“Imputation” and “mental labeling” or, since it only occurs in conceptual cognition, “conceptual labeling” are the most common English translations for the Sanskrit term “prajñapti,” rendered in Tibetan with various inflections of the verb “’dogs-pa.” “Imputation,” however, is English jargon, and for most people, the term does not convey much meaning.
The Sanskrit term “prajñapti” is an action noun derived from the causative root of the verb “prajñā.” The mental factor “prajñā” derives from the same root. It was translated into Tibetan as “shes-rab,” which literally means “superior knowing.” That is perhaps the reason it is commonly translated as “wisdom.” I have been translating it into English as “discriminating awareness.” But to find a more accurate translation, we need to look at how the Nalanda masters have defined it.
According to these masters, prajñā is a mental factor that verifies with certitude that an item is an accurate or a distorted object and that it is an object of a valid or of an invalid way of knowing. It is based on having divided and sorted phenomena into these categories and having assessed the item to determine its status. Let’s call it a verifying mental factor or verification. By translating it like that, it fits in with Buddha’s advice not to accept anything he said out of respect or faith, but to test and verify it for yourself. It also explains the emphasis on learning ways of knowing (blo-rigs) and ways of reasoning (rtags-rigs) in the Buddhist training
Asanga gave the definition according to the Chittamatra system in Anthology of Special Topics of Knowledge (Chos mngon-pa kun-las btus-pa, Skt. Abhidharmasamuccaya) as a mental factor that differentiates a mixed group of items that that have been assessed and sorts them, with certitude, into those that have been set by a valid way of knowing or an invalid one. It is the agent for turning back doubts.
Vasubandhu defined it, as understood in both the Vaibhashika and Chittamatra systems, in A Discussion of the Five Aggregate Factors (Phung-po lnga’i rab-tu byed-pa, Skt. Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa), as a mental factor that differentiates a mixed group of items by sorting, with certitude:
- Those that have been generated by a valid way of knowing (an accurate and decisive cognition)
- Those by an invalid way of knowing (such as presumption, indecisive wavering and distorted cognition)
- Those by a means other than those two (such as instinctively knowing, from birth, how to suck milk).
Yashomitra defined it according to the Vaibhashika system in The Clarified Meaning, An Explanatory Commentary on (Vasubandhu’s) “Treasure House of Special Topics of Knowledge” (Chos mngon-pa’i mdzod kyi ‘grel-bshad don-gsal-ba, Skt. Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā) as a mental factor that differentiates items.
Sthiramati explained it further in The Meaning of the Facts, An Annotated Subcommentary to (Vasubandhu’s) “Autocommentary to ‘A Treasure Trove of Special Topics of Knowledge’” (Chos mngon-pa mdzod-kyi bshad-pa’i rgya-cher ’grel-pa don-gyi de-kho-na-nyid, Skt. Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyā-ṭīkā-tattvārtha):
As for, “A verifying mental factor is a (mental factor) that differentiates items,” it differentiates (them) by sorting (them). It is that which differentiates a mixed group of items into correct and distorted ones, and individually characterized and collectively characterized ones, and makes an assessment, like, “these are tainted, these are untainted, these are phenomena with a form, these are phenomena that are without a form.”
Chandrakirti, in his text also called A Discussion of the Five Aggregate Factors (Phung-po lnga’i rab-tu byed-pa, Skt. Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa), defines it, as understood in both the Svatantrika and Prasangika systems, as a mental factor that differentiates what is correctly and incorrectly understood through hearing, analytical thinking about, and meditating on voidness (emptiness).
Taking these definitions into consideration, “verifying” more accurately conveys the meaning – verifying whether some object has been generated by a valid means of knowing.
Verifying may be part of a conceptual or a non-conceptual cognition, and its certitude may or may not be accurate. For example:
- Non-conceptual – verifying whether what we see in the distance is a person and whether we need to get closer to know if it is a person or a scarecrow.
- Conceptual – verifying what we understood from our friend’s message as definitely being what they meant.
Furthermore, verifying may or may not be with a philosophical view (lta-ba), such as one that asserts justice in the universe, and the view may or may not be a correct one. If in conjunction with a view, verifying follows a conceptual assessment (rtog-pa, Skt. tīraṇā) of whether the view is in accord with the Buddhist Dharma – for instance, the verifying involved when analyzing the validity of the Svatantrika view and reaching a decisive conclusion.
Verifying always functions in conjunction with the mental factor of distinguishing (‘du-shes, Skt. samjñā). In general, something is “verifiable” if it can be distinguished as a specific individual item and that distinction can be differentiated as correct or incorrect. Something is “verifiable” if it can be differentiated, in the context of a view or of a conceptual framework, as a distinct item that can be analyzed, evaluated and validly cognized. For example, “love” is a verifiable item if, when we examine our emotional feelings toward someone, we are able
- To distinguish what we feel toward them
- To fit what we feel into the object category (don-spyi) “love”
- To evaluate whether our thinking we love them is correct.
The Tibetan term “’dogs-pa” means “something that is bound or tied to something else,” which puts the emphasis on something’s dependency on something else. Although the explicit meaning suggests something existing tied to something else, the implicit meaning is something that can only be distinguished and verified by depending on first distinguishing and verifying something else as in the case of noncongruent affecting variables (ldan-min ‘du-byed) or voidness, or verifying two things simultaneously, like long and short, a part and a whole, and a category and an item that fits in the category
- An example is the age of a tree being distinguishable and verifiable dependent on the number of rings on the tree trunk. The age is not distinguishable and verifiable just by itself without depending on first distinguishing and verifying the number of rings.
- The Tibetan term does not connote adding what was not naturally there, like attaching a baggage tag to our checked-in suitcase so that we can distinguish it as ours.
Based on this definition of prajñā, prajñapti (Tib. btags-pa) is an item that is verifiable on the basis of something else – namely, by being dependent on a basis, as in the case of a person and the five aggregates.
- Literally translated, “prajñapti,” means “something that makes it possible for something else to be verified.”
- The verb “prajñapyate,” usually translated as “impute” or “mentally label,” literally means “make it possible for something else to be verified.”
- Prajñapti, then, as an “imputation” or a “mental label,” is something that renders something else as being a distinctly cognizable object that the mental factor of verifying can focus on.
Prajñaptisat (Tib. btags-yod), then, which I have previously translated as “imputedly knowable,” and where sat means “existent,” becomes “existent as an item verifiable on the basis of something else.”
Prajñaptisiddha (btags-pas grub-pa), then, is “established by being verifiable on the basis of something else.” Note that siddha (Tib. grub-pa) is also the term for “affirmed” and “proven.” It does not mean “created.”
- Prasangika asserts “rtog-pas btags-tsam-gyis grub-pa,” “established by merely a conceptual mind as being an item verifiable on the basis of something else.”
- Svatantrika asserts “established by a conceptual mind in conjunction with a marker of the item to be verified that is findable on the side of the basis that makes it verifiable.
According to Chandrakirti, a valid verification of the form of object something is (its ngo-bo, Skt. svarūpa) cannot be made from the side of the object, but only from the side of the mind:
- There must be an agreed upon convention of it – to exclude the son of a barren woman
- It must not be contradicted by a mind that validly sees conventional truth – to exclude someone else when I see you
- I must not be contradicted by a mind that validly sees deepest truth – to exclude a self-established person.