The Correct View of Voidness
Today we will skip the summary of what Tsongkhapa has written up until the point that we are at in his Letter of Practical Advice on Sutra and Tantra and go directly to the section that we are on, which is Tsongkhapa’s discussion of voidness. In that discussion he is pointing out that there’s a correct understanding and an incorrect understanding, and we really have to watch out for getting an incorrect understanding since that can be quite disastrous for our practice. The misunderstanding of voidness that he points out seems to be probably a misunderstanding that was prevalent in his day; otherwise, he wouldn’t have pointed it out so strongly. Here he says that:
Suppose we had analyzed from the viewpoint of many lines of reasoning the arising, ceasing and so forth of phenomena.
Here he’s referring specifically within the context of the twelve links of dependent arising in terms of what keeps us in samsara (Skt. saṃsāra) and perpetuates it. It’s the arising and the ceasing, the actual ending of samsara (the third noble truth).
When (we had done so),
In terms of neither one nor many and all of these things.
the entire presentation of conventional truth had fallen apart (for us) and thereby we could not find (any way of) taking anything as being (conventionally) “this.” (Thus, we felt there was nothing conventionally true or real.) Because (of that), we might come (to the wrong conclusion)
Because of that, we would come to three wrong conclusions. One:
that all bondages and liberations (from samsara)
Being caught in samsara and being liberated from samsara.
are in fact like all bondages and liberations of children of barren women.
In other words, if there’s no this or that, then there’s no me, there’s no you — there’s nothing. Who is it that’s caught in samsara and who can be liberated from samsara? If you take that literally, then you feel that all of it is ridiculous.
Then the second thing is that:
Then we would go on (to wrongly imagine) that the occurrence of happiness and suffering from constructive and destructive actions was in fact no different than the arising of horns from a rabbit’s head.
In other words, we would then feel that the whole presentation of causality, cause and effect, was absurd — there was no reason to do anything constructive, because nothing could arise from anything, and so on, and we couldn’t get rid of suffering, so there’s no point, since there is nothing that would end.
Then the third one is:
Thereby, we would come to a (completely false) understanding that all of conventional truth is distorted conventional truth and that all conceptual cognitions
This is another point.
are distorted cognitions that are deceived about their conceptualized objects.
Mental Labeling (continued)
Okay. we went on, but since you wanted a little bit of a review concerning voidness, let’s just take this point and explain once more what we’re talking about here.
When we talk about mental labeling — imputation — mental labeling is a conceptual process. The actual process of mental labeling doesn’t occur in non-conceptual cognition, but that point does not deny that the existence of everything is established in as much as things are what the labels for them refer to. What does that mean? That’s what I’ve been explaining so often that mental labeling doesn’t create things. This is where the misunderstanding can come. If you think that conceptual thought creates things as this and that, then if you could just become non-conceptual — then there’s no this or that. If there’s no this or that, then what is anything? Then you think “What’s cause and effect?” and all these sorts of things. You have a real problem here.
Something Can Only Be a Basis of Labeling in Relation to a Label
Now, with mental labeling — mental labeling is by words or concepts. Let’s not get into the complication in terms of space and all these sorts of things; let’s just leave it in terms of conceptual cognition. Conceptual cognition, imputation, imputing things — when we talk about that, we have a basis for labeling and a label. These two are dependent on each other. Nothing exists as a basis of labeling independently of a label. It’s not as though bases for imputation are sitting out there waiting for somebody to label them and give them a name, like a blank diskette. It’s not like that. Something can only be a basis of labeling in relation to a label, just as something can only be the meaning of a word in relation to a word. You don’t have words and meanings existing independently of each other. That’s actually a very profound point in terms of dependent arising. This is dependent arising in terms of conventional truth of things — basis for labeling and a label.
Labeling and Voidness Do Not Contradict Cause and Effect
Participant: For example, take apple. The meaning apple I can also have without the word?
Dr. Berzin: No. If you take the word apple, can you have the meaning of the apple there without the…
Participant: I can still eat an apple, no?
Dr. Berzin: You can still eat an apple.
Participant: Without the label apple.
Dr. Berzin: Without the label apple.
Participant: But then it has a meaning to me.
Dr. Berzin: It has a meaning to you? No. Not independently of the word apple. That’s what we just said.
Participant: Why not? If I don’t know the word apple and eat an apple, then it can have…
Dr. Berzin: If you don’t know the word apple and eat an apple… If you don’t know the word apple or concept apple, are you eating an apple?
Participant: I’m eating something.
Dr. Berzin: Oh, you’re eating something. Is that something a basis for the name apple independently of the concept apple? Is it a something independent of a concept of a something?
Participant: No.
Dr. Berzin: No. Because something implies… Let’s not get into what something implies; that gets complicated.
Participant: You mean that the concept apple… There is a thing one can eat, but one would not cognize it as an apple without the label apple. That’s what you are saying?
Dr. Berzin: What you’re saying is: If we have the label apple… If we don’t have the label apple…
Participant: No, I’m just trying to summarize.
