A Manual for Engaging in Logic

Out of those, statements of a thesis and so on constitute a logical proof. By means of statements about the subject of the thesis, the reason and the examples, a matter that is not believed by a challenger (in a debate) is explicated. 

Out of those, the thesis consists of an established property-possessor wished by someone to be established as being characterized by a well-known characteristic – “that is not incompatible with bare cognition and so on” is the remainder of the statement. It is like this: “Sound is permanent, or it is impermanent.”

The reason consists of three components. How is it threefold, in other words, in nature? (It is threefold with)

1. “(The reason’s) being a property of the subject of the thesis 
2. Its existence (as a property) in a homogeneous item 
3. Its nonexistence (as a property) in a heterogeneous item.”

(If you ask), “And what is a homogeneous item and what is a heterogeneous item?” 

• An item that is the same, in the sense of having the same property as what is to be established, is a homogeneous item. It is like this: in the statement that is to be established, “Sound is not permanent,” something impermanent, such as a clay jug and so on, is a homogeneous item. 
• A heterogeneous item is something in which what is to be established does not exist (as a property. It is like this): “Whatever is permanent is seen to be something unproduced, like space and so on.” 

Here, being something produced, or (in other words,) being something (that has arisen) immediately from effort, exists only (as a property) in a homogeneous item and never (as a property) in a heterogenous item. Thus, “The reason – (being something produced) – is (a property) in (what is to be established,) being impermanent and so on.”

The example is of two types:

1. (One given) through its similarity
2. (One given) through its dissimilarity. 

Out of those:

[1] First, as for something that is (given as an example) through its similarity, it is something stated as having existence only as an item homogeneous with (both the property to be established and) the reason. It is like this: “A clay jug and so on, (as an example) for whatever is produced, is seen to be impermanent.” 

[2] Further, as for something that is (given as an example) through its dissimilarity, it is something explained as being absent (as a property) of what is to be established and likewise absent (as a property) of the reason. It is like this: “Space and so on, (as an example) for whatever is permanent, is seen to be something unproduced.” 

What is meant by the word “permanent” is an absence, in something, of impermanence and, by the word “unproduced,” an absence (in something) of a state of being something produced, just as the absence of a presence is (called) an “absence.”

The subject of a thesis and so on have (now) been explained. 

Statements of these at the time of a convincing of others (constitute) a logical proof. It is like this:

1. “Sound is impermanent” is a statement of a thesis
2. “Because of being something produced, and so on,” is a statement of a property of the subject of the thesis (given as a reason)
3. “Whatever is something produced is seen to be impermanent, like a clay jug and so on,” is a statement of concordance, as in the case of a homogenous item. “Whatever is permanent is seen to be something unproduced, like space,” is a statement of negative concomitance (as in the case of a heterogeneous item).

Just these three alone are called “the members (of a logical proof).” 

Something that is wished to be established, but which is contradictory to bare perception and so on, is a semblance of a thesis. It is like this: (there is)

1. “One that is contradictory to bare perception
2. One that is contradictory to inferential cognition
3. One that is contradictory to textual tradition
4. One that is contradictory to worldly common sense
5. One that is contradictory to one’s own statement
6. One that is an unestablished characteristic
7. One that is for an unestablished item to be characterized
8. One that is both an unestablished (characteristic and for an unestablished item to be characterized)
9. One that is (a characteristic having) a (mutually) established connection (with the item being characterized).”

Out of those:

[1] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to bare perception would be (the thesis), “Sound is not something that can be heard.”

[2] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to inferential cognition would be (the thesis), “A clay jug is permanent.”

[3] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to textual tradition would be (the thesis), “Sound is permanent,” for a Vaisheshika (proponent).

[4] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to worldly common sense would be (the thesis), “The skull of a human head is pure because of being the component of a living creature, like the shell of a conch.”

[5] How something (wished to be established) can be contradictory to one’s own statement would be (the thesis), “My mother is a barren woman.” 

