Refutation of Nonrevealing Forms as Substantial Entities in Sautrantika

Jinaputra Yashomitra, in The Clarified Meaning, An Explanatory Commentary on (Vasubandhu’s) (Chos mngon-pa’i mdzod kyi ‘grel-bshad don-gsal-ba, Skt. Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośavyākhyā) (Gretil ed. 351, Derge Tengyur vol. 143, 7B), explains the first reason for Sautrantika rejecting a nonrevealing form as being a substantial entity – “because of it being a mere non-committing, after having pledged”: 

“It too does not exist as a substantial entity” (means) a nonrevealing (form) too does not exist as a substantial entity. The word “too” means it is not a revealing form (as defined by Vaibhashika) alone (that does not exist as a substantial entity). As for “because of it being a mere non-committing, after having pledged,” “having pledged” means (with the promise) “depending on this (pledge), from now onwards I shall refrain from taking a life and so on.” After that (making of a pledge), the mere non-committing of them (of those actions one vowed to refrain from) is (what you Vaibhashikas call) “a non-revealing (form).” [Tib. only: With the depletion (of committing those actions)] like this, Sautrantika (asserts) that it (the non-revealing form asserted by Vaibhashika) does not exist as a substantial entity. 

(Skt.) sāpi dravyato nāsti sāpy avijñaptir dravyato nāsti. na kevalā vijñaptir ity apiśabdaḥ. abhyupetyākaraṇamātratvād iti. imaṃ divasaṃ upādāya prāṇātipātādibhyaḥ prativiramāmīty abhyupetya. tasmāt pareṇa teṣām akaraṇamātram avijñaptir ity evaṃ dravyato nāstīti sautrāntikāḥ. 

(Tib.) /de yang rdzas su med de zhes bya ba ni rnam par rig byed ma yin pa de yang rdzas su med do/ /yang zhes bya ba'i sgra ni rnam par rig byed 'ba' zhig tu ma zad kyi zhes bya ba yin no/ /khas blangs nas mi byed pa tsam yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni mdo sde pa rnams na re dus 'di nas bzung ste/ srog gcod pa la sogs pa spong ngo zhes khas blangs nas de phyin cad de dag mi byed pa tsam la rnam par rig byed ma yin pa zhes bya bar zad pas de ltar na rdzas su med do zhes zer ro/ 

Sthiramati, in The Meaning of the Facts, An Annotated Subcommentary to (Vasubandhu’s) “Autocommentary to ‘A Treasure House of Special Topics of Knowledge’” (Chos mngon-pa mdzod-kyi bshad-pa'i rgya-cher ‘grel-pa don-gyi de-kho-na-nyid, Skt. Abhidharmakoṣa-bhāṣyā-ṭīkā-tattvārtha) (Derge Tengyur vol. 210, 12A-12B), explains further:

As for “because of it being a mere non-committing, after having pledged” and so on, (it means) after having previously pledged, “I shall not commit this,” then afterwards “because of the mere non-committing of that.” In other words, since a non-revealing form is the absence of being a revealing form, it cannot be accepted as being a substantial entity. 

(Tib.)  /khas blangs nas mi byed pa tsam gyi phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni 'di bdag gis mi bya'o zhes sngar khas blangs nas phyis de mi byed pa tsam gyi phyir zhes bya ba ste/ rnam par rig byed ma yin pa ni rig byed med pa yin pas rdzas su khas blang bar mi bya'o/ 

The mere non-committing (mi-byed-pa tsam, Skt. akaraṇamātra) of actions one has pledged to abstain from committing is the mere absence of the committing of them. As a mere absence, the mere non-committing is a nonimplicative negation phenomenon (med-dgag, Skt. aparyudāsapratiṣedha). 

• A nonimplicative negation phenomenon, after negating its object of negation, leaves only an explicitly apprehended (dngos-su rtogs-pa) negation phenomenon (dgag-pa, Skt. pratiṣedha) – namely, the absence of the object negated – which appears. 
• The mere fact of the non-committing of an action of body or speech that one has pledged to abstain from, after negating the committing of it, leaves only the non-committing of that action, and nothing else. 

