The Relation between Wholes and Parts: Gelug Presentation

If something is self-sufficiently knowable, it is pervasive that it requires actual cognition of something else simultaneously with it, either its parts or, in the case of the Sautrantika assertion of partless particles, the larger conglomerates that they are parts of. These parts, however, do not need to be ascertained first before cognizing the whole.  

If something is imputedly knowable, however, it is not pervasive that it requires cognition of something else simultaneously with it, for example the static phenomena of voidness and selflessness as asserted in Chittamatra and Svatantrika, though not in Sautrantika. Their basis for imputation must first be ascertained prior to cognition of them, but their basis for imputation does not need to appear simultaneously with their ascertainment. That is not the case, however, with other static phenomena, namely categories and spaces.

• Cognition of a static category requires cognition of an individual item prior to and simultaneously with cognition of the category.
• Cognition of the lack of anything tangible or obstructive in an in-between area (bar-snang – a nonstatic, noncongruent affecting variable) between two things, such as in an open doorway of a barn seen by a cow, requires first (1) non-conceptually seeing the colored shapes between the two open doors, together with the information of the in-between area and open space as imputations on them, but not ascertaining either of them, (2) while explicitly non-conceptually seeing the colored shapes, conceptually cognizing the in-between area through the medium of a space that would not impede walking into it, as the imputation on it, and then (3) while explicitly non-conceptually seeing the colored shapes and the in-between area, simultaneously implicitly apprehending the space conceptually.

Let’s examine the non-conceptual sensory cognition of a whole form of a physical phenomenon, such as a body and its parts. The body is self-sufficiently knowable and, although it does not require cognition of all its parts in order to be known, it does require cognition of at least some of its parts simultaneously with it.

There are three different types of parts, for instance of a body: 

• Cognitive parts, namely different sensory qualities (yon-tan, sensory information) – its sight, sound, smell, taste and texture
• Physical parts (cha) – limbs, trunk and a head.
• Temporal parts – moments during which a body holds its individual essential nature (rang-gi ngo-bo ‘dzin-pa) – in other words, its conventional identity.

According to the True Aspectarian (rnam bden-pa) interpretation of Sautrantika, Chittamatra and Svatantrika, as accepted by the Gelug tradition, but not by the non-Gelug, when we cognize non-conceptually with a specific sense consciousness a part of a body, such as the colored shapes of the sight of the front of it in one moment, we also cognize non-conceptually a whole, commonsense body that pervades all its sensory data and extends over time. 

This is because we also non-conceptually “see” the collection synthesis (tshogs-spyi) and kind synthesis (rigs-spyi) that are forms of physical phenomena that are imputations on each moment of each of these types of sensory data. A collection synthesis is a whole validly knowable phenomenon. A kind synthesis is a specific type of validly knowable phenomenon, distinguishable from other types of phenomena. We see a kind of body; we are not seeing a kind of apple.

From the Sautrantika viewpoint, the fact that when we see these colored shapes. we are also seeing a whole object and a kind of body is an objective fact. The colored shapes, the collection synthesis of a whole object and the kind synthesis of a body are all forms of physical phenomena. They constitute a whole commonsense object, a body, in this case of an object cognized non-conceptually by a valid visual bare cognition. 

The body has its existence established from its own side as a validly knowable phenomenon that is a whole and that is a specific kind of phenomenon. It has this established by the individual defining characteristic marks (rang-mtshan) of the collection synthesis and kind synthesis – either by those marks alone, as in Sautrantika and Chittamatra, or by those marks in conjunction with being something imputed by conceptual cognition, as in Svatantrika. 

The individual types of sensory data (sight, sound, smell, taste and physical sensation) of the body and the individual moments of the body do not exist independently of each other; nevertheless, each has its own individual defining characteristic mark established on its own side. Thus, the individual defining characteristic marks of the whole collection synthesis and kind synthesis are found in each moment of each type of sensory data of the commonsense object.

When seeing the body, then, we see the body as a whole commonsense object that is a specific kind of object (a body), simultaneously with seeing one moment of the colored shapes that are its basis for imputation. The moment of colored shapes is the basis for the defining characteristic marks (mtshan-gzhi) of the collection synthesis and kind synthesis of the whole body.

The body as a whole commonsense object (a collection synthesis and kind synthesis) and any moment of any one of its sensory qualities – for instance, the body and the sight of the front of the body, or the body and the texture of the body – constitute a single substantial entity established simultaneously in a sensory cognition (grub-sde rdzas-gcig). This means that the body and the sight of the body are established as objects of a single cognition at the same time: when we see a body, we see the sight of the body. They cannot be seen separately from each other. They constitute a substantial entity which, according to Sautrantika, is the externally established natal source of the visual cognition of it. 

• A substantial entity (rdzas) is one that performs a function and, in fact, the full term for a self-sufficiently knowable phenomenon is a self-sufficiently knowable substantially existent phenomenon (rang-rkya thub-pa’i rdzas-yod). 

