself, to any new understanding, meditation on everything being like an illusion is only effective when it follows meditation on voidness. 

If we apply this line of thinking in analytical meditation, we would contemplate, “Viewing everything to be like an illusion based merely on the line of reasoning, ‘All phenomena are like an illusion because their mode of appearance is not the same as their mode of existence,’ does not teach me anything. It is circular reasoning, since the syllogism can also be stated as, ‘The mode of appearance of all phenomena is not the same as their mode of existence because all phenomena are like an illusion.’ To understand that all phenomena are like an illusion, I need to understand that they are like an illusion because they are devoid of self-established existence.” 

The four Prasangika lines of reasoning, as presented by Gelug scholars, constitute a comprehensive method for leading proponents of self-established existence, such as followers of Svatantrika, to question and eventually upgrade their view of voidness. These lines of reasoning do this without affirmating an alternative position with another syllogism.

Each of these four lines of reasoning challenges self-established existence from a different angle:

• “Inferential cognition well-known to others” uses syllogisms that are well-known to and accepted by Svatantrika, in which the reason applies to the property to be established, to lead the Svatantrika proponents to realize that these syllogisms do not work on the basis of both the reason and the property having self-established existence. 
• “Absurd conclusions that express contradictions” points out that the implications of self-established existence lead to contradictions even within the framework of the Svatantrika opponent’s own views.
• “Equalization by a congruence of causes” indicates that self-established phenomena having identical self-natures, defining characteristic marks or causal conditions would be indistinguishable, thus eliminating diversity and individual identity.
• “Non-establishment due to a tautology of the property to be established and the reason that establishes it” indicates the ineffectiveness of circular proofs that restate what they aim to demonstrate.

According to Sakya, Nyingma and Kagyu scholars, there is no difference within Madhyamaka between Svatantrika and Prasangika regarding the view of voidness. In terms of conventional truth, all phenomena as whole commonsense objects are merely conceptual contructs (spros-pa, Skt. prapañca). In terms of deepest truth, there are no such objects. Nevertheless, cause and effect still function without there being, even in terms of conventional truth, anything findable that is functioning.

The only difference between Svatantrika and Prasangika is their method for gaining a correct understanding of voidness. Svatantrika uses syllogisms and Prasangika uses absurd conclusions. The aim of the Prasanga method is to go beyond the conceptual framework of syllogistc logic so as to attain a non-conceptual cognition of voidness beyond words and concepts.

The Sakya, Nyingma and Kagyu scholars explain in common that the four Prasangika lines of reasoning constitute a progressive method for leading debate opponents to go beyond the four extremes of conceptualization about causality. These scholars differ mostly in the examples they use and in what they emphasize. What follows is based on the Sakya explanations, with Nyingma and Kagyu variants or addenda noted when they occur.

Inferential Cognition Well-Known to Others 

The first line of reasoning, “inferential cognition well-known to others,” is used to refute the extreme of phenomena arising from no cause at all. It does this by referencing a premise that opponents in a debate commonly accept, namely that functioning phenomena arise from causes. This is not a standalone method that leads to deepest truth. Rather, it prepares the opponent for deeper consequences to follow.

Absurd Conclusions That Express Contradictions

The second line of reasoning, “absurd conclusions that express contradictions,” draws out the absurd consequences of an opponent’s view in order to induce them to give up their assertion that things arise from themselves. For instance, if the result already exists in the cause, just ready to pop out – for instance, a sprout already exists in a seed but is just unmanifest – then production would be pointless. The result already exists. 

Another example, used by Kagyu masters as relevant to mahamudra meditation on the mind, concerns the relation between mind and thoughts. If mind truly creates its own thoughts, then the paradox would occur that the mind was thinking before it thought. Further, if the thoughts are first created before they are thought, then there is no reason to think them, since they would already exist. This second line of reasoning leads to an opponent rejecting the extreme of production from self. 

Equalization by a Congruence of Causes

With the third line of reasoning, “equalization by a congruence of causes,” one takes a causal relation that the opponent asserts and shows that it applies equally to an analogous case that the opponent cannot accept. In other words, if a truly existent cause can give rise to a result that is truly different from itself, it could give rise to anything that is truly different from itself. 

For example, if a rice seed can give rise to a rice sprout, then a wheat seed could also give rise to a rice sprout. Or if a fire can give rise to light, then it could also give rise to darkness. Instead of directly indicating the contradiction in the opponent’s assertion, this method broadens the opponent’s reasoning beyond acceptable limits and leads them to reject the extreme of production from other. 

Nyingma masters emphasize, with this line of reasoning, that if a cause and effect were truly existent and different from each other, they could not connect with each other.

Non-establishment Due to a Tautology of the Property to Be Established and the Reason That Establishes It

The fourth line of reasoning, “non-establishment due to a tautology of the property to be established and the reason that establishes it,” leads an opponent to reject the extreme of production from both self and other. It applies to the case where an opponent uses a combination of unestablished causes to prove an unestablished thesis. For example, the physical world truly exists because it is made of truly existent particles and fashioned by a truly existent omnipotent divine creator. The fault of asserting truly established existence applies here to both the property to be proven and the reason used to prove it.

Nyingma applies this line of reasoning also to the case when both cause and effect are unreal, as in the example of water in a dream putting out fire in a dream. In meditation, one would contemplate the circular reasoning in thinking that the self must truly exist because its basis, my body and mind, feel real. This line of reasoning also helps to overcome grasping to voidness as truly existent, because it is also circular reasoning to argue that voidness is devoid of truly established existence because it is voidness, the negation of truly established existence. 

Through the sequence of these four lines of reasoning, one leads an opponent to go beyond all four extremes of conceptual fabrication – production from no cause (neither self nor other), from self, from other and from both self and other.