Here (a challenger) states: The disturbing mental factors, karmic impulses, bodies, agents, and results – all of these – are not what is actual. Rather, like a city of the celestial musician gandharvas and the like, although they are simply not what is actual, they nevertheless appear to childish beings in the aspect of being what is actual.
He then asks, What, then, in this case, is what is actual? And how does one enter into what is actual?
(Reply): Because nothing internal or external whatsoever, with no exception, is findable (because if it were findable, it would be found), the state in which “I ”-making and “mine,” made out of what is internal and what is external, have been extinguished in every respect – this is what is meant here by “what is actual.”
As for entering into what is actual:
Seeing with verifying intelligence that the disturbing mental factors and faults, without exception, (all) arise from (cognizing with) a deluded view toward a perishing network, and having understood the ātman-soul to be its object, the yogi makes, in fact, a negation of the ātman-soul.
(Entering into what is actual) is to be understood in detail from the passage (beginning like this) in Engaging in Madhyamaka (Madhyamakāvatāra, VI.120).
(The yogi) sees that saṃsāra has the deluded view toward a perishing network as its very root. (The yogi) also fully sees that from not finding an ātman-soul (which would be found if it existed), the disturbing view of a perishing network is gotten rid of. From its being gotten rid of, all the disturbing mental factors are turned away. Therefore, first of all, he closely examines precisely the ātman-soul: “What, then, is this (thing) called ‘the ātman-soul’ that is the object of ‘I’-making? And when this object of ‘I’-making is conceptually construed, would its way of existing be as something (identical with) the aggregates or distinct from the aggregates?”
The positions of support, supported, and possession are included within the positions of oneness and otherness. Therefore, because our Founding Master, Ācarya (Nāgārjuna), wishes to speak only in brief, he wishes to undertake the negation of the ātman-soul by just refuting the two positions of oneness and otherness. Thus, he states:
If the ātman-soul were the aggregates, it would be subject to arising and passing away. If it were something other than the aggregates, it would have characteristics that were not those of the aggregates. || 1 ||
(Challenger): But why, elsewhere (in this text), in (chapter XXII), “Examination of the Tathāgata,” and in (chapter X), “Examination of Fire and Fuel,” are five positions in each case brought forward (for analysis), whereas here, by contrast, there are only two positions spoken of?
(Reply): It is precisely because the five positions in each case have already been specified there in those two chapters that, having been specified elsewhere, they are not specified again here. Rather, for the sake of brevity, only the two positions are brought forth (for analysis).
Out of these (two), suppose the aggregates are conceptually construed to be the ātman-soul. The aggregates are subject to arising and passing away. Therefore, since the aggregates are subject to arising and passing away, it follows that the ātman-soul also possesses an arising and a passing away. But this cannot be accepted (by you, since you assert the ātman-soul to be a partless monolith. This is) because the absurd conclusion (would follow) of the fault of the ātman-soul being (temporally) multiple. For, as (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) will say (later in this text, XXVII.12):
Nor could it have arisen after being nonexistent (prior to this lifetime when there was a different ātman-soul in the previous lifetime. This is) because the fault would absurdly follow here that the ātman-soul (arising in this lifetime) either would be something produced or would come into existence without a cause.
Likewise (XXVII.6):
And the ātman-soul is also not exactly the basis relied upon for obtaining it. That (basis, the aggregates,) goes out of existence and comes into existence. For how, indeed, could the basis relied upon for obtaining it be the obtainer? (If it were, there would be two ātman-souls – the obtainer basis and the obtainer).
Moreover:
If the aggregates were the ātman-soul, then because of (the aggregates) being multiple, there would likewise, in fact, be many ātman-souls (one corresponding to each aggregate). It would also follow that the ātman-soul was a substantial entity (since the aggregates are substantial entities), and being such, when (arising and perishing) were operating with the substantial entity (of the aggregates), the contrary could not be the case (with the ātman-soul).
(Then although) at the occurrence of (pari)nirvāṇa, there would necessarily be an annihilation of the ātman-soul (since the aggregates cease). But before the occurrence of (pari)nirvāṇa, there would be the (ātman-soul’s) destruction and production from moment to moment (since the aggregates are destroyed and are produced at each moment. Then) because of the destruction of the agent (in each moment), there would, in fact, be the nonexistence of a result (from what the agent did), and someone else would experience (the results of) karmic impulses acquired by someone else.
Because of the analysis undertaken in detail in Engaging in Madhyamaka with these (last two verses, VI.127-128) and so on, an extensive elaboration is not undertaken again here. Therefore, first of all, the aggregates are not the ātman-soul.
(The ātman-soul) being distinct from the aggregates is, in fact, also untenable, for if the ātman-soul were something other than the aggregates, it would have characteristics that were not those of the aggregates. Just as a horse, being other than a cow, does not have the characteristics of a cow, likewise the ātman-soul, conceptually construed as distinct from the aggregates would have characteristics that were not those of the aggregates.
In that case, because the aggregates are affected phenomena, (the aggregates) are (phenomena that) come into existence from causes and conditions and have arising, abiding and disintegrating as their characteristics. In such a case, according to your hypothesis, the ātman-soul, having characteristics that are not those of the aggregates, would not be conjoined with the characteristics of arising, abiding, and disintegrating. And then, whether because it was nonexistent like a flower (appearing) out of thin air or because it was unaffected like nirvāṇa (and therefore not included in the aggregates), something like that does not (satisfy the condition for being a component of the aggregates needed to) acquire for itself the designation “ātman-soul” at all. Nor would it be tenable for it to be the object of “I”-making. Thus, an ātman-soul that is distinct from the aggregates is also untenable.
Alternatively, there is this other interpretation. If the ātman-soul were distinct from the aggregates, it would have characteristics that were not those of the aggregates. The five aggregates have the characteristics (respectively) of forming a physical phenomenon, experiencing (a feeling) by taking hold of indicative features, compelling (a way of being aware of something to perform its function) and making an object be cognized. If the ātman-soul being asserted (existed) distinct from the aggregates, like a consciousness is from a form of physical phenomenon, it would be established as having separate characteristics. And if it were established as having separate characteristics, it would be cognitively taken (as something different) like a consciousness is from a form of physical phenomenon. But it is not cognitively taken (like that). Therefore, one that is distinct from the aggregates does not exist.
(Challenger): But the Indian non-Buddhist extremists have for sure asserted an ātman-soul that is distinct from the aggregates. They describe it as having characteristics different from those of the aggregates. Therefore, this dictum (of yours that an ātman-soul could not exist because if it did exist, it would have to have characteristics different and distinct from those of the aggregates, such as being unaffected by causes and conditions) is one that does not counteract their (assertions).
(Reply): As for how the non-Buddhist extremists describe an ātman-soul that has characteristics different from those of the aggregates, it is just as said in Engaging in Madhyamaka (VI.121, the first half referring specifically to the Sāṃkhyas):
The ātman-soul conceptually construed by the Indian non-Buddhist extremists is (for example) one that is static, a non-agent (of karmic actions), an experiencer (of feelings that ripen from karmic potentials), without (the three) constituents (of rajas, sattva, and tamas) and without activity. Depending on one or another Veda, the non-Buddhist extremists’ formulations of its (fundamental makeup) have come to differ.
What is being said by this is that it is true that the Indian non-Buddhist extremists state characteristics of (an ātman-soul) that are distinct from those of the aggregates. Nevertheless, they do not state its characteristics after having found an ātman-soul existing as its own kind of conventional object.
(Challenger): What, then, is the case?
(Reply): They do not understand that (a conventional self’s) being verifiable is something obtained from reliance on a basis. Out of fear, they do not accept a (conventional) self that is (made verifiable) by merely (relying on) a name. They have thereby fallen away from even conventional truth. And so, having been deceived by mere semblances of inference (arising) from false conceptualization, they conceptually construe an ātman-soul and, out of close-mindedness, state its characteristics. Their (position) has in fact been rendered refuted, even conventionally, in chapter (VIII), “Examination of Karma and Agent” and elsewhere, by (the syllogism) that the self and the basis relied upon for the obtainment of it are established in mutual dependence (on each other).
