Commentary on “A Manual for Engaging in Logic” – Dr. Berzin

Out of those, statements of a thesis and so on constitute a logical proof. By means of statements about the subject of the thesis, the reason and the examples, a matter that is not believed by a challenger (in a debate) is explicated. 

In this text, the Sanskrit term pakṣa (Tib. phyogs) is used for both a thesis and sometimes also for the subject of a thesis. A thesis (bsgrub-bya, Skt. sādhya) consists of a subject of a thesis (sgrub-chos, Skt. pakṣadharma) and a property to be established (sgrub-bya’i chos, Skt. sādhyadharma). In addition, the logical proof includes a reason (gtan-tshig, Skt. hetu) and two kinds of example (dpe, Skt. drṣṭānta).

In a debate, the challenger (phyir-rgol, Skt. prāśnika), literally the “questioner,” questions the thesis that the proponent (dam-bca’-ba, Skt. pratijñā) asserts as being proven by the reason and examples he or she gives. The proponent is also known as the defender (tshur-rgod).

Out of those, the thesis consists of an established property-possessor wished by someone to be established as being characterized by a well-known characteristic – “that is not incompatible with bare cognition and so on” is the remainder of the statement. It is like this: “Sound is permanent, or it is impermanent.”

A property-possessor (chos-can, Skt. dharmin), here, is a synonym for the subject of the thesis. A characteristic (khyad-par, Skt. viśeṣa) is a distinguishing property of something.

The issue of whether or not sound is permanent (rtag-pa, Skt. nitya), central to debate among the proponents of the various Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems, primarily concerns the status of the sounds of the words of the Vedas. The Brahmanic position is that they are permanent, in the sense that they are eternal and fixed or static. This is asserted by the non-Buddhist Mīmāṃsaka (dpyod-pa-pa, spyod-pa-pa) system. The non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya system asserts that sound in general is eternal, unmanifest in primal matter (gtso-bo, rang-bzhin, Skt. pradhāna, prakṛti), and only manifesting occasionally. The non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣika (bye-brag-pa) system and all the Buddhist tenet systems assert that sound is impermanent, neither eternal nor static and unchanging.  

The reason consists of three components. How is it threefold, in other words, in nature? (It is threefold with)
   1. “(The reason’s) being a property of the subject of the thesis 
   2. Its existence (as a property) in a homogeneous item 
   3. Its nonexistence (as a property) in a heterogeneous item.”

A reason must be complete with the three components (tshul-gsum, khrugs-gsum, Skt. trirūpa) as a means to prove a thesis. In most Tibetan texts on ways of reasoning (rtags-rigs), (1) being a property of the subject of the thesis (phyogs-kyi chos-kyi ltos-gzhi-la yod-pa, Skt. pakṣadharmatva) is referred to in Tibetan simply as “applicability to the topic” (phyogs-chos), (2) existence in a homogeneous item (mthun-phyogs-la yod-pa, Skt. sapakṣe sattvam) as pervasion (rjes-khyab) and (3) nonexistence in a heterogeneous item (mi mthun-phyogs-la med-pa, Skt. vipakṣe asattvam) as negative pervasion (ldog-khyab). Both a homogeneous item (mthun-phyog, rang-phyogs, Skt. sapakṣa) and a heterogenous item (mi-mthun-phyog, gzhan-phyogs, Skt. vipakṣa) must also be given as examples in order to complete the proof. 

(If you ask), “And what is a homogeneous item and what is a heterogeneous item?” 
   - An item that is the same, in the sense of having the same property as what is to be established, is a homogeneous item. It is like this: in the statement that is to be established, “Sound is not permanent,” something impermanent, such as a clay jug and so on, is a homogeneous item. 
   - A heterogeneous item is something in which what is to be established does not exist (as a property. It is like this): “Whatever is permanent is seen to be something unproduced, like space and so on.”

Here, being something produced, or (in other words,) being something (that has arisen) immediately from effort, exists only (as a property) in a homogeneous item and never (as a property) in a heterogenous item. Thus, “The reason – (being something produced) – is (a property) in (what is to be established,) being impermanent and so on.”

Being something produced (byas-pa-nyid, Skt. kṛtakatva) means being something that has arisen immediately from effort (brtsal ma-thag-tu byung-ba-nyid, Skt. prayatnānantarīyakatva). “Immediately” (Skt. anantarīyaka) means, literally, “without an interval” between the causal effort and the arising of the effect. According to the teachings on karma, happiness ripens from the effort one puts into constructive behavior; however, happiness does not arise immediately from the effort of doing one constructive deed. A clay jug, in contrast, arises immediately from the effort a potter puts into making it. Naturally occurring phenomena, such as lightning, on the other hand, may arise immediately from causes, but they are not produced from the effort of someone. Thus, although all impermanent, non-static phenomena are affected phenomena (’dus-byas-kyi chos, Skt. saṃskṛtadharma) ­– they have arisen from and are affected or conditioned by causes and conditions – not all are produced as not all have arisen immediately from effort.

The example is of two types:
   1. (One given) through its similarity
   2. (One given) through its dissimilarity. 

Out of those:
[1] First, as for something that is (given as an example) through its similarity, it is something stated as having existence only as an item homogeneous with (both the property to be established and) the reason. It is like this: “A clay jug and so on, (as an example) for whatever is produced, is seen to be impermanent.” 

[2] Further, as for something that is (given as an example) through its dissimilarity, it is something explained as being absent (as a property) of what is to be established and likewise absent (as a property) of the reason. It is like this: “Space and so on, (as an example) for whatever is permanent, is seen to be something unproduced.” 

Similarity (mthun-pa, Skt. sādharmya), in this context, means having as properties both the property to be established and the property given as the reason. Dissimilarity (mi-mthun-pa, Skt. vaidharmya) means lacking as properties both the property to be established and the property given as the reason. 

What is meant by the word “permanent” is an absence, in something, of impermanence and, by the word “unproduced,” an absence (in something) of a state of being something produced, just as the absence of a presence is (called) an “absence.”

The subject of a thesis and so on have (now) been explained.