[6] How something (wished to be established) can be an unestablished characteristic would be (the thesis) of a Buddhist, “Sound is perishable,” (made) to a Samkhya (proponent).

[7] How something (wished to be established) can be for an unestablished item to be characterized would be (the thesis) of a Samkhya (proponent), “The soul (atman) is the conscious one,” (made) to a Buddhist. 

[8] How (something wished to be established) can be both an unestablished (characteristic and for an unestablished item to be characterized) would be (the thesis) of a Vaisheshika (proponent), “The soul is an inherent material cause of happiness and so on,” (made) to a Buddhist.

[9] How (something wished to be established) can be (a characteristic having) a (mutually) established connection (with the item being characterized) would be (the thesis), “Sound is something that can be heard.”

The statements of these are ones with faults in the proposition:

• “(The first five) through the gateway of rejection of the self-nature of the property (to be established)
• (The next three) through the impossibility of demonstrating (it to the opponent)
• (The last one) through the uselessness of the logical proof.”  

They are said to be semblances of a thesis.  

(There are three kinds of) semblances of a reason:

• One that has an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis)
• One that is inconclusive
• One that is contradictory.

Semblances of a Reason Having an Unestablished Connection with the Subject of the Thesis

Out of those, there are four kinds of (semblances of a reason having an) unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis). It is like this: (there is)

1. One with an unestablished (connection) for both (parties of the debate)
2. One with an unestablished (connection) for one or the other (party of the debate)
3. One with an unestablished (connection) due to doubt
4. One with an unestablished (connection) as a substratum support.

Out of those:

[1] In the case of the impermanence of sound being what is to be established, (the reason) because of its visibility is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis) for both (parties of the debate).

[2] (Also in the case of the impermanence of sound being what is to be established, giving as a reason) “because of being something produced” to (a Mimamsaka) propounder of sound being a (brief) manifestation is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis) for one or the other (party of the debate).

[3] (The presence of) a conglomerate of basic elements being pointed out as (a reason) for proving (the presence) of fire, while doubting (it is smoke) because of the presence of mist, is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (invariable connection with the subject of the thesis) due to doubt.

[4] (A Vaisheshika proponent giving as a reason) “because of being the substratum support of qualities” to a (Charvaka) propounder of the nonexistence of space for (establishing the thesis), “Space is a basic thing,” is (an example of a semblance of a reason) with an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis) as a substratum support.

Inconclusive Semblances of a Reason

There are six kinds of inconclusive (semblances of a reason):

1. “One that is common (to both homogenous and heterogenous items)
2. One that is uncommon (to both homogenous and heterogenous items other than the subject of the thesis)  
3. One that is an occurrence in (only) one division of homogeneous items, but which has pervasion with (all) heterogeneous items
4. One that is an occurrence in one division of heterogeneous items, but which is something that has pervasion with (all) homogeneous items
5. One that is an occurrence in (only) one division of both (homogeneous items and heterogeneous items)
6. One that leads to contradictory (theses) without discrepancy (from both properties applying to the subject of the thesis).”

Out of those:

[1] (An example of an inconclusive semblance of a reason that is) common (to both homogenous and heterogenous items) is, “Sound is permanent because of its valid knowability.” This (reason) is, in fact, inconclusive because of its commonality with both (all) permanent and (all) impermanent items. (One could ask,) “Is it because of its valid knowability that sound is impermanent like a clay jug; or is it because of its valid knowability that, perhaps, it is permanent like space?”

[2] (An example of an inconclusive semblance of a reason that is) uncommon (to both homogenous and heterogenous items other than the subject of the thesis) is, “Sound is permanent because of its audibility.” This is, in fact, a dubious reason because of the exclusion (of audibility) from being (something occurring either in all) permanent or (in all) impermanent items and because of the nonexistence of any other (possibility) except (sound being) permanent or impermanent. (One could ask,) “What kind of thing (permanent or impermanent) could audibility be (a characteristic) of besides (sound)?”

[3] How would (an inconclusive semblance of a reason) be that is an occurrence in (only) one division of homogeneous items, but which has pervasion with (all) heterogeneous items? (It would be), “Sound is something that does not (arise) immediately from effort, because of its impermanence.” In the case when something that does not (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item homogeneous with it is lighting or space, and so on. Impermanence is seen (as a property) in some of these (homogeneous items), such as in lightning and so on, but not in space. (Further,) in the case when something that does not (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item heterogeneous with it is a clay jug and so on. There, impermanence is seen (as a property) in all cases, in a clay jug and so on. Because of that, that (reason) is inconclusive through the similarity of lightning and a clay jug (in their both having the reason, impermanence, as a property). (One could ask,) “Is it because of its impermanence, like that of a clay jug and so on, that sound is something that does (arise) immediately from effort, or is it because of its impermanence, like that of lighting and so on, that perhaps it is something that does not (arise) immediately from effort?” 

[4] How would (an inconclusive semblance of a reason) be that is in one division of heterogeneous items, but which is something that has pervasion with (all) homogeneous items? (It would be), “Sound is something that does (arise) immediately from effort because of its impermanence.” In the case when something that does (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item homogeneous with it is a clay jug and so on. There, impermanence is seen (as a property) in all cases, in a clay jug and so on. (Further,) in the case when something that does (arise) immediately from effort is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item heterogeneous with it is lighting or space, and so on. There, impermanence is seen (as a property) in some of these (heterogeneous items), such as in lightning and so on, but not in space. Because of that, that (reason) is inconclusive, like in the previous case, through the similarity of lightning and a clay jug (in their both having the reason, impermanence, as a property).

[5] How would (an inconclusive semblance of a reason be that is) an occurrence in (only) one division of both (homogeneous items and heterogeneous items)? (It would be), “Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality.” In the case when being permanent is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item homogenous with it is space or subtle particles, and so on. There, incorporeality is seen (as a property) in (only) one division of these (homogeneous items), such as space and so on, but not in (the others), such as subtle particles and so on. (Further,) in the case when being permanent is (the property to be established in) the thesis, an item heterogeneous with it is a clay jug or happiness, and so on. There, incorporeality is seen (as a property) in one division of these (heterogeneous items), such as happiness and so on, although not in (the others), such as a clay jug and so on. Because of that, that reason is inconclusive through the equality of both happiness and space (in their both having the reason, incorporeality, as a property).

[6] How would (inconclusive semblances of a reason be that) lead to contradictory (theses) without discrepancy (from both properties applying to the subject of the thesis)? (They would be, for a Vaisheshika to assert,) “Sound is impermanent because of being something produced, like a clay jug,” and also, “Sound is permanent because of its being something heard, like ‘being a sound.’” Having established the two of them, one must be inconclusive, because the reasons lead to indecisive wavering in regard to both.

Contradictory Semblances of a Reason

There are four kinds of contradictory (semblances of a reason). It is like this: (there is)

1. One that proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property (to be established)
2. One that proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property (to be established)
3. One that proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis)
4. One that proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis). 

Out of those:

[1] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property (to be established)? (It would be), “Sound is permanent because of being something produced, (or in other words,) because of being something (that has arisen) immediately from effort.” That reason is contradictory because of its presence only (as a property) in a heterogeneous item.

[2] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property (to be established)? (It would be the Samkhya proposition), “The eyes and so on are items for the use of something other (than themselves), because of their being a conglomerate (of parts), like the characteristic of (being a conglomerate of) parts in the case of a bed, a chair and so on.” (But) if that reason establishes the usability of the eyes and so on for something other (than itself), so too does it establish the conglomerate (state) of (that) something other (than itself that uses them), the soul, because of there being no discrepancy from both (properties applying to the subject of the thesis).

[3] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to the self-nature of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis)? (It would be the Vaisheshika proposition), “The (pervasive generic character ‘objective) existence’ is not a basic thing, not a quality, and not an activity, because of its being something (namely, a substratum support) that has (supported on it) singular basic things and because of its existence in qualities and activities (as the substratum support that supports them), as are (specific) generic characters and individualities.” But if that reason establishes the rejection of (objective) existence being a basic thing and so on, so too does it establish the nonexistence of (objective) existence, because of there being no discrepancy from both (properties applying to the subject of the thesis).

[4] How would (a contradictory semblance of a reason be that) proves something opposite to a characteristic of the property-possessor (that is the subject of the thesis)? (It would be giving) the same reason as in the above thesis and, as a characteristic of the property-possessor (the pervasive generic character “objective existence”), it’s being that which causes conviction in its being existence. But that (reason) also establishes the opposite, its being that which causes conviction in its being nonexistence, because of there being no discrepancy from both (properties applying to the subject of the thesis).  

Semblances of an example are of two kinds:

• (One given) through its similarity
• (One given) through its dissimilarity. 

Semblances of Examples Given through Their Similarity

There are five kinds of semblances of examples that are (given) through their similarity. It is like this: (there is)

1. One that is unestablished for the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof
2. One that is unestablished for the property to be established
3. One that is unestablished for both (the property given as a reason and the property to be established)
4. One (given for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) concomitance
5. One (given for a thesis) where the concomitance is (stated) in the reverse order.

[1] How would (a semblance of an example given through its similarity) be that is unestablished for the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof? “(It would be the example) like a subtle particle for (the logical proof), Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality; whatever is incorporeal is seen to be permanent, like a subtle particle. Although the property to be established, permanence, is present in (the example) a subtle particle, the property given as a reason, incorporeality, is not, because of the corporeality of subtle particles.”

[2] How would (a semblance of an example given through its similarity) be that is unestablished for the property to be established? “(It would be the example) like the intellect for (the logical proof), Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality; whatever is incorporeal is seen to be permanent, like the intellect. Although the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof, incorporeality, is present in (the example) the intellect, (yet) the property to be established, permanence, is not, because of the impermanence of the intellect.”

[3] Those (semblances of an example given through their similarity) that are unestablished for both (the property given as a reason and the property to be established) are of two types: those that are existent and those that are not existent. Of those:

• (The semblance of an example) “like a clay jug” is an existing one for which both (properties) are unestablished, because of the impermanence and corporeality of a clay jug.
• (The semblance of an example) “like space” is a non-existing one for which both (properties) are unestablished (in a debate) against a (Charvaka) proponent of its nonexistence.

[4] (A semblance of an example, given through its similarity, for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) concomitance is one in which the co-presence is observed of both the property to be established and the property given as a reason, as in “a clay jug in which being something produced and impermanence are (both) observed,” but without the concomitance (between the two properties being stated).

[5] How would (a semblance of an example given through its similarity) be (for a thesis) where the concomitance is (stated) in the reverse order? (It would be) one where, when “Whatever is something produced is observed to be impermanent” is what should be said, (the proponent) states (instead), “Whatever is impermanent is seen to be something produced.”   

Semblances of Examples Given through Their Dissimilarity

There are five kinds of semblances of examples that are (given) through their dissimilarity. It is like this: (there is)

1. One that is not in contrast with the property to be established
2. One that is not in contrast with the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof
3. One that is not in contrast with both (properties, the one given as a reason and the one to be established)
4. One (given for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) negative concomitance
5. One (given for a thesis) where the negative concomitance is (stated) in the reverse order.

Out of those:

[1] How would (a semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) be which is not in contrast with the property to be established? “(It would be the example) like a subtle particle for (the logical proof), Sound is permanent because of its incorporeality; whatever is corporeal is seen to be impermanent, like a subtle particle. Although (the example,) a subtle particle, is in contrast with the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof, incorporeality, (yet) because of the corporeality of subtle particles, the property to be established, permanence, is not in contrast (with it), because of the permanence of subtle particles.”

[2] How would (a semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) be which is not in contrast with the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof? It would be the example, “like a karmic impulse” (for the same proposition as above). Although (the example) a karmic impulse is in contrast with the property to be established, permanence, (yet) because of the impermanence of a karmic impulse, the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof, incorporeality, is not in contrast (with it), because of the incorporeality of a karmic impulse.

[3] (A semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) that is not in contrast with both (the property given as a reason and the property to be established) is “like space” (again for the same proposition as above in a debate) against a proponent of its existence. “In that (proposition, the example, space), is not in contrast with (both) permanence and incorporeality, because of the permanence and incorporeality of space.”

[4] (A semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity, for a thesis) where there is no (statement of) negative concomitance between the property to be established and the property given as a reason would be one that can be pointed out as existing as a heterogenous item, in which (both) corporeality and impermanence are observed, as in the case a clay jug.

[5] How would (a semblance of an example given through its dissimilarity) be in which the negative concomitance is (stated) in the reverse order? (It would be) one where, when “Whatever is impermanent is observed to be corporeal,” is what should be said, (the proponent) states (instead), “Whatever is corporeal is seen to be impermanent.”  

The expression of these semblances of a thesis, a reason and the (two kinds of) example constitutes a semblance of a logical proof.

For the purpose of demonstrating something to oneself, there are only two (ways of validly) cognizing it:

1. Bare perception
2. Inferential cognition.

Out of those:

[1] Bare perception is the one from which concepts are excluded. “The one that is free of the concepts of name and genus in reference to an object of knowledge, such as a sight and so on, and which occurs through each of the sense organs” is (called) bare perception.  

[2] Inferential cognition is the one that is a showing of an object from a line of reasoning. The line of reasoning with three components has previously been discussed. Anything known that arises from them in regard to an object that can be inferred, such as “Here is fire” or “Sound is impermanent,” is (known through) inferential cognition.

In both cases, for that (cognizing), only a (valid) knowing is the result (of the cognizing), because of its quality of having the essential nature of apprehending (something). Because of its being well-known as something having a use, it is (called) the “valid cognitive measurement (of something).”

A conceptual knowing in reference to an external object is a semblance of bare perception. Any knowing of something, a clay jug or a cloth, that arises conceptually is a semblance of a bare perception because of its not having as its object (of experience) that object as an individually characterized phenomenon.

A knowing (of something) that has been preceded by a semblance of a reason is a semblance of an inferential cognition. Since the many sorts of semblances of a reason have already been spoken of, therefore any knowing that arises, in reference to an inferable object, of someone unknowledgeable (about logic) is a semblance of an inferential cognition.  

Refutations are the pointing out of faults in a logical proof.

• A fault in the logical proof would be its being defective.
• A fault in the thesis would be its being contradictory to bare perception and so on.
• A fault in the reason would be its having an unestablished (connection with the subject of the thesis), its being inconclusive or its being contradictory.
• A fault in the example would be its being unestablished for the property (given as a reason) in the logical proof and so on.

The pointing out of this as a (way of) convincing a challenger (of his fallacy) is a refutation.

Semblances of a refutation are the pointing out of faults in a logical proof that are baseless. (They include):

• The statement of a defectiveness in regard to a logical proof that is complete
• The statement of a fault in a thesis in regard to a thesis that is a not flawed
• The statement of a reason being unestablished in regard to a reason that is established
• The statement of a reason being inconclusive in regard to a reason that is conclusive
• The statement of a reason being contradictory in regard to a reason that is not contradictory
• The statement of an example being flawed in regard to an example that is not flawed.

These are semblances of refutations. An opponent (in a debate) cannot, in fact, be refuted by these, because of his being blameless.

Thus, (this treatise) is concluded. As a start, only the main points have been mentioned, for the sake of establishing a direction (for going further). Whatever is proper or improper here has been more thoroughly examined elsewhere. Thus, A Manual for Engaging in Logic has been completed.