Here, someone [In Nāgārjuna’s time, a Sautrantika. In Chandrakīrti’s time, a Svatantrika, asserts that the Tathāgata is self-established as conventionally existent, but depends on the self-established aggregates he obtains in order to make himself verifiable and so a marker of his self-established existence is found on the side of the self-established aggregates] stated: “Because the Tathāgata, the Accordantly Gone One, establishes by himself that he conventionally exists, this is known to have come about because of the continuum of his (previous) recurring samsaric existence. That is because it was (1) by possessing great compassion and both skillful means and verification and a mind single-pointedly intent on bringing about the complete pacification of the suffering of all classes of sentient beings throughout the three realms, without exception, and (2) by continuously engaging, without interruption, for three or seven countless eons, in those various unsurpassed and extraordinarily diverse undertakings of meritorious acts that are characterized by having as their sole function the bringing about of the welfare of the entire world, and (3) by being wholly dedicated to the welfare of all beings without exception, with a concern even greater than that which one has for a beloved only son, and (4) by, under the power of great compassion, making himself available for the use of others in whatever realm of rebirth (he appeared), like earth, water, fire, wind, common medicine, and a great tree – it is by means of all that, over a long period of time here (in this world), that the Bhagavān, the Vanquishing Master Surpassing All, attained the state of omniscience that completely discerns every aspect. That Bhagavān, having thus attained omniscient deep awareness, is called the Tathāgata, the Accordantly Gone One, because he has gone to Buddhahood, without remainder, in accord with how the actuality of phenomena has been determined. If there had been no continuum of his (previous) recurring samsaric existence, then there would likewise be no Tathāgata. For it is not possible to attain the state of a Tathāgata in a single lifetime. Therefore, the continuum of his (recurring samsaric) existence is known to exist because (now) the Tathāgata conventionally exists, established by himself.
It is replied, “(That’s not the case at all,) for in fact it is this great misknowing of yours that causes the continuum of your own recurring samsaric existence to continue without interruption and for an extremely long time. Indeed, although being dispelled by the moonlight-like illumination of deep awareness in his (the Buddha’s) various manifestations, yet the exceedingly thick, dense darkness of your misknowing has become so greatly reinforced through your extensive accumulation of habitual tendencies built up over an exceedingly long time that, even now, it has neither been destroyed nor come to an end.
If there were, in fact, someone called a Tathāgata whose conventional existence was established by himself, then, because he would have become fully accomplished over a long period of time, there would have been a continuum of his recurring samsaric existence. But no such one called a “Tathāgata” has been perceived as established by himself as being conventionally existent. Rather, it is only because your mind’s eye is obscured by the darkness of misknowing that you falsely perceive a self-established Tathāgata, like (someone seeing) two moons, hairs, fruit flies, and the like. And because a Tathāgata does not have self-established conventional existence, (Nāgārjuna), explaining this, stated:
1. The aggregates are not (the Tathāgata); he is not other than the aggregates. The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in them. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates. How, then, is there a Tathāgata here?
For if there were some findable object corresponding to the word “Tathāgata,” stainless and free from conceptual fabrication, then he would either (1) be self-established as (conventionally identical with) the aggregates – either self-established as (conventionally identical with) the five aggregates that are called “forms of physical phenomena, feelings, distinguishing, affecting variables, and types of consciousness” or, alternatively, self-established as (conventionally identical with) the five aggregates that are called “ethical self-discipline, absorbed concentration, verification, liberation, and deep awareness of liberation” – or else (2) he would be (self-established as) something (conventionally) other than those. Here, however, in this analysis, only the former five aggregates are obtained (as a basis), because they have the indicative feature of being the basis for making someone verifiable, whereas the latter do not pervade (all cases), since they are included within the former five.
Alternatively (if not conventionally identical with the aggregates), he would be something (conventionally) other than the five aggregates. In that case, (as two separate objects), either the aggregates would be in the Tathāgata, or he would be in the aggregates, or the Tathāgata would possess the aggregates, like Devadatta possesses wealth. But, when examined in every way, none of these is possible.