Statements of these at the time of a convincing of others (constitute) a logical proof. It is like this:
   1. “Sound is impermanent” is a statement of a thesis
   2. “Because of being something produced, and so on,” is a statement of a property of the subject of the thesis (given as a reason)
   3. “Whatever is something produced is seen to be impermanent, like a clay jug and so on” is a statement of concordance, as in the case of a homogenous item. “Whatever is permanent is seen to be something unproduced, like space,” is a statement of negative concomitance (as in the case of a heterogeneous item).

A convincing (go-bar-ston-pa, Skt. pratyāyana) is a presentation of a line of reasoning in order to convince others of the truth of statement.

Concordance (rjes-’gro, Skt. anugama), in other words concomitance (sbyar-ba, Skt. anvaya) between two properties means that everything that has the reason as a property also has as a property the property to be established. A statement of concordance must include both the homogeneous example and the pervasion (khyab-pa, Skt. vyāpti) between the two properties – in this case, “Whatever is produced is impermanent, like a clay jug.”

Negative concomitance (ldog-pa, Skt. vyatireka) between two properties means that everything that is excluded from having as a property the property to be established is also excluded from having the reason as a property. A statement of negative concomitance must similarly include both the heterogeneous example and the pervasion between the two exclusions – in this case, “Whatever is not impermanent is not something produced, like space.”

Just these three alone are called “the members (of a logical proof).” 

The Buddhist use of a logical proof having just three members (ya-gyal, Skt. avayava) – a thesis, a reason and two kinds of examples – is in contrast with the five-member syllogism used by proponents of the Nyāya system of logic: (1) an assertion (dam-bca’, Skt. prātijñā), (2) a reason (gtan-tshig, Skt. hetu), (3) a (concordant) example (dpe, Skt. upāharaṇa), (4) an application (of the example to a specific case) (nye-bar sbyar-ba, Skt. upanaya) and (5) a conclusion (mjug-bsdud, Skt. nigamana).

Something that is wished to be established, but which is contradictory to bare perception and so on, is a semblance of a thesis. It is like this: (there is)
   1. “One that is contradictory to bare perception
   2. One that is contradictory to inferential cognition
   3. One that is contradictory to textual tradition
   4. One that is contradictory to worldly common sense
   5. One that is contradictory to one’s own statement
   6. One that is an unestablished characteristic
   7. One that is for an unestablished item to be characterized
   8. One that is both an unestablished (characteristic and for an unestablished item to be characterized)
   9. One that is (a characteristic having) a (mutually) established connection (with the item being characterized).”

Out of those:
[1] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to bare perception would be (the thesis), “Sound is not something that can be heard.”

Buddhists assert that the audibility of sound is an obvious phenomenon (mngon-gyur-pa, Skt. abhimukhībhūta) and can be cognized through bare auditory perception. To assert otherwise is contradictory (bsal-ba, Skt. viruddha) to bare perception.

Some later Mīmāṃsaka proponents, however, assert that “being something that can be heard” (mnyan-bya, Skt. śrāvaṇa) is the function (bya-ba, Skt. karaṇa) of sound and that bare sensory perception cannot cognize the function of something. The audibility of sound can only be known through concordance (whatever can be heard is sound) and negative concomitance (whatever cannot be heard cannot be sound). For example, even deaf persons can know, through this logic, that sound is something that can be heard.

[2] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to inferential cognition would be (the thesis), “A clay jug is permanent.”

This thesis is contradicted by valid inferential cognition of the logical proof, “A clay jug is impermanent, because it is something produced.”

[3] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to textual tradition would be (the thesis), “Sound is permanent” for a Vaisheshika (proponent).

According to the textual tradition (yid-ches-pa, Skt. āgama) of the Vaiśeṣika tenet system, there are 6 types of entities (tshig-gi don, Skt. padārtha): (1) 9 types of basic things (rdzas, Skt. dravya), (2) 24 types of qualities (yon-tan, Skt. guṇa), (3) 5 types of activities (las, Skt. kriyā), (4) 2 types of generic characters (spyi, Skt. jāti), (5) individual characters (bye-brag, Skt. viśeṣa), and (6) 5 types of inherent relationships (’du-ba, Skt. samavāya). A seventh type of entity, (7) 4 types of non-existence (ma-yin-pa, Skt. abhava), was added centuries after our text and is not included in the context of this text.

All six types have self-established findable existence as entities corresponding to the meaning of the words for them, which is the literal meaning of the term for them, padārtha. Sound, as one of the 24 qualities, is impermanent: the sound of a voice, for instance, as something that can be heard, is affected by the structure of the ear through which it is heard.

Vaiśeṣika also asserts that when sound is heard, also heard with it is the specific generic character (nye-tshe-ba’i spyi, Skt. vyaktisarvagata) of “being a sound” (sgra-nyid, Skt. śabdatva), which is permanent. Thus, when Vaiśeṣika asserts, “Sound is permanent because of its being something heard, like ‘being a sound,’” it is contradictory to its assertion that, as a quality, sound is impermanent.

[4] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to worldly common sense would be (the thesis), “The skull of a human head is pure because of being the component of a living creature, like the shell of a conch.”

Some followers of a Śaivite tradition carried human skull cups as vessels from which to eat and drink. 

[5] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to one’s own statement would be (the thesis), “My mother is a barren woman.” 

Although modern medicine diagnoses many possible causes for female infertility and many possible methods through which some such women may still have a biological child, these examples do not pertain to the time of this text. In ancient times, it was impossible to be the biological child of a woman who could not have children.

[6] How something (wished to be established) can be an unestablished characteristic would be (the thesis) of a Buddhist, “Sound is something that has a perishing” (made) to a Samkhya (proponent).

According to the Sāṃkhya tenets, sound is eternal, existing in unmanifest form in eternal primal matter. Through perturbations (rnam-’gyur, Skt. vikāra) in the equilibrium of primal matter, sound undergoes change, becoming briefly manifest and then receding once more, but it is never something that has a perishing (’jig-yod, Skt. vināśin). The assertion that sound does have a perishing is unestablished (ma-grub-pa, Skt. aprasiddha) and therefore unacceptable to a Sāṃkhya proponent.

[7] How something (wished to be established) can be for an unestablished item to be characterized would be (the thesis) of a Samkhya (proponent), “The soul (atman) is the conscious one,” (made) to a Buddhist. 