Dr. Berzin: Yeah, summarize it. Please summarize it again.
Participant: Okay. Now I forgot it.
Participant: Without the concept of an apple, you can’t cognize it as an apple.
Dr. Berzin: Right. Without the concept of an apple, you can’t cognize it as an apple. Correct.
Participant: But I could still eat it without…
Dr. Berzin: You could eat it.
Participant: I could eat something. I could eat it, but I…
Dr. Berzin: You could eat something. That becomes an interesting question. You could eat something. The wrong view would be that you could eat nothing, that you couldn’t eat if you didn’t have the concept of apple. Is there, though, something that’s just sitting there and could be labeled an apple, or an Apfel, or a…
Participant: That’s not the point.
Dr. Berzin: That’s not the point. Right. Cause and effect still functions. Mental labeling and voidness do not contradict cause and effect. We could still eat. But what is eating?
Participant: It depends on the mental label eating.
Dr. Berzin: Right. Eating is merely what the concept eating refers to on the basis of an appropriate basis for labeling, but in relation to that, with a definition which is also mentally constructed.
Participant: That’s with everything. There’s nothing that exists without a label.
Dr. Berzin: There’s nothing… You can’t establish… This is why I always say that you have to translate this whole discussion very literally with the word establish. That’s what the word drup (sgrub) means in Tibetan (and siddha in Sanskrit, which is what it is translating). You can’t establish the existence. It’s not that things don’t exist independently of mental labels. It’s also the same word as prove or affirm. It’s the same word as affirm.
How do you establish that there is such a thing as eating? It’s only in relation to the word eating and a basis. But a basis of eating, with the defining characteristics and so on — all of it is interdependent.
Participant: The point I just wanted to make (I got it a bit too strict): I imagine that you could have absolutely no label at all and still cause and effect would work, but you would not have mental constructs about it; you would not have labels about them. I imagine if there was no mental label at all, it would be a different… it would disappear.
Dr. Berzin: If there were no such things as mental labels, then everything would disappear?
Participant: If labels were to disappear.
Dr. Berzin: If we were to become non-conceptual, completely non-conceptual, cause and effect would still operate.
Participant: That’s what I wanted to say.
Dr. Berzin: Right. A Buddha’s mind is totally non-conceptual. However, that does not negate cause and effect with respect to a Buddha. How do you establish anything? It’s in terms of labels.
Mixing the Appearance of What Something Is with the Appearance of How it Exists
Now he’s talking about the conceptualized object (zhen-yul) in the text, and we would have:
the false understanding that all of conventional truth is distorted conventional truth and that all conceptual cognitions are distorted cognitions that are deceived about their conceptualized objects.
Conceptualized object. We have a concept of something, a label; we’re labeling something. The label refers to something — it’s what the label refers to — that’s the conventional truth of something.
Now, in terms of that, everybody else before Tsongkhapa, and the non-Gelugpas after, don’t differentiate the concept of what something is and the concept of how it exists (its manner of existence). Conceptual cognition by definition is projecting, or interpolating, true existence to something. An appearance of true existence… No, it’s a belief in true existence. Anyway, it’s projecting true existence — let’s not go into too much detail — projecting true existence onto things. Both are conventional truth: the conventional appearance of what something is and the conventional appearance of how it exists. If you put that into one package, then — because how something exists would be distorted in terms of how conceptual cognition sees it (it gives an appearance of true existence) — then the whole package would be distorted. This is what Tsongkhapa is refuting. It’s because of that that all conceptual cognition is so strongly rejected by the non-Gelugpas. Tsongkhapa differentiates the two and says the conceptualized object is what the concept refers to. The conceptualized object — in terms of an appearance of true existence, that aspect of it — that makes it into a thing.
You have, for instance, the conceptualized object of an apple. Okay? Conceptually I’m thinking in terms of apple, or I call it an apple. What does that apple refer to? I mean what does that concept refer to? It’s not the basis for labeling, but there’s a referent object. You can’t find that referent object established from the power of the side of the basis, but nevertheless there’s a referent object.
We have to differentiate here an apple and true existence. From one point of view, the conceptualized object is an apple. Tsongkhapa would say that’s valid. From another point of view, the conceptualized object here is true existence. That doesn’t exist at all. If you put those two together, the conceptualized object and the conceptualized manner of existence, then you have a referent thing, a truly existent apple. A referent thing can’t be found. There is no such thing as a referent thing, a truly existent apple, but there is an apple.
All conceptual thought is deceived with respect to the manner of existence, but it’s not necessarily deceived with what something is. This is Tsongkhapa’s point, that you have to differentiate these two: what something is and how it exists. The conceptualized object, in terms of just being an apple, is not incorrect. Whereas the conceptualized object being truly existent is incorrect. A referent thing, a truly existent apple — that doesn’t exist.
Participant: The referent object in your terms is…
Dr. Berzin: The referent object would be the conventional truth, the conventional truth in terms of what it is and how it exists, in terms of dependent arising. Its voidness is its deepest truth.