Vaibhashika does not assert nonimplicative negation phenomena. According to Vaibhashika, all negation phenomena are implicative negation phenomena (ma-yin dgag, Skt. paryudāsapratiṣedha). 

• An implicative negation phenomenon, after negating its object of negation, leaves an explicitly apprehended (dngos-su rtogs-pa) negation phenomenon, which appears, and also an implicitly apprehended (shugs-la rtogs-pa) affirmation phenomenon (sgrub-pa, Skt. siddha), which does not appear. 
• The mere fact of the non-committing of an action of body or speech that one has pledged to abstain from, after negating the committing of it, leaves not only the non-committing of that action, but also the nonrevealing form of a pratimoksha vowed restraint as an affirmation phenomenon. 

Sautrantika argues that if Vaibhashika asserts a nonrevealing form, it too would be a nonimplicative negation phenomenon. After negating “being a revealing form,” the only thing left is “the absence of being a revealing form.” A nonrevealing form would not be an implicative negation phenomenon, as Vaibhashika claims, which, after negating being a revealing form, leaves both “not a revealing form” (a negation phenomenon) and also the nonrevealing form of a pratimoksha vowed restraint (an affirmation phenomenon).  

Sautrantika asserts that all nonimplicative negation phenomena, such as this mere absence of committing an action one has pledged to abstain from, are static phenomena. Although Vaibhashika asserts that both nonstatic and static phenomena are substantial entities (rdzas, Skt. dravya) – entities capable of performing a function – Sautrantika asserts that only nonstatic phenomena, being objective entities (rang-mtshan, Skt. svalakṣaṇa), are substantial entities. Static phenomena, as metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, Skt. sāmānyalakṣaṇa), are not substantial entities and therefore incapable of performing any function.  

According to Vaibhashika, however, the nonrevealing form of a pratimoksha vow performs the function of causing one to refrain from committing a certain action that one has vowed to abstain from for the rest of one’s life. Sautrantika, on the other hand, argues that if the nonrevealing form of a pratimoksha vow is the mere non-committing of an action that one has vowed to abstain from for the rest of one’s life, that mere non-committing of that action is not something that performs a function. The mere non-committing of that action is merely a static fact that does not change so long as the vowed restraint is not relinquished.

Note that the static fact of the mere non-committing of a certain action so long as one keeps the vowed restraint not to commit it is not the same as an instance of the constructive action of not committing that action when the intention arises of wanting to commit it. The not-committing of an action is an implicative negation phenomenon. After negating the committing of that action, it leaves not only the negation phenomenon of the not-committing of the action, it also leaves the affirmation phenomenon of doing of something else, such as keeping still or remaining silent. As an implicative negation phenomenon, an instance of the not-committing of an action is a nonstatic, objective, substantial entity, one that performs a function.

Jinaputra Yashomitra, The Clarified Meaning (Gretil 352, Derge 7B), explains the second reason for Sautrantika rejecting a nonrevealing form as being a substantial entity – “because of it being something that makes itself known [Tib.: is tied and knowable] as something that arises dependently on great elements that are, in fact, no longer happening and because of the existence of these (great elements) as things with a self-nature of being a non-presence [Tib.:a self-nature of being an absence]”:

As for “of these no-longer-happening great elements,” for something no longer happening there does not exist a self-nature of being something still present. [Tib.: As for “because of these having a self-nature of being things that are absent,” these no-longer-happening great elements lack a self-nature as things that are still present.] This was made evident in chapter five (V.26d-27abc) of “Treasure House (of Special Topics of Knowledge).” How can its (a nonrevealing form’s) foundation (from which it arises) be (great elements) that are not present [Tib: that are absent], and therefore, it (a nonrevealing form) does not exist as a substantial entity. 