The Sāṃkhya system asserts a permanent, partless soul (bdag, Skt. ātman, self), or individual being (skyes-bu, Skt. puruṣa), that can exist independently of a body and mind in a state of liberation. Such a soul is called “the conscious one” (sems-pa, Skt. cetana), meaning that it is mere consciousness, passive in the sense of not actually cognizing anything. Buddhists do not accept the existence of a partless, permanent, independently existing soul, let alone such a soul that is consciousness.

[8] How (something wished to be established) can be both an unestablished (characteristic and for an unestablished item to be characterized) would be (the thesis) of a Vaisheshika (proponent), “The soul is an inherent material cause of happiness and so on,” (made) to a Buddhist.

The Vaiśeṣikas assert a soul (ātman) as one of the 9 types of basic things. It is eternal, static, partless and, by itself, lacks consciousness. It is contingently, or conditionally, connected (sbyor-ba, Skt. saṃyoga) with 9 of the 24 qualities, including sensory awareness and happiness. Of the 5 types of inherent relationships, the one that connects basic things and qualities – in this case, a soul with happiness – is the relationship of the soul being the inherent material cause (rgyu-rkyen ’dus-shing rten-cing ’brel-ba, Skt. samavāyikāraṇa) of happiness, like clay being the inherent material cause of a clay jug. Buddhism does not accept either the existence of a soul or the self-established findable existence of inherent relationships.

[9] How (something wished to be established) can be (a characteristic having) a (mutually) established connection (with the item being characterized) would be (the thesis), “Sound is something that can be heard.”

“Sound is something that can be heard” is mutually established (phan-tshun grub-pa, Skt. prasiddha) for Buddhists and both Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya proponents. 

The statements of these are ones with faults in the proposition:
   - “(The first five) through the gateway of rejection of the self-nature of the property (to be established)
   - (The next three) through the impossibility of demonstrating (it to the opponent)
   - (The last one) through the uselessness of the logical proof.”  

In the first five types of semblances of a thesis, the self-nature (ngo-bo, Skt. svarūpa) of the property to be established is one that is impossible to characterize the subject of the thesis. Thus, the first five are a rejection (bsal-ba, Skt. nirākaraṇa) of this self-nature.

They are said to be semblances of a thesis.  

(There are three kinds of) semblances of a reason:
   1. One that has an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis)
   2. One that is inconclusive
   3. One that is contradictory.

Semblances of a Reason Having an Unestablished Connection with the Subject of the Thesis

Out of those, there are four kinds of (semblances of a reason having an) unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis). It is like this: (there is)
   1. One with an unestablished (connection) for both (parties of the debate)
   2. One with an unestablished (connection) for one or the other (party of the debate)
   3. One with an unestablished (connection) due to doubt
   4. One with an unestablished (connection) as a substratum support.

Out of those:
[1] In the case of the impermanence of sound being what is to be established, (the reason) because of its visibility is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis) for both (parties of the debate).

Neither Buddhism nor non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems assert that sound is something that can be cognized by visual bare perception.

[2] (Also in the case of the impermanence of sound being what is to be established, giving as a reason) “because of being something produced” to (a Mimamsaka) propounder of sound being a (brief) manifestation is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis) for one or the other (party of the debate).

The Mīmāṃsaka non-Buddhist tenet system asserts that the sound of the words of the Vedas are eternal, unchanging and unproduced. As an underlying permanent cause, they briefly manifest as an impermanent effect only when chanted in a ritual. For a Mīmāṃsaka proponent, sound being a brief manifestation of a cause as an effect (mngon-par gsal-ba, Skt. abhivyakti) has an unestablished connection with impermanence, because this school asserts that sound is permanent.

[3] (The presence of) a conglomerate of basic elements being pointed out as (a reason) for proving (the presence) of fire, while doubting (it is smoke) because of the presence of mist, is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (invariable connection with the subject of the thesis) due to doubt.

If, in the presence of a conglomerate of basic elements (’byung-ba chen-po ’dus-pa, Skt. bhūtasaṃghāta), there is indecisive wavering between whether what one sees is mist or smoke, the proposition, “What I see indicates the presence of fire, because it is the presence of smoke,” is unestablished due to doubt (the-tshom za, Skt. saṃdigdha) about the reason, the presence of smoke.  

[4] (A Vaisheshika proponent giving as a reason) “because of being the substratum support of qualities” to a (Charvaka) propounder of the nonexistence of space for (establishing the thesis), Space is a basic thing, is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis) as a substratum support.

The 9 types of basic things (rdzas, Skt. dravya) that Vaiśeṣika asserts are earth particles, water particles, fire particles, wind particles, space particles, time, location, souls, and physical mind particles. Each of these, other than souls, serve as the substratum support (gzhi, Skt. āśraya) of the qualities they temporarily possess, contingent on causes and conditions. Being a substratum support is one of the 5 types of inherent relationships asserted by Vaiśeṣika. Although proponents of the non-Buddhist Cārvāka (rgyang-’phen-pa) tenet system accept the existence of the basic elements (’byung-ba, Skt. bhūta) earth, water, fire and wind, they do not accept the existence of space as a basic element. Therefore, for a Cārvāka, space is also not a basic thing and therefore cannot be the substratum support for sound as a quality of space.

Inconclusive Semblances of a Reason

There are six kinds of inconclusive (semblances of a reason):
   1. “One that is common (to both homogenous and heterogenous items)
   2. One that is uncommon (to both homogenous and heterogenous items other than the subject of the thesis)  
   3. One that is an occurrence in (only) one division of homogeneous items, but which has pervasion with (all) heterogeneous items
   4. One that is an occurrence in one division of heterogeneous items, but which is something that has pervasion with (all) homogeneous items
   5. One that is an occurrence in (only) one division of both (homogeneous items and heterogeneous items)
   6. One that leads to contradictory (theses) without discrepancy (from both properties applying to the subject of the thesis).”

Out of those:
[1] (An example of an inconclusive semblance of a reason that is) common (to both homogenous and heterogenous items) is, “Sound is permanent because of its valid knowability.” This (reason) is, in fact, inconclusive because of its commonality with both (all) permanent and (all) impermanent items. (One could ask,) “Is it because of its valid knowability that sound is impermanent like a clay jug; or is it because of its valid knowability that, perhaps, it is permanent like space?”