How so? To begin with, the aggregates themselves are not the Tathāgata. Why? Because it has been stated: “If this fuel were the fire itself, there would be a oneness of agent and what it used for enacting its actions.” That should be applied here as well, “If a (self-established) Buddha were (identical with the aggregates he) obtained (as a basis to use for enacting his actions of body and speech), there would be a oneness of an agent (existing self-contained) and what he used for enacting his actions.” Likewise, it has been stated: “If an ātman-soul were the aggregates, it would partake of arising and passing away.” That should be applied here as well: “If the Buddha were the aggregates, he would partake of arising and passing away.” Thus, to this extent, the aggregates are not the Tathāgata.
Now the Tathāgata is not other than the aggregates either. Why? Because it has been stated: “Fire comes from fuel. If it were otherwise, it would exist without this fuel,” Likewise, in this alternative case, because of being non-dependent (on fuel), (the fire) would not have a cause enabling it to shed light. And in that case, there would be no purpose for ever starting it again, as it would exist without an object (as its basis to use) for enacting its actions. That should be applied here as well. If a (self-established) Buddha were other than the (aggregates he needed to obtain as a basis to use for enacting his actions), he would exist without an obtaining of anything (as a basis to use). Likewise, in this alternative case, because of being non-dependent (on obtaining a basis), he would be someone without an obtaining of a basis. And in that case, there would be no purpose in his doing anything again, as he would exist without obtaining an object (as a basis to use) for enacting his actions.
Likewise, if, (being self-established), he were (conventionally) other than the aggregates, he would have the defining characteristic of being conventionally existent without aggregates. But because of there not being an otherness between the aggregates and the Tathāgata, the aggregates are not suitable to be in a Tathāgata (that was self-established as other than they), nor is a (self-established) Tathāgata suitable to be (conventionally established by being) in the aggregates. And this has also been stated in the Madhyamakāvatāra (Engaging in Madhyamaka) in explanation of both positions:
An ātman-soul is not found in the aggregates, nor are the aggregates here in an ātman-soul. In the case of there being an otherness (between them), this conceptual construct would indeed exist; but that otherness does not exist, and because of that, (so too) this conceptual construct.
(A self-established) Tathāgata is not accepted as possessing aggregates, just as it has been said there that an ātman-soul is not accepted as possessing a visible form. This is because, since an ātman-soul does not exist at all, there is no applicability here of the suffix expressing possession (to something that does not exist). [The same is the case with a self-established Tathāgata, who does not exist at all.]
In the distinction (made between) “possessing a cow” and “possessing a form,” in (this) distinction (between something) being it and being other (than it), neither of the two pertain to an ātman-soul because there is no such thing as an ātman-soul. In fact, however, all five positions are included within the two positions of something being it and being other (than it). It should be understood, however, that the Master described the five positions entirely as being dependent upon their issuing from the deluded view of a perishing network.
“And since no (self-established) Tathāgata is found to conventionally exist when examined in these five ways in relation to aggregates, how could he be established as conventionally existent like an ātman-soul (in relation to aggregates) in any other way. Therefore, it is altogether impossible that there is a Tathāgata (that is self-established as being conventionally existent).”
Thus, not seeing someone established by himself as being conventionally existent, the Master (Nāgārjuna) stated the line, “How, then, is there a Tathāgata here?” His intended meaning is that there simply is no one who discerns all the entities of the three planes of compulsive existence whose conventional existence is established by himself. And because of the non-existence of a Tathāgata whose conventional existence is established by himself, it is established that a continuum of recurring samsaric existence did not exist as the substantially existent natal source (of such a non-existent Tathāgata). Thus ends the first (verse). ||1||
To that, the person (who asserts self-established existence) says, “Indeed, we do not assert that a (self-established) Tathāgata is (identical with) the aggregates, because that would entail the faults already stated. Nor do we assert that he is other than the aggregates. Nor do we maintain that the untainted aggregates are in the Tathāgata, like a cluster of trees (being) in the Himālaya mountains. Nor do we maintain that the Tathāgata is in the aggregates, like a lion (being) in a cluster of trees. Nor do we maintain that he possesses the aggregates, like a universal monarch possesses the major and minor marks.
Since we do not accept either its identity or otherness (like this), what, then? We determine that a Tathāgata, who cannot be said (in relation to the aggregates) to be them, to be other (than them), and so on – (such a Tathāgata) obtains stainless (self-established) aggregates as a basis (upon which to rely for establishing and verifying his conventional existence). Therefore, this refutation does not invalidate our position.”
To this it is replied:
2. If the Buddha’s conventional existence is not established by himself, but is established by obtaining aggregates that are self-established, how could it be that, not being self-established by himself (since that is impossible), his conventional existence is established by relying on something other than himself that is self-established?
Because if the Buddha Bhagavān’s (conventional existence) is made verifiable from (depending on) stainless (self-established) aggregates he has obtained (as a basis) – (a relationship that) cannot be expressed in terms of his being them or being other (than them) – then it becomes evident that his conventional existence is not established by himself. This is because, like a reflection, his conventional existence is made verifiable (dependent on a basis) obtained (that is other than he).
But how can someone (such as the Buddha), whose conventional existence as the form of phenomenon that he exists as is not established by himself, and so, being non-existent as a self-established conventional object, obtains aggregates (as a self-established basis to depend on for establishing his own conventional existence) – (how can such a Buddha as that) come to be someone having his conventional existence be established by relying on self-established objects that are “other (than himself).” For it is certainly not reasonable that something nonexistent, such as the son of a barren woman, will come to establish its conventional existence by looking to depend on something else whose own conventional existence is self-established. ||2||
Suppose it were argued: “A reflection, although not existing by itself being self-established, nevertheless comes to conventionally exist by looking to depend on something else being self-established – a face, a mirror and so on. Like that, so too the Tathāgata, although not established by himself as being conventionally existent, comes to establish his conventional existence by looking to depend on obtaining as a basis something else that is self-established – the five untainted aggregates. [In other words, how can something not conventionally existent by itself come to be conventionally existent by relying on something else that is self-established. Put even more simply, how can something non-existent come to be established as existent.] Even so:
3. (Suppose you reply that) someone whose conventional existence is established in dependence on a self-established “other” is someone who [beforehand] is without an ātman-soul of self-established existence. [Response] How can someone who [beforehand] is without an ātman-soul of self-established existence come to be the Tathāgata?
It is reasonable that, “If it is maintained that the Tathāgata, like a reflection, dependently arises on the basis of something else being self-established, then in that case it follows that, just like a reflection, the Tathāgata [before encountering the mirror] is someone without an ātman-soul of self-established existence, because his conventional existence is (in fact) not self-established [before encountering the mirror].”
Here, the word ātman, “soul,” is a synonym for svabhāva, “self-established existence.” And how will someone without an ātman-soul, someone who lacks self-established existence like a reflection [before encountering the mirror], become a Tathāgata as a form of phenomenon with self-established existence [by encountering the mirror as you assert]? The intended meaning is that he cannot be someone (a Buddha) who has proceeded on the unmistaken path. /3/
Moreover, if there were the self-established existence of the Tathāgata, then, relative to that self-existence, the self-existence of the aggregates would be something other that was self-established. Dependently arisen on that other object that was self-established, the Tathāgata would then conventionally exist. But when there is no self-established existence of the Tathāgata at all, then from where could the aggregates have the status of being something other than this? Explaining this, (Nāgājuna) stated:
4. If there is no existence established from oneself, how could there be existence established from what is other?
And when this is so – when neither existence established from oneself nor existence established from what is other exists – then:
Apart from being someone with existence established from oneself or existence established from what is “other,” who could this Tathāgata be?
An existent functional phenomenon, as a findable object corresponding to the word for it, would have its existence be established either from the side of itself or from the side of something other than itself (in contrast to it). But aside from these two, what Tathāgata could be determined (to exist) as a findable object corresponding to the word for it that is an alternative of these two (possibilities)? Furthermore,
5. If there were some Tathāgata that (first existed) without obtaining (a basis) from the aggregates and then now he were to obtain (one), he would then exist having obtained (a basis).
If you think: “The Tathāgata – (whose relationship with) the aggregates cannot be expressed in terms of his being them or being other (than them) – is made verifiable as someone who (at first) has not obtained (a basis) from the aggregates,” then when would that be tenable? It would be tenable if someone called “the Tathāgata” were to exist beforehand without (relying) on obtaining the aggregates (as a basis), and not having (already) obtained the aggregates (as a basis), he could then obtain the aggregates (as a basis). For it is precisely someone already established beforehand as something distinct who obtains something – (for example) Devadatta, already established as distinct from his wealth, acquires wealth.
Likewise, if there were some Tathāgata without having obtained the aggregates (as a basis) and then he would now obtain the aggregates (as a basis), and thereafter, having obtained those aggregates (as a basis), he would then exist; but when examined, this is altogether impossible.
6. But there isn’t any Tathāgata who (first) exists not obtaining (a basis) from the aggregates.
Because of the absurd conclusion that he would then exist without a cause [for being made verifiable].
And how could someone, not obtaining a basis and so not existing, then obtain (a basis) for himself?
The intended meaning is: (He can’t) because he is not someone seen as existing [before obtaining the aggregates as a basis]. And when this is so that [at first] he is not obtaining anything for himself (as a basis), it is not tenable that someone called “the Tathāgata,” who obtains (a basis) from the aggregates, could then come to exist [by obtaining them]. And as this is so, then because a Tathāgata, not seen as existing before obtaining (the aggregates as a basis), cannot then obtain for himself anything, then that obtaining (of a basis by a nonexistent Tathāgata), which is not an obtaining of anything, cannot be an obtaining.
To demonstrate this, [Nagarjuna] stated:
7. And any obtaining that is by something that [at first] is without (a basis) obtained cannot exist.
And if, in this way, an obtaining (of a basis) is not an obtaining because it is not being obtained by anyone at all, then, because of the nonexistence of an obtaining (of a basis), there is not any obtainer either. To demonstrate this, [Nagarjuna] stated:
And so, a Tathāgata [who at first is] without an obtaining (of a basis) does not exist in any way whatsoever.
Thus, by the line of reasoning just established:
8. When he cannot (be found to) exist, when being sought for (in relation to the aggregates) in five ways – being them, being other (than them, and so on) – how could a Tathāgata be made verifiable by (reliance on) obtaining (the aggregates as a basis)?
He (referring to) the Tathāgata, when being sought for – (meaning) when being analyzed – in relation to the aggregates, cannot (be found to) exist as being them – (meaning) being identical (with them) – and cannot (be found to) exist in relation to the aggregates as being other (than them) – (meaning) being distinct and separate (from them). And because of not (being found to) exist as being them or being other (than them), then when being sought for in (the other three of) the five ways – being what supports them, what is being supported by them and what possesses them – he also cannot (be found to) exist. So, how could a Tathāgata, who is known as not existing at all in agreement (with any of these five ways), possibly be made verifiable by (relying on) obtaining (aggregates as his basis). Therefore, because of that, someone called the Tathāgata cannot (be found to) exist as a self-established findable object. || 8||
Not only is the Tathāgata not (found to) exist (on his own) by this close examination, but also he is not seen as (becoming) existent because of (relying) on a basis that is self-established. Also, the obtained (basis to rely on), the five aggregates – form, feeling, distinguishing, affecting variables and consciousnesses – these too are not seen to establish their conventional existence just by being themselves, because of their dependent arising and because that has already been refuted in detail in (the chapter) “Examination of the Aggregates.”
Suppose someone were argue, “If (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are not (found to) establish themselves as being conventionally existent, then they would (be found to) have their conventional existence be established by their identity as the causes and conditions that establish something else as being conventionally existent (namely, that which obtains them as its basis).” That too is untenable.
Explaining this, (Nāgājuna) stated, “How would they (the aggregates), not established as being conventionally existent by themselves, come to have their conventional existence be established by (being obtained as a basis) by something else?” ||9|| The son of a barren woman, not seen to establish himself as being conventionally existent, cannot be made verifiable by something else that establishes its conventional existence. Because of that, the obtained (aggregates) cannot be found to conventionally exist as self-established findable objects.
9. Even these (aggregates) that are obtained (as a basis) are not seen to establish their conventional existence by themselves.
Because (the aggregates) are dependent on an obtainer, and because something independent of an obtainer cannot have the status of being something obtained (as a basis), there is no basis obtained whose conventional existence is established by itself.
Now suppose someone were to argue, “Even if a basis obtained cannot be established as conventionally existent by itself, independent of an obtainer (obtaining it), then let it be established as conventionally existent by depending on an obtainer (obtaining it).” Even in that case,
How would they (the aggregates), not established as being conventionally existent by themselves, come to have their conventional existence be established by (being obtained as a basis) by something else?
If (the aggregates) obtained (as a basis) do not have their conventional existence established by themselves, how would they, [at first] being non-existent as self-established, come to have conventional existence established by an obtainer (obtaining them as its basis). Therefore, (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are not (found to be) conventionally existent as self-established findable objects.
Now, pointing out the conclusion that has already been established, (Nāgārjuna) stated:
10. Thus, the (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are devoid in every way and so too is the one who obtains them.
(The aggregates) obtained (as a basis), when being examined in every way, are devoid, being without self-established existence, and the one who obtains them (as well) is (also) devoid, lacking self-established existence. Therefore, now, with such (aggregates) obtained (as a basis):
So, how can (your theories that assert self-established existence) explain that a Tathāgata that is devoid (of self-established existence) is made verifiable by means of something (obtained aggregates) that is (also) devoid (of self-established existence)?
“[By your theories that assert self-established existence], it is simply not possible that a Tathāgata, who [before obtaining a basis] does not conventionally exist, can be made verifiable by depending on something else (the aggregates) that also do not conventionally exist [before being obtained]. Therefore, it is not tenable that “The Tathāgata is made verifiable (dependent) on aggregates obtained (as a basis).”
At this point, they say, “Alas, our hopes have been dashed – we, of all people, who had given up our hope in the founders of the non-Buddhist Indian traditions – Kaṇāda (founder of the Vaiśeṣika tradition), Akṣapāda (founder of Nyāya), the Digambaras (the Jains), Jaimini (founder of Mīmāṃsāka), the (later) Naiyāyikas, and the like. They pride themselves on (imparting) teachings of an unmistaken path to heaven and final release, but they themselves are ensnared in a net, like in a jungle of thorny creepers and palms, (consisting) of extremely rigid false views fabricated by their own conceptual constructs. And so, they have wandered astray by going down a path that is the opposite of the one leading to the city of nirvāṇa and have not crossed beyond the perilous, trackless, wilderness that is the forest of saṃsāric rebirth.
And, for the purpose of removing the thick, impenetrable darkness of deluminating closed-mindedness, and with the aim of liberation and the aim of unsurpassed, complete enlightenment, we have taken the safe direction of refuge in the Tathāgata, the sun. The exceedingly penetrating sun-rays of his teachings of the true Dharma pervade the entire expanse of space in all directions dispelling the darkness of the non-Buddhist Indian views without remainder, illuminating their paths (to reveal) that they are the opposite of those lead to heaven and final release. Wholly intent on causing the minds of the various disciples to be trained to open up, like lotus-buds, (by means of) the stainless solar orb of his ten powers, the fearlessnesses and unique Buddha qualities, (the Tathāgata) is the singular stainless eye for those who are fit recipients of the true meaning of the words of the Dharma, established in accord with reality. Thus, he is the one worthy to offer a safe direction of refuge for the entire world, without a second. He is the supreme charioteer of the Great Vehicle, Mahayana, the Great Path, equipped with the lofty horses and foot soldiers that are the seven factors leading to a purified state. Wholly intent on drying up the river (flowing through) the wilderness of repeated saṃsāric rebirth, (characterized by) birth, old age and death, for all beings throughout the three realms of existence, he is victorious against the shower of falling arrows in the battle against the enemy, the four māra demonic forces. He is the one who drives away the seizure (of the sun of the teachings) by the eclipsing Rāhu-like embodiment of the grasping at what is unreal that affects the entire world.
And with regard to that, you have stated, “Thus, the (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are devoid in every way and so too is the one who obtains them. So how can (your Prasangika theories explain that) a Tathāgata that is devoid (of self-established existence before obtaining a basis) is made verifiable by means of something that is also devoid (of self-established existence before being obtained)?” By you asserting with statements like this the nonexistence of anything self-established, our hopes for liberation and desire for the attainment of unsurpassable complete enlightenment have been destroyed.
“Enough of that, you, who are comparable to darkeners of the world who are (trying to) cover over the great sun that is the Tathāgata by (pathetically) emitting out-of-season peals of rolling thunder. It is rather our own hopes in unawake people such as yourselves that have been dashed. For although people like you, by having the wish for liberation, have given up other non-Buddhist Indian views and have accepted the Bhagavān Tathāgata, the supreme teacher who is without error; yet, because of the poverty of their own intellectual disposition, like deer they cannot endure the lion’s roar of selflessness (that there is no such thing as self-established existence) which is supremely profound, unsurpassed, and unique among all the doctrines of the non-Buddhist Indian teachers. Instead, they plunge onto that very path, infested with swarms of venomous serpents in the form of various wrong views, followed by people whose understanding is distorted, and trodden by those wandering in the trackless wilderness of the extremely terrifying forest of saṃsāra.
For the Tathāgatas never, at any time, make verifiable the (self-established) existence of either themselves or the aggregates (as findable objects.) As has been said in the Bhagavatī (Prajñāpāramitā):
Venerable Subhūti, even the Buddha is like an illusion, like a dream. Venerable Subhūti, even the Buddha’s attributes are like an illusion, like a dream.
Likewise,
For those (who employ) verification, but not for childish people, phenomena, in terms of being self-established, are devoid and parted (from that). The purified stated (of arhatship and Buddhahood), in terms of being self-established, are devoid and parted (from that). Whoever practices (like that) is also devoid of self-established existence.
Nor do we assert the total nonexistence of the Tathāgatas, who totally lack any conceptual fabrications. Otherwise, the fault of asserting total nonexistence would accrue to us.” ||10||
By a genuine yogi explaining the Tathāgata as devoid of self-established existence and wishing to express the non-distorted meaning, in all ways:
11. It should not be said that (the Tathāgata) is devoid (of self-established existence) or not devoid, or both or neither.
“All of that is not to be said by us. But, in the case of not saying (anything), those who would understand the actual way in which objects abide would be unable to understand. Therefore, for the sake of conventional (communication) in conformity with the person to be trained and remaining only on the level of conventional truth with our conceptual interpolations, we too sometimes say ‘devoid,’ sometimes ‘not devoid,’ sometimes ‘both devoid and not devoid, ’ and sometimes ‘neither devoid nor not devoid.’” Therefore, (Nāgārjuna) stated:
It is only stated for the purpose of making (the Tathāgata) conventionally verifiable.
Therefore, as was said by the Bhagavān,
All phenomena are devoid by virtue of their lacking self-established existence. All phenomena are without a sign, with reference to their being without a sign (of having a self-established findable cause). All phenomena are without a hope, in connection with their being without a hope (of having a self-established findable result). All phenomena in their fundamental makeup are clear light by virtue of their complete purification with prajñāpāramitā, far-reaching verification.
Elsewhere, it was said (by the Buddha that phenomena are) not devoid,
If a no longer happening form (of material object), O monks, were not to exist at all, a learned ārya śrāvaka would not (be able to) delight in a no longer happening form. Therefore, O monks, because a no longer happening form (of material object) does (conventionally) exist, a learned ārya śrāvaka can delight in a no longer happening form.
Likewise: “If a not yet happening (form of material object) did not exist, O monks…” and so forth. Similarly, continuing through: “If a no longer happening consciousness did not exist, O monks…” and so forth, exactly as before.
Likewise, according to the Sautrantika system, no longer happening and not yet happening phenomena are devoid (of substantially established existence), while everything else (presently happening) is not devoid (of substantially established existence). Noncongruent revealing forms (as karmic impulses of the body and speech) are devoid (of any existence at all).
In the Chittamatra system, there is the voidness of the self-existence of totally conceptional phenomena because of their not being dependently arising (from causes and conditions), like the seeing of two moons by someone with an eye disorder.
And it is (both) devoid and not devoid – therefore, all these (alternatives) are mentioned. And because it is existent and because it is not existent, that is the Middle Way approach, Madhyamaka.
However, the intended meaning with which voidness and the rest are taught must be understood through the (chapter) “Examination of the Ātman-Soul.” As it has been said in a sūtra:
This world has been described by you as like an illusion, like a theatrical performance, and like a dream. There is no ātman-soul, no sentient being, nor living being, no wanderer in samsāra. Phenomena are like a mirage and the moon reflected in water.
Precisely because the world does not understand (reality as being) devoid, peaceful, and characterized by non-appropriation (of anything as “mine”), it wanders (through samsaric rebirths); but, out of compassion, you bring them to incarnate (understanding) by hundreds of skillful means, methods, and reasonings. Seeing the entire world tormented by hundreds of diseases such as longing desire and so on, you, O Sugata, move about like an incomparable physician, liberating hundreds of beings. The whole world revolves like a chariot wheel, passing through the animal, clutching ghost, and hell realms; bewildered, without a guide, roaming about without a protector – to the, you reveal the supreme path.
None of these conceptual constructs, however, exist in the Tathāgata, who lacks any conceptual fabrication. ||11||
Moreover, it is not only the fourfold set beginning with “devoid” that does not apply to the Tathāgata; rather:
12. How could the fourfold alternative “eternal,” “not eternal” and so on (apply) in the case of the Peaceful One? And here too, how could the fourfold alternative “finite,” “not finite” and so on (apply) in the case of the Peaceful One?
Here, the fourteen unspecified matters have been set forth by the Bhagavān. Namely, the fourfold set: the world is eternal, the world is not eternal, the world is eternal and not eternal, the world is nether eternal nor not eternal. The second is the world is finite, the world is not finite, the world is both finite and not finite, the world is neither finite nor not finite. The third is the Tathāgata exists after death, the Tathāgata does not exist after death, the Tathāgata both exists after death and does not exist after death, and the Tathāgata neither exists after death nor does not exist after death. The living being is (the same as) the body, the living being is other than the body. These fourteen are called the unspecified matters because there were unspecified (and so left unanswered by the Buddha).
Here, by the reasoning explained above, just as the fourfold alternative of being devoid and so on does not apply in the case of the Tathāgata, peaceful in his fundamental makeup and without self-established existence, so likewise the fourfold alternative of “eternal,” “not eternal,” and so on does not apply here. And it is precisely because the fourfold alternative is inapplicable that it was not declared by the Bhagavān to the world, just as the darkness, fairness, and the like of the son of a barren woman (were not declared). And just as this fourfold alternative does not apply to the Tathāgata, so too the fourfold alternative of “finite,” “not finite” and so on also does not apply to the peaceful Tathāgata. ||12||
Now, spelling out the inapplicability of the fourfold conceptual constructions, “The Tathāgata exists after death” and so on, (Nāgārjuna) stated,
13. Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata by means of the cognitive taking that he solidly exists, self-established as a findable object, would also conceptualize about him even when he has passed into parinirvāṇa, that (now) he does not exist.
Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata, with a great intensity, that he even more solidly exists, self-established as a findable object – (whoever) has given rise to such a conceptual construct will conceptually construe, with regard to the Tathāgata who has passed completely into parinirvāṇa, that after death the (solidly existent) Tathāgata (now) does not exist – after the time of death he no longer exists; the Tathāgata has been cut off; he is no longer seen to exist. For someone conceptualizing in this way, he would have given rise to a fabricated (false) view. ||13||
But if one holds that, because the Tathāgata is devoid of self-established existence, there is no circumstance whatsoever under which one could predicate either existence or nonexistence of the Tathāgata, then according to that position:
14. But when this (Tathāgata) is devoid of self-established existence, the thought, “After final cessation the Buddha exists” or “does not exist,” simply does not make sense.
The intended meaning is that this conceptual construct could not arise, just as with a conceptual construct of a variegated visible form in an empty space. ||14||
Thus, it is because of (their) dull intellect that, concerning the Tathāgata – who in his fundamental makeup is peaceful, not self-established, and beyond all conceptual fabrications – they conceptually construe that he is permanent, not permanent and so on, eternal, not eternal and so on, existent, not existent and so on, devoid, not devoid and so on, omniscient, not omniscient, and so on:
15. Those who conceptually fabricate about the Buddha, who is beyond conceptual fabrication and unchanging, are all overcome by conceptual fabrication; they do not see the Tathāgata.
For conceptual fabrications are tied to findable objects, and the Tathāgata is not a findable object. How, then, could there be (any possibility for) conceptual fabrications to arise? Therefore, the Tathāgata is beyond conceptual fabrications. And because his way of existing lacks any arising (into something else) and because it does not pass over into another way of existing, he is unchanging.
Those who, because their minds are polluted by the impurities of distorted conceptual constructs of their own imagination, conceptually fabricate various unreal conceptual constructs concerning such a Tathāgata as this, the Buddha, the Bhagavān, are struck down by their very own conceptual fabrications and remain utterly remote from the abundance of the Tathāgata’s good qualities. And consequently, being corpse-like with respect to this teaching, they do not see the Tathāgata, just as those blind from birth (do not see) the sun.
Therefore, the Bhagavān has stated:
Those who saw me by means of (my) visible form, those who followed me by means of the sound (of my voice), those people, proceeding with mistaken striving, will not see me. The Buddhas are to be seen through the Dharma, for the Guides have a Dharmakāya. But how all dharmas, (all) phenomena, exist is not to be cognitively known (by ordinary consciousness); it cannot be cognitively known (by that). ||15||
Here, in this (chapter) “Examination of the Tathāgata,” the entire world of sentient beings – including the gods, asura anti-gods, humans, and so on – has been examined. And just as this world of sentient beings lacks self-established existence, so too, in order to point out that the world serving as their environment likewise lacks self-established existence – from the sphere of wind and so on up to the palaces spread throughout the Akaniṣṭha heaven – (Nāgārjuna) stated:
16. Whatever manner of existence the Tathāgata has himself, this world has just that manner of existence itself.
“This world” means the world serving as the environment. But what manner of existence does the Tathāgata have? (Nāgārjuna) stated further:
The Tathāgata lacks self-established existence, and so this world (also) lacks self-established existence.
And just as the world serving as the environment lacks self-established existence, so too this has been demonstrated by the (chapters) “Examination of Conditions” and the so forth. Therefore, it has indeed been said in a sūtra:
“At no time is the Tathāgata a (self-established) phenomenon (that is made verifiable by) obtaining (a basis); and (in this respect) all phenomena are like the Sugata, the Blissfully Gone One. But people of childish understanding, by cognitively taking indicative signs (of phenomena as being self-established, as if that corresponded to reality), engage with unreal phenomena in the world.
For the Tathāgata is like a reflection of untainted constructive phenomena. Here there is neither suchness nor a Tathāgata, and yet the reflection exists and is seen by all throughout the whole world.
Thus, illusion and sentient beings are not dual (in the way they exist), they are not divided into two (ways of existing). Dreams and sentient beings are not dual (in the way they exist), they are not divided into two (ways of existing). O sons of the gods, all phenomena indeed are like illusions, like dreams. Even an (enterer) stream-enterer is like an illusion, like a dream. Even a resultant stream-enterer is like an illusion, like a dream. Likewise, an (enterer) once-returner as well and a resultant once-returner. Even an (enterer) non-returner as well and a resultant non-returner. Even an (enterer) arhat is like an illusion, like a dream. A resultant arhat as well is like an illusion, like a dream. A pratyekabuddha as well is like an illusion, like a dream. Even pratyekabuddhahood is like an illusion, like a dream. A Fully Enlightened Buddha as well is like an illusion, like a dream. Even Fully Enlightened Buddhahood is like an illusion, like a dream,” say I (Subhūti).
Then indeed the sons of the gods asked the venerable Subhūti this: “O Noble Subhūti, are you saying that even a Fully Enlightened Buddha is like an illusion, like a dream, and that even Full Enlightened Buddhahood is like an illusion, like a dream?’
Subhūti (then) said: “O sons of the gods, I say that even nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream. What, then, need to be said of any other phenomenon?”
The sons of the gods (then) said, “O Noble Subhūti, are you saying that even nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream?’
Subhūti (then) said: “O sons of the gods, even if there were some phenomenon superior to nirvāṇa, I would say that it too is like an illusion, like a dream. For an illusion and nirvāṇa are not dual (in the way they exist), they are not divided into two (ways of existing).”
Thus ends the twenty-second chapter, entitled “Examination of the Tathāgata,” in Clear Words Commentary on Madhyamaka, composed by the Spiritual Master Ācārya Candrakīrti.