Further, regardless of how much of the sight of the body we see in one moment, the visual information of the body extends over the entire surface of the body. It is not larger or smaller than the extent of the body. 

Another way of describing the relation between the two is that the body and the sight of the front of the body are the “same substantial entity but different conceptual isolates (rdzas-gcig ldog-pa tha-dad).” Conceptually, one can isolate everything other than a body from everything other than the sight of the front of a body, but substantially they constitute one entity. 

• According to the Jetsunpa textbook tradition, the single substantial entities established by the body and each of its sensory qualities constituent separate, different substantial entities and so separate, different natal sources for valid cognition of them by different senses. If this were not the case and they were all the same substantial entity established simultaneously in a sensory cognition, then the absurd conclusion would follow that one cognition, for instance visual cognition, would have to cognize the body together with all its sensory qualities at the same time – not only a colored shape, but also a texture, a smell, a taste, and a sound. Or, when we see a body, we would have to see the entire body at once – both its front and its back – and not just a part of it. Nevertheless, the body and all its sensory qualities, extending over time, and all its physical parts constitute a whole, commonsense body.
• According to the Panchen textbook tradition, the whole, commonsense body and all the single substantial entities constituted by the body and each of its sensory qualities constitute the same substantial entity established simultaneously in cognition of it by any of the senses. Otherwise, the absurd conclusion would follow that one could cognize a whole commonsense body separately from cognizing a body together with just one of its sensory qualities. 
• Thus, according to Jetsunpa, the sight of the body and the smell of the body are different substantial entities; whereas according to Panchen, they constitute the same substantial entity.

Although in seeing the body, the mental factor of distinguishing (‘du-shes), focusing on its individual defining characteristic mark, differentiates it from other whole objects and other kinds of objects in the sensory field, one does not yet know what it is. One only knows what it is in the next moment, conceptually, with mental labeling of an object/ meaning category (don-spyi) and designation with a word.  

• Sautrantika and Svatantrika assert that the mental labeling of a category and designation of a word are on the basis of this individual defining characteristic mark. That mark establishes from the side of the whole object not only that it is a validly knowable object, but also what category of similar objects it belongs to and what its name is, whether or not anyone labels or designates it as such. For example, from this whole object’s own side, it is established as a body and as the meaning of the word “body,” even before anyone sees it or mentally labels it (fits it into the category of a body) and designates it with the word “body.” 
• Chittamatra asserts that although this individual defining characteristic mark establishes that this whole object is a distinct validly knowable object, it is not the basis on which the mentally labeled categories cling or the sound of the designated words are set. Although True Aspectarian Chittamatra accepts that when one sees colored shapes one is simultaneously seeing a whole object that is a specific kind of object; nevertheless, what category of object it fits in and what it is called is established exclusively by what it is imputed as by conceptual cognition. It can only be established conceptually as fitting in the category of “body” as the type of object that the word “body” refers to.
• Svatantrika asserts that it is not established exclusively from the individual characteristic mark findable on its own side as a distinct validly knowable object or fitting in the category “body” as the type of object that the word “body” refers to. And it is not established as any of these exclusively by conceptual imputation and designation. It can only be established as these by the combination of the characteristic mark findable on its own side and being what the mental label and word refer to. 

Even in seeing the colored shapes of a body, we never see the visual information of an entire body at the same time. When we see the front of a body, we do not see the back. Further, we may only see a part of a body, for instance just the top half of the body of someone walking past our ground floor window. Or we may see the body of someone for just a brief moment. Nevertheless, we would still need to say that we are seeing a body simultaneously with seeing just a physical part of it – even if the physical part is just a hand or a skin cell.

• We are not seeing the whole body, but yet the hand and the skin cell still have the individual defining characteristic mark of a body, not of an apple, and of our body, not someone else’s. In this regard, the individual defining characteristic mark or marker is someone what like the DNA of a body. 
• The issue is how much of one type of sensory data or how many moments of non-conceptual cognition of it are needed before we can correctly know what it is – in other words, before we can have correct conceptual cognition mentally labeling it with a conventionally correct category and designating it with a conventionally correct word?
• Depending on our abilities as the person looking at the sensory data, we may need to use valid cognition in which determination of its object needs to be induced by another cognition (gzhan-la nges-kyi tshad-ma, other-induced valid cognition). This is a cognition that validly knows that it will require another cognition in order to determine what its object is. We may need to see a larger part, or we may need to have a closer look, for instance under a microscope. 

The Svatantrika system makes a distinction between substantially existent composite forms and grouped forms of physical phenomena that may be relevant in other tenet systems as well:  

• Composite forms (bsags-pa’i gzugs) – literally, “piled-up forms” – are those in which their constituent particles and/or constituent parts connect with each other, like the head, arms, legs and trunks of our bodies or the parts of a vase. They constitute whole masses (gong-bu) and have composite substantial existence (bsags-pa’i rdzas-yod).
• Grouped forms (bsdu-pa’i gzugs) are those in which their constituent parts do not connect with each other, such as a forest, made up of a group of trees, or an army. They have grouped substantial existence (bsdu-pa’i rdzas-yod). 

Composite forms are self-sufficiently knowable. When we see just an arm that is connected to the whole body, we simultaneously see the arm and a body, even though we don’t see the entire body. 

Grouped forms are imputedly knowable, despite having substantial established existence. If we see a severed arm or just a skin cell, although they both have the characteristic marks of a body, we could see them on their own without the rest of the body being present. In that case, we could not say that we are seeing a body when we see just the severed arm or skin cell. But if the rest of the body were present, then we would need first to see the severed arm or skin cell and then, to ascertain that it is part of the whole body, the arm or cell together with part of the rest of the body that constitutes a composite form. 

The colored shapes of a part of a body – an arm, for instance – a body as a whole conventional commonsense object and a person all constitute a single substantial entity established simultaneously in a sensory cognition. The colored shapes are the basis for the defining characteristic marks of the arm and the body, but not of the person. A person is a sentient being (sems-can), which literally means “a possessor of a limited mind.” Thus, there is always a mind when there is a person. 

Thus, according to Sautrantika and Svatantrika, the mental consciousness is the basis for the defining characteristic mark of a person, while Chittamatra asserts the basis to be foundation consciousness (kun-gzhi rnam-shes), alayavijnana. When one sees the colored shapes of an arm together with seeing a body, then since there is also mental consciousness or foundation consciousness together with the body – assuming that it is the body of a live person – we can say that we are also simultaneously seeing a person. But, as explained above, we cannot ascertain the person in the first moment of seeing.  

As we have seen, the Sautrantika, Chittamatra and Svatantrika tenet systems, all self-sufficiently knowable phenomena are, more fully, self-sufficiently knowable substantially existent phenomena. They have substantially established existence, defined as existence established by the fact of something’s performing a function. Among imputedly knowable phenomena, noncongruent affecting variables, such as persons, also have substantially established existence, whereas static phenomena lack such existence.

Prasangika, as asserted by the Gelug tradition, refutes substantially established existence. Thus, it asserts that there are no phenomena that are self-sufficiently knowable. It accepts as what it calls “coarse imputedly knowable phenomena” imputedly knowable phenomena as defined by these three other Indian Buddhist tenet systems. It then asserts that all validly knowable phenomena have subtle imputedly knowable existence. Actual cognition of them requires simultaneous actual cognition of their basis for imputation. This applies to the cognition of wholes and parts. A whole and its parts, then, are imputedly knowable in this subtle sense of the term. 

Prasangika refutes existence established by individual defining characteristic marks (rang-mtshan-gyis grub-pa), whether by the power exclusively of the defining characteristic marks or by the power of them in conjunction with what is mentally labeled with conceptual cognition. Such existence is equivalent to substantially established existence, existence established from something’s own side (rang-gi ngos-nas grub-pa), existence established by something’s essential nature (rang-gi ngo-bos grub-pa) and existence established by something’s self-nature (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa, self-established existence, inherent existence). 

Prasangika asserts that all validly knowable phenomena, including wholes, parts and their individual defining characteristic marks, have existence established exclusively by being something imputed by conceptual cognition (rtog-pas btags-pa-tsam-du grub-pa). Thus, Prasangika refutes that wholes and their parts constitute a single substantial entity established simultaneously in a sensory cognition. Instead of describing the relation between a whole and its parts as the two constituting the same substantial entity but being different conceptual isolates, Prasangika describes a whole and its parts as having the same essential nature but different conceptual isolates (ngo-bo gcig ldog-pa tha-dad). The self and any of its aggregates or parts of its aggregates also share the same essential nature but different conceptual isolates. And remember, nothing has existence established by the power of a findable essential nature. Nevertheless, the rest of the explanation given by the lower three tenet systems for the steps of cognition of the parts of a body, a whole body and a person are the same.

In more detail, Prasangika asserts that the defining characteristic mark of a whole that is an imputation on parts is not established on the side of any of the parts of the basis for imputation. If it were, then the whole and that part would be identical, which is the extreme of “one.” If the defining characteristic mark of the whole were established on the side of the whole, then the whole and its parts would be totally separate and unrelated, which is the extreme of “many.” Thus, the defining characteristic mark of the whole has existence established exclusively by being something imputed by conceptual cognition. The same analysis applies to the relation between the conventional self, as an imputation, and the five aggregates as its basis for imputation. The same analysis also applies to the relation between the subtlest clear light consciousness and subtlest wind, as an imputation, and the grosser levels of mind and the grosser elements as their basis for imputation.