What Establishes that Something Exists Is Mental Labeling, Even from the Perspective of a Buddha
Participant: Like the presentation that things are established in terms of there being a valid convention referring to them. I mean, this is really more a presentation from the perspective of an ordinary being or from a non-Buddha, actually, isn’t it? I mean, not that for a Buddha it’s completely wrong what we think, but a Buddha doesn’t need to rely on concepts for his own establishment of validity, does he?
Dr. Berzin: Ah, now we have a difficult question. I hope that got recorded, because I can’t possibly repeat it, and you probably can’t repeat it either. He’s saying: When we talk about ordinary beings in terms of “this is an apple,” and so on… Is mental labeling just what ordinary beings have? That’s what you’re saying, basically. And what about aryas, and what about Buddhas?
Buddhas establish things in terms of mental labeling as well. For a Buddha to cognize something — a Buddha doesn’t have to have conceptual cognition, but a Buddha knows that “This can be established as an apple merely in terms of conceptual cognition.” Conceptual cognition occurs in non-Buddhas. Even aryas have conceptual cognition — not during total absorption on voidness but at other times.
There’s a point here. When we talk about deepest truth and conventional truth, the non-Gelugpas say, “Deepest truth is in terms of how things appear to a Buddha. Conventional truth is how it appears to non-Buddhas.” Tsongkhapa agrees that non-Buddhas always have an appearance of true existence except when totally absorbed on voidness. However, that’s not the best way of differentiating conventional truth and deepest truth (because then it mixes the appearance of what something is together with the appearance of how it exists) in terms of what’s valid and invalid — this is the misunderstanding here — then all of conventional truth is invalid.
Participant: I mean, I see that point from a bit of a different angle. I think it’s a sufficient criterion for establishment for it to be established in terms of conceptual cognition, a valid conceptual cognition.
Dr. Berzin: He says it’s a sufficient condition to establish things in terms of conceptual cognition. Yeah?
Participant: No. It’s the other way around: it’s a necessary condition.
Dr. Berzin: It’s a necessary condition? Is it sufficient? Yes, because that’s the Prasangika (Skt. Prāsaṅgika) point of view: mental labeling alone, names alone. It’s the Svatantrikas that say it’s necessary but it’s not sufficient: you have to have, from the side of an object, the defining characteristic.
Participant: Yeah, but I’m thinking more about phenomena that can really only be cognized by a Buddha.
Dr. Berzin: Phenomena that can really only be cognized by a Buddha. What can only be cognized by a Buddha?
Participant: For example, certain intricacies about cause and effect.
Dr. Berzin: Certain intricacies about cause and effect. What a Buddha is unique in is omniscience, being able to know everything. Others are limited — that’s why I call them limited beings (sems-can) — with limited minds and limited bodies. A tenth level bodhisattva might be able to cognize an awful lot, including about cause and effect, going back — and then they give the numbers of how many lifetimes — but not everything. Why not everything?
Participant: Because of appearance-making (snang-ba) of true existence.
Dr. Berzin: Because of appearance-making of true existence. They still have that. That puts things in boxes, which then separates them out from being able to see everything. It excludes.
All right. If we were all Buddhas… Which is a ridiculous question, because the Buddhist point of view is not like the Samkhya (Skt. Sāṃkhya) point of view, which is inevitably — I forget the technical term, but the inevitability that everybody eventually is going to become liberated. Buddhism doesn’t say that. We strive for that, but it’s not inevitable. When we ask the question, “Then what happens when everybody’s enlightened?” — if we pose that silly question anyway (with the caveat that it’s silly) — then would the existence of things still be established by conceptual cognition? This is, I think, what’s underlying your question. We’d have to say yes. We’d have to say yes.
Participant: Underlying my question is the point whether everything that’s knowable can be known by a non-Buddha.
Dr. Berzin: Can everything knowable be known by a non-Buddha? Um, I think so. No. Dharmakaya (Skt. Dharmakāya) can’t be known by a non-Buddha. Only Buddhas can know Dharmakaya, whatever that means. And Dharmakaya is what? The omniscient mind of a Buddha. One omniscient mind can know everything. Depending on what system we’re talking about, the voidness of the omniscient mind of a Buddha, or the inseparability of the three bodies (which means basically the two truths simultaneously all the time), or another presentation of Svabhavakaya (Skt. Svabhāvakāya) is the bliss of a Buddha’s mind, of a Buddha’s omniscient mind. Only Buddhas can know those.
Participant: Can you please repeat what came out when everybody is a Buddha, the silly one.
Dr. Berzin: If everybody were to become a Buddha — subjunctive case/tense — then still you would have to say that the existence of everything is established in terms of mental labels.
Participant: What for?
Dr. Berzin: How do you establish the existence of anything? What establishes the existence of anything?
Participant: For whom to establish something?