Whatever is permanent is validly knowable (gzhal-bya, Skt. prameya), but not everything validly knowable is permanent, because impermanent phenomena are also validly knowable. Thus, there is a commonality (thun-mong-du ’jug-pa, Skt. sādhāraṇatva) between valid knowability (gzhal-bya-nyid, Skt. prameyatva) and both all permanent items and all impermanent items. In other words, valid knowability is common to both all permanent phenomena and all impermanent phenomena. Therefore, “because of its valid knowability” is an inconclusive (ma-nges-pa, Skt. anaikāntika) – literally, not unequivocal – reason for proving the thesis, “Sound is permanent,” because of it being overly comprehensive. 

[2] (An example of an inconclusive semblance of a reason that is) uncommon (to both homogeneous and heterogenous items other than the subject of the thesis) is, “Sound is permanent because of its audibility.” This is, in fact, a dubious reason because of the exclusion (of audibility) from being (something occurring either in all) permanent or (in all) impermanent items and because of the nonexistence of any other (possibility) except (sound being) permanent or impermanent. (One could ask,) “What kind of thing (permanent or impermanent) could audibility be (a characteristic) of besides (sound)?”

Sound is the only item, whether permanent or impermanent, that is audible. Because of that, there is no commonality between audibility and either all homogeneous permanent items or all heterogeneous impermanent items. In other words, there is an exclusion (Skt. vyāvṛttatva) of audibility from occurring in all of either type of item. The nonexistence of another possibility except something being either one or the other of two possibilities of a dichotomy (dngos-’gal), such as permanent and impermanent, is the Indian formulation of what in Aristotelian logic is known as the “law of the excluded middle.” Two mutually exclusive sets form a dichotomy if all existent phenomena must be a member of either one or the other mutually exclusive set. 

[3] How would (an inconclusive semblance of a reason) be that is an occurrence in (only) one division of homogeneous items, but which has pervasion with (all) heterogeneous items? (It would be), “Sound is something that does not (arise) immediately from effort, because of its impermanence.” In the case when something that does not (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item homogeneous with it is lighting or space, and so on. Impermanence is seen (as a property) in some of these (homogeneous items), such as in lightning and so on, but not in space. (Further,) in the case when something that does not (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item heterogeneous with it is a clay jug and so on. There, impermanence is seen (as a property) in all cases, in a clay jug and so on. Because of that, that (reason) is inconclusive through the similarity of lightning and a clay jug (in their both having the reason, impermanence, as a property). (One could ask,) “Is it because of its impermanence, like that of a clay jug and so on, that sound is something that does (arise) immediately from effort, or is it because of its impermanence, like that of lighting and so on, that perhaps it is something that does not (arise) immediately from effort?” 

For the logical proof, “Sound is something that does not (arise) immediately from effort (brtsal ma-thag-tu ’byung-ba ma-yin-pa, Skt. prayātnānantarīyaka), because of its impermanence,” the reason “impermanence” is an occurrence in only one division (phyogs gcig-la ’jug-pa, Skt. ekadeśavṛtti) of homogeneous items such as lightning, but not in others such as space, which is permanent. Further, impermanence is something that has pervasion (khyab-par yod-pa, Skt. vyāpin) with all heterogeneous items – those that do arise immediately from effort – such as a clay jug. All items that arise immediately from effort are impermanent. Since the reason must have pervasion with all homogeneous items, not just some, and be excluded from all heterogeneous items and not be pervasive with all of them, “impermanence” in this logical proof is an inconclusive reason.

[4] How would (an inconclusive semblance of a reason) be that is an occurrence in one division of heterogeneous items, but which is something that has pervasion with (all) homogeneous items? (It would be), “Sound is something that does (arise) immediately from effort because of its impermanence.” In the case when something that does (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item homogeneous with it is a clay jug and so on. There, impermanence is seen (as a property) in all cases, in a clay jug and so on. (Further,) in the case when something that does (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item heterogeneous with it is lighting or space, and so on. There, impermanence is seen (as a property) in some of these (heterogeneous items), such as in lightning and so on, but not in space. Because of that, that (reason) is inconclusive, as in the previous case, through the similarity of lightning and a clay jug (in their both having the reason, impermanence, as a property).

For the logical proof, “Sound is something that does (arise) immediately from effort because of its impermanence,” the reason “impermanence” is something that has pervasion with all homogeneous items – those that do arise immediately from effort, such as a clay jug. However, impermanence is an occurrence in one division of heterogeneous items such as lightning, although not in others such as space, which is permanent. Since the reason must have pervasion with all homogeneous items, which in this case it does, and be excluded from all heterogeneous items and not occur in any of them, which in this case it does not have, the reason given in this logical proof is inconclusive.

[5] How would (an inconclusive semblance of a reason be that is) an occurrence in (only) one division of both (homogeneous items and heterogeneous items)? (It would be), “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality.” In the case when being permanent is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item homogenous with it is space or subtle particles, and so on. There, incorporeality is seen (as a property) in (only) one division of these (homogeneous items), such as space and so on, but not in (the others), such as subtle particles and so on. (Further,) in the case when being permanent is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item heterogeneous with it is a clay jug or happiness, and so on. There, incorporeality is seen (as a property) in one division of these (heterogeneous items), such as happiness and so on, although not in (the others), such as a clay jug and so on. Because of that, that reason is inconclusive through the equality of both happiness and space (in their both having the reason, incorporeality, as a property).

For the logical proof, “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality,” the reason “incorporeality” (thogs-pa-med-pa-nyid, Skt. amūrtatva) is an occurrence in only one division of homogeneous items. Both Buddhists and Vaiśeṣika proponents accept space as a homogeneous item (something permanent) that is incorporeal. Vaiśeṣika also asserts that subtle particles (rdul phra-rab, Skt. paramāṇu) – those of earth, water, fire and wind – are homogeneous items as well, because they too are permanent; however, according to their system, subtle particles are corporeal (thogs-pa yod-pa, Skt. mūrta). Thus, although both space and subtle particles are homogeneous items for a Vaiśeṣika proponent, because both are asserted as being permanent, the reason, incorporeality, is an occurrence only in such homogeneous items as space, but not in others such as subtle particles.

Likewise, among heterogeneous items, namely those that are impermanent, although the reason, incorporeality, is not an occurrence in one division of such items, for instance a clay jug and so on, it is an occurrence in another division, for instance happiness. Since the reason, incorporeality, must have pervasion with all homogeneous items and not occur in just one division of them, and since the reason must also be excluded from all heterogeneous items and not occur in one of their divisions, the reason given in this logical proof is inconclusive.