And as (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) has said (in Precious Garland, Ratnāvalī, I.31-34):
The reflection of one’s own face is indeed seen as obtained in reliance on a mirror, but that very (reflection) is not anything in terms of what is actual. Likewise, “I”-making is found as obtained in reliance on the aggregates, but in terms of what is actual, there is no such (“I”-making), just like the reflection of one’s own face. Without taking a mirror as its basis, the reflection of one’s own face is not seen. Likewise, without taking the aggregates as its basis, an “I” is not (found) either. From hearing this kind of point, the Noble Ārya Ānanda attained the (extrasensory) eye of the Dharma. He himself repeatedly spoke (of it) to the monks.
Therefore, no further effort is undertaken for the purpose of demonstrating that.
It is precisely an ātman-soul being made into something verifiable by relying (on a basis) (that is at issue here). For those who have come under the influence of the distortion of misknowing, it has become the support for (their) adherence to an ātman-soul. It is this that is analyzed by those desiring release.
(They analyze): This (ātman-soul), for the obtainment of which this network of five aggregates appears as the basis – does it have the characteristics that are those of the aggregates or the characteristics that are not those of the aggregates?
But, analyzing it in every way, those desiring release do not find this (ātman-soul) as having self-established existence as a findable existent “thing.” Then, for them:
When there is no atman-soul, how could there possibly be anything belonging to an atman-soul? || 2ab ||
Because of not finding an ātman-soul (which they would find if it existed), they all the more do not find the network of five aggregates as something belonging to the ātman-soul (as “mine”). (After all, these aggregates are) the basis on which (an ātman-soul) relies in order to be obtained and made verifiable. When a chariot has been burned, its parts are not found because of their also having been burned. Likewise, whenever yogis realize the lack of an impossible ātman-soul of an ātman-soul, at that very same time they necessarily also realize the lack of an impossible ātman-soul of things (included) in the aggregates and belonging to the ātman-soul (as “mine”).
As (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) has said in Precious Garland (I.29-30):
The aggregates have their origination in “I”-making; that “I”-making is false in actuality. When its seed is false, how could its sprout be true? Having seen the aggregates thus as not true, one rids oneself of “I”-making; and from having rid oneself of “I”-making, there is no further arising of the aggregates.
It is just like that. (For example), in summer, when the blazing-rayed sun has reached the end of the midday period and is about to traverse the middle region of the cloudless sky, its rays, resembling widely scattered sparks of an exceedingly fierce fire slightly whirling about, are intent on scorching the exceedingly parched surface of the earth. In dependence on those rays encountering an exceedingly parched area of ground, and in dependence on mistaken seeing, mirages are found having the appearance of water. In people standing at a far-distant spot, they give rise to a cognition having the appearance of extremely clear, deep-blue water. But they do not (give rise to such a cognition) in those who have come near.
Likewise, there are those traveling along the road of saṃsāra who follow the distortion of misknowing. Because of this, they are standing at a (mental) spot far removed from (where they would be able) to see what is actual concerning the supposedly firmly established objects purportedly referred to by the words “an ātman-soul” and “something belonging to an ātman-soul.” For them, there is an interpolation onto the aggregates of precisely (this) deceptive object (an ātman-soul) appearing as true. But this (interpolation) does not appear to those who are standing close (where they can) see what is actual concerning such (seemingly) findable objects purportedly corresponding to words.
As Ācarya (Nāgārjuna), at whose feet we bow, has said (in Precious Garland, I.52-54):
A form observed from afar is seen clearly by those nearby. If a mirage were water, why would it not be cognitively taken by those nearby? Just as this world is seen by those situated far away as though (its way of appearing) were the way it actually is, it is not seen (that way) by those who are near. It is without the (corresponding) indicative features, like a mirage. Just as a mirage resembles water but is not water (conventionally or) in actuality, likewise the aggregates resemble an ātman-soul but are not ātman-souls (conventionally or) in actuality.
And precisely because of this, from not finding an ātman-soul or what belongs to an ātman-soul, the yogi definitely comes close to seeing the deepest (truth).
From the final stilling of an ātman-soul and of what is of benefit to an ātman-soul, (one comes to be) without “mine” and without “I”-making. || 2cd ||
“Ātmanīna” means “what is of benefit to an ātman-soul,” namely, the five aggregates; the significance is “what belongs to an ātman-soul” (“ātmīya”). Through the final stilling, namely the non-arising (due to) the non-finding, of (1) an ātman-soul, which is the object of “I”-making, and of (2) what is beneficial to an ātman-soul, namely “things” (included) in the five aggregates and the like as the objects of “mine”-making, the yogi comes to be without “mine” and without “I”-making.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 2 ||
(Challenger): But surely that one who in this way comes to be a yogi without “mine” and without “I”-making – he, at least, exists. And with him existing, the ātman-soul and the aggregates are established.
(Reply): This is not so, because:
Even someone who is without “mine” and without “I”-making does not exist.
Whoever sees one without “mine” and without “I”-making does not see. || 3 ||
The kind of (findable) objects the ātman-soul and aggregates exist as is in no way found. (They would be found if they existed). How could there, then, be some other findable object corresponding to a word, distinct from that pair, who would be that one who is without “mine” and without “I”-making?” Someone who, in this way, sees a (findable) person without “mine” and without “I”-making, despite the kind of (findable) object that person exists as cannot be found, should be understood as not seeing what is actual.
As the Bhagavan (Buddha) has said:
See the internal as void; see the external as void. Even someone who meditates on voidness does not exist.
Likewise:
Anyone who thinks of phenomena as (findable “things” that are) void is, in fact, a childish being who has entered the wrong path. Phenomena are designated “void” by means of words, but they are without words; the words are merely uttered. Whoever thinks of phenomena as (findable “things” that are) stilled and completely stilled – even that mind (which conceives them in this way) has never arisen and never existed. All conceptually fabricated projections are conceptualizations of the mind. Understand phenomena as subtle and inconceivable.
Likewise:
The aggregates are devoid of being self-established and findable, free of it; enlightenment is devoid of being self-established and findable, free of it. Whoever practices (this) is himself devoid of being self-established and findable. (This is understood) by one possessing deep awareness, but not by one who is childish.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 3 ||
Thus, like that:
Upon “mine” and “I” having been eradicated, an obtainer mind toward what is external and what is internal as well is ceased. From the eradication of that, there is the eradication of birth. || 4 ||
It is said in a sūtra that all disturbing mental factors have a deluded view toward a perishing network as their root, as their origin, as their cause. And that deluded view toward a perishing network is gotten rid of through not finding an ātman-soul or what belongs to an ātman-soul. And from getting rid of that, the fourfold set of obtainer desire, (deluded) views, (deluded) morality and conduct, and doctrines of an ātman-soul are gotten rid of. From the eradication of the obtainers, there is the eradication of birth, characterized as further existence.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 4 ||
And as this sequence for turning away birth has been arranged in this way, therefore:
Liberation is from the eradication of karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors. || 5a ||
Thus, it has been established. For when the obtainers have been eradicated, further existence, which has that as its condition, does not occur. When further existence has ceased, how could birth, aging, death, and so forth possibly arise? Thus, it is established that liberation occurs from the eradication of karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors.
It must then be asked: through the eradication of what does the extinguishment of karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors come about? (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) has said:
Karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors (originate) from conceptual discrimination; these (originate) from conceptually fabricated projection; but conceptually fabricated projection ceases in voidness || 5bcd ||
For a childish ordinary being who, without proper consideration, conceptually construes forms and so forth, a disturbing mental factor, such as longing desire, arises. For (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) will say (XXIII.1):
Longing desire is said to have conceptual constructs as its source, as (do) also hostility and close-mindedness. That is because they dependently derive from distorted (conceptions) concerning attractive and unattractive.
And it is said in a sūtra:
O longing desire, I know your root. You arise indeed from conceptual constructs. I will not conceptually construct you and because of that, you will not exist in me.
Thus, first of all, karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors roll forth from conceptual discrimination. And those conceptual discriminations originate from assorted conceptually fabricated projections that one has become habituated to throughout beginningless saṃsāra. (These projections) are of (findable) characteristic marks of cognizing and what is cognized, what is said and what says it, the one who does something, the impulse to do it, the doing of it, and what is done, clay jug, cloth, crown and chariot, form of physical phenomenon and feeling, woman and man, gain and loss, happiness and unhappiness, fame and infamy, criticism and praise, and so on. But upon seeing the voidness of the self-established and findable existence of all (phenomena), (one sees that) this mundane conceptually fabricated projection ceases in voidness without remainder.
How so? Because, if “things,” were indeed found, there would be the web of conceptually fabricated projection described above. For those with longing desire do not engage in conceptually fabricated projection concerning a barren woman’s daughter possessing physical form, beauty, and youth without finding her. And without engaging in conceptually fabricated projection, they do not engage in improper conceptual discrimination having that (barren woman’s daughter) as its object. And without engaging in a web of conceptualization, they do not cause, through adherence to “me” and “mine,” the host of disturbing mental factors rooted in a deluded view toward a perishing network, to arise. And without causing the host of disturbing mental factors having as their self-identity a deluded view toward a perishing network to arise, they do not implement constructive, destructive, and unwavering karmic impulses. And without implementing karmic impulses, they do not experience the wilderness of saṃsāra, forming a single tangling web of birth, aging, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, unhappiness, distress, and so on.
Likewise, yogis, when in a state of seeing voidness, do not find any of the aggregates, cognitive sources, and cognitive stimulators as kinds of findable objects, without exception. And, not finding any “things” that are kinds of findable objects, (which they would find if they existed), they do not engage in conceptually fabricated projection having them as its object. And without engaging in conceptually fabricated projection having them as its object, they do not engage in conceptual discrimination. And without engaging in conceptual discrimination, they do not cause, through adherence to “me” and “mine,” the host of disturbing mental factors to arise rooted in a deluded view toward a perishing network. And without causing the host of disturbing mental factors – a deluded view toward a perishing network and so on – to arise, they do not implement karmic impulses. And without implementing them, they do not experience the links (of the dependent arising of saṃsāra) called birth, aging, and death.
Thus, upon reaching voidness, characterized by the peaceful final stilling of all conceptually fabricated projection without remainder, the entire web of conceptualization and conceptually fabricated projection disappears. From the disappearance of conceptually fabricated projection comes the turning away of conceptual discrimination. From the turning away of conceptual discrimination comes the turning away of karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors without exception. From the turning away of karmic impulses and disturbing mental factors comes the turning away of birth. Therefore, because (voidness) is characterized by the turning away of all conceptually fabricated projection, it is precisely voidness that is spoken of as nirvāṇa (in the sense that cognizing voidness is necessary for attaining nirvāṇa as both liberation and enlightenment).
As (the Lineage Master Ācarya Āryadeva) has said in (Four) Hundred (Verse Treatise, Catuḥśataka-śastra-kārika, XII.23):
The Tathāgatas describe the Dharma in brief as nonviolence (for higher rebirth) and precisely voidness for nirvāṇa (as both liberation and enlightenment). Here, this (Dharma) is only these two.
The Lineage Master Ācarya Bhāviveka, however, not accepting the śrāvakas’ and pratyekabuddhas’ realization of voidness as described above, explains thusly (in the Lamp of Verification, Prajñāpradīpa, commentary to XVIII.3ab):
Even an ārya śrāvaka observes merely an assemblage of affected phenomena, arisen from other (causes and conditions) and terminating at every moment, (to be) neither an ātman-soul nor something belonging to an ātman-soul. (Such an ārya śrāvaka) comes to see that, because there is nothing that is an ātman-soul or that belongs to an ātman-soul, they are merely phenomena that are born and die. Because an ātman-soul is the object of “I”-making (then because of its nonexistence, what belongs to it is nonexistent as well). It is precisely because it is nonexistent that nowhere is there any internal or external “thing” (belonging to it). Therefore, because of the non-arising of “mine”-making, one is without “mine” and without “I”-making, and so no determination of what kind of (findable) object the “I” exists as originates apart from what has been agreed upon by convention. (If this is the case for ārya śrāvakas), it is even more so for great bodhisattvas who see all conditioned phenomena as unborn and who abide in the practice of non-conceptual verification.
Therefore, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states (XVIII.3ab):
Even someone who is without “mine” and without “I”-making does not exist.
That this Lineage Master (Ācarya Bhāvaviveka), on a matter of this kind, does not subsequently follow the position of the Lineage Master (Ācarya Buddhapālita), at whose feet we bow, has been explained accordingly in Engaging in Madhyamaka (VII.1):
Since on the (seventh bhūmi-level of mind), Far-Gone, an ārya bodhisattva is superior (to an ārya śrāvaka) in the power of his verifying intelligence (but not in its object verified)…
Thus, concerning this, no further effort is made in a refutation of that (position). For precisely this reason, the Bhagavan Buddha has said in the Sūtra on the Noble Bhagavatī Far-reaching Verification in Eight Thousand (Verses):
Subhūti, anyone wishing to fully realize the purified state of a śrāvaka must train in this very far-reaching verification. Subhūti, anyone wishing to fully realize the purified state of a pratyekabuddha must train in precisely this far-reaching verification. Subhūti, a bodhisattva mahāsattva wishing to fully realize the unsurpassed, perfect and complete purified state must train in this very far-reaching verification, and so on.
He states further:
Whoever wishes, “May I become a śrāvaka of the Sugata, may I become a pratyekabuddha, or likewise a Dharma King,” cannot attain (that) without relying on this patient acceptance (of far-reaching verification), just as one who does not see the shore cannot go from this shore to the far shore.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 5 ||
Here (the challenger) asks: If it has been established that what is actual is the nonarising, internally and externally, of the webs of conceptualization in terms of “I” and “mine,” because no internal or external findable “thing” is found, then what about this statement made by the Bhagavan:
The ātman-soul is indeed the guardian of the ātman-soul. What other guardian could there be? Indeed, with the ātman-soul thoroughly tamed, the wise person attains a heavenly realm. Indeed, the ātman-soul is the guardian of the ātman-soul. What other guardian could there be? Indeed, the ātman-soul is the witness of the ātman-soul, of what has been done (right) and what has been done wrong.
Likewise, in the Noble King of Absorbed Concentrations (Sūtra) (Āryasamādhirāja Sūtra):
Negative and positive karmic potentials do not perish; created by the ātman-soul, (their results) are to be experienced (by the ātman-soul). There is no transfer of a karmic result (to someone else) and no experience (of one) without a cause.
and so on at length. How, then, is that not contradictory?
(Reply): But didn’t the Bhagavan also say this?
Here there is no sentient being or ātman-soul; rather, these phenomena have causes.
For likewise:
Form is not an ātman-soul; nor does an ātman-soul possess form; an ātman-soul is not in form; and form is not in an ātman-soul … and so on, through to, Consciousness is not an ātman-soul; nor does an ātman-soul possess consciousness; an ātman-soul is not in consciousness; and consciousness is not in an ātman-soul.
Similarly:
All phenomena are without an ātman-soul.
How, then, would this scriptural passage not contradict the preceding scriptural passage? Therefore, the intended purport of the Bhagavan’s teaching must be investigated.
In general, however, in the extensive differentiation into interpretable and definitive meanings in the teachings by the Bhagavan Buddha – like never-setting suns, intent on causing the lotus beds of the minds of all those in the world to be tamed to open with their spreading rays of great compassion and knowledge of skillful means:
Even an ātman-soul made verifiable has been indicated and even no ātman-soul as well; and even there is neither an ātman-soul nor no ātman-soul has been indicated by the Buddha. || 6 ||
And here the intended meaning is this: There are those here for whom the entire eye of their verifying intelligence has been covered over by a cataract of the darkness (that arises) from adhering to wrong seeing (arising from the distortion concerning there being no ātman-soul). Even while remaining merely within the realm of conventional truth, they do not see even the class of existent things that falls within the range of the clear seeing of mundane people. Intent on describing what is actual merely in terms of earth, water, fire and wind, they describe verifying intelligence as coming into existence merely from the maturation of the great elements, beginning with those present at the initial stage of an embryo. They compare this to an alcoholic drink, endowed with the specific characteristics of being able to produce intoxication, stupor and so forth, coming into existence dependent merely on the maturation of specific substances such as roots, cooked rice, water and yeast.
Being thus engaged in denying past and future existence, they deny that this life (comes from a previous one), that there is a next life, and that there is an ātman-soul. Thus, they disclaim:
There is no present life (coming from a previous one); there is no next life; there are no ripened results of the karmic potentials from constructive and destructive karmic actions; there is no spontaneously arising sentient being (such as those on the two higher planes of compulsive existence), and so forth.
And because of their denial of (all) that, they are turned away from bringing about the specific desirable results distinguished as heaven and final release. (Instead), they are constantly and continally turned toward perpetrating destructive karmic actions. (Consequently) they are headed toward falling into the great abysses of the hells and so forth.
In order to turn them away from those wrong views, the Bhagavan Buddhas follow the dispositions of the realm of limited beings, which is divided into eighty-four thousand types of mental behavior. They are intent on fulfilling their pledge, undertaken to bring the entire realm of limited beings across (the sea of saṃsāra), not leaving out any. With networks of verification, method, and great compassion foremost, they are incomparable, the sole friends of the world. As great kings of physicians, they are the healers of the great disease of all disturbing mental factors, without exception. With the wish to care for those to be tamed who are of lesser, middling, and highest (capacities), and (specifically) in order to turn away from (committing) destructive karmic actions and so forth those of lesser capacity who engage in destructive karmic actions, the Buddhas, the Bhagavans, have in some cases even made an “ātman-soul” verifiable and established it in the world.
The reasoning for refuting the assertion that things arise without a cause is to be understood from (chapter VIII), “Examination of Karma and Agent,” from the passage beginning, “Nor from no cause,” and, in detail, from Engaging in Madhyamaka (Madhyamakāvatāra). Therefore, no further effort is undertaken here to refute that assertion.
But (there are also) those who, like birds bound by the great cord of the view of an ātman-soul as actually existent – (a cord that is) strong and extremely long but slack – have flown very far by engaging in constructive karmic actions and turning away from pathways of destructive karmic actions. Nevertheless, they are still unable to pass beyond taking rebirth in any existence within the three planes and reach the peaceful city of nirvāṇa, where there is no old age or death. For those persons to be tamed who are of intermediate scope, the Bhagavan Buddhas, wishing to benefit them, have even taught “no ātman-soul,” in order to loosen their firm adherence to a deluded view toward a perishing network and engender in them a longing for nirvāṇa.
But there are those in whom the seed acquired through confident acceptance of the profound Dharma, which has followed from a special previous habituation, has matured and for whom nirvāṇa is close at hand. Having ascertained the exceptional degree of confident acceptance of these persons to be tamed who are of advanced scope, from whom sticky attachment to an ātman-soul has departed and who are capable of plunging into what is actual concerning the meaning of the extremely profound teachings of the Lord of Sages:
Even there is neither an ātman-soul nor no ātman-soul has been indicated by the Ārya Buddhas.
For just as the view of an ātman-soul is not what is actual, likewise even its counterposition, the view of no ātman-soul, is also not what is actual. In this way, it has been indicated that there is no ātman-soul whatsoever, nor is there any no ātman-soul.
As has been said in the Noble Pile of Jewels Sūtra (Āryaratnakūṭa):
O Kāśyapa, “ātman-soul” is one extreme; “absence of an ātman-soul” is the second extreme. That which is the middle between these two extremes is formless, cannot be indicated, is not established, does not appear, cannot be made known, and has no abode. This, Kāśyapa, is called the middle path – the examination of phenomena as they actually are.
(Ācārya Nāgārjuna) also has said in Precious Garland (II.3-4):
Neither an ātman-soul nor no ātman-soul is found by one who sees what is actual. The Great Sage (Buddha) caused us to avoid the two views constructed in terms of an ātman-soul and no ātman-soul. It was stated by the Sage that what is seen, heard and so forth is neither true nor false. From a position there would be a counterposition, and neither of the two is anything in actuality.
In this way, the Dharma teachings of the Bhagavan Buddhas have advanced in accordance with the diverse underlying inclinations of persons to be tamed who are of lesser, intermediate, and superior (capacities). Namely, (they have advanced) with the (assertion of) an ātman-soul, no ātman-soul, and the refutation of both of these. Because this is so, there is therefore no contradiction with scriptural authority for the Mādhyamikas. Thus, precisely for this reason, it was stated by (Ācārya) Āryadeva, at whose feet we bow, (in Four Hundred Verse Treatise, VIII.15):
First, there is warding off demeritorious (actions); intermediately, warding off (grasping for) an ātman-soul; and finally, warding off (grasping for) everything (being self-established and findable). Whoever knows (these stages for leading disciples) has verifying intelligence.
Likewise, our Founding Master at whose feet we bow, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) has said in Precious Garland, IV.94-96):
Just as a grammarian would have (students) recite even the letters of the alphabet in order, the Buddha expounded the Dharma to those to be tamed in accordance with what was appropriate (for them). To some, he expounded the Dharma for turning away from what builds up negative potential; to some, for the purpose of establishing positive potential; and to some, (a Dharma) relying on duality. To some, (a Dharma) not relying on duality – profound and frightening to the fearful – containing voidness and compassion within it as the means for attaining enlightenment.
Or, alternatively, this is another meaning: having imagined the absence of a connection between affected phenomena terminating at every moment and karmic results, the Sāṃkhyas and others have also made verifiable an (unaffected) “ātman-soul” (as the experiencer of karmic results). The Lokāyatas have also made “no ātman-soul” verifiable since, on rational grounds, they do not see a transmigrating ātman-soul. (They assert in an unidentified text):
A person is precisely only so much as is within the range of the sense faculties. O good woman, what those who have heard much say (beyond this) is indeed like the (made-up) wolf’s track (used as evidence for a wolf) and so on.
Persons free of cataracts do not see the hairs, gnats and so forth perceived by those suffering from cataracts. Likewise, the Buddhas do not see in any way whatsoever an ātman-soul, no ātman-soul, and so forth, which childish persons conceptually construe as “things” existing as kinds of findable objects. They have therefore indicated that there is even neither an ātman-soul nor no ātman-soul.
Likewise, it has been stated in the Secrets of the Ārya Tathāgatas Sūtra, (Ārya Tathāgata Guhya Sūtra) :
Then indeed the bodhisattva Śāntamati said this to the Bhagavan: “Bhagavan, it is said, ‘final stilling, final stilling.’ What is this that is called ‘final stilling’? And from the final stilling of what is it called ‘final stilling’?”
The Bhagavan said: “Son of good family, ‘final stilling’ is a designation for the final stilling of the disturbing mental factors. The ‘final stilling of the disturbing mental factors’ is a designation for the final stilling of conceptual constructions, conceptual discriminations, and conceptual construals. The ‘final stilling of conceptual constructions, conceptual discriminations, and conceptual construals’ is a designation for the final stilling of distinguishing and taking to mind. The ‘final stilling of distinguishing and taking to mind’ is a designation for the final stilling of distorted cognition. The ‘final stilling of distorted cognition’ is a designation for the final stilling of causes and focal objects. The ‘final stilling of causes and focal objects’ is a designation for the final stilling of misknowing, further existence, and thirsting. The ‘final stilling of misknowing, further existence, and thirsting’ is a designation for the final stilling of ‘I’-making and ‘mine’-making. The ‘final stilling of “I”-making and “mine”-making’ is a designation for the final stilling of the views of annihilationism and eternalism. The ‘final stilling of the views of annihilationism and eternalism’ is a designation for the final stilling of the deluded view toward a perishing network.
“Thus, Śāntamati, whatever is connected with focal objects, causes, and views, they all issue forth from conceptual constructs, and all of them originate from the deluded view toward a perishing network. From the final stilling of the deluded view toward a perishing network comes the final stilling of all views. From the final stilling of all views comes the final stilling of all disturbing pursuits. From the final stilling of all disturbing pursuits comes the final stilling of all disturbing mental factors.
“Śāntamati, it is just as when the root of a tree has been cut, all its branches, leaves, and fruits dry up. Likewise, Śāntamati, from the final stilling of the deluded view toward a perishing network, all disturbing mental factors become stilled with finality. Śāntamati, when the deluded view toward a perishing network has not been fully understood, all the derivative disturbing mental factors associated with obtaining arise. When the deluded view toward a perishing network has been fully understood, all the derivative disturbing mental factors associated with obtaining neither arise nor cause harm.”
Śāntamati said: “But Bhagavan, what is the full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network?”
The Bhagavan said: “Śāntamati, the non-arising of an ātman-soul is the full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network. The non-arising of a sentient being, the non-arising of a living being, the non-arising of a person, and the non-arising of views are the full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network.
“Moreover, Śāntamati, that view is not established internally, nor is it established externally. That view is not established anywhere. The deep awareness that such an unestablished view is unestablished – this, Śāntamati, is the full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network.
“Śāntamati, ‘full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network’ is a designation for voidness. When, through patient acceptance concordant with voidness, one does not cognitively take hold of that view – this too, Śāntamati, is the full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network.
“Śāntamati, as for ‘a perishing network,’ when, through the view of voidness, of no sign (of a findable cause), no hope (of a findable result), no affecting action, non-birth, and non-arising, one does not cognitively take hold of that view – this too, Śāntamati, is the full understanding of the deluded view toward a perishing network.
“Śāntamati, as for ‘a perishing network,’ this is no network. It does not develop, does not expand, does not accumulate, and does not increase. From the very outset, something that is not the case has been conceptually construed. But anything not the case that has been conceptually construed has not been conceptually construed. When it is no longer conceptually construed, no longer conceptually discriminated, no longer produced, no longer fabricated, no longer conjured, and no longer adhered to, that is called a ‘final stilling.’”
Śāntamati said: “Bhagavan, it is said, ‘finally stilled, finally stilled.’ From the final stilling of what is it called ‘finally stilled’?”
The Bhagavan said: “Śāntamati, the mind blazes from having a (seemingly findable) focal object. Whatever it no longer makes into a (findable) focal object, it does not blaze (from cognizing that). Not blazing, it is called ‘finally stilled.’
“Śāntamati, it is just as, for example, a fire blazes from having an obtainer and becomes stilled from not having an obtainer. Likewise, the mind blazes from having a (seemingly findable) focal object and becomes stilled from having no (such) focal object.
“In this regard, Śāntamati, this bodhisattva, skilled in means and purified by far-reaching verification, understands the equality of (all semingly findable) focal objects and also stills the (seemingly findable) focal object of roots of constructive force.” And so on.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 6 ||
Here, (the challenger) asks: If neither an ātman-soul nor not an ātman-soul has been indicated by the Bhagavan Buddhas, then what has been indicated?
In response, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) says:
When what is in the pasture of the mind has been turned away, (then) what is expressible has been turned away. Because like nirvāṇa, the actuality (of all phenomena) is indeed that they are non-arisen and non-ceased… || 7 ||
Here, if there were some findable “thing” that could be expressed, it would be indicated. But when what can be expressed has been turned away, there is no (findable) cognitive object (indicated by) a word; then absolutely nothing is indicated by the Buddhas.
(The challenger asks further):
Why, then, is there nothing that can be expressed?
(Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states (7a):
When what is in the pasture of the mind has been turned away.
The pasture of the mind is the pasture for the mind (to graze in). What are in the pasture are (seemingly findable) cognitive objects; the meaning is (seemingly findable) focal objects. If there were (findable focal objects in) the pasture for the mind, then, by interpolating (onto them) indicative signs, there would be words that have issued forth (from them). But when (findable) cognitive objects of the mind could not have even come about, then where could there be the interpolations of indicative signs by means of which words could have issued forth?
(Challenger): But why, then, are there no (findable) cognitive objects (in the pasture) of the mind?
Explaining this, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states (7cd):
Because like nirvāṇa, the actuality (of all phenomena) is that they are non-arisen and non-ceased…
Because the actuality (of all phenomena) – the way of existing of (all) phenomena, the fundamental makeup of (all) phenomena – has been established as their being non-arisen and non-ceased, like nirvāṇa, they therefore do not issue forth from the mind. And when there is (nothing that) has issued forth from the mind, where could there be the interpolations of indicative signs? Because of the absence of them, where could there be words that have issued forth (from them)? Thus, it is completely established that nothing has been indicated by the Bhagavan Buddhas. And precisely because of this, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) will state (XXV.24):
(Nirvāṇa is) the final stilling of finding (anything findably existent), the final stilling of conceptually fabricated projection, the peaceful (state). Nowhere has any phenomenon whatsoever been indicated by the Buddha to anyone.
And this is indeed so.
Alternatively, this is another initial position (of a challenger): As for what was said:
Conceptually fabricated projection is ceased in voidness.
How is it, then, that there is a cessation of conceptually fabricated projection in voidness?
(Reply): It is because:
What is expressible has been turned away,
and so on. This is to be explained in the same way as before.
Or (the challenger asks): As for what was previously said:
Because nothing internal or external whatsoever, with no exception, is findable (because if it were findable, it would be found), the state in which ‘I’-making and ‘mine’-making out of what is internal and what is external have been extinguished in every respect – this is what is meant here by “what is actual.”
What it is like? What does it resemble? Or can it be expressed?
(Reply): For that reason (to answer those questions, Ācārya Nāgārjuna states, 7ab):
When what is in the pasture of the mind has been turned away, (then) what is expressible has been turned away.
Here, “in terms of what is actual” is (to be added as) the completion of the sentence.
(The challenger goes on): But what is the reason that, with respect to what is actual, when what is in the pasture of the mind has been turned away, (then) what is expressible has been turned away?
(In reply, Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states (7cd):
Because like nirvāṇa, the actuality (of all phenomena) is that they are non-arisen and non-ceased…
Thus, precisely the preceding explanation is to be applied. And precisely because of this, it was said in the Secrets of the Ārya Tathāgatas Sūtra:
O Śāntamati, from the night on which the Tathāgata fully awakened to unsurpassed perfect and complete enlightenment until the night following upon which he will pass into parinirvāṇa, during this interval not even a single syllable has been uttered by the Tathāgata, has been uttered forth, nor will he utter forth one. How, then, have indications of various kinds of Dharma been indicated by the Bhagavan to the people to be tamed, comprising all the gods, anti-gods, humans, quasi-humans, accomplished practitioners, knowledge-holders, nāgas, and so forth? (They have been uttered) merely by a single moment’s utterance of speech. (This indication of the Dharma) removes the darkness from the minds of each respective person and causes the lotus-groves of their manifold kinds of intelligence to open. It dries up the ocean formed by the rivers of aging and death. It puts to shame even the spreading mass of rays of the seven suns and the fire at the end of an eon. And it has the great radiance of the scarlet autumn dawn.
Thus, (as is said) in (the same) sūtra:
A mechanical chime sounds, set in motion by the wind, with no player whatsover, yet sounds issue forth. So too, the Buddha’s speech, likewise set in motion by the dispositions of all sentient beings and because of previous thorough purification, issues forth, yet there is no conceptualization in this. Just as the sound of an echo is situated neither internally nor externally, likewise, the speech of the Lord of Men is situated neither internally nor externally.
Likewise (in this sūtra):
The divine drum that admonishes the gods, which had arisen as the karmic result of the gods, knew that the gods were dwelling heedlessly and sent forth the sound of the drum from the sky, “All objects of desire are nonstatic and non-lasting, transient and unstable, having the way of existing (the same as that) of foam. They are like illusions and mirages, like moons in water. All states of further existence have the way of existing (the same as that) of dreams.”
