Here, (a challenger) puts forward: “Because the Tathāgata, the Accordantly Gone One, exists, there was a continuum of (his prior samsaric) existence. That is because it was:
- by possessing great compassion and both skillful means and verification and having a mind single-pointedly intent on bringing about the complete pacification of the suffering, beginning with birth, of all classes of sentient beings throughout the three realms, without exception, and
- by continuously exerting himself, without interruption and in stages, for three or seven countless eons, in those various unsurpassed and extraordinarily diverse undertakings of meritorious acts, characterized by having as their sole function the bringing about of the welfare of the entire world, and
- by being wholly dedicated to benefiting the entire world without exception, with a concern even greater than that which one has for a beloved only son, and
- by, under the power of great compassion, making himself available for people to use as they wished in whatever realm of rebirth (he appeared), like earth, water, fire, wind, common medicine, and a great tree –
it is by means of all that, over a long period of time here (in this world), that the Bhagavān, the One Endowed with All Good Qualities, attained the state of an omniscient one that completely discerns every aspect.
That Bhagavān, having thus attained the deep awareness of an omniscient one, is called the Tathāgata, the Accordantly Gone One, because, by having become a Buddha, he has gone exactly in accord with how the actuality of phenomena has been determined, leaving no aspect of it unrealized. If there had been no continuum of his (previous) recurring samsaric existence, then there would likewise be no Tathāgata, for it is not possible to attain the state of a Tathāgata in a single lifetime. Therefore, the continuum of his (prior recurring samsaric) existence is known to exist because (now) the Tathāgata exists.”
(Reply): (That’s not the case at all,) for in fact it is this great misknowing (about the actuality of phenomena) of yours (and not the existence of the Tathāgata) that causes the continuum of samsaric existence to continue without interruption and for an extremely long time. Indeed, such is this exceedingly great, dense darkness of misknowing of yours that, although it is being dispelled by the illuminations of (the Buddha’s) deep awareness, like the light of autumn moons, in his various rebirths, it has nevertheless become so greatly reinforced through the extensive accumulation of (detrimental) habitual tendencies built up through habituation over an exceedingly long time that, even now, this (misknowing of yours) has neither been dispelled nor turned back.
If there were, in fact, someone called a “Tathāgata” who existed by means of a self-established identity, then, because he would have become fully accomplished over a long period of time, there would have been a continuum of his (prior) recurring samsaric existence. But no one called a “Tathāgata” is found as an existent thing having a self-established identity. Rather, it is only because the eye of your verifying intelligence is impaired by the darkness of misknowing that you falsely perceive a Tathāgata as existing by means of a self-established identity, like (someone seeing) two moons, hairs, fruit flies, and the like.
Explaining how a Tathāgata does not exist by means of a self-established identity, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
The aggregates are not (the Tathāgata); he is not other than the aggregates. The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in them. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates. What, then, is the Tathāgata here? || 1 ||
For if there were some stainless findable object, free from conceptually fabricated projection, corresponding to the word “Tathāgata,” he would either (1) be self-established as (conventionally identical with) the aggregates – either self-established as (conventionally identical with) the five aggregates called “forms of physical phenomena, feelings, distinguishing, affecting variables, and types of consciousness” or, alternatively, self-established as (conventionally identical with) the five aggregates called “ethical self-discipline, absorbed concentration, verification, liberation, and deep awareness and seeing of liberation” – or else (2) he would be (self-established as) something (conventionally) other than them. Here, however, in this analysis, only the former five aggregates are taken as the basis because they have the indicative feature of being the basis for making a person verifiable. The latter five are not, because they do not pervade (all cases), since they are included within the former five.
Alternatively (if not conventionally identical with the aggregates), he would be something (conventionally) other than the five aggregates. In that case, (as two separate objects), either the aggregates would be in the Tathāgata, or he would be in the aggregates, or the Tathāgata would possess the aggregates, just as Devadatta possesses wealth. But, when examined in every way, none of these is possible.
How so? To begin with, the aggregates themselves are not the Tathāgata. Why? Because it has been stated: “If the fuel itself were the fire, there would be a oneness of agent and what it used for enacting its actions.” That should be applied here as well, “If a (self-established) Buddha were (identical with the aggregates he) obtained (as a basis to use for enacting his actions of body and speech), there would be a oneness of the agent (existing self-contained) and what he used for enacting his actions.” Likewise, it has been stated: “If an ātman-soul were the aggregates, it would partake of arising and passing away.” That should be applied here as well: “If the Buddha were the aggregates, he would partake of arising and passing away.” Thus, to this extent, the aggregates are not the Tathāgata.
Now the Tathāgata is not other than the aggregates either. Why? Because it has been stated: “If fire were other than (and alien to) fuel, it would (already) exist without fuel,” Likewise, in that alternative case, because of being non-dependent (on fuel), (the fire) would have no cause for its (ever) being kindled. And in that case, there would be no purpose for ever undertaking to kindle it again, as it would exist (already) without (needing to obtain) an object (fuel, as its basis to use) for enacting its actions.
That should be applied here as well. If a (self-established) Buddha were other than (and alien to the aggregates he needed to) obtain (as a basis to use for enacting his actions), he would (already) exist without (needing to) obtain anything (as a basis to use). Likewise, in that alternative case, because of being non-dependent (on needing to obtain such a basis), he would have no cause for (ever) obtaining a basis. And in that case, there would be no purpose for his ever undertaking to obtain such a basis again, as he would (already) exist without (needing to) obtain an object (a body and speech provided by the aggregates, as its basis to use) for enacting his actions.
Likewise, if, (being self-established), he were (conventionally) other than the aggregates, he would have the defining characteristic of being without aggregates. But because there is no otherness between the aggregates and the Tathāgata, it is not suitable for the aggregates to be in a Tathāgata (that was self-established as other than they), nor is it suitable for a (self-established) Tathāgata to be in the aggregates. And this has also been stated in the Madhyamakāvatāra (Engaging in Madhyamaka) (VI.142), in explanation of both positions:
An ātman-soul is not found in the aggregates, nor are these aggregates here in an ātman-soul. If there were an otherness (between them), this conceptual construct would indeed exist. But that otherness does not exist, and because of that, neither does this conceptual construct.
Likewise, (a self-established) Tathāgata is not accepted as possessing aggregates, just as it has been stated there (in Madhyamakāvatāra VI.143):
An ātman-soul is not accepted as possessing a visible form, because an ātman-soul does not exist; therefore, there is no applicability here of the suffix expressing possession (to something that does not exist). In the case of difference, there is “possessing a cow” and, in the case of non-difference, there is also “possessing a visible form.” But, with respect to a visible form, neither being it nor being other than it pertains to an ātman-soul (because there is no such thing as an ātman-soul).
In fact, however, all five positions are included within just the two positions of something being it and being other (than it). It should be understood, however, that the Founding Master Ācārya (Nāgārjuna) described the five positions in dependence on the ways in which the deluded view toward a perishing network operates.
“And since, when examined in these five ways in relation to aggregates, no (self-established) Tathāgata is found, with what other identity could he exist?” Thus, a (self-established) Tathāgata is altogether impossible.
Therefore, not seeing a Tathāgata as an existent thing having a self-established identity, the Founding Master, Ācārya (Nāgārjuna), at whose feet I bow, stated, “What, then, is the Tathāgata here?” His intended meaning is that there simply is no one who discerningly sees all the existent things throughout the three planes of compulsive existence and who is an existent thing having a self-established identity. And because there is no such Tathāgata, it is established that a continuum of (his prior) recurring samsaric existence did not exist as a substantially existent continuum. Thus ends (the discussion of) the first (verse). ||1||
To that, some say, “Indeed, we do not assert that a (self-established) Tathāgata is (identical with) the aggregates, because that would entail the faults already stated. Nor do we assert that he is other than (and alien to) the aggregates. Nor do we maintain that the untainted aggregates are in the Tathāgata, like a cluster of trees in the Himālaya mountains. Nor do we maintain that the Tathāgata is in the aggregates, like a lion in a cluster of trees. Nor do we maintain that he possesses the aggregates, like a universal monarch possesses the major and minor marks, precisely because we do not accept either identity or otherness (between them). What, then? In reliance on the stainless aggregates (as a basis upon which to rely for making him verifiable), we establish the Tathāgata as inexpressible in terms of being actually identical with them or different from them, and so forth. Therefore, this refutation does not invalidate our position.”
To this it is replied:
If the Buddha’s conventional existence, after obtaining the aggregates (as a basis upon which to rely for making himself verifiable), is not established by means of his own self-established identity, how could he, who does not exist by means of his own self-established identity, exist by means of the self-established identity of something other (than himself)? || 2 ||
For if the Bhagavān Buddha, who cannot be expressed as being either actually the stainless aggregates or other than them, is made verifiable by having obtained the stainless aggregates (as a basis), then it becomes evident that he does not exist by means of a self-established identity, since, like a reflection, he is made verifiable by having obtained (a basis).
But how could someone who now does not exist by means of a self-established identity as a findable object in his own right, and who is thus nonexistent by means of a self-established identity, come to exist, after obtaining the aggregates (as a basis), by means of the self-established identity of something other (than himself)? For it is certainly not reasonable that something nonexistent, such as the son of a barren woman, should come to exist by depending on the self-established identity of something other (than itself). (This concludes the discussion of ) || 2 ||
Suppose it were argued: “Just as a reflection, although not existing by means of being self-established, nevertheless comes to exist in dependence on something else being self-established – a face, a mirror, and so on – likewise, the Tathāgata too, although not existing by means of being self-established, will come to exist by means of something else being self-established – the five untainted aggregates, obtained as the basis on which his conventional existence depends.” Even so:
It is reasonable that someone who (exists) in dependence on something else being self-established is without an ātman-soul (of self-established existence). But how can someone who is without an ātman-soul (of self-established existence) become the Tathāgata? || 3 ||
It is reasonable that, “If it is maintained that the Tathāgata, like a reflection, dependently arises on the basis of something else being self-established, then, in that case, it follows that, just like a reflection, the Tathāgata is someone without an ātman-soul of self-established existence. It is not reasonable, however, that he exists by means of being self-established.”
Here, the word ātman, “soul,” is a synonym for svabhāva, “self-established existence.” And how can someone without an ātman-soul – that is, someone lacking self-established existence, just like a reflection – become a Tathāgata as a form of phenomenon having self-established existence? The intended meaning is that he cannot be someone (a Buddha) who has proceeded on the unmistaken path. (This concludes the discussion of ) || 3 ||
Moreover, if the Tathāgata had any self-established existence, then, relative to that self-established existence, the self-established existence of the aggregates would be existence established as something other. And the Tathāgata would then exist in dependence on that existence established as something other. But when the Tathāgata has no self-established existence at all, then how could the aggregates have the status of being something other (than him)? Explaining this, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
If there is no existence established from oneself, how could there be existence established from what is other?
And when this is so – when neither existence established from oneself nor existence established from what is other exists – then:
Apart from (being someone with) existence established from oneself or existence established from what is other, who could this Tathāgata be? || 4 ||
For if a findable object corresponding to a word existed, its existence would be established either from the side of itself or from the side of something other (than itself). But apart from these two, what alternative findable object corresponding to a word could there be that could be established as “the Tathāgata”? Therefore, the Tathāgata does not exist by means of being self-established. (This concludes the discussion of ) || 4 ||
Moreover:
If there (actually) were some Tathāgata who (first existed as a Tathāgata who) had not obtained the aggregates (as a basis), he could now obtain them (as a basis), and then, having obtained them, he would exist (as a Tathāgata having a basis). || 5 ||
If you think: “The Tathāgata, who cannot be expressed as being either actually the aggregates or other (than them), is made verifiable by having obtained the aggregates (as a basis),” then when would that be tenable? It would be tenable if someone called “the Tathāgata” were to exist beforehand without having obtained the aggregates (as a basis), and, not having (already) obtained the aggregates (as a basis), he could then obtain the aggregates (as a basis). For it is precisely someone already established beforehand as something distinct who obtains something – (for example) Devadatta, already established as distinct from his wealth, acquires wealth.
Likewise, if there were some Tathāgata who existed without having obtained the aggregates (as a basis), he could now obtain those aggregates (as a basis), and then, having obtained them (as a basis), he would subsequently exist (as a Tathāgata having obtained them as a basis). (This concludes the discussion of ) || 5 ||
But when examined in every way…
But there is also no Tathāgata who exists without having obtained the aggregates (as a basis),
because of the absurd conclusion that he would then exist without a cause (for being made verifiable).
And how could someone who does not exist without having obtained a basis then obtain (a basis) for himself? || 6 ||
The intended meaning is: “(He could not obtain a basis) because he does not exist.” And when, this being so, he does not obtain anything whatsoever (as a basis), then it is not tenable that, having obtained the aggregates (as a basis), someone called “the Tathāgata” could come to exist.| (This concludes the discussion of ). || 6 ||
And when, this being so, the Tathāgata does not obtain anything (as a basis), because he does not exist before obtaining (a basis), then that obtaining (of a basis), too, which is not being obtained by anyone whatsoever, cannot possibly be an obtaining (of a basis). To indicate this, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
There cannot be any obtaining (of a basis) if it is not obtained (by someone).
And when, this being so, something cannot constitute an obtaining (of a basis) if it is not being obtained by anyone whatsoever, then, in the absence of any obtaining (of a basis), there also cannot be anyone who obtains (a basis). To indicate this, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) continues:
And there can in no way be a Tathāgata without his obtaining (a basis). || 7 ||
(This concludes the discussion of ) || 7 ||
Thus, by the line of reasoning just established:
When he cannot (be found to) exist, when being sought for (in relation to the aggregates) in five ways – as being them, being other (than them, and so on) – how could the Tathāgata be made verifiable by (reliance on) obtaining (the aggregates as a basis)? || 8 ||
The Tathāgata, when being sought for – (meaning) when being analyzed – cannot (be found to) exist as being them – (meaning) as being identical with the aggregates – and cannot (be found to) exist as being other than them – (meaning) as being distinct and separate from the aggregates. Thus, because he cannot (be found to) exist as being them or as being other than them, then when being sought for in five ways – as being them, as being other than them, as what supports them, as what is supported by them, or as what possesses them – he cannot (be found to) exist.
So how could a Tathāgata, who is not found to exist at all (in any of these five ways), possibly be made verifiable by (reliance on) obtaining (the aggregates as a basis)? Therefore, for this reason as well, someone called “the Tathāgata” cannot (be found to) exist as a self-established findable object. (This concludes the discussion of ) || 8 ||
Not only is the Tathāgata not (found to) exist by this close examination, but also:
This obtained (basis) does not, in fact, exist from its being self-established (as existent). || 9ab ||
The obtained (basis), namely the five aggregates called form, feeling, distinguishing, affecting variables and consciousness, does not exist, in fact, by means of being self-established (as existent), because it dependently arises and because this has already been refuted in detail in (the chapter) “Examination of the Aggregates.”
Suppose someone were to argue, “Although the obtained (basis) does not exist by means of being self-established (as existent), nevertheless it will exist from being established (as existent) by something other, with that something other having causes and conditions as its identity.
Explaining that this too is untenable, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
So how could that which does not exist by means of being self-established (as existent) exist from being established (as existent) by something other? || 9cd ||
A son of a barren woman, who does not exist by means of being self-established, cannot be made verifiable by means of being established (as existent) from something other. Therefore, the obtained (basis) also does not exist.
Alternatively:
This obtained (basis) does not, in fact, exist from its being self-established (as existent). || 9ab ||
Because (the aggregates) are dependent on an obtainer, and because something independent of an obtainer cannot have the status of being something obtained (as a basis), there is no basis obtained that is established as existent from its being self-established.
Now suppose someone were to argue, “Even if a basis obtained cannot be established as existent from its being self-established independently of an obtainer (obtaining it), then let it be established as existent precisely by depending on an obtainer (obtaining it).”
It is said: Even in that case,
So how could that which does not exist from its being self-established (as existent) exist from its being established (as existent) by something other? || 9cd ||
If the basis obtained is not established as existent from its being self-established, then, being nonexistent as something self-established, how could it come to exist from its being established (as existent) by something other, namely by the obtainer (obtaining it as a basis)? Therefore, the basis obtained also does not exist (from its being self-established as existent). (This concludes the discussion of ) || 9 ||
Now, pointing out the conclusion that has already been established, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
Thus, the (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are devoid in every way and so too is the one who obtains them. || 10ab ||
The (aggregates) obtained (as a basis), when examined in every way, are devoid, not being established as existent by being self-established, and so too is the one who obtains them. Therefore, now, with such (aggregates) obtained (as a basis):
So, how can (your assertions that phenomena are existent by being self-established) explain that a Tathāgata who is devoid (of being self-established) is made verifiable by means of something (the obtained aggregates) that is also devoid (of being self-established)? || 10 cd ||
(According to your assertions), it is simply not possible for a nonexistent Tathāgata to be made verifiable by means of something that is nonexistent. Therefore, it is not tenable that the Tathāgata is made verifiable by depending on aggregates obtained (as a basis).
At this point, (the challengers) say: Alas, our hopes have been dashed! We, of all people, had abandoned our hopes in the founders of the non-Buddhist Indian traditions – Kaṇāda (founder of the Vaiśeṣika tradition), Akṣapāda (founder of Nyāya), the Digambaras (the Jains), Jaimini (founder of Mīmāṃsā), the Naiyāyikas and the like – who pride themselves on imparting teachings of an unmistaken path to heaven and final release. But they themselves are ensnared in a net, like a tangled mass of thorny creepers and palms, consisting of extremely rigid false views conceptually constructed by their own conceptual discriminations. They have gone astray by proceeding along a path opposite to the one leading to the city of nirvāṇa. They have not crossed beyond the perilous, trackless wilderness of the forest of repeated saṃsāric rebirth.
And, for the purpose of dispelling the thick, impenetrable darkness of our deluminating minds, and with the aim of liberation and the aim of unsurpassed, complete enlightenment, we have taken safe direction of refuge in the Tathāgata, the sun. The exceedingly penetrating sunrays of his indications of the true Dharma pervade the entire expanse of space in all directions, completely dispelling the darkness of the views of the non-Buddhist Indian traditions and illuminating the paths that are opposite to those leading to heaven and final release. (In this way) he is wholly intent on causing the lotus-buds of the minds of his various disciples to open. With the stainless solar orb of his ten powers, fearlessnesses and unique Buddha qualities, he is the singular stainless eye for those who are fit recipients of the actual meaning of the referent objects of words that are established in accord with reality. He is the one worthy to offer safe direction of refuge for the entire world, without a second.
He is the supreme charioteer of the Great Vehicle Mahāyāna, the Great Path, equipped with the lofty horses and foot soldiers that are the seven factors leading to a purified state. He is wholly intent on drying up the river of repeated saṃsāric rebirth – birth, old age and death – flowing through the wilderness for all beings throughout the three realms of existence. He is victorious against the shower of falling arrows in the battle against the enemy, the four māra demonic forces. He drives away the seizure of the entire world by the Rāhu-like (eclipsing) embodiment of grasping at what is unreal.
And yet, concerning him, you have stated:
Thus, the (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are devoid in every way and so too is the one who obtains them. So how can a Tathāgata who is devoid be made verifiable by means of something that is also devoid?
By asserting with statements such as this that things do not exist by being self-established, you have dashed our hopes for liberation and our desire to attain unsurpassed, complete enlightenment.
(Reply): Enough of that, you, who are comparable to darkeners of the world, trying to cover over the great sun that is the Tathāgata by emitting out-of-season peals of rolling thunder. It is rather our own hopes in unawake people such as yourselves that have been dashed. For although people like you, because of wishing for liberation, have given up the views of other non-Buddhist Indian teachers and have accepted the Bhagavān Tathāgata, the supreme teacher who is without error; nevertheless, because of the poverty of their own receptivity, like deer they cannot endure the lion’s roar of selflessness (the absence of being established as existent by being self-established), which is supremely profound, unsurpassed, and unique among all the doctrines of the non-Buddhist Indian teachers. Instead, they plunge onto that very path, infested with multitudes of venomous serpents in the form of various wrong views, followed by people whose understanding is distorted, and trodden by those wandering through the trackless wilderness of the extremely terrifying forest of saṃsāra.
For the Tathāgatas never, at any time, make verifiable the (self-established) existence of either themselves or the aggregates. As has been said in the Bhagavatī (Prajñāpāramitā):
Venerable Subhūti, even the Buddha is like an illusion, like a dream. Venerable Subhūti, even the Buddha’s attributes are like an illusion, like a dream.
Likewise,
For those who employ verification, but not for childish people, phenomena, in terms of being self-established, are devoid and parted (from that). The purified state (of arhatship and Buddhahood), in terms of being self-established, is devoid and parted (from that). Whoever practices (like that) is also devoid of being self-established.
Nor do we assert the total nonexistence of the Tathāgatas, who are totally free of (conceptual) interpolation. Otherwise, the fault arising from denying them would accrue to us. (This concludes the discussion of ) ||10||
Moreover, for a genuine yogi explaining the Tathāgata as not being established as existent by being self-established and wishing to express the non-distorted meaning, in every respect:
It should not be said that (the Tathāgata) is devoid (of being self-established), or not devoid, or both, or neither. || 11ab ||
None of all this is to be said by us. However, if nothing were said, those who would understand would be unable to understand what the Tathāgata actually is. Therefore, we too, remaining solely on the level of conventional truth with (conceptual) interpolations, for the sake of conventional communication and in conformity with the people to be trained, sometimes say “devoid,” sometimes “not devoid,” sometimes “both devoid and not devoid,” and sometimes “neither devoid nor not devoid.”
Therefore, (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
It is stated, however, for the purpose of making (the Tathāgata) conventionally verifiable.” || 11cd ||
Therefore, as was said by the Bhagavān (that phenomena are devoid):
All phenomena, by virtue of their lacking self-established existence, are devoid. All phenomena, with reference to their being without a sign (of having a self-established findable cause), are without a sign. All phenomena, by virtue of their lacking a hope (of having a self-established findable result), are without a hope. All phenomena, by virtue of their complete purity (as verified) through far-reaching verification, are clear light in their fundamental makeup.
Elsewhere, it was said (by the Buddha that phenomena are) not devoid:
If a no longer happening form (of material object), O monks, did not exist, a learned ārya śrāvaka would not delight in a no longer happening form. Therefore, O monks, because a no longer happening form (of material object) does exist, a learned ārya śrāvaka delights in a no longer happening form.
Likewise: If a not yet happening (form of material object), O monks, did not exist… and so forth. Similarly, continuing through: If a no longer happening consciousness, O monks, did not exist… and so forth, exactly as before.
Likewise, according to the Sautrāntika system, no longer happening and not yet happening phenomena are devoid (of substantially established existence), while everything else (presently happening) is not devoid (of substantially established existence). Noncongruent revealing forms (as karmic impulses of the body and speech) are devoid (of any existence at all).
In the Chittamātra system as well, there is the voidness of the self-established existence of totally conceptional phenomena because they do not arise dependently (on causes and conditions), as in the case of someone with an eye disorder seeing two moons.
(As Maitreya said in Differentiating the Middle from the Extremes, Madhyāntavibhāga I.2):
(Everything) is neither devoid nor not devoid. Therefore, everything is described (in this way). Because of the existence (of false conceptualization), the nonexistence (of the duality of apprehended and apprehender), and the existence (of voidness), this is the Middle Way approach.
However, the intended meaning with which voidness and the rest are taught must be understood through the (chapter) “Examination of the Ātman-Soul.”
As it has been said in The Sūtra (of Rāṣṭrapāla’s Questions, Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā Sūtra):
This world has been understood by you as being like an illusion, like a theatrical performance, and like a dream. There is no ātman-soul, no sentient being, nor any living being or wanderer (through samsāra). Phenomena are like a mirage and the moon reflected in water.
Because the world does not understand (that phenomena are) devoid, peaceful, and characterized by nonarising, it wanders (through samsaric rebirths). But, out of compassion, you lead them to an understanding through hundreds of skillful means, methods, and lines of reasoning. Seeing the entire world tormented by hundreds of diseases, such as longing desire and so on, you, O Sugata, move about like an incomparable physician, liberating hundreds of beings. The entire world revolves like a chariot wheel, passing through the animal, clutching ghost, and hell realms. Bewildered, without a guide, and having no protector, to them you reveal the supreme path.
None of these conceptualizations, however, can occur in the Tathāgata, who is free of conceptually fabricated projection. (This concludes the discussion of) || 11 ||
Moreover, it is not only the fourfold set beginning with “devoid” that does not apply in the case of the Tathāgata. Rather:
How could the fourfold alternative of “eternal,” “not eternal,” and so on apply in the case of the Peaceful One? And here too, how could the fourfold alternative of “finite,” “not finite,” and so on apply in the case of the Peaceful One? || 12 ||
Here, fourteen unspecified matters have been set forth by the Bhagavān. Namely, there is the fourfold set: the world is eternal; the world is not eternal; the world is both eternal and not eternal; the world is neither eternal nor not eternal. The second is: the world is finite; the world is not finite; the world is both finite and not finite; the world is neither finite nor not finite. The third is: the Tathāgata exists after death; the Tathāgata does not exist after death; the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death; the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death. And (the remaining two are): the living being is the same as the body; the living being is other than the body. These fourteen matters are called “unspecified matters” because they were left unspecified (by the Buddha).
Here, according to the line of reasoning explained above, just as the fourfold alternative beginning with being devoid does not apply in the case of the Tathāgata, who in his fundamental makeup is peaceful and is without self-established existence, likewise the fourfold alternative of “eternal,” “not eternal,” and so on does not apply here. And precisely because this fourfold alternative does not apply, it was not specified by the Bhagavān to the world, just as whether the son of a barren woman has a dark complexion, a light complexion, or the like (was not specified). And just as this fourfold alternative does not apply in the case of the Tathāgata, likewise the fourfold alternative of “finite,” “not finite,” and so on does not apply in the case of the peaceful Tathāgata. (This concludes the discussion of) || 12 ||
Now, spelling out the inapplicability of the fourfold conceptualization beginning with “The Tathāgata exists after death,” (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) stated:
Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata by means of the cognitive taking that he solidly exists, self-established as a findable object, would, conceptually discriminating, “He does not exist,” conceptualize (him in this way) even when he has passed completely into parinirvāṇa. || 13 ||
Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata with great intensity as solidly existent, self-established as a findable object – (whoever) has given rise to such a conceptual construal – would definitely conceptually construe, with regard to the Tathāgata who has passed completely into parinirvāṇa, that the Tathāgata does not exist after death: after the time of death, he does not exist; the Tathāgata has been cut off; he is no longer found to exist. For someone conceptually discriminating in this way, there would be a fabricated (false) view. (This concludes the discussion of) || 13 ||
But if one holds that, because the Tathāgata is devoid of self-established existence, there is no circumstance whatsoever in which either existence or nonexistence can apply to the Tathāgata, then according to that position:
But when this (Tathāgata) is devoid of self-established existence, the thought, “After cessation, the Buddha exists,” or “He does not exist,” simply does not make sense. || 14 ||
The intended meaning is that such a conceptualization does not occur, just as one does not conceptualize a variegated visible form in empty space. (This concludes the discussion of) || 14 ||
Thus, it is because of their dull intellect that, concerning the Tathāgata – who in his fundamental makeup is peaceful, not self-established, and beyond all conceptually fabricated projections – they conceptualize him as permanent, not permanent and so on; eternal, not eternal and so on; existent, nonexistent and so on; devoid, not devoid and so on; omniscient, not omniscient and so on:
Those who conceptually fabricate projections about the Buddha, who is beyond conceptually fabricated projection and is unchanging, are all struck down by conceptually fabricated projection; they do not see the Tathāgata. || 15 ||
For conceptually fabricated projections are tied to findable objects, whereas the Tathāgata is not a findable object. How, then, could there be any possibility for conceptually fabricated projections to arise? Therefore, the Tathāgata is beyond conceptually fabricated projections. And because his way of existing is without arising and because he does not pass over into another way of existing, he is unchanging.
Those whose minds are polluted by the impurities of false conceptual construals imagined by themselves and who conceptually fabricate various unreal, specific conceptual construals concerning such a Tathāgata as this – the Buddha, the Bhagavān – are struck down by their very own conceptually fabricated projections and remain utterly remote from the abundance of the Tathāgata’s good qualities. Consequently, being like corpses with respect to this teaching, they do not see the Tathāgata, just as those blind from birth do not see the sun.
Therefore, the Bhagavān stated:
Those who saw me by means of my visible form, those who followed me by means of the sound of my voice, those people, proceeding with mistaken striving, will not see me. The Buddhas are to be seen through the Dharma, for the Guides have a Dharmakāya. But how phenomena actually exist cannot be cognitively known; it is not possible to cognitively know it.
(This concludes the discussion of) || 15 ||
Here, in this (chapter) “Examination of the Tathāgata,” the entire world of sentient beings – including the gods, asura anti-gods, humans, and so on – has been examined. And just as this world of sentient beings lacks self-established existence, so too, in order to point out that the world serving as their environment likewise lacks self-established existence – from the sphere of wind and so on up to the palaces spread throughout the Akaniṣṭha heaven – (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states:
Whatever way of existing the Tathāgata has, this world has that same way of existing. || 16ab ||
“This world” means the world serving as the environment. But what way of existing does the Tathāgata have? (Ācārya Nāgārjuna) states further:
The Tathāgata lacks self-established existence, and so this world also lacks self-established existence. || 16cd ||
And just as the world serving as the environment lacks self-established existence, so too this has been demonstrated by the (chapters) “Examination of Conditions” and so forth. Therefore, it has indeed been said in a sūtra:
“The Tathāgata always has non-arising as his way of existing, and all phenomena are similar to the Sugata, the Blissfully Gone One. But those of childish understanding, by cognitively taking indicative signs (of phenomena as being self-established, as if that corresponded to reality), engage with unreal phenomena in the world. For the Tathāgata is like a reflection of an untainted constructive phenomenon.
Here, there is neither suchness nor a Tathāgata, and yet the reflection appears and is seen throughout the whole world. Thus, an illusion and sentient beings are not dual (in the way they exist); they are not divided into two (ways of existing). A dream and sentient beings are not dual (in the way they exist); they are not divided into two (ways of existing).
O sons of the gods, all phenomena are indeed like illusions, like dreams. Even a stream-enterer is like an illusion, like a dream. Even the result of stream-entry is like an illusion, like a dream. Likewise, a once-returner and the result of once-returning; a non-returner and the result of non-returning. Even an arhat is like an illusion, like a dream. Even the result of arhatship is like an illusion, like a dream. A pratyekabuddha too is like an illusion, like a dream. Even pratyekabuddhahood is like an illusion, like a dream. A Fully Enlightened Buddha too is like an illusion, like a dream. Even Fully Enlightened Buddhahood is like an illusion, like a dream.” – so say I (Subhūti).
Then the sons of the gods asked the venerable Subhūti, “O Noble Subhūti, are you saying that even a Fully Enlightened Buddha is like an illusion, like a dream, and that even Fully Enlightened Buddhahood is like an illusion, like a dream?”
Subhūti replied, “O sons of the gods, I say that even nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream. What need, then, to speak of any other phenomenon?”
The sons of the gods said, “O Noble Subhūti, are you saying that even nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream?”
Subhūti replied, “O sons of the gods, even if there were some phenomenon more exalted than nirvāṇa, I would say that it too is like an illusion, like a dream. For an illusion and nirvāṇa are not dual (in the way they exist); they are not divided into two (ways of existing).”
Subhūti (then) said: “O sons of the gods, I say that even nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream. What, then, need to be said of any other phenomenon?”
The sons of the gods (then) said, “O Noble Subhūti, are you saying that even nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream?’
Subhūti (then) said: “O sons of the gods, even if there were some phenomenon superior to nirvāṇa, I would say that it too is like an illusion, like a dream. For an illusion and nirvāṇa are not dual (in the way they exist), they are not divided into two (ways of existing).”
Thus ends the twenty-second chapter, entitled “Examination of the Tathāgata,” in Clear Words Commentary on Madhyamaka, composed by the Lineage Master Ācārya Candrakīrti.