[6] How would (inconclusive semblances of a reason be that) lead to contradictory (theses) without discrepancy (from both properties applying to the subject of the thesis)? (They would be, for a Vaisheshika to assert,) “Sound is impermanent because of being something produced, like a clay jug” and also “Sound is permanent because of its being something heard, like ‘being a sound.’” Having established the two of them, one must be inconclusive, because the reasons lead to indecisive wavering in regard to both.

According to the Vaiśeṣika tenets, sound is an impermanent quality. Furthermore, sound has as its substratum support the specific generic character “being a sound,” which is a permanent entity. When a sound is heard, its substratum support, the permanent generic character “being a sound,” is also heard. Suppose a Buddhist debater asks a Vaiśeṣika opponent (pha-rol-gyi phyogs, Skt. parapakṣa) if he accepts the line of reasoning, “Sound is impermanent, because of being something produced, like a clay jug.” The Vaiśeṣika proponent would have to accept, because the reason fulfills the three components to prove a thesis: (1) sound is something produced, (2) something produced, like a vase, is impermanent and (3) something produced, like a vase, is never permanent. If the Buddhist debater then asks if the Vaiśeṣika opponent also accepts the thesis, “Sound is permanent because of its being something heard, like the specific generic character ‘being a sound,’ the opponent would also need to accept it. In accord with the Vaiśeṣika tenets, the reason also fulfills the three components: (1) sound is something heard, (2) something heard, like the specific generic character “being a sound,” is permanent, and (3) something heard, like the specific generic character “being a sound,” is never impermanent. The Buddhist proponent could then point out that the Vaiśeṣika opponent is contradicting himself. Sound cannot be both impermanent and permanent. Since each of the reasons has no discrepancy (mi-’khrul-ba, Skt. avyabhicārin) – meaning no exception – from its applying to the subject of the thesis, sound, one of the two propositions must be false, because of its inconclusive reason.

Contradictory Semblances of a Reason

There are four kinds of contradictory (semblances of a reason). It is like this: (there is)
   1. One that proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property (to be established)
   2. One that proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property (to be established)
   3. One that proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis)
   4. One that proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis). 

Out of those:
[1] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property (to be established)? (It would be), “Sound is permanent because of being something produced, (or in other words) because of being something (that has arisen) immediately from effort.” That reason is contradictory because of its presence only (as a property) in a heterogeneous item.

For the logical proof, “Sound is permanent because of being something produced, or in other words, because of being something (that has arisen) immediately from effort,” the reason, being something produced, does not exist as a property of any homogeneous item: there isn’t any permanent item that is produced. However, even though being something produced is a property of only one division of the impermanent items that constitute heterogenous items – being something produced is a property of a clay jug, but not of lightning – nevertheless, if something is produced, it is pervasive that it be a heterogeneous item, namely that it be impermanent. Thus, if a Sāṃkhya proponent asserts as the self-nature (ngo-bo, Skt. svarūpa) of sound that it is permanent, the logical proof cited here demonstrates the opposite (’gal-ba, Skt. viparīta), namely that the self-nature of sound is that it is impermanent.

[2] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property (to be established)? (It would be the Samkhya proposition), “The eyes and so on are items for the use of something other (than themselves), because of their being a conglomerate (of parts), like the characteristic of (being a conglomerate of) parts in the case of a bed, a chair and so on.” (But) if that reason establishes the usability of the eyes and so on for something other (than itself), so too does it establish the conglomerate (state) of (that) something other (than itself that uses them), the soul, because of there being no discrepancy from both (properties applying to the subject of the thesis).

According to the Sāṃkhya tenets, all knowable phenomena other than persons are material phenomena made up of primal matter. As such, they all are conglomerates of the three universal constituents (yon-tan, Skt. guṇa): rajas (rdul), sattva (snying-stobs), and tamas (mun-pa). This includes the sensory organs, such as the eyes, the ears and so on, as well as material objects, such as a bed, a chair and so on. Souls (ātman), on the other hand, are partless; they make use of the eyes, the ears and so on to cognize sensory objects.

When a Sāṃkhya proponent proposes the thesis, “The eyes and so on are items of use by something other than themselves” and uses the reason “because of their being a conglomerate, like the characteristic of (being a conglomerate of) parts in the case of a bed, a chair and so on,” he is trying to prove that the ātman, the soul, which is what makes use of the eyes to perceive things, is that something that is other than the eyes.

The reason, here, being a conglomerate of parts, fulfills the three components to prove a thesis: (1) the eyes and so on are a conglomerate of the three constituent parts, (2) what is a conglomerate of parts, like a bed and a chair, is an object of use by something other than themselves and (3) what is a conglomerate of parts is never not an object of use by something other than itself.

That which makes use of a bed or a chair, however, and which is other than them, is a body; and a characteristic of a body is that it is also a conglomerate of parts, namely the three universal constituents. But the Samkhya proponent did not specify in the thesis that the item that makes use of the eyes is not only something that is other than the eyes, but that it is other than the eyes also in the sense of having the characteristic of being partless. Because of that omission, then in establishing that the eyes are made use of by something other than themselves, namely the ātman, because of their characteristic of being a conglomerate of parts, the reason also establishes the characteristic of that something else, namely that, like a body, the atman too is a conglomerate of parts. Being a conglomerate of parts, however, is the opposite of one of the characteristics of the atman, namely that it is partless. Therefore, the reason is contradictory to a characteristic of the property to be established.  

[3] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis)? (It would be the Vaisheshika proposition), “The (pervasive generic character ‘objective) existence’ is not a basic thing, not a quality, and not an activity, because of its being something (namely, a substratum support) that has (supported on it) singular basic things and because of its existence in qualities and activities (as the substratum support that supports them), as are (specific) generic characters and individualities.” But if that reason establishes the rejection of (objective) existence being a basic thing and so on, so too does it establish the nonexistence of (objective) existence, because of there being no discrepancy from both (properties applying to the subject of the thesis).

To recap, the 6 types of entities that Vaiśeṣika asserts are basic things, qualities, activities, generic characters, individual characters, and inherent relationships.

Generic characters are of two types: the pervasive generic character (khyab-pa’i spyi, Skt. sarvasarvagata) of objective existence (yod-pa-nyid, Skt. bhāva) and specific generic characters, such as “being a table.” Objective existence, as a pervasive generic character, is an entity that serves as the substratum support for all basic things, qualities, and activities. Although the other three types of entities – generic characters, individual characters, and inherent relationships – exist, they do not have objective existence. Thus, the pervasive generic character “objective existence” does not serve as the substratum support for these three.

The 9 types of basic things are earth, water, fire, wind, mind, space, time, location, and souls. Each is considered a singular item by itself. The first 4, however, occur in the form of either one particle, in which case it is a singular item, or a conglomeration of many particles. Mind consists of just a single particle; while space, time, location, and souls are singular items that do not consist of any particles.

Basic things can serve as the substratum support for other basic things only if those other basic things are not the substratum support for any other basic thing, or if those basic things are the substratum support for multiple basic things, as in the case of gross material objects that are the substratum supports for many particles. A basic thing cannot be the substratum support of another basic thing that is just a singular item.

Objective existence, however, is the substratum support for each of the 9 types of basic things as singular items. Because a basic thing cannot be the substratum support of another basic thing that is only a singular item, Vaiśeṣika does not consider objective existence to be a basic thing.

Vaiśeṣika also asserts that qualities cannot exist in other qualities as their substratum support; and activities cannot exist in other activities as their substratum support. Because objective existence exists in qualities and activities as the substratum support that supports them, Vaiśeṣika also does not consider objective existence to be either a quality or an activity.

Generic characters and individual characters, like objective existence, are entities that are also not basic things, qualities or activities, because they too are substrata supports that have supported on them singular basic things and they too are entities that are substrata supports for qualities and activities.

If objective existence is not a basic thing, a quality or an activity, and if it is the substratum support only for these three types of entities, then it cannot be the substratum support for itself. Therefore, objective existence does not exist. Thus, if the logical proof establishes the rejection (ma-yin-pa, Skt. pratiṣedha) of objective existence being a basic thing, a quality or an activity, it also establishes the nonexistence of objective existence. Nonexistence is the opposite of the self-nature of objective existence, namely existence.

[4] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis)? (It would be giving) the same reason as in the above thesis and, as a characteristic of the property-possessor (the pervasive generic character “objective existence”), it’s being that which causes conviction in its being existence. But that (reason) also establishes the opposite, its being that which causes conviction in its being nonexistence, because of there being no discrepancy from both (properties applying to the subject of the thesis).  

According to Vaibhaṣika, each phenomenon has as one of its characteristics its being that which causes conviction in what it is when someone cognizes it. If a Vaiśeṣika proponent accepts that the pervasive generic character “objective existence” is not a basic thing, not a quality and not an activity, because of the reason given above, but still asserts that it is that which causes conviction in its being existence (yod-pa-nyid sgrub-par byed-pa, Skt. satpratyayakartṛtva), then by the logic used to demonstrate that the above thesis leads to the conclusion that objective existence does not exist, it also leads to the conclusion that objective existence is likewise that which causes conviction in its being nonexistence, which is the opposite characteristic.

Semblances of an example are of two kinds:
   1. (One given) through its similarity
   2. (One given) through its dissimilarity. 

An example given through similarity to both the property given as an example and the property to be established refers to a homogeneous item. An example given through dissimilarity with those two properties refers to a heterogeneous item.  

Semblances of Examples Given through Their Similarity

There are five kinds of semblances of examples that are (given) through their similarity. It is like this: (there is)
   1. One that is unestablished for the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof
   2. One that is unestablished for the property to be established
   3. One that is unestablished for both (the property given as a reason and the property to be established)
   4. One (given for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) concomitance
   5. One (given for a thesis) where the concomitance is (stated) in the reverse order.

[1] How would (a semblance of an example given through its similarity) be that is unestablished for the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof? “(It would be the example) like a subtle particle for (the logical proof), 'Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality; whatever is incorporeal is seen to be permanent, like a subtle particle.' Although the property to be established, permanence, is present in (the example) a subtle particle, the property given as a reason, incorporeality, is not, because of the corporeality of subtle particles.”

For the logical proof, “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality like a subtle particle,” a homogeneous example must be both permanent and incorporeal. For a Vaiśeṣika proponent, although a subtle particle is permanent, it is not incorporeal, because Vaiśeṣika asserts the corporeality of subtle particles. Thus, in a debate with a Vaiśeṣika opponent on the above proposition, giving a subtle particle as a homogeneous example would be unestablished and therefore unacceptable.

[2] How would (a semblance of an example given through its similarity) be that is unestablished for the property to be established? “(It would be the example) like the intellect for (the logical proof), Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality; whatever is incorporeal is seen to be permanent, like the intellect. Although the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof, incorporeality, is present in (the example) the intellect, (yet) the property to be established, permanence, is not, because of the impermanence of the intellect.”

Here, again, the homogeneous example must be both permanent and incorporeal. For a Buddhist proponent, although the intellect (blo, Skt. buddhi) is incorporeal, it is not permanent, because Buddhism asserts the impermanence of all mental factors (sems-byung, Skt. cetasika) such as intellect. Thus, in a debate with a Buddhist opponent on the above proposition, giving the intellect as a homogeneous example would unestablished and therefore unacceptable.

[3] Those (semblances of an example given through their similarity) that are unestablished for both (the property given as a reason and the property to be established) are of two types: those that are existent and those that are not existent. Of those:
   - (The semblance of an example) “like a clay jug” is an existing one for which both (properties) are unestablished, because of the impermanence and corporeality of a clay jug.
   - (The semblance of an example) “like space” is a non-existing one for which both (properties) are unestablished (in a debate) against a (Charvaka) proponent of its nonexistence.

As before, for the logical proof: “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality,” a homogeneous example must be both permanent and incorporeal. For any opponent, giving a clay jug as a homogeneous example would be unestablished because a clay jug is neither permanent nor incorporeal. For a Cārvāka opponent in debate, who does not accept the existence of space, giving space as an example is likewise unestablished, because something nonexistent can neither be permanent nor incorporeal.

[4] (A semblance of an example, given through its similarity, for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) concomitance is one in which the co-presence is observed of both the property to be established and the property given as a reason, as in “a clay jug in which being something produced and impermanence are (both) observed,” but without the concomitance (between the two properties being stated).

For the logical proof: “Sound is impermanent because it is something produced, like a clay jug,” although a clay jug, as an example given through its similarity, has the co-presence (Skt. sahabhāva) of both properties – it is both something produced and impermanent – the concomitance between the reason, being something produced, and the property to be established, impermanence, “Whatever is something produced is impermanent,” is not stated. Without the statement of the concomitance, the example is just a semblance of an example; it is insufficient by itself to support the reason cited for sound being impermanent – being something produced. This is because an opponent in this debate could challenge with a counter homogeneous example, “Sound is impermanent because it is not something produced, like lightning.”

[5] How would (a semblance of an example given through its similarity) be (for a thesis) where the concomitance is (proposed) in the reverse order? (It would be) one where, when “Whatever is something produced is observed to be impermanent” is what should be said, (the proponent) states (instead), “Whatever is impermanent is seen to be something produced.”   

In the thesis, “Sound is impermanent because of being something produced; whatever is something produced is impermanent, like a clay jug,” being something produced is concomitant with being impermanent. Everything produced is impermanent. However, in the thesis, “Sound is something produced because it is impermanent; whatever is impermanent is something produced, like a clay jug,” the concomitance proposed is the reverse (log-pa, Skt. viparīta) of what is the case. This is because being impermanent is not concomitant with being something produced, as in the case of lightning. Therefore, if a clay jug is given as an example through its similarity for the thesis, “Sound is something produced because it is impermanent; whatever is impermanent is something produced,” it is merely a semblance of a homogeneous example because it is for a thesis in which the concomitance is expressed in the reverse order.

Semblances of Examples Given through Their Dissimilarity

There are five kinds of semblances of examples that are (given) through their dissimilarity. It is like this: (there is)
   1. One that is not in contrast with the property to be established
   2. One that is not in contrast with the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof
   3. One that is not in contrast with both (properties, the one given as a reason and the one to be established)
   4. One (given for a thesis) where there is no negative concomitance (between what is in contrast with the property to be established and what is in contrast with the property given as a reason)
   5. One (given for a thesis) where the negative concomitance is (expressed) in the reverse order.

Out of those:
[1] How would (a semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) be which is not in contrast (ldog-pa med-pa, Skt. avyāvṛtta) with the property to be established? “(It would be the example) like a subtle particle for (the logical proof), Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality; whatever is corporeal is seen to be impermanent, like a subtle particle. Although (the example,) a subtle particle, is in contrast with the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof, incorporeality, (yet) because of the corporeality of subtle particles, the property to be established, permanence, is not in contrast (with it), because of the permanence of subtle particles.”

For the logical proof, “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality,” a heterogeneous example must be neither permanent nor incorporeal. For a Vaiśeṣika proponent, although a subtle particle is not incorporeal, it is not impermanent, because Vaiśeṣika asserts the permanence of subtle particles. Thus, in a debate with a Vaiśeṣika opponent on the above proposition, giving a subtle particle as a heterogenous example would be unestablished.

[2] How would (a semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) be which is not in contrast with the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof? It would be the example, “like a karmic impulse” (for the same proposition as above). Although (the example) a karmic impulse is in contrast with the property to be established, permanence, (yet) because of the impermanence of a karmic impulse, the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof, incorporeality, is not in contrast (with it), because of the incorporeality of a karmic impulse.

According to the Sautrāntika Buddhist tenet system, all karmic impulses are the mental factor of an urge (sems-pa, Skt. cetanā). As a mental factor, a karmic urge is incorporeal. Thus, in a debate with a Sautrāntika opponent on the proposition “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality,” giving a karmic impulse as a heterogenous example would be giving merely a semblance of a dissimilar example.

[3] (A semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) that is not in contrast with both (the property given as a reason and the property to be established) is “like space” (again for the same proposition as above in a debate) against a proponent of its existence. “In that (proposition, the example, space), is not in contrast with (both) permanence and incorporeality, because of the permanence and incorporeality of space.”

Space is merely a semblance of a dissimilar example here because, for all Buddhists, space is neither impermanent nor corporeal. Thus, in a debate with any Buddhist on the proposition “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality,” giving space as a heterogenous example would be unestablished.

[4] (A semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity, for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) negative concomitance between the property to be established and the property given as a reason would be one that can be pointed out as existing as a heterogenous item, in which (both) corporeality and impermanence are observed, as in the case a clay jug.

For the logical proof: “Sound is incorporeal because it is permanent” although a clay jug is excluded from being either incorporeal or permanent, it is still a semblance of a heterogeneous example. This is because the statement of the heterogenous example, a clay jug, lacks the statement of the negative concomitance, “Whatever is not incorporeal is not permanent.” Without the statement of the negative concomitance, the example is just a semblance of an example; it is insufficient by itself to support the reason cited for sound being incorporeal – being permanent. This is because a Vaiśeṣika opponent in this debate could challenge with a counter heterogeneous example, subtle particles, for supporting the counter proposition, “Sound is incorporeal because it is impermanent.” According to the Vaiśeṣika assertions, subtle particles are excluded from being either incorporeal or impermanent.

[5] How would (a semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) be in which the negative concomitance is (stated) in the reverse order? (It would be) one where, when “Whatever is impermanent is observed to be corporeal” is what should be said, (the proponent) states (instead), “Whatever is corporeal is seen to be impermanent.”  

In the thesis, “Sound is incorporeal because it is permanent,” the negative concomitance that should be stated is “whatever is impermanent is corporeal, like a clay jug.” This negative concomitance is stated in the correct order even though the concomitance is incorrrect. Whatever is excluded from being permanent is not necessarily excluded from being incorporeal, for instance happiness. Although a clay jug, in this case, is just a semblance of a heterogenous example; nevertheless, this is the negative concomitance that fits the incorrect thesis and therefore it is the one that should be stated. 

If a clay jug is given as the heterogenous example by stating, “whatever is corporeal is impermanent, like a clay jug,” the negative concomitance is stated in the reverse order, and for that reason, a clay jug is also just a semblance of a heterogenous example. But in this case, a clay jug is doubly just a semblance of a heterogenous example, because again a Vaiśeṣika opponent would challenge the negative concomitance with the counter example of corporeal subtle particles that are permanent.

The expression of these semblances of a thesis, a reason and the (two kinds of) example constitutes a semblance of a logical proof.

For the purpose of demonstrating something to oneself, there are only two (ways of validly) cognizing it:
   1. Bare perception
   2. Inferential cognition.

Out of those:
[1] Bare perception is the one from which concepts are excluded. “The one that is free of the concepts of name and genus in reference to an object of knowledge, such as a sight and so on, and which occurs through each of the sense organs” is (called) bare perception.

Bare perception is “bare” in the sense that it is non-conceptual. It does not cognize objects through the concept (rtog-pa, Skt. kalpana) of a name (ming, Skt. nāma) or a genus (spyi, Skt. jāti), a category. Here, only sensory bare cognition (dbang-po’i mngon-sum, Skt. indriyapratyakṣa) is discussed, and not the other three types asserted by the Sautrāntika tenet system: (1) mental bare cognition (yid-kyi mngon-sum, Skt. manasapratyekṣa), (2) bare cognition by reflexive awareness (rang-rig-pa’i mngon-sum, Skt. svasaṃvedanapratyekṣa), and (3) yogic bare cognition (rnal-’byor-pa’i mngon-sum, Skt. yogipratyekṣa). Reflexive awareness cognizes exclusively the primary consciousness (rnam-shes, Skt. vijñāna) and mental factors of every cognition; while yogic bare cognition relies on a joined pair of a stilled and settled state of mind (zhi-gnas, Skt. śamathā) and an exceptionally perceptive state of mind (lhag-mthong, Skt. vipaśyanā) to arise.

[2] Inferential cognition is the one that is a showing of an object from a line of reasoning. The line of reasoning with three components has previously been discussed. Anything known that arises from them in regard to an object that can be inferred, such as “Here is fire” or “Sound is impermanent,” is (known through) inferential cognition.

The three components of a line of reasoning (rtags, Skt. liṅga) are (1) the statement of a property of the subject of the thesis as the reason, (2) the statement of concomitance between the property and items to which the reason pertains, as in the case of a homogenous item, (3) the statement of the negative concomitance, as in the case of a heterogeneous item.

In both cases, for that (cognizing), only a (valid) knowing is the result (of the cognizing), because of its quality of having the essential nature of apprehending (something). Because of its being well-known as something having a use, it is (called) the “valid cognitive measurement (of something).”

In the valid cognizing of something, whether by bare perception or inferential cognition, what is to be accomplished is the knowing of something (shes-pa, Skt. jñāna) and what has been accomplished as a result is also the knowing of something. There is no difference. Although some Buddhist logicians also assert that there is also no difference between these two and what accomplishes this, namely the cognizing of something, in this text only a knowing of something is taken as having no difference with the result of the cognizing. Because the valid cognizing of something has an essential nature of apprehending (yang-dag-pa’i shes-pa, Skt. adhigama) that something, then the apprehending of something is both what the valid cognizing of it does as well as the result of the valid cognizing.

The Sanskrit word for valid cognition, “pramāṇa,” literally means “the measuring of something.” Valid cognition, then, is something that has the cognitive measurement of something as its use (don-byed nus-pa, Skt. savyāpāra).

A conceptual knowing in reference to an external object is a semblance of bare perception. Any knowing of something, a clay jug or a cloth, that arises conceptually is a semblance of a bare perception because of its not having as its object of experience that object as an individually characterized phenomenon.

The Sautrāntika tenet system divides all validly knowable phenomena into individually characterized phenomena (rang-mtshan, Skt. svalakṣaṇa) and generically characterized phenomena (spyi-mtshan, Skt. sāmānuyalakṣaṇa).

Individually characterized phenomena are impermanent (in the sense of nonstatic) objective entities and include such externally existent objects as a clay jug and a cloth. Such external objects are the appearing objects (snang-yul) of non-conceptual sensory bare perception. An appearing object is the direct object (dngos-yul) that arises in a cognition, as if it were directly in front of the consciousness.

Generically characterized phenomena are static metaphysical entities – primarily categories – validly knowable only in conceptual cognition, where they are the appearing object. For example, in the conceptual cognition of a clay jug, the appearing object is the object category (don-spyi, Skt. arthasaāmānya), clay jugs. Since categories lack any form, what appears through them is a mental representation (snang-ba) of a clay jug. The externally existent, objective clay jug – an individually characterized phenomenon – does not actually appear in the cognition. It is simply the conceptually implied object (zhen-yul), but not the object of experience (spyod-yul, Skt. viṣaya) of this cognition. Thus, conceptual cognition of a clay jug is a semblance of a bare perception.

A knowing (of something) that has been preceded by a semblance of a reason is a semblance of an inferential cognition. Since the many sorts of semblances of a reason have already been spoken of, therefore any knowing that arises, in reference to an inferable object, of someone unknowledgeable (about logic) is a semblance of an inferential cognition.  

Refutations are the pointing out of faults in a logical proof.
   - A fault in the logical proof would be its being defective.
   - A fault in the thesis would be its being contradictory to bare perception and so on.
   - A fault in the reason would be its having an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis), its being inconclusive or its being contradictory.
   - A fault in the example would be its being unestablished for the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof and so on.

The fault (skyon, Skt. doṣa) of being defective (yan-lag ma-tshang-ba-nyid, Skt. nyūnatva) means that the logical proof is lacking the statement of a component.

The pointing out of this as a (way of) convincing a challenger (of his fallacy) is a refutation.

Semblances of a refutation are the pointing out of faults in a logical proof that are baseless. (They include):
   - The statement of a defectiveness in regard to a logical proof that is complete
   - The statement of a fault in a thesis in regard to a thesis that is a not flawed
   - The statement of a reason being unestablished in regard to a reason that is established
   - The statement of a reason being inconclusive in regard to a reason that is conclusive
   - The statement of a reason being contradictory in regard to a reason that is not contradictory
   - The statement of an example being flawed in regard to an example that is not flawed.

These are semblances of refutations. An opponent (in a debate) cannot, in fact, be refuted by these, because of his being blameless.

Thus, (this treatise) is concluded. As a start, only the main points have been mentioned, for the sake of establishing a direction (for going further). Whatever is proper or improper here has been more thoroughly examined elsewhere. Thus, A Manual for Engaging in Logic has been completed.