(Skt.) teṣāṃ cātītānāṃ mahābhūtānāṃ. na hy atītānāṃ pratyutpannasvabhāvo 'sti. paṃcame ca kośasthāna etad darśayiṣyata iti. katham avidyamānāny asyā āśraya ity ato na dravyato 'sti. 

(Tib.) /de dag kyang rang gi ngo bo med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni 'das pa'i 'byung ba chen po de dag kyang da ltar byung ba lta bur rang gi ngo bor med de/ /'di ni mdzod kyi gnas lnga pa nas kyang ston par 'gyur ro/ /med pa dag ni ji ltar na 'di'i rten yin te/ de bas na rdzas su med do/ 

According to Vaibhashika, a nonrevealing form arises dependently on (rgyur-byas-pa, Skt. upādāya) and simultaneously with the great elements of a revealing form as the foundation (rten, Skt. āśraya) that functions as its generating cause (skyed-pa’i rgyu, Skt. jananahetu). Further, the nonrevealing form, while not revealing the ethical status of the mind that causes (motivates) it to arise, nevertheless makes itself known [Tib.: is tied and knowable] (‘dogs-pa, Skt. prajñapti) as something that arose dependently on those great elements. From the second moment onwards, until they are relinquished, subsequent moments of the no-longer-happening great elements of the no-longer-happening revealing form continue to function as the foundation dependent on which the sequence of subsequent moments of the nonrevealing form initially arose. This is because Vaibhashika asserts that the phenomena that are not yet happening, presently happening and no longer happening are all nonstatic substantial entities and therefore all perform a function.

Sautrantika, on the other hand, asserts that a not-yet-happening phenomenon is a prior absence of a presently-happening phenomenon, and a no-longer-happening phenomenon is a subsequent absence of a presently-happening phenomenon. A prior absence of something is a static phenomenon with the no beginning but with an end, while a subsequent absence of something is a static phenomenon with a beginning but with no end. So long as those absences are the case, they do not change and do not perform any function. Thus, Sautrantika argues that even if we accepted the existence of revealing forms as defined by Vaibhashika, still, no-longer happening great elements, being a subsequent absence of presently-happening great elements, leaves subsequent moments in a sequence of nonrevealing forms without a foundation from which they initially arose. But, as Vasubandhu stated, nonrevealing forms are tied to and make themselves known as something that arises dependently on great elements that are no longer happening. If no-longer-happening great elements are merely an absence of presently-happening great elements, then there would be no such thing as a nonrevealing form because the sequence of momentary nonrevealing forms that arise from it would lack a foundation from which they arose.

Sthiramati explicitly states this consequence in The Meaning of the Facts (Derge 12B):

As for “of these no-longer-happening great elements,” (that is said) because that (point) derives from (Vasubandhu, Treasure House IV.4cd), “A nonrevealing (form) in subsequent moments generates from the (presently) no-longer-happening elements included on (the plane of sensory objects) of desire.” As for “because of these having a self-nature of being a non-presence,” (it means) because these no-longer-happening great elements lack a self-nature of being presently happening. (Therefore) the forms (of physical phenomena) they have as their foundation are not present and so there isn’t (such a form).  

(Tib.) 'das pa'i 'byung ba chen po rnams la zhes bya ba ni/ 'dod gtogs rnam rig min skad cig /phyin chad 'das pa'i 'byung las skye/ /zhes 'byung ba'i phyir la/ de rnams kyang yod pa ma yin pa'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir te/ 'das pa'i 'byung ba chen po de rnams ni da ltar byung ba rang bzhin med pa'i phyir ro/ /rgyur byas pa'i gzugs ni yod pa ma yin pa'i rten can yod pa yang ma yin no/

In the above verse, Jinaputra Yashomitra makes reference to A Treasure House (V.26d-27abc) (Gretil ed., Derge 16B-17A), where Vasubandhu lists the reasons Sautrantika gives to refute the Vaibhashika assertion that the phenomena of all three times are nonstatic, functional, substantial entities that all exist simultaneously. Specifically, the refutation is of the presentation of the three times attributed to Vasumitra (dByigs-bshes, Skt. Vasumitra), one of the compilers of The Great Extensive Commentarial Treatise on Special Topics of Knowledge (Skt. Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra) and author of two of the seven main Sarvastivadin abhidharma texts: A Corpus of Cognitive Sources (Skt. Dhātukāya) and the first four chapters of Verses on Topics (Skt. Prakaraṇapāda). Vasubandhu states in this verse that Vasumitra’s explanation is the best of the four Sarvastivada presentations and thus, by implication, it is the Vaibhashika position that he accepts:

The (three) times have been presented in terms of being performers (of functions). What (could bring about) an end (to them performing their functions)? Further, how could they (the substantial entities of the three times performing their functions) be non-separate (from time) and likewise (how could) they exist as linked to time [Tib.: it would be inappropriate for then to exist in time]? Why would they (a not-yet-happening entity) not yet arise and (a no-longer-happening entity) already have perished? 

(Skt.) adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ // kiṃ vighnaṃ tatkathaṃ nānyat adhvāyogaḥ tathā sataḥ / ajātanaṣṭatā kena gambhīrā khalu dharmatā 

(Tib.) /dus rnams rnam gzhag gegs su byed/ /de yang ji ltar gzhan ma yin/ /dus su mi rung de bzhin du/ /yod na ci phyir ma skyes zhig /chos nyid dag ni zab pa yin/ 

The First Dalai Lama (rGyal-ba dGe-‘dun grub), in his Annotated Commentary to (Vasubandhu’s) Treasure House (of Special Topics of Knowledge): Clarifying the Path to Liberation (mDzod-tik thar-lam gsal-byed) (Varanasi ed., 295-296), succinctly states in debate form the lengthy explanation of the Sautrantika refutations that Vasubandhu gives in his Autocommentary (Gretil 297.11-301.13, Derge 240B-243B) to explain the above terse verse. 

Sautrantikas’ First Point

Firstly, in reference to the Sautrantikas’ first point, “The (three) times have been presented in terms of being performers (of functions),” the First Dalai Lama explains:

From among them (the four Sarvastivada positions concerning the three times), the third is slightly better, because (according to this position) the presentation of the three times is through the gateway of (something) not yet giving rise to its functioning, its functioning having not yet ceased, and its functioning having already ceased. 

(Sautrantika argues that) this (position) has faults. The absurd conclusion would be that the property-possessor – a presently-happening eye-sensor (when asleep, which is) of equal status to (a presently-happening eye sensor when awake) – would not be a presently-happening entity. (This would be) because it was not performing the function of seeing (while asleep). 

Suppose (Vaibhashika) replies that although it does not at present perform the function of seeing visible forms, yet because it performs the function of giving and taking hold of a result (that will happen in the next moment when awake), it can be set as a presently-happening (entity). 

(In that case, Sautrantika argues that) the absurd conclusion would be that the property-possessor – an equal status cause (of a presently-happening eye-sensor) that is a no-longer-happening (asleep eye-sensor when it is awake) – would be a presently-happening (eye-sensor) because it would still perform the presently-happening function of giving and taking hold of a result (that will happen in the next moment).

(Tib.) de dag gi nang nas gsum pa cung zad bzang ste/ bya ba ma skye pa dang skye la ma ‘gags pa dang bya ba ‘gags pa’i sgo nas dus gsum po rnams rnam par bzhag pa’i phyir/ de la yod skyon yod de/ da ltar gi mig gi dbang po der mtshung chos can/ da lta ba ma yin pa’ thal/ ‘bras bu skyed pa’i bya ba mi byed pa’i phyir/ kho na re/ des da lta gzugs la lta ba’i bya ba mi byed kyang/ ‘bras bu ‘dzin ‘byin gi bya ba byed pas da ltar bar ‘jog go zhe na/ ‘das pa’i skal mnyam gi rgyu de yang chos can/ da lta bar thal/ da lta ‘bras bu ‘byin pa’i bya ba byed pa’i phyir/ 

An equal status cause (skal-mnyam-gyi rgyu, Skt. sabhagahetu) is a phenomenon that gives rise to a result that is in the same category of phenomenon as it is. A presently-happening asleep eye-sensor is of equal status with a presently-happening awake eye-sensor since they are both in the category of eye-sensors. Sautrantika argues that the defining characteristic of an eye-sensor is performing the function of seeing, but presently-happening asleep eye-sensors do not see anything. Therefore, the absurd conclusion would follow that presently-happening asleep eye-sensors are not eye-sensors because they do not perform the function of seeing. 

Vaibhashika replies that being an equal status cause of a next moment of seeing is the defining characteristic of an eye-sensor that both a presently-happening asleep eye-sensor and a presently-happening awake eye-sensor share in common. 

Sautrantika then argues that if that is the case, the absurd conclusion would follow that a no-longer-happening asleep eye-sensor is a presently-happening eye-sensor because it would still have the defining characteristic of giving rise to a next moment of seeing. 

Sautrantikas’ Second Point

The First Dalai Lama (296) continues with an explanation of the Sautrantika’s second point, “What (could bring about) an end (to them performing their functions)?”:

The (next) absurd conclusion would be that the property-possessor – the three times (as substantial entities that all exist at the present moment performing their functions) – could not be made to end (their functioning). This is because of (all three) existing (and functioning) as substantial entities at the present (moment).

(Tib.) dus gsum ga chos can/ da lta bya ba byed pa la gegs-su byed de mi byed par thal/ da lta rdzas su yod pa’i phyir/ 

Vaibhashika asserts that not-yet-happening, presently-happening and no-longer-happening eye-sensors, for example, all exist and perform their functions at the same time. 

• A not-yet-happening eye-sensor performs the function of not yet giving rise to its functioning, which is the seeing of something.
• A presently-happening eye-sensor performs the function of giving rise to its functioning, which has not yet ceased, of seeing something 
• A no-longer-happening eye-sensor performs the function of giving rise to its functioning, which has already ceased, of seeing something.

If the eye-sensors of all three times substantially existed as presently-happening entities performing these presently-happening functioning, nothing could cause them to stop performing these functions. If something could cause them to stop performing these functions, the absurd conclusion would follow that a not-yet-happening eye-sensor that is presently-happening would lose its substantially established identity as a not-yet-happening eye-sensor.    

Sautrantikas’ Third Point

The First Dalai Lama (296) goes on to explain the Sautrantikas’ third point, “Further, how could they (the substantial entities of the three times performing their functions) be non-separate (from time) and likewise (how could) they exist as linked to time [Tib.: it would be inappropriate for them to exist in time]?”:

Furthermore, (Sautrantika questions,) are they (the not yet giving rise to a functioning, the giving rise to a functioning that is not yet ceasing, and the giving rise to a functioning that has already ceased) separate from (the three) times or not (separate from them)? If it is like the first case (where the three functionings are separate from the three times), the absurd conclusion would be that the property-possessors, the (three) functionings, would be unaffected phenomena. And if you accept that, then the absurd conclusion would be that they (these three functionings) were static phenomena. 

If it is like the second case, (where the three functionings are not separate from time), then the absurd conclusion would follow that the property-possessors – a no-longer-happening and a not-yet-happening (phenomena) – would be presently happening and unsuitable to be no longer happening or not yet happening. (This is) because anything that is non-separate from time would be substantially existent in the present. 

(Tib.) gzhan yang bya ba de yang ji ltar dus las gzhan yin nam min/ dang po ltar na/ bya ba chos can/ ‘dus ma byas su thal/ de’i phyir/ ‘dod na/ rtag par thal/ gnyis pa ltar na/ ‘das ma ‘ongs chos can/ da lta ‘das ma ‘ongs kyi dus su mi rung bar thal/ dus las gzhan min pa gang zhig/ da lta rdzas su yod pa’I phyir/

If, with respect to eye-sensors, for instance, their not yet giving rise to a functioning, their giving rise to a functioning that is not yet ceasing, and their giving rise to a functioning that has already ceased had substantially established existence, these three functionings would need to exist as separate substantial entities either separately from the substantially existent three times or not separately from them. 

If the first possibility were the case – that these three functionings existed separately from the three times – then the three functionings would be neither not yet happening, presently happening nor no longer happening. In that case, the absurd conclusion would follow that these three functionings would be outside time, which means they would be eternal, unaffected by causes and conditions. If they were eternal, then the absurd conclusion would follow that they would be static phenomena, unable to produce any effects. If that were the case, then the absurd conclusion from that would be that the three functioning are not able to perform their functions because they are static, unaffected phenomena. 

If the second possibility were the case – that these three functionings did not exist separately from the three times – then since the three functionings are all substantially existent and all perform their functions at present, the absurd conclusion would follow that the three functionings were all presently-happening substantial entities. If that were the case, then the absurd conclusion from that would be that it would not be reasonable for there to be something no longer happening or not yet happening. In other words, the absurd conclusion would follow that something no longer happening or not yet happening would not be no longer happening or not yet happening because it would be presently happening as a no-longer-happening or not-yet-happening substantial entity. 

Sautrantikas’ Fourth Point

The First Dalai Lama (296) continues with an explanation of the Sautrantikas’ fourth point, “Why would they (a not-yet-happening entity) not yet arise and (a no-longer-happening entity) already have perished?”:

Suppose (Vaibhashika) replies that there would be no fault, because something being set as no longer happening or not yet happening is from the gateway of its functioning not yet arising and its functioning having perished. (Well then, Sautrantika replies,) how could something not yet happening be (set as) something not yet arisen and something no longer happening be (set as) something that has perished? The absurd conclusion would be that they couldn’t. This is because they (both) would be performing their function of presently giving a result. 

(Tib.) skyon med de/ bya ba ma skyes pa dang bya ba zhig pa’i sgo nas ‘das ma ongs su ‘jog pa’i phyir zhe na/ ci’i phyir ma ‘ongs pa ma skyes pa dang ‘das pa zhig pa yin te ma yin par thal/ da ltar ba de bzhin du rdzas su yod pa’i phyir/    

Vaibhashika replies that there is not fault in asserting that the three functionings exist in the context of time because something is set as not yet happening from the gateway of its functioning not yet arising and something is set as no longer happening from the gateway of 

its functioning having perished. Sautrantika then questions how could this be so. How could a not-yet-happening eye-sensor, for example, be set as something that has totally not yet given rise to a result and a no-longer-happening eye-sensor be set as something that has totally stopped giving rise to a result? The absurd conclusion would follow that they could not be set as existing as that. This is because although a not-yet-happening eye-sensor is not yet giving rise, as its result, to the seeing of something, it is presently giving rise, as its result, to the not-yet-seeing of something. Likewise, although a no-longer-happening eye-sensor has stopped giving rise, as its result, to the seeing of something, it is presently giving rise, as its result, to the no-longer-seeing of something.  

With these four lines of reasoning, Sautrantika rejects that not-yet-happening phenomena and no-longer-happening phenomena are substantially existent entities that perform a function – although Sautrantika also does accept that presently happening phenomena are substantially established and do perform a function. 

Because of the Sautrantika assertion, then, that not-yet-happening and no-longer-happening phenomena are static, metaphysical entities, then their second reason for rejecting nonrevealing forms as being substantial entities is because the no-longer-happening great elements of a revealing form could not serve as their foundation and continue to perform the function of initially serving as the generating cause for them. This is because no-longer-happening phenomena are static, metaphysical entities, not nonstatic, objective, substantial entