1. (Objection) If all this were void, there could be no arising or no perishing. Then, through the riddance or cessation of what could nirvāṇa be posited?
Here, the Bhagavān has described two types of nirvāṇa, states of being extinguished, for persons who have lived a brahmacarya life of pure conduct, who have entered into the teachings of the Tathāgata, and who are engaged in practice in accord with the Dharma. (These are) a nirvāṇa that is with the leftover support and a nirvāṇa that is without the leftover support.
Of these, a nirvāṇa with the leftover support is asserted to be the state attained through ridding oneself of the host of disturbing mental factors, such as misknowing, attachment, and so forth, without any of them left over. In this context, the support is “that on which stickiness to an ātman-soul places itself.” By the term “support” is meant the five obtainer aggregates, which have the indicative sign of being the basis from which an ātman-soul is made verifiable. “That which has been left over” is called a “leftover.” The obtainer aggregates themselves are the leftover; therefore, they are called the “leftover support.” Because it exists together with this leftover support, it is called (a nirvāṇa) “with the leftover support.”
What is it that exists in this way? It is a nirvāṇa, a state of being extinguished. In that state, only the mere aggregates remain, completely devoid of the thieves that are the disturbing mental factors, such as the deluded view of a perishing network. This is analogous to the mere village remaining after all the bands of thieves have been destroyed. This is a nirvāṇa with the leftover support.
But when, in a nirvāṇa state, there are not even the five aggregates, that is a nirvāṇa without the leftover support, because a leftover support is gone from it. It is analogous to the destruction not only of all the bands of thieves, but also of the village itself. Concerning precisely that, it is said:
The body has perished; distinguishings, feelings, and all the rest have ceased. The affecting variables have quieted down completely; the consciousnesses are gone.
Likewise:
With a body that had not collapsed, he endured (saṃsāric feelings; the liberation of his mind was like the extinguishing of a lamp.
Thus, a nirvāṇa without the leftover support is attained through the cessation of the aggregates.
(Objection) But if there is a cessation of both the disturbing mental factors and the aggregates, how can these two types of a nirvāṇa be fitting? For if all this is voidness, and nothing whatsoever arises and nothing whatsoever ceases, then from where could disturbing mental factors come? And from where could aggregates come, such that a nirvāṇa could result from their cessation? Therefore, the self-established existence of existent phenomena must indeed be found.
Nevertheless, even in the case of accepting that existent phenomena have self-established existence:
2. (Reply) If all this were not void, there could be no arising or no perishing. Then, through the riddance or cessation of what could a nirvāṇa be posited?
For, if disturbing mental factors and the aggregates were established through their own self-established existence, then, because that self-established existence could not disappear, how could they be brought to an end such that a nirvāṇa state would result from their being brought to an end? Therefore, for those who propound self-established existence, a nirvāṇa is not tenable at all.
Moreover, those who assert voidness do not maintain that a nirvāṇa is characterized by a bringing of the aggregates to an end or by a bringing of the disturbing mental factors to an end in the manner supposed by the opponent; therefore, this fault does not apply to them. Hence, for those who assert voidness, this is merely a case of the non-finding of something that, if it existed, would be found.
If those who assert voidness do not maintain that a nirvāṇa is characterized by a bringing of the disturbing mental factors or the aggregates to an end, then what characteristic do they maintain it to have? It is replied:
3. (A state) without having gotten rid of, without having gained, and without having cut off (anything), and without anything permanent, without anything ceased, and without anything arisen – that’s called a nirvāṇa.
That which is without anything (self-established) that has been gotten rid of, like attachment and the other disturbing mental factors; without anything (self-established) that has been gained, like the resultant stage of a renunciate; without anything (self-established) that has been cut off, like the aggregates and the like; that which is also not something (self-established) that is permanent, like something that is not at all void; that which is without a self-established ceasing and arising and is characterized by the quieting down of all conceptual fabrications (of self-established existence) – that is said to be a nirvāṇa, a state of being extinguished.
In such a state, devoid of all conceptual fabrications, from where could there be any conceptual constructs (of self-established) disturbing mental factors, such that a nirvāṇa state would result from ridding oneself of them? And from where could there be any conceptual constructs (of self-established) aggregates there, such that a nirvāṇa state would result from ceasing them? For as long as these conceptual constructs (of self-established existence) remain operative, there is no realization of a nirvāṇa state. That is because the realization of it is only because of the complete eradication of all conceptual fabrications.
Suppose someone were to object: “Although there are no disturbing mental factors and no aggregates in a nirvāṇa state, nevertheless they do exist prior to a nirvāṇa state. Therefore, a nirvāṇa state of their being extinguished will come about through completely eradicating them.”
It is replied: One should rid oneself of this (mistaken) way of taking things, because it is not possible to make into nonexistence things that exist by self-established existence prior to nirvāṇa. Therefore, anyone aspiring to nirvāṇa should rid themselves of this conceptualization, because (Nāgārjuna) will state (later in this chapter):
As for what the temporal limits of a nirvāṇa state are and the temporal limits of recurring saṃsāric rebirth – there is not the slightest (distinction) whatsoever between these two.
Thus, it should be understood that in a nirvāṇa state there is neither the riddance of anything nor the cessation of anything. Accordingly, a nirvāṇa state just takes the form of all conceptual constructs being eradicated without remainder. And it has been said by the Bhagavān:
The extinction of kinds of phenomena does not exist. Kinds of phenomena that are non-existing do not exist at all. For those who conduct themselves with the conceptual constructs “there exists” and “there do not exist,” suffering never becomes stilled.
The meaning of this verse is as follows. Upon cessation, in the sphere of nirvāṇa without any leftover support, there are no existent kinds of phenomena or aggregates characterized by disturbing mental factors, karma, and rebirth, because of their completely disappearing (like the sun that has gone down). This is something accepted by all schools of tenet systems. However, those phenomena that are not present in this state of their having stopped were never truly existent at all. (They have disappeared) just as the fear of a snake (imagined) in a rope perceived in darkness disappears when a lamp is lit.
Thus, those phenomena characterized as disturbing mental factors, karma, rebirth, and so forth do not truly exist at any time, even in the condition of recurring saṃsāric rebirth. For a rope, while in a state of darkness, is not self-established as a snake as its form of conventional object. If it were truly a snake, then, just like an actual snake, it would be apprehended by the eye consciousness and the body consciousness both in darkness and in light. But it is not.
If it is asked, “Then how does recurring saṃsāric rebirth exist?” It is replied: “To childish ordinary beings who are seized by grasping for a nonexistent ātman-soul and what belongs to an ātman-soul, there appear to be truly existing phenomena despite their being forms of phenomena that are nonexistent, just like nonexistent hairs, fruit flies, and the like to someone suffering from an eye disease.”
Therefore, (the Bhagavān) stated:
For those who conduct themselves with the conceptual constructs “there exists” and “there do not exist,” suffering never becomes stilled.
“There exists” refers to those who entertain conceptual constructs concerning the truly established existence of phenomena, namely the followers of Jaimini (the Mīmāṃsākas), Kaṇāda (the Vaiśeṣikas), Kapila (the Sāṃkhyas), and others up to and including the Vaibhāṣikas. And “there do not exist” refers to those who entertain conceptual constructs of nonexistence, namely the nihilists whose final destination is a lower rebirth. It also refers to those (Sautrāntikas) who assert the nonexistence of no-longer happening and not-yet-happening phenomena and of nonrevealing (forms) and noncongruent affecting variables, while asserting the existence of other phenomena; and to those (Cittamātrins) who assert the nonexistence of phenomena with a completely conceptualized manner of existing while asserting the existence of phenomena with a dependent manner of existing and of phenomena with a thoroughly established manner of existing. For those who espouse “there exists” and “there do not exist,” and conduct themselves like that, suffering, namely recurring saṃsāric rebirth, does not go quiet.
Likewise:
Just as someone who, out of suspicion, takes something to be poison and, even though no poison has entered his stomach, comes under its sway, so too a childish person, overpowered by conceptual constructs, is continually born and dies through what is unreal.
Thus, it should be understood that in a nirvāṇa state there is neither the riddance of anything nor the cessation of anything. Accordingly, a nirvāṇa state has the form of all conceptual constructs being eradicated. As it is said in (Nāgārjuna’s) Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland):
Nor is nirvāṇa a state of nonexistence, so how could it be made into that? Nirvāṇa is said to be the state in which conceptual speculation about states of existence and states of nonexistence has been eradicated. ||3||
But those who are not explaining nirvāṇa as having the form of being the quieting down of all conceptual constructs and instead conceptually construe a nirvāṇa state as having the form of being an existent phenomenon, a nonexistent phenomenon, both, or neither – to them the following is said:
4. Nirvāṇa is not a state of existence, (which, if it were), it would absurdly be characterized by aging and dying. That’s because there is no existence that is without aging and dying.
Concerning this, some who have become engrossed in nirvana being a state of existence explain: “Here, nirvāṇa, as the referent of the word (nirvāṇa), is an existent phenomenon whose self-identity is a cessation – an existent phenomenon that blocks forever the continuance of the stream of disturbing mental factors, karma, and rebirth, and that functions like a dam, an existent phenomenon that blocks the flow of water. A phenomenon not existing with self-established existence cannot be seen as performing a function like this.
“(On the other hand), hasn’t it also been said that nirvāṇa is an eradication, a freeing from attachment, a cessation of thirsting, accompanied by delight and attachment. A mere state of an eradication cannot exist as an existent phenomenon. And it has been said (in a sutra), ‘The liberation of that mind is like the going out of a butter lamp.’ And the going out of a butter lamp cannot reasonably be an existent phenomenon,” it says.
(Reply) This should not be understood in that way. “The eradication of thirsting” does not mean simply “the eradication of thirsting.” Rather, it should be understood as meaning that, when this phenomenon called nirvāṇa is present, the eradication of thirsting occurs. That is why it is called “the eradication of thirsting.” And the lamp is merely an illustration. There too, it should be understood as meaning that when that is present, the liberation of the mind occurs.
(Here) where nirvāṇa is posited like this (by the opponent) as being an existent phenomenon, the Ācārya (Nāgājuna) examined: “Nirvāṇa does not possess existence as an existent phenomenon. Why? Because it would absurdly follow that it would have aging and dying as its characteristic, since an existent phenomenon is invariably accompanied by the characteristic of aging and dying. Consequently, it would not be a nirvāṇa at all, because it would have the characteristic of aging and dying, just like consciousness.” This is the intended meaning.
Making this very point explicit, that an existent phenomenon never deviates from having the characteristics of aging and dying, (Nāgārjuna) stated: “There is no existent phenomenon that is without aging and dying.” For anything that is free from aging and dying cannot possibly be an existent phenomenon, like a sky-flower, precisely because of being free from aging and dying. Furthermore:
5. And if nirvāṇa were an existent phenomenon, then nirvāṇa would be an affected phenomenon, for no unaffected phenomenon is found to exist anywhere in any manner as an existent phenomenon.
If nirvāṇa were an existent phenomenon, then that nirvāṇa would be an affected phenomenon, because it would be an existent phenomenon like consciousness and so on. Specifying the negative concomitance that whatever is an unaffected phenomenon is not found to exist as an existent phenomenon, as in the case of a rabbit horn, (Nāgārjuna) stated: “For no unaffected phenomenon is found to exist anywhere in any manner as an existent phenomenon.” “Anywhere” means in any place, at any time, or in any tenet system. “In any manner” means as something internal or something external. Furthermore:
6. And if nirvāṇa were an existent phenomenon that was unobtained from reliance on a basis, how could that be? For a nirvāṇa unobtained from reliance on a basis is not found to exist in any manner as an existent phenomenon.
If, according to your position, nirvāṇa were an existent phenomenon, then it would exist as something obtained from reliance on a basis – that is, it would have been obtained by relying on the conglomeration of its own causes as the basis on which it emerged. But nirvāṇa is not accepted as existing as something obtained from reliance on a basis in that way. Rather, it is accepted as existing without having been obtained from reliance on a basis. Therefore, if nirvāṇa, as an existent phenomenon, existed without having been obtained from reliance on a basis, how could that be? It could not exist (like that) without having been obtained from reliance on a basis, because it is an existent phenomenon (and all existent phenomena exist like that), just like consciousness and so on. Specifying the negative concomitance, (Nāgārjuna) stated: “For (a nirvāṇa) unobtained from reliance on a basis is not found to exist in any manner as an existent phenomenon.”
At this point (the opponent) states: “Well then, if nirvāṇa is not an existent phenomenon because of the faults that would absurdly follow as have been mentioned, then what is it? Is nirvāṇa instead a nonexistent phenomenon, since it is merely the bringing of disturbing mental factors and rebirth to an end?”
It is replied: “That too is untenable, because…”
7. If nirvāṇa is not an existent phenomenon, then how could it exist as a nonexistent phenomenon? Wherever no existent phenomenon can be found as existing, no nonexistent phenomenon can be found as existing there either.
If nirvāṇa is not accepted to be an existent phenomenon – that is, if it is not accepted that nirvāṇa is an existent phenomenon – then how could it exist as a nonexistent phenomenon? The meaning is that it could not exist even as a nonexistent phenomenon.
If it is claimed that nirvāṇa is the nonexistence of disturbing mental factors and rebirth, then, in that case, the impermanence of disturbing mental factors and rebirth would be a nirvāṇa. For the nonexistence of disturbing mental factors and rebirth is nothing other than their impermanence. Consequently, impermanence itself would be a nirvāṇa. But this is not accepted, because it would absurdly follow that liberation occurs effortlessly. This has already been said.
Furthermore,
8. And if nirvāṇa were a nonexistent phenomenon, then how could nirvāṇa be one unobtained from reliance on a basis? For there is no nonexistent phenomenon that can be found as existing unobtained from reliance on a basis.
Here, a nonexistent phenomenon, namely impermanence, is made verifiable by being obtained from reliance on an existent phenomenon, since the impermanence of such things as rabbit horns cannot be focused on. A defining characteristic is made verifiable in reliance on what it defines, and what is defined is made verifiable in reliance on its defining characteristic. Therefore, since what defines and what is defined function in mutual dependence, how could impermanence exist without depending on an existent phenomenon that it defines?
Therefore, a nonexistent phenomenon too is made verifiable by being obtained from reliance on a basis. Consequently, if nirvāṇa were a nonexistent phenomenon, how could nirvāṇa be not obtained from reliance on a basis? It would have to be obtained from reliance on a basis, because it is a nonexistent phenomenon, just like destruction. Making precisely this point clear, (Nāgārjuna) stated: “For there is no nonexistent phenomenon that can be found as existing unobtained from reliance on a basis.”
If that is so, then, if a nonexistent phenomenon does not exist without being obtained from reliance on a basis, would the nonexistent phenomena such as the son of a barren woman now exist by being obtained from reliance on a basis? But who has ever said that such things as the son of a barren woman are nonexistent phenomena? For it was explained earlier, if an existent phenomenon is not established, a nonexistent phenomenon is likewise not established. For people call a nonexistent phenomenon the state of an existent phenomenon’s being otherwise (than it was). Therefore, such things as the son of a barren woman are not nonexistent phenomena.
And as for the statement: “Space, rabbit horns, and the son of a barren woman, although nonexistent, are nevertheless spoken of; likewise, conceptual constructions are made regarding existent phenomena” – even there, however, (the verse) merely refutes conceptual construction regarding an existent phenomenon; it does not teach conceptual construction regarding a nonexistent phenomenon. This should be understood because the status of its being an existent phenomenon has not been established. “The son of a barren woman” is merely the sound (of words). No referent meaning of them is apprehended (which would be apprehended if it existed), a referent meaning whose status as either an existent phenomenon or a nonexistent phenomenon could be established. How could conceptual construction as either an existent phenomenon or a nonexistent phenomenon apply to something whose own self-established existence is not apprehended (which would be apprehended if it existed)?
Therefore, it should be understood that the son of a barren woman is not a nonexistent phenomenon. Consequently, the conclusion already established remains intact: “For there is no nonexistent phenomenon that can be found as existing unobtained from reliance on a basis.” ||8||
(The opponent says), “If nirvāṇa is neither an existent phenomenon nor even a nonexistent phenomenon, then what, indeed, is nirvāṇa?”
It is replied: “In this regard, the Bhagavān Tathāgatas have (said)…
9. Whatever the phenomenon of coming into and going out (of a saṃsāric rebirth might be), either obtained from reliance on a basis or dependently arisen (from causes and conditions) – nirvāṇa is taught to be that which is neither obtained from reliance on a basis nor dependently arisen (from causes and conditions).
Here, “the phenomenon of coming into and going out (of a saṃsāric rebirth)” means (the succession) one after another of taking birth and dying. Sometimes this phenomenon of coming into and going out (of a saṃsāric rebirth) is made verifiable as something, like tall and short, that emerges from a basis – (namely, from) a conglomeration of (aggregates arising from) causes and conditions. Sometimes, it is made verifiable as something that has been produced, like light from a butter lamp and a sprout from a seed. But whichever way (saṃsāric rebirth is explained), whether as something made verifiable by what it is obtained from or as something set as something dependently arisen, in every case nirvāṇa is set as a non-continuance of the connected succession of taking rebirth and dying, one after another – something neither dependent on nor obtained from (reliance on something else), whichever way it is explained. And that mere non-continuance cannot be conceived of as either an existent phenomenon or a nonexistent phenomenon. Thus, nirvāṇa is neither an existent phenomenon nor a nonexistent phenomenon.
In other words, there are those whose position is (framed from the point of view of) affected (aggregates) repeatedly arising in each saṃsāric rebirth. For them, the non-continuing of these (aggregates) to dependently arise, whose production and destruction has dependently arisen again and again – that is called nirvāṇa. And there are also those (whose position is framed from the point of view of) the person repeatedly arising in each saṃsāric rebirth, and (for such a person), who cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent, the phenomenon of their coming into and going out (of a saṃsāric rebirth), which has relied on this and that basis, continues to be obtained. For them, the continuing of obtaining (a saṃsāric basis) like that, again and again, being now a non-continuing of obtaining one – that is called nirvāṇa. ||9||
Furthermore,
10. And the Teacher proclaimed ridding oneself of (conceptualizing nirvāṇa in terms of) existence or annihilation. Therefore, it is appropriate that nirvāṇa is neither an existent phenomenon nor a nonexistent phenomenon.
Therefore, it is said in a sutra, “O monks, anyone who seeks a definite escape from samsaric existence through existence or annihilation has a misunderstanding.” This is because both of these are to be cast aside: thirsting after existence and thirsting after annihilation. But it was not said by the Bhagavān that nirvāṇa was something to be gotten rid of; rather, it is not to be gotten rid of. If nirvāṇa were in the form of an existent phenomenon or in the form of a nonexistent phenomenon, it would be something to be gotten rid of, but it is not to be gotten rid of. “Therefore, it is appropriate that nirvāṇa is neither an existent phenomenon nor a nonexistent phenomenon.”
Furthermore, there are those who put forward that the form of phenomenon that nirvāṇa exists as is as both – because for them, owing to the absence of disturbing mental factors and rebirth, it has the form of a nonexistent phenomenon, while because it itself has the form of an existent phenomenon, it has the form of an existent phenomenon. Explaining that nirvāṇa having the form of both is untenable, (Nāgārjuna) stated:
11. If nirvāṇa were both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon, then liberation too would be both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon. But that is not tenable.
If nirvāṇa were of the form of both an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon, then liberation too would consist of both an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon. Consequently, the coming into existence of affected phenomena, together with their disappearance, would itself be liberation. But it is not tenable that affected phenomena themselves (functioning like this) are liberation. Therefore, (Nāgārjuna) stated, “But that is not tenable.”
Furthermore,
12. If nirvāṇa were both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon, then nirvāṇa would not be something unobtained from reliance on a basis, for both of those are obtained from reliance on a basis.
If nirvāṇa were of the form of both an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon, then it would exist by being obtained by relying on the conglomeration of causes and conditions as the basis from which it emerged, not by being unobtained (like that). Why? Because both of those are obtained from reliance on a basis. A nonexistent phenomenon is obtained from reliance on an existent phenomenon, and an existent phenomenon is obtained from reliance on a nonexistent phenomenon. Thus both of these, an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon, exist only by being obtained from reliance on a basis, not without being obtained from reliance on a basis. Accordingly, nirvāṇa too would be of the form of an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon. But this is not so. Therefore, this is not tenable.
Furthermore:
13. How could nirvāṇa be both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon? Nirvāṇa is an unaffected phenomenon, whereas an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon are both affected.
Because an existent phenomenon comes about from the conglomeration of its own causes and conditions, it is affected (by other things). And because a nonexistent phenomenon, too, comes about from arising dependently on an existent phenomenon, and because (scripture) speaks of aging and dying as having taken birth as their cause, it is affected (by other things). Therefore, if nirvāṇa had the self-established existence of both an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon, then it would not be an unaffected phenomenon but, rather, an affected one. Since nirvāṇa is not accepted as an affected phenomenon, it is therefore not tenable that nirvāṇa has the form of both an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon.
Suppose, however, someone were to say: “Nirvāṇa does not itself have the form of an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon. Rather, an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon are in nirvāṇa.” Even this is not tenable. Why? Because…
14. How could both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon be in nirvāṇa? For the two can never exist together in one and the same place, just as light and darkness (cannot).
Since an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon are mutually opposed, it is impossible for the two to occur together in one and the same nirvāṇa. Therefore, “How could both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon be in nirvāṇa?” The intended meaning is: “They certainly could not be.” || 14 ||
Likewise it is not tenable for nirvāṇa to be neither an existent phenomenon nor a nonexistent phenomenon, and so, explaining this, (Nāgārjuna) now stated:
15. The assertion, “Nirvāṇa is neither a nonexistence nor an existence,” would be established only if both nonexistence and existence had themselves already been established.
For if there were anything that was called “existence,” then by negating that it could be conceptually constructed, “Nirvāṇa is not an existence.” Likewise, if there were anything that was called “nonexistence,” then by negating that it could be that “Nirvāṇa is not a nonexistence.” But when neither existence nor nonexistence exists in the first place, then their negation does not exist either. Therefore, even the conceptual construction, “Nirvāṇa is neither an existence nor a nonexistence,” is itself untenable. Hence, this position is not correct.
Furthermore:
16. If nirvāṇa did exist as neither a nonexistence nor an existence, then by whom could it be correctly known as “neither a nonexistence nor an existence”?
If this nirvāṇa is imagined to be neither in the form of a nonexistence nor in the form of an existence, then by what is that nirvāṇa, having such a form – namely, being in the form of neither – correctly known, cognitively taken, or made apparent? Is there someone there with regard to that nirvāṇa who cognizes it in this way, or is there no one? If there is (someone), then, in that case, according to you, even nirvāṇa would have an (independent) ātman-self (who correctly knows it).
But this is not accepted, because the existence of an ātman-self that is unobtained from reliance on a basis does not exist. If, on the other hand, there isn’t (such a cognizer), then by whom is it decisively determined that that kind of nirvāṇa exists?
If it is replied, “Someone remaining in saṃsāra decisively determines it,” then, if someone remaining in saṃsāra decisively determines it, does he decisively determine it by means of a dividing consciousness, or by means of a deep awareness? If it is imagined that he decisively determines it by means of a dividing consciousness, that is not tenable. Why? Because dividing consciousness has as its focal aim indicative features and there are no indicative features whatsoever in nirvāṇa. Therefore, for that reason (nirvāṇa) is not taken as a focal aim by a dividing consciousness.
Nor is it known by a deep awareness. Why? Because voidness must be taken as the focal aim of a deep awareness, and that (deep awareness) has the form of a non-arising. Therefore, how could a nirvāṇa that is neither existent nor nonexistent be cognitively taken by that whose form of phenomenon that it exists as is not seen to exist. That’s because the form of phenomenon that a deep awareness exists as is beyond all conceptual fabrications.
Therefore, a nirvāṇa that is “neither a nonexistence nor an existence” is not correctly known by anyone, and thus its existence like that, which cannot be correctly known, cannot be made apparent, cannot be cognitively taken, is untenable.
And just as, in every way, these four conceptual constructs do not apply to nirvāṇa, so likewise these conceptual constructs do not apply at all to the Tathāgata, the one who has attained nirvāṇa. Explaining this, (Nāgārjuna) stated:
17. It is not conceptually posited that after a final cessation, the Bhagavān exists. Nor is it conceptually posited that he does not, or both or neither.
Because it has been previously said,
Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata by means of the cognitive taking that he solidly exists, self-established as a findable object, would also conceptualize about him even when he has passed into parinirvāṇa, that (now) he does not exist.
Thus, like that, after final cessation the Tathāgata cannot be not conceptually posited as existing or not existing. Because of the nonexistence of those two, he cannot not be conceptually posited as existing as both. And because of the nonexistence of (his existing as) both, neither can he be conceptually posited and cognitively taken as existing as neither of the two. || 17 ||
Moreover, it is not only after final cessation that the Bhagavān cannot be conceptually posited in these four ways. Rather:
18. Even while remaining (alive), the Bhagavān cannot be conceptually posited as existing. Nor can he be conceptually posited as not (existing), or as either both or as neither (of the two).
Just as it has been explained in the chapter “Examination of the Tathāgata” that none (of these alternatives) can be correctly known and none can be conceptually posited, and so it is here as well.
19. There is no distinction (regarding is there the Tathāgata) while (remaining) in samsara from while in nirvāṇa, and there is no distinction while in nirvāṇa from while (remaining) in samsara.
Since, even while remaining (alive), the Bhagavān cannot be conceptually posited as (any of the four alternatives) beginning with existing, and even after having passed into parinirvāṇa, he likewise cannot be conceptually posited as (any of the four alternatives) beginning with existing. It is precisely for this reason that there is no distinction whatsoever between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa with respect to one another, because, when examined, they are of the same form of phenomenon.
And this statement of the Bhagavān also is therefore well founded: “Monks, the uncontrollably recurring saṃsāric cycle of taking birth, aging, and dying has no beginning and no end.” This too is appropriate precisely for this reason, because there is no distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. || 19 ||
Thus, (Nāgārjuna) stated:
20. As for what the temporal limits of nirvāṇa are and the temporal limits of recurring saṃsāric rebirth – there is not the slightest (distinction) whatsoever between these two.
And it is not only that, but because of the non-distinction of recurring saṃsāric rebirth from nirvāṇa, conceptual constructs (of the four alternatives) regarding a beginning-limit and an end-limit are impossible. And even regarding these:
21. The (four alternative) views beginning with (the Tathāgata exists) after final cessation and those beginning with (the Tathāgata) is eternal have been grounded in (taking) nirvāṇa as having an end point or a starting point.
They too are therefore not tenable, precisely because both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa have a single taste by virtue of their fundamental makeup of being at peace.
Here, the expression “after final cessation,” serves as an indicative sign that the four views are included:
- The Tathāgata exists after death.
- The Tathāgata does not exist after his death.
- The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death.
- The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.
These four views are set into motion by conceptual speculation about nirvāṇa.
There are also the views beginning with “having an end” – namely:
- The universe has an end.
- It does not have an end.
- It both has an end and does not have an end.
- It neither has an end nor does not have an end.
These four views are set into motion based on (there being) an end. Regarding that, not seeing a not-yet-happening arising of a self (in a next rebirth) or of a universe (after the end of this cycle of eons) and conceiving of a universe that has an end, then (the view) goes into motion focused on there being an end (that it ends with this cycle of eons). Likewise, seeing a not-yet-happening arising (of a next cycle of eons), (the view) goes into motion of a universe not having an end (it goes on). Seeing and not seeing (one), it is explained as being both. And by the negation of both, it is explained that it neither has an end nor does not have an end.
“The universe is eternal, the universe is non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, and the universe is neither eternal nor non-eternal” – these four views are set into motion based on there being a starting point. Regarding that, seeing the no-longer-happening arising of a self (in a previous rebirth) or of a universe (in a previous eon), it is explained that the universe is eternal (it is cyclic); and not seeing (one), it is explained that it is non-eternal (it just started with this eon). (Both) seeing (one) and not seeing (one), it is explained that it is (both) eternal and not eternal; and neither seeing (one) nor not seeing (one), it is explained that it is neither eternal nor non-eternal. This is based on there being a starting point.
But how could these views be fitting? If there were any self-established existence of any objects referred to by words, these views would arise from conceptual constructs of their existing and their nonexisting. But when the non-distinction of recurring saṃsāric rebirth and nirvāṇa has been explained, then...
22. When all phenomena are devoid (of self-established existence), what could be without an end, what could have an end, what could (both) not have an end and have an end, and what can neither not have an end nor have an end?
23. What could be just that, what could be other (than just that), what could be eternal, what could be non-eternal, what could be (both) eternal and non-eternal, and what could be also neither both here?
These fourteen things would be unfitting to be unspecified (by the Buddha) in the case of (them being left unanswered to) someone in whom (grasping for) phenomena existing as self-established kinds of things was absent. But for someone who falsely interpolates existence as self-established kinds of things (on to phenomena), and then becomes engrossed in it, having developed the view of them being phenomena that end and do not end, their engrossment blocks the path leading to the city of nirvāṇa and causes them to be bound to sufferings as saṃsāric beings. This should be understood. ||23||
Here (someone) objects, “If this is so, then you have also disallowed nirvāṇa. But the Bhagavān’s own way of existing is as someone who, unmistakenly knowing the inclinations of the entire world, attends to the multitude of sentient beings endlessly wandering (in saṃsāric rebirths) and who, under the sway of great compassion, looks after the beings of the three planes of compulsive existence, not leaving out any, as if they were his beloved only child. The Dharma that he has imparted is for the sake of the world’s achievement of nirvāṇa and it has the form of being the antidote to their wandering. It would come to be without a purpose (if he wouldn’t answer questions about nirvāṇa).
In response, it has been said, “If there were any Dharma that had the form of being self-established, and if there were any sentient beings that were listeners to that Dharma, or any Buddha, called the Bhagavān, imparting it, who had self-established existence as existent phenomena, then it would be like that. But when:
24. (Nirvāṇa) is the peaceful auspicious state of the quieting down of all focusing (on objects as if they were findable) and the quieting down of conceptual fabrication. No Dharma whatsoever has ever been taught by Buddha anywhere to anyone.
Then how could the fault that you have stated be an absurd conclusion for us? Because, here, nirvāṇa is the quieting down and non-continuance of the flow of all conceptual fabrications and indicative signs. It is a quieting down and a peaceful auspicious state because of their fundamental makeup. It is the quieting down of conceptual fabrication because of the non-continuance of the flow of verbal (thoughts), or it is a peaceful auspicious state because of the non-continuance of the flow of the mind. It is a peaceful auspicious state by virtue of the non-continuance of the flow of disturbing mental factors or by virtue of the non-continuance of the flow of rebirths. It is the quieting down of conceptual fabrication by virtue of having rid oneself of the disturbing mental factors, or it is a peaceful auspicious state by virtue having rid oneself of their tendencies without exception. It is the quieting down of conceptual fabrication by virtue of the absence of cognizable objects which, if they were present, would be cognized, or it is a peaceful auspicious state by virtue of the absence of cognizing minds that know them which, if they were present, would be cognized.
When the Bhagavān Buddhas are in nirvāṇa, a peaceful auspicious state in the form of a quieting down of all conceptual fabrication, they are like royal swans located in the humid monsoon sky, connected to no support. That is because in the empty space for the wind, when the wind comes down to being their own networks of positive force and deep awareness, there is an absence of anything in that empty space. Then, because of the non-perception of any indicative signs (of something or someone as if it were findable), it should be understood that nowhere among gods or humans is any Dharma imparted to the gods or humans, whether something concerning defiled states or something concerning what cleanses them away. Thus, as was said in The Sutra of the Hidden (Factors) of the Highly Realized Tathāgatas (Āryatathāgataguhya-sūtra):
O Śāntamati, during the interval between the night of the full awakening of the Tathāgata to unsurpassed complete enlightenment and his passing into a parinirvāṇa state of being without obtaining (further rebirth), not even a single syllable was uttered by the Tathāgata in explanation, or was uttered in articulation, or was uttered in proclamation, or would be uttered in proclamation. And yet, all sentient beings distinguished various types of this and that speech issuing forth in accord with their receptivities and their various capacities and inclinations. Thus, it occurred among them individually and separately, “This Bhagavān is imparting this Dharma teaching to us” and “We are hearing the Tathāgata’s teaching of the Dharma.” But there, the Tathāgata was not conceptually construing (anything) and not conceptually elaborating further. This is because, Śāntamati, for the Tathagata the net of all conceptual constructs and conceptual further elaborations, their habits and conceptual fabrications is gone.
Likewise:
Without speech, without syllables, completely void, peaceful and immaculate – one who knows phenomena in this way is called a Buddha-prince.
“If then, no Dharma whatsoever has been taught by the Buddha anywhere to anyone, how are these very diverse conventional presentations of his discourses verifiably known?” It is replied: “These are arising from their own conceptual elaborations, like those of embodied beings who, having come under the sway of the sleep of misknowing, are dreaming, ‘This Bhagavān, protector of the gods, anti-gods and humans throughout the three planes of compulsive existence is imparting the Dharma to us.’”
As was said by the Bhagavān, “Because the Accordantly Gone Tathāgata is someone existing as a reflection of the constructive untainted Dharma, and there is certainly no Thusness and no Tathāgata, then the original source (of what he reflects) is being indicated with him to all the world.” And this has been explained extensively in the chapter, “Hidden (Features) of the Tatāgata’s Speech” (Tathāgatavāgguhya-parivarta).
And therefore, because of the nonexistence of a teaching of the Dharma that was for the aim of (establishing) nirvāṇa, then how could the existence of nirvāṇa come about through the existence of the teaching of the Dharma? Therefore, it is established that nirvāṇa, too, does not exist. And it was said by the Bhagavān:
A nirvāṇa that is no nirvāṇa was imparted by the Protector of the World. A knot made by space is released just by space.
Likewise, it was elaborated:
O Bhagavān, there is no crossing over beyond uncontrollably recurring saṃsāric rebirth for those who seek a nirvāṇa state as an existent object. What is the reason for that? O Bhagavān, what is called “nirvāṇa” is a quieting down of all indicative signs and a stopping of all stirrings and subtle stirrings (of the mind). Therefore, O Bhagavān, these closed-minded people who, having gone forth as renunciates in the Vinaya of the well-proclaimed Dharma, having fallen into the views of the non-Buddhist extremists, seek a nirvāṇa state as an existent object just like (seeking) sesame oil from sesame seeds and ghee from milk.
With all phenomena, O Bhagavān, being completely ceased in a parinirvāṇa state, those who seek for a nirvāṇa state I call, “non-Buddhist extremists with distorted arrogance.” No, O Bhagavān, a yogic practitioner who has correctly entered the path does not bring about the arising or the ceasing of any kind of phenomenon and does not wish for the acquiring or the realization of any kind of phenomenon.
Thus ends the twenty-fifth chapter, entitled “Examination of Nirvāṇa” in Clear Words Commentary on Madhyamaka, composed by the Spiritual Master Ācārya Candrakīrti.