When the drum had sounded, Śakra, together with the gods, proceeded to the Dharma assembly. He expounded to the gods a Dharma discourse, a discourse conducive to peace and freedom from attachment.
Likewise, in the Noble King of Absorbed Concentrations (Sūtra):
When the Buddha shall become the King of Dharma, the Sage who makes known all phenomena, there will be the sound, “Phenomena are nonexistent” (issuing forth) from grasses, bushes, trees, medicinal plants, rocks and mountains. However many sounds there are in that world-realm, all will proclaim, “Everything is nonexistent; there is not a single existent thing.” All those sounds will issue forth from that Tathāgata, the Guide of the World.
And so on at length. Likewise (from the same sūtra):
Although your voice is one, O Benefactor of the World, it issues forth in accordance with the various inclinations (of beings). Each one thinks, “The Triumphant One is speaking to me.” Tell us, for whose sake, then, was the smile made?
Here some (challengers) raise the following objection: The Mādhyamikas are indistinct from the nihilists, because (the Mādhyamakas) say that constructive and destructive karmic impulses, the agent, the result, and the entire world are all devoid of self-established existence as findable things. Because the nihilists also say, “These do not exist,” therefore, the Mādhyamikas are indistinct from the nihilists.
(Reply): That is not so. Why? Because the Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent arising. They explain that absolutely everything in this life and the next lacks self-established findable existence because of (everything) having arisen, being obtained from and depending upon causes and conditions. The nihilists are proponents of findable existence (the existence of phenomena as the kinds of “things” they appear to be). They certainly have not accepted the nonexistence of other lives (on the basis that) because they are dependently arisen, they are devoid of self-established existence as findable “things.”
How, then, (is it that the nihilists accept the nonexistence of other lives)? Having found the kinds of things belonging to this world (which they take to be established as findable “things”), and not seeing any of them coming here with findable existence from another life or going from this life to another life, they deny (the existence of) other findable objects corresponding to words (in those other lives) similar to the findable objects corresponding to words they find in this life (and thus they deny other lives).
Suppose (they counter): Even so, as for precisely (these phenomena of other lives) not existing in the manner of being kinds of findable “things,” we assert them as being (totally) nonexistent. Therefore, at least from that point of view, there is a similarity.
(Reply): That is not so. Why? Because the Mādhyamikas acknowledge them nevertheless to be existent by convention, there is no equivalence.
Suppose (they challenge further): But aren’t they nevertheless equivalent in terms of (their status) as findable “things.”
(Reply): Although they are equivalent in that (these phenomena of other lives) are not established as (findable) “things,” nevertheless, because there is a difference between those who understand this, there is no equivalence.
For it is like this. Suppose a man has committed a theft. One person, without properly ascertaining (that the theft took place), but prompted by an enemy of his, makes an unsubstantiated accusation against him, saying, “He committed the theft.” Another person, however, charges him after having seen (the theft take place) with his own eyes. In such a case, although there is no difference with respect to the actual facts of the matter, nevertheless, because of the difference between the two (accusations) with respect to their ascertainment (of the matter), the one is said in that case to be an untruthful speaker, whereas the other (is said to be) a speaker of truth. And, when correctly considered, the one is appropriately subject to both disrepute and negative karmic force, but not the other.
Likewise here as well, although there is no difference in what kind of findable “thing” is involved, there is no equivalence in knowing and stating between the Mādhyamikas, who properly know what kind of findable “things” are involved and who speak and understand accordingky, and the nihilists, who do not properly know what kind of findable “things” are involved.
For just as there is a similarity in being equanimous between an ordinary being who is equanimous without discriminative analysis and an arhat who is equanimous through discriminative analysis, there is nevertheless a great difference between them. Likewise, although there is a similarity in the determination concerning a place with a dangerous precipice by a person blind from birth and by a sighted person, there is a great difference between them too. In the same way, there will be a difference between the nihilists and the Mādhyamikas. Thus (said) the earlier masters.
But enough of the digression. We shall explain only the matter at hand. (This concludes the discussion of) || 7 ||
(Here, a challenger requests): Although, as (explained, 7cd):
Because like nirvāṇa, the actuality (of all phenomena) is that they are non-arisen and non-ceased…
there is no (automatic) rolling forth of speech and mind with respect to that (actuality), nevertheless, (the actuality of all phenomena) cannot be understood by people without its being indicated. Therefore, for the purpose of bringing persons to be guided into it, there must necessarily be, at some point, a sequence of indications with regard to conventional truth. So, please explain (what that sequence is).
(Reply): Here, the following is to be understood as the sequence of indications by which the Bhagavan Buddhas bring (others) into the nectar of what is actual, namely:
Everything is correct as it is and is not correct as it is; both correct as it is and not correct as it is; neither not correct as it is nor correct as it is. This is the Buddha’s instruction. || 8 ||
In this regard, (Ācārya Āryadeva has said in Four Hundred Verse Treatise V.10):
Whatever is pleasing to whomever, one should first act accordingly toward that person; for someone who has been put off is in no way a suitable vessel for the excellent Dharma.
And likewise, the Bhagavan has said:
The world disputes with me; I do not dispute with the world. Whatever is agreed upon in the world as existing, that is also agreed upon by me as existing. Whatever is agreed upon in the world as not existing, that too is agreed upon by me as not existing.
And from an Āgama Discourse:
Just as a non-Indic speaker cannot be made to understand by means of a language other (than their own), likewise, people cannot be made to understand without (using) what is mundane.
Thus, right from the outset, there were persons to be tamed in whom a desire had arisen (to hear more) through hearing about the divisions of the findable objects corresponding to words that they themselves accept and the differentiation of the kinds of findable objects they are. For them, the Bhagavan initially described as true these aggregates, cognitive sources, cognitive stimulators, and so on that those with the cataracts of misknowing had conceptually construed and found as truly (existent). He did so with regard to their way of seeing them, for the purpose of generating respect for himself.
This Bhagavan knows, without exception, everything that takes place in the world. He is omniscient and sees all, for he has indicated, without distortion, the state, arising, disintegrating, and so forth, of the container world, extending from the wind maṇḍala up to the peak of existence and terminating in the space element. (He has likewise indicated) the world of sentent beings, together with their extremely diverse divisions, their (karmic) causes, their (karmic) results, what gives them joy and what causes them distress.
Accordingly, for the people to be tamed in whom, in this way, the cognition, “The Bhagavan is omniscient,” had (already) arisen, at a later time precisely all those same things were indicated as “not correct as they are.” In this regard, what is called “correct as it is” is that which has (no alternative), no being otherwise. But affected phenomena undergo becoming otherwise, because of their being destroyed at every moment. Therefore, because becoming otherwise is present, they are not “correct as they are.” The word vā is to be understood as having the meaning of ca (“and”) in combining the indications. Thus (8a):
Everything is correct as it is and is not correct as it is;
For some, all this was indicated as both being correct as it is and not being correct as it is. In this regard, from the point of view of ordinary people, all this is correct as it is. But from the point of view of the deep awareness of the āryas, all this is untruthful, because they do not find it in this way.
But for some who had practiced seeing what is actual for an extremely long time and for whom only a little of the root of the tree of obscuration (remained) unuprooted, it was indicated that all this is neither not correct as it is nor correct as it is. For the purpose of ridding them of even that small amount of obscuration, both of these were negated, just as both the whiteness and the darkness of the son of a barren woman are negated.
And this is the successive instruction of the Bhagavan Buddhas: an instruction that, having led (people) away from a wrong path, firmly sets (them) on the correct path. An instruction given in this way, in successive stages, is a successive instruction. Or, an instruction in accordance with the people to be tamed is a successive instruction.
And all these indications of the Bhagavan Buddhas, who possess great compassion and knowledge of skillful means, are established as means for bringing (people) into the nectar of what is actual. For the Tathāgatas do not utter a statement that is not a means for bringing (people) into the nectar of what is actual. Just as medicine appropriate to an illness is administered, they, out of the wish to benefit the people to be tamed, indicate the Dharma in whatever manner is appropriate.
As (Ācārya Āryadeva) has said (in Four) Hundred (Verse Treatise, VIII.20):
“Existent,” “nonexistent,” “both existent and nonexistent,” and “neither” are spoken of. After all, what medicine is appropriate depends on the illness.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 8 ||
(A challenger asks): But what are the defining characteristics of that which is actual, for the purpose of bringing (others) into which the Bhagavans give these indications?
(Reply): We have stated this (7ab):
When what is in the pasture of the mind has been turned away, (then) what is expressible has been turned away
And since this is so, what more is there to ask?
(The challenger replies): Even if this is so, nevertheless, just as what is true from a mundane point of view and so forth is accepted (as such merely in terms of conventional truth), please, in conformity with conventional truth, describe the defining characteristics (of what is actual, not as actually belonging to it, but) as an interpolation (onto it).
(Reply): (Ācārya Nāgājuna) states them (as follows):
Not dependent on someone else, stilled, not conceptually fabricated and projected by conceptually fabricated projections, with no conceptual discrimination, and not entailing there being differentiated findable objects – these are the defining characteristics of what is actual. || 9 ||
In this regard, because there is no dependence on someone else for (gaining realization of) it, it is “not dependent on someone else.” (Specifically, what is actual) cannot be reached through (dependence on) someone else’s instruction. The meaning is that it must be realized by oneself.
For example, those with cataracts, while seeing deceptive forms such as hairs, gnats, flies, and so forth, are unable, even through the instruction of those without cataracts, to realize in the manner of those without cataracts – namely, by not seeing the hairs –what kind of findable objects the hairs actually exist as. What, then, do they understand? From the instruction of those without cataracts, they understand merely this much: “This is deceptive.”
But when they have anointed the eyes of their verifying intelligence with the ointment of the undistorted seeing of voidness that destroys cataracts, they develop deep awareness of what is actual. They themselves then realize (what is actual) through the yoga method of not realizing anything (to be the kind of findable object it appears to be). Thus, without being dependent on someone else’s (explanation), they realize how phenomena actually exist with respect to what kind of (seemingly) findable objects they are. This is what is actual, with self-established findable existence stilled, like the nonseeing of hairs by those without cataracts. The meaning is that (the way they exist) is free of self-established findable existence.
Precisely because of this, it is “not conceptually fabricated and projected by conceptually fabricated projections.” For conceptually fabricated projection is speech, because it conceptually fabricates and projects findable objects (corresponding to words). “Not conceptually fabricated and projected by conceptually fabricated projections” means “not uttered by words.”
And it is without conceptual discrimination. Conceptual discrimination (of this and that) is the moving about of the mind. Because of being free of such (movement), that which is actual is without conceptual discrimination. As stated in a sūtra:
What is deepest truth? That in which there is no moving about even of deep awareness, not to mention of words.
Thus, it is with no conceptual discrimination.
(In the case that) “(what is actual) entailed there being differentiated findable objects,” “entailing there being differentiated findable objects” (means) “entailing there being distinct findable things.” (So), “not entailing there being differentiated findable objects” (means) “not entailing there being distinct findable things.” As stated in The Noble Engaging in the Two Truths Sūtra (Ārya-Satyadvayāvatāra-sūtra):
The divine son said, “Mañjuśrī, what, then, is correct engagement?”
Mañjuśrī said, “Divine son, just as, from the point of view of deepest truth, the accordant way of things, the sphere of reality, and unending non-arising are the same, so too, from the point of view of deepest truth, the five heinous crimes are the same as they. Just as the five heinous crimes are the same, so too the wrong views people have gone to are the same as they. Just as the wrong views people have gone to are the same, so too the phenomena pertaining to ordinary beings are the same as they. Just as the phenomena pertaining to ordinary beings are the same, so too the phenomena pertaining to those still needing training are the same as they. Just as the phenomena pertaining to those still needing training are the same, so too the phenomena pertaining to those no longer needing training are the same as they. Just as the phenomena pertaining to those no longer needing training are the same, so too the phenomena pertaining to the perfectly and fully enlightened Buddhas are the same as they.
“Just as the phenomena pertaining to the perfectly and fully enlightened Buddhas are the same, so too nirvāṇa is the same as they. Just as nirvāṇa is the same, so too saṃsāra is the same as it. Just as saṃsāra is the same, so too, from the point of view of deepest truth, taintedness is the same as it. Just as, from the point of view of deepest truth, taintedness is the same, so too, from the point of view of deepest truth, purification is the same as it. Just as, from the point of view of deepest truth, purification is the same, so too, from the point of view of deepest truth, all phenomena are the same as it.
“Divine son, a monk who is engaged in this way to the sameness of all phenomena from the point of view of deepest truth is called ‘correctly engaged.’”
The divine son said, “Mañjuśrī, by what sameness, then, is it the case, up through (the statement), ‘Just as, from the point of view of deepest truth, purification is the same, so too, from the point of view of deepest truth, all phenomena are the same’?”
Mañjuśrī said, “From the point of view of deepest truth, all phenomena are the same in terms of the sameness of the non-arising of all phenomena and, from the point of view of deepest truth, in terms of the sameness of the unending non-arising of all phenomena.
“Why is that? Divine son, from the point of view of deepest truth, all phenomena are no different from nirvāṇa, on account of their being unendingly non-arisen. Divine son, it is, for example, like the space inside an earthen vessel and the space inside a precious vessel: they are simply the element of space. From the point of view of deepest truth, there is no difference whatsoever in it.
“Likewise, divine son, whatever is tainted is, from the point of view of deepest truth, unendingly non-arisen. Whatever is purified is also, from the point of view of deepest truth, unendingly non-arisen. Saṃsāra too is, from the point of view of deepest truth, unendingly non-arisen. Up through nirvāṇa too, they are (all), from the point of view of deepest truth, unendingly non-arisen. There is no difference whatsoever here from the point of view of deepest truth.
“Why is that? Because, from the point of view of deepest truth, all phenomena are unendingly non-arisen.”
Thus, in this way, it is to be understood that not entailing differentiated findable objects is a defining feature of what is actual, because (what is actual) has the single taste of voidness. And here the successive explanations are to be understood with each explaining the preceding one.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 9 ||
Thus, what has been explained so far are the defining characteristics of what is actual for the āryas who have accomplished their task for extinguishing the saṃsāra of birth, aging, and death. Now, with reference to the defining characteristics of what is actual on the mundane level, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) has said:
Because whatever comes about having depended (on something else) is, in the first place, certainly not that very thing (on which it depends); nor is it something other than (and alien to) that. It is therefore neither terminated nor permanent. || 10 ||
Whatever is produced arises dependently on whatever produces it – for example, a rice sprout arises dependently on a rice seed and the assemblage of earth and so forth. In the first place, it cannot be said that the one is precisely the other. The very seed itself is certainly not the very sprout itself, since a oneness of what generates and what is generated would absurdly follow. And from that, a oneness of father and son would also absurdly follow. Further, because of a non-otherness (of the two), at the stage of the sprout the seed would also have to be cognitively taken just as the sprout is; and the sprout would also have to be cognitively taken just as the seed is. In this way, moreover, there would be a staticness of the seed because of its being accepted as not perishing (when the sprout arises and thus it does not undergo change). And from that there would be a great mass of faults because the assertion of permanence would absurdly follow (since what does not undergo change would be permanent. As a consequence), the nonexistence of karmic impulses, their results, and so forth would absurdly follow (because, if causes were permanent, they could not undergo the change involved in giving rise to their results).
Thus, in the first place, it is untenable that the very seed itself is the very sprout itself. Nor, however, is it (totally) other than (and alien to) it. Nor is there an otherness of the sprout from the seed, because (if there were), the arising of a sprout even without a seed would absurdly follow:
If something were other than something else, it would exist even without that other thing.
Because of this statement, it would absurdly follow that, even at the stage of the sprout, the seed would not terminate (since, if it did terminate, the sprout would exist without the seed and would therefore be other than it). And from that, there would be the fault of the assertion of what is produced already being existent (in what produces it, since if the seed did not terminate when the sprout arose, the sprout, being non-other than the seed, would already have been existent in the seed). And since, in this way, whatever is produced arises in dependence on whatever produces it, what produces it is certainly not what is produced (for otherwise it would be permanent), nor is what is produced other than (and alien to) that which produces it (for otherwise what is produced could exist without it). Therefore, it can be established that what produces it is neither terminated (since what is produced is not other than it) nor permanent (since what is produced is not it).
As has been said by (Ācārya) Āryadeva, at whose feet I bow:
Because an existent phenomenon rolls onward, (its) termination does not arise; because an existent phenomenon rolls back, (its) staticness does not arise.
And as it was said in the Noble Extensive Play Sūtra (Ārya Lalitavistara Sūtra):
Just as, given the existence of a seed, there is a sprout, yet whatever the seed itself might be, the sprout is certainly not that. Nor is it other than (and alien to) that, nor is it that very thing. Likewise, the actuality of phenomena is (their) non-termination and non-permanence.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 10 ||
Thus, in this way, according to the reasoning explained above:
Having diverse findable objects, (yet) not having diverse findable objects; without annihilation, (yet) not permanent – this is the nectar of the instructions of the Buddhas, the Guardians of the World. || 11 ||
The majestic elephant-like, perfectly and fully enlightened Buddhas continuously cover the regions in all directions, as far as the limits of the expanse of space, with great cloudbanks of great compassion and skillful means. They are intent on stilling with finality the torment of the world from the burning suffering of birth, aging and death, as it is scorched by the exceedingly fierce orb of the sun – namely, the manifest occurrence of the hosts of disturbing mental factors, attachment and so forth. They also wish to sustain the arisen, extremely abundant growth, appropriate to each of the persons to be tamed, of the crops, medicinal plants, fruits, flowers and vines that are their roots of constructive force. They do so by pouring down continuous and uninterrupted streams of the nectar of indications of the true Dharma. They are the protectors of those in the world who have no protection, lords of those who have no lord, and lords of the entire world. This nectar of the true Dharma of theirs, existing in such a way as to eradicate all the suffering of further existence throughout the three planes of existence, is to be understood, according to the reasoning explained above, as free of oneness and otherness and as having departed from the assertions of permanence and annihilation.
The śrāvakas have entered into this nectar of what is actual about the Dharma and proceed in the sequence of listening, thinking and meditation. Through partaking of the nectar-like taste of the three aggregates, having ethical self-discipline, absorbed concentration and verification as their respective self-identities, they definitely attain nirvāṇa, having the eradication of aging and death as its own way of existing.
But even if, somehow, despite having listened to this nectar of the true Dharma, they do not attain liberation in this very lifetime because their roots of constructive force have not ripened here, nevertheless, in another life, solely through the force of the previous cause, an assured attainment comes about for them.
As (Ācārya Āryadeva) has said in (Four) Hundred (Verse Treatise, VIII.22):
Although in this life one who knows what is actual does not attain nirvāṇa, he will necessarily attain it effortlessly in a subsequent birth, just as with karma.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 11 ||
But suppose that, somehow,
When perfectly and fully enlightened Buddhas have not arisen and, moreover, śrāvakas have died out, || 12ab ||
there would be no attainment of the nectar of what is actual about the Dharma because of lacking the condition of a spiritual teacher who indicates the ārya path. Nevertheless, solely through the force of the cause of having listened to what is actual about the Dharma in a previous lifetime, even for those who do not depend on instruction in this life and for whom the conditions have come about merely through cultivating seclusion, there is the self-derived
deep awareness of pratyekabuddhas that rolls forth from non-association. || 12cd ||
Seclusion of body and mind is “non-association,” or else it is not seeking a spiritual teacher. From that cause of non-association, the pratyekabuddhas’ attainment of what is actual about the Dharma does indeed occur even at a time without a perfectly and fully enlightened Buddha. Therefore, it is to be understood that the efficacy of this medicinal nectar of what is actual about the true Dharma, prescribed by the great king of physicians, the perfectly and fully enlightened Buddha, is unfailing. And because this is so, a person endowed with verification ought to seek the actual way of the true Dharma even at the cost of giving up his life. As the Bhagavan has said in the Sūtra on the Noble Bhagavatī Far-reaching Verification in Eight Thousand (Verses) (Ārya-bhagavatī-aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā- sūtra):
“And how, Bhagavan, did the bodhisattva mahāsattva Sadāprarudita seek this far-reaching verification?”
When this had been asked, the Bhagavan said this to the venerable elder Subhūti: “Previously, when the bodhisattva mahāsattva Sadāprarudita was seeking far-reaching verification, he sought it with no concern for his body, without regard for his life, and, while seeking it, not relying on gain, honor or fame.
“Having gone into the wilderness while seeking far-reaching verification, he heard a voice from the sky: ‘Go, son of good family, toward the east. There you will hear far-reaching verification. And go in such a way that you do not give rise to regard for bodily fatigue, do not give rise to regard for dullness and sleepiness, and do not give rise to regard for food, and so on, as far as: do not direct your mind anywhere, either internally or externally.
“‘And, son of good family, do not go looking to the left; do not go looking around to the right, (to the east), to the west, to the north, upward, downward, or in any intermediate direction. And, son of good family, go in such a way that you do not deviate because of (an ātman-soul), because of a (deluded view toward a) perishing network, because of form, because of feeling, because of distinguishing, because of other affecting variables, or because of consciousness. For whoever deviates from these departs.
“‘(From what does he depart?) He departs from the qualities of a Buddha. Whoever departs from the qualities of a Buddha wanders in saṃsāra. Whoever wanders in saṃsāra does not conduct himself in far-reaching verification and does not attain it.’”
…until, when the water had been made to disappear by Māra the Malicious, this occurred to him: “What if I were to pierce my own body and sprinkle this area of ground with (my) blood? For what reason (would I want to do that)? This area of ground has its dust stirred up. May the element of dust from here not fall upon the body of the bodhisattva mahāsattva Dharmodgata. What shall I do with this bodily existence, which necessarily has the property of disintegrating? It would certainly be better for the destruction of my bodily existence to be brought about by myself through an action of this kind rather than through an action of no such efficacy. Moreover, many thousands of my bodily existences have disintegrated again and again as I have wandered in saṃsāra because of sense desires, with sense desire as their cause, but never in circumstances such as these. …”
Then, indeed, the bodhisattva mahāsattva Sadāprarudita, having taken a sharp weapon, pierced himself all over and sprinkled that area of ground all around with his own blood, and so on. Then, immediately upon seeing the bodhisattva mahāsattva Dharmodgata, the bodhisattva mahāsattva Sadāprarudita obtained happiness of such a kind as, for example, the happiness of a monk who has entered into the first state of mental stability, a monk whose attention is single-pointed.
There, this was the indication of far-reaching verification of the bodhisattva mahāsattva Dharmodgata – namely, through the sameness of all phenomena, the sameness of far-reaching verification; through the separateness of all phenomena, the separateness of far-reaching verification; through the non-moving of all phenomena, the non-moving of far-reaching verification; through the non-intellectualizing of all phenomena, the non-intellectualizing of far-reaching verification; through the non-benumbing of all phenomena, the non-benumbing of far-reaching verification; through the single taste of all phenomena, the single taste of far-reaching verification; through all phenomena being without an endpoint, far-reaching verification being without an endpoint; through the non-arising of all phenomena, the non-arising of far-reaching verification; through the non-ceasing of all phenomena, the non-ceasing of far-reaching verification; through space being without an endpoint, far-reaching verification being without an endpoint; up to: through all phenomena being unmixed, its far-reaching verification being unmixed; through all phenomena being not found, its far-reaching verification being not found; through the overcoming of all phenomena being the same, its far-reaching verification of the overcoming of all phenomena being the same; through all phenomena being inert, its far-reaching verification of all phenomena being inert; and through all phenomena being inconceivable, its far-reaching verification being inconceivable.
Thus ends the eighteenth chapter, entitled “Examination of the Ātman-Soul,” in Clear Words Commentary on Madhyamaka, composed by the Lineage Master Ācārya Candrakīrti.