Dr. Berzin: Who do you have to have… No, no, no. Now you’re getting confused by this meaning of the word drup (sgrub) meaning “to prove.” It’s not that you have to prove it to anybody. What demonstrates, what proves — it’s not that you have to prove it in the sense that “Buddhas don’t really think this, and so I have to prove it to them.” It doesn’t mean that, although you could misunderstand the English word to mean that in this context (it does mean that in other contexts).
Participant: Okay. In order to prove something, one would need a label, of course.
Dr. Berzin: I mean, do Buddhas need labels in order to eat? Buddhas don’t eat, so that’s theoretical. Do Buddhas need labels to help others? Yes, because they have to communicate. Then, if everybody were enlightened — as I say, that’s a totally silly question.
Participant: Yes, but if you take this totally silly question…
Dr. Berzin: But come on. Doesn’t that come into the category of unanswered questions. What happens when there’s the end of samsara and everybody’s enlightened?
Participant: I don’t think it’s in these fourteen questions [the fourteen questions that Buddha refused to answer].
Dr. Berzin: I said it could come in the category. It goes in that general basket.
Participant: I think the question is about cognition theory and not about practicability in that situation.
Dr. Berzin: Right. We’re talking about…
Participant: It’s easier to understand with an extreme what we’re talking about.
Dr. Berzin: It’s easier to understand something with an extreme? Maybe. I don’t know. I think we’re talking about (if I can use the technical jargon) an ontological question here, rather than — maybe I’m not using the right term — than epistemological. What establishes it? You don’t have to establish it for a Buddha. You don’t have to prove it to a Buddha. However, what does ontologically establish that something exists — just from the point of view of existence? It is mental labels. There’s nothing on the side of the object that does it. You see, it’s not a matter of who is mentally labeling. It doesn’t matter who mentally labels, because mental labeling doesn’t create things.
Participant: Just the necessity to…
Dr. Berzin: The necessity to? Why would you have to establish that anything exists for a Buddha?
Participant: That’s just the point.
Dr. Berzin: It doesn’t matter. There’s no reason why you would have to establish it. However, that doesn’t deny that it is a true statement that, even from the perspective of a Buddha, what establishes that something exists is mental labeling. It’s a fact. A fact is a fact. You don’t have to convince somebody of it. You don’t have to convince Buddha of it. Buddha doesn’t have to state it. It’s just a fact — which is true regardless of who’s around, who’s there; it’s irrelevant.
Participant: It’s similar to my question, actually. Is valid conceptual cognition (with the emphasis on conceptual) the only possible means of establishing something?
Dr. Berzin: Is valid conceptual cognition the only way of establishing the existence of something? Again, you’re getting it confused. Conceptual thinking itself doesn’t do, actively, the establishing. The establishment is in relation to conceptual cognition; it’s not an active…
Participant: It’s the only context.
Dr. Berzin: It’s the only context, yes. Naming.
Why Couldn’t a Buddha Establish Things Non-Conceptually?
Participant: That is mainly the point, at least for a Buddha, that I find weird. Yes, of course we can only think by using conceptual models, but why couldn’t there be a non-conceptual representation for a Buddha as well?
Dr. Berzin: Why can’t there be a non-conceptual representation? How do you establish something non-conceptually? It would be what… Aha. That becomes an interesting question. According to Gelugpa, non-conceptual cognition also has an appearance of what something is and an appearance of how it exists, and it also has an appearance of truly established existence. The same [as conceptual cognition]. One has to differentiate those two with respect to non-conceptual cognition as well.
Participant: Would there be such a level even though we can’t…
Dr. Berzin: Also, in terms of non-conceptual cognition for Gelugpas, you’re also seeing conventional objects. Commonsense objects (’jig-rten-la grags-pa) are the objects of non-conceptual cognition.
Remember we had the non-Gelugpas, that non-conceptual cognition is only of one sense, and you only see one type of sense data, and it’s conceptual cognition that puts the sense data from all the senses together and you perceive a commonsense object, like an apple. Sight — you only see a red sphere, a red shape. An apple is not a red shape. When you get rid of conceptual cognition and say it’s all distorted, then you really get rid of it — I mean, there are no commonsense objects even; all commonsense objects are distorted as well. That becomes really weird.
Now your question is: Within the Gelugpa scheme, couldn’t we say that the existence of something is established in terms of what valid mental activity refers to? You don’t have a conceptualized object. You have to have an appearing object — now you have to get into the whole analysis of the different types of objects — there’s the appearing object (snang-yul), there’s the involved object (’jug-yul), but there’s no conceptualized object (zhen-yul). Whether or not that’s valid, I don’t know.
There’s an appearing object. You could differentiate an appearing object, like the mental hologram, in terms of the appearing object of what it is and the appearing object of how it exists. But what does it refer to? The involved object — I’d have to refresh my memory — the involved object is not necessarily an object out there… Well, is it an object out there? I don’t know. Now it starts to get complicated, very complicated. One would have to analyze very carefully why.
The only thing that comes to my mind, which may not at all be the correct answer here, is that you need concepts and vocabulary and words in order to communicate. When we put together — this is purely coming out of the top of my head, purely a guess — when we put together voidness and dependent arising in terms of concepts, and concepts together with what they mean, this is starting to sound to me very much like a basis level analogous to Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya (Skt. Saṃbhogakāya), and Nirmanakaya (Skt. Nirmāṇakāya). You have things similar to this in presentations in mahamudra (Skt. mahāmudrā). In tantra, Sambhogakaya is speech — in anuttarayoga tantra — it’s communication. Then Nirmanakaya is actual appearances of physical forms. If we extend that, we have words, and we have their meanings and their voidness. That seems to me very parallel. Although I haven’t seen that analogy drawn like that, it certainly fits into other analogies that you have in terms of voidness, the appearance-making aspect of the mind, and the actual appearances. That’s a presentation of mahamudra.
- The voidness aspect, which can be in terms of voidness of true existence or other-voidness (gzhan-stong) in terms of general awareness — not general (that’s a technical term) — in terms of awareness. The awareness of voidness aspect being Dharmakaya. You have omniscience or the voidness of omniscience.
- Then you have appearance-making. That’s equivalent to, or parallel to, Sambhogakaya.
- Then you have the appearance content itself. That’s parallel to Nirmanakaya.
Similarly, I think you could say that you have voidness, and then you have mental labels, and you have what they refer to. By formulating it this way, it emphasizes the inseparability of these three kayas. They’re very, very important — you have it only in Mahayana (Skt. Mahāyāna) — why? Because it’s with Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya that you help others. If you negate the conventional truth, it’s very difficult to really take seriously the existence of people, of limited beings, of anybody. We’re not just talking about there’s no pillars and there’s no vases.
Participant: But still if the Buddhas communicate with each other, do they need to relate…
Dr. Berzin: Do the Buddhas communicate with each other? That also is a silly question. They send email? How do they communicate with each other? Is there any need for them to communicate with each other?
Participant: I have no idea.
Dr. Berzin: It’s a silly question. Not silly, but it’s irrelevant. I don’t mean to be arrogant in saying that, but Zen masters would hit you over the head for asking that kind of question.
Participant: I would hit back.
Dr. Berzin: You would hit back. Right.
Do Buddhas communicate? They’re omniscient. If they’re omniscient, then why is there a need for communication one omniscient mind to another omniscient mind? They know what each other is thinking.
Participant: Maybe they want to ask for directions.
Dr. Berzin: They want to ask for directions. Right. Let’s not get to the Theravada (Skt. Theravāda) presentation of what a Buddha knows.
Is any of this relevant to our ordinary lives or are we just engaging in abstract thought here?
Participant: I think it’s relevant. We have to understand how…
Dr. Berzin: You think it’s relevant. How is it relevant?
Participant: In order to understand what all these concepts mean that we are talking about. I think it’s very easy to understand with an extreme, because then one sees “Oh, that does not work,” “This works,” and so forth.
If, as you said, the Buddhas have no need to communicate — that’s right, yeah? — there’s no need for any type of concept or for mental labeling. If there were only Buddhas.
Dr. Berzin: As he said, there’s no need for Buddhas, among each other, to communicate. Buddhas do not have conceptual thought. Do Buddhas speak to each other? Why would they need to speak to each other?
Participant: Then the question is irrelevant.
Dr. Berzin: The question is irrelevant. I mean, it sounds like a joke: What did one Buddha say to the other Buddha when they met them on the road?
The Three Criteria for Establishing the Existence of Something
Participant: The question that it’s getting at is really: Could there be another way of establishing objects?
Dr. Berzin: Could there be another way of establishing?
Participant: Even though, in terms of our mental framework, it’s not possible.
Dr. Berzin: There was an objection to… I think it was in maybe Svatantrika (I don’t really remember exactly). Something is established as true if it can be an object of cognition. True existence can be an object of cognition.
I mean, you have a point there. Because if we differentiate what something appears to be and how it appears to exist, you could differentiate that in both conceptual and non-conceptual cognition. Therefore, we would have to say that distorted cognition, whether conceptual or non-conceptual, can be distorted in terms of what it is (you think this dog is a cat) or how it exists. Ignorance — unawareness — accompanies both conceptual and non-conceptual cognition; not knowing accompanies both. Why does it have to be established in terms of names and concepts rather than in terms of cognition? (Or valid cognition I guess you’d have to say. Valid cognition. The definition of what exists is what can be validly cognized.) But to establish that it exists… When you say mental labels and names, it’s not active: it’s not that somebody actually has to do it. Whereas if you say cognition, it’s hard to dissociate that from who does it. Of course, you have the voidness of the three spheres — there’s the object, the agent, and the process. That’s the same with all three.
I don’t know. I don’t know. Obviously, we would have to think more deeply. There must be a reason.
Participant: The only thing that comes to my mind — but it’s again from the perspective of non-Buddhas — validating things works only with conceptuality for us.
Dr. Berzin: You’re saying: For non-Buddhas — the validating process works only conceptually with us. What do you mean?
Participant: If you’re trying to determine whether a cognition is mistaken or not mistaken — I don’t know how we would do that with non-conceptual cognition if we’re trying to investigate.
Dr. Berzin: If we’re trying to investigate whether something is valid or not.
Participant: Is something validly established or not.
Dr. Berzin: Established or not. What are the criteria for a valid mental labeling?
- There’s a convention. There is such a word as apple.
- It’s not contradicted by a mind that validly sees conventional truth.
- And not contradicted by a mind that validly sees deepest truth.
If we’re going to base our validation — how do you establish the existence of something? — if we do it on the basis of non-conceptual cognition, you’d have to take out the first of Chandrakirti’s criteria, that there’s a convention. But Tsongkhapa says we see apples, we taste apples, we smell apples. What are you validating? You’re validating that it’s an apple — non-conceptually? How can you validate that it’s an apple non-conceptually, independently of the concept apple? You couldn’t.
Participant: What if you take the second [not being contradicted by a mind that validly sees conventional truth]?
Dr. Berzin: The second? I conventionally see… What do you conventionally see? I conventionally see an apple. Without the convention, how could you… I mean, this was why the non-Gelugpas rejected that you saw commonsense conventional objects with hearing or seeing or smelling. Because how do you establish it? You have to establish that “I see an apple” in terms of the concept apple. When I see an apple, am I labeling that apple? No. Is it what the label apple refers to? Yes. Is it sitting there as an apple, and I don’t have to see it as an apple in order to see an apple — that gets pretty weird — and it’s existing as an apple from its own side?
It’s very hard to concretize even seeing — I see an apple. I think this is probably why you couldn’t establish it just on the basis of valid non-conceptual cognition. How could valid non-conceptual cognition establish that it’s an apple, establish the existence of an apple? Then you’re saying that things exist without being apples. Then what do they exist as? As somethings (then you have blank cassettes) or as nothing (then you have nothing).
Participant: That’s true existence. Both of those are true existence.
Dr. Berzin: Both of which have, probably, true…
Participant: But what does it exist as?
Dr. Berzin: What does it exist as? Is that true existence? Is an apple an apple? That’s a silly question. That’s saying that it basically is an apple and then asking is that valid or not. That’s a silly question.
Participant: Define is. That’s the problem.
Dr. Berzin: Define is. Right. An apple is validly an apple — those are dependently arising with each other.
Participant: It’s very difficult, then, to talk about something, to non-conceptually see something that’s already impossible.
Dr. Berzin: Well, non-conceptually do you see something? Tsongkhapa says, “Yes. We see commonsense objects.” Objects known in the world, literally — jigten la dragpa (’jig-rten-la grags-pa) — objects well known in the world. We deal with them, of course.
Participant: But then non-conceptually means what?
Dr. Berzin: Non-conceptually means not through the medium of a category. Categories are associated with words.
Participant: Yes, but how can you label something without a category?
Dr. Berzin: How can you label something without a category? You don’t. You can’t. But non-conceptual cognition doesn’t label. Labeling is conceptual.
Participant: Yes. I’m saying it would be impossible to cognize anything non-conceptually.
Dr. Berzin: Is it impossible to cognize anything non-conceptually? This is the position Tsongkhapa refutes.
Participant: Yes, but why?
Dr. Berzin: Why? Because then you have this extreme that you tend to fall to nihilism, that nothing exists.
Participant: The other way around, I would guess.
Dr. Berzin: Because they would accuse Tsongkhapa of saying that if within their system…
Participant: But what was the question?
Dr. Berzin: Wait a second. What’s the question? Now I’ve gotten a little bit confused.
Nonetheless, We Do Cognize Conventional Objects
If you can only cognize thises and thats conceptually, and thises and thats only exist conceptually, then non-conceptually what are you seeing? You can say, “We’re seeing just shapes, colored shapes. We’re hearing just sounds.” Are they things? And then you get someone like — what’s his name? — Shakya Chogden, a Sakya master, who says, “Not even that. Even colored shapes are conceptual. What you actually perceive are pixels of light.” Then you could go even further and say, “You don’t cognize anything.” It goes off in the direction of nihilism.
To avoid nihilism — that you don’t cognize anything non-conceptually — Tsongkhapa says, “But you do cognize conventional objects.” But it doesn’t mean that the conventional objects are just sitting there. Whether the conceptual objects are sitting there or not — that’s irrelevant. I mean, is there a rose in the valley if there’s nobody there to see it? When a tree falls in a valley with nobody there, does it make a sound? That’s not the point.
Participant: But when you say non-conceptual cognition, it’s a cognition that is without a concept. Or what did you say it was?
Dr. Berzin: Non-conceptual cognition is not through the medium of a category, category like apple or good or bad.
Participant: Then how can you cognize an apple?
Dr. Berzin: How can you cognize an apple without the category apple?
Participant: Because the basis for labeling is still there.
Dr. Berzin: Because the basis for labeling is still there? No. The basis for labeling is still there, dependently arising on the label, but it doesn’t have to be labeled at that time by you, or by anybody. Does that mean that it exists as the basis for labeling independently of the label just because at that moment nobody is labeling it? No. It’s established as a basis for labeling in relation to a label. It’s not created as a basis for labeling.
Participant: The answer is that one must not label it at that time an apple. In this way…
Dr. Berzin: Right. You don’t have to label it at that time as an apple.
Participant: But one could.
Dr. Berzin: But you could. It would be what an apple is. I mean, what are you eating? What are you eating? You’re just eating. What is eating? There’s putting it in your mouth, there’s chewing, there’s swallowing — what is eating? It’s made up of parts.
Participant: One could mentally label it eating, but one could also non-conceptually…
Dr. Berzin: One could non-conceptually… One eats. Things function.
This is not easy. This is not at all easy to understand. What is the world like to a non-conceptual mind that’s non-conceptual all the time? This is a very difficult question. Here’s something that only a Buddha could know.
Participant: That’s a nasty conclusion to this discussion.
Dr. Berzin: Right. Nasty conclusion? Right.
Participant: Before you know it, there isn’t an answer.
Participant: Ask a Buddha.
Participant: Be a Buddha.
Dr. Berzin: I look at you, or I look at — what do I look at? I look at the colored shapes over there? What am I looking at? Colored shapes. Am I seeing Mark? Do I have to think Mark in order to see Mark? No.
Participant: Yes.
Dr. Berzin: I have to think Mark? I don’t necessarily have to repeat the name in my mind.
Participant: No, you don’t have to repeat the name, but you have to mentally label it Mark.
Dr. Berzin: If I don’t mentally label you as Mark, are you not Mark?
Participant: Not for you.
Dr. Berzin: Not for me. If I don’t know that you’re Mark. I may not know. I might never have seen you before, and this is the first time I see you.
Participant: You can’t mentally label me Mark.
Dr. Berzin: I can’t mentally label you Mark. But if other people mentally label you Mark, then are you — what establishes you as Mark? The fact that other people are mentally labeling you Mark, and there is such a name, and conventionally other people — “Hey, what’s his name?” “It’s Mark.” Does he exist truly as Mark from beginningless time? No. So, okay, it’s not contradicted. That’s valid. Do I have to know it? No. When I see you, do I see Mark? Yes, I see Mark. What establishes you as Mark? The fact that other people label you that, that you’re what the label refers to. Can I relate to you without knowing your name? Yes. Can I relate to you as Mark, with all your history, and stuff like that? I don’t know. If I had extrasensory powers to know past and future, and stuff like that, I suppose. I don’t know.
Mark is the name of a person. There’s also Mark Three and Mark Four, the names of various machines.
These are topics that could go on and on and on. Does it make any sense to you?
What Is a Buddha’s Speech Like?
Participant: I just have this comment. Buddhas when they become Buddhas, it’s more or less getting rid of the obstacles and obscurations. You go beyond words and concepts, something like that. It doesn’t mean that you can’t use those terms.
Dr. Berzin: Right. He’s saying: When you become a Buddha, you go beyond words and concepts — when you get non-conceptual cognition of voidness, that’s a voidness that is beyond words and concepts. Then you asked, “Don’t Buddhas still need words?” Yes, they need words to communicate with others.
Participant: Even if we can’t understand what really a Buddha cognizes and what objects he takes or doesn’t take, whatever — that’s not part of the question — but he uses the reality as we know it to…
Dr. Berzin: He uses the reality as we know it — as if he had a choice. He doesn’t have a choice. I mean, that’s the reality.
Now, it’s very interesting if you think about Buddhas’ speech. Does a Buddha speak? What is Buddhas’ speech like? What’s one of the qualities of Buddhas’ speech? All the different languages, and everybody understands it, a different meaning at their own level, in every language. What’s that? Is a Buddha using mental labels? This is an interesting question. I’ve never explored that. I mean, what does it communicate? That’s interesting. When a Buddha uses speech…
Participant: He uses mental labels, of course, what else?
Dr. Berzin: Is he using mental… How can it be a generic mental label if everybody understands it in their own language?
Participant: If he uses different mental labels for everybody, that’s still a mental label.
Dr. Berzin: He’s speaking simultaneously in all languages?
Participant: Yes. Otherwise, how to do it?
Dr. Berzin: Otherwise, how to do it? This is a very interesting question.
Participant: It’s sort of like a thief turned policeman. He is totally skilled to manipulate the things that he has left behind. The thief had the skill to break into a house, but after a time he takes the decision “No, I don’t want to do it. I’ll become a policeman, and I’ll explain to the people there how thieves break into people’s houses to prevent future breaking-ins.” The mind of the Buddha went beyond words and concepts, but he still can make use of those skills that he had.
Dr. Berzin: What he’s explaining is that if you use the analogy of a thief who’s become a policeman, the thief — the ex-thief as a policeman — can explain to others the dangers of being a thief, and how people break into houses, in order to help them to avoid that. Isn’t that the same or analogous with overcoming conventional labeling and words and concepts but nevertheless using them, explaining them with others? Yes, but I still don’t know quite what it sounds like, how a Buddha’s speech works. These things are very difficult to understand.
Participant: I imagine that he is making some noise, however, and this noise appears to different people.
Dr. Berzin: Right. He’s making some sort of noise, he’s saying. Does the noise have any meaning? Yes, it does have meaning.
Participant: The noise made that way appears as different mental labels to different people.
Dr. Berzin: Right, appears as different mental labels in different people. How about that a Buddha is teaching simultaneously in all languages to all Buddha-fields, as numerous as all the pores of the skin, and so on?
Participant: That’s a story for children.
Dr. Berzin: That’s a story for children? Is it a story for children that a Buddha’s mind is omniscient? I think that this is related. Is a Buddha speaking everywhere at the same time to everyone if a Buddha’s omniscient? Is a Buddha just sort of broadcasting? Is a Buddha just sort of broadcasting on all frequencies simultaneously throughout the universe. Buddhas’ speech reaches all directions.
Participant: Body, speech…
Dr. Berzin: Body, speech — it’s… I don’t know. I’m just thinking about these things for the first time, I must say.
Participant: Music also. That’s also a means to teach.
Dr. Berzin: Music as a means to teach. Yeah, well, that’s one type of — Nirmanakaya uses music to teach.
Does the speech have inherent meaning?
Participant: Obviously not.
Dr. Berzin: Obviously not. Does a Buddha have intent? A Buddha teaches without intending. The enlightening influence (’phrin-las) of a Buddha is without effort, without intention — it’s the intention to benefit others, but I mean without preplanning — spontaneously accomplishes everything. I get the feeling that it probably is just broadcasting all the time, and those who are receptive will understand it, and those who are not receptive will not. It’s like a magnetic field.
The enlightening influence of a Buddha — sometimes translated as activity, Buddha-activity — and the Buddha’s speech, and the Buddha’s… I mean, if Buddha pervades everywhere, Buddha’s mind pervades everywhere. If Buddha’s mind pervades everywhere, the subtlest winds of that subtlest mind of a Buddha pervades everywhere as a basis. Doesn’t mean that Buddha’s the size of the universe. It’s not that Buddha becomes Brahma, like a Hindu thing. Buddha’s speech would pervade the whole universe as well. Those who are receptive would see the Buddha in different forms. Buddha appears in different forms to different people. It’s not that Buddha’s intentionally appearing in this form or that form; it’s that their mind can perceive the Buddha with this appearance or that appearance based on their, I guess, conceptual framework. Similarly, they can understand the speech — the so-called Sambhogakaya from a tantra point of view — it’s like a vibration; it’s the communication aspect of enlightened mind. Each one, just as they would see a Buddha in a different way, will also hear the words in a different way, with a different meaning, depending on their level of receptivity, the level of their network of deep awareness and positive force, and so on. That makes sense. That makes sense in terms of the teachings.
Is a Buddha speaking in words? No, not really. Not really.
Participant: That’s pretty close to what I was talking about.
Dr. Berzin: Yeah. But is it just noise? No, you couldn’t say it’s noise. It’s sort of a vibration
Participant: Vibration noises.
Participant: It’s a technical thing.
Dr. Berzin: A technical thing, whether or not it’s associated with a sound or something else. Then you get into the sound in the space element in Indian metaphysical systems. That gets weird, because — well, let’s leave it. Let’s leave it.
Anyway, that brings us to the end of the class. Thank you for your patience with this. Although we have covered these points before, I think that the more we discuss it, the more it will actually start to sink in. But I think we have to think in terms of: What’s the practical application of all of this in terms of how we relate to the world, how we relate to each other?
If we think of the bodhichitta (Skt. bodhicitta) meditations of equanimity — friend, enemy, stranger. These are labels. Can it be conventionally true that somebody is a friend, enemy, or stranger? Yes, it can. Are they ultimately that? No. Are we all equal? Yes, if you look at it in the longer perspective in terms of beginningless and endless mind. Everybody’s equal. We have an equal attitude toward everybody — friend, enemy, stranger. That’s important if we want to have Mahayana point of view, Mahayana point of view in which we want to be able to benefit everybody, like a Buddha, so lights and everything going out to everybody. However, are there those who are conventionally closer to us, with whom we have some connection, that we can benefit this person more easily than others? Yes. These two levels we have to see as noncontradictory. All these things of working with two levels, two aspects, a label of friend, enemy, stranger — where are they valid? What aspects of them are valid? These are things that we need to take into consideration.
Let’s end with a dedication. We think whatever understanding, whatever positive force has come from this, may it go deeper and deeper and act as a cause to reach enlightenment for the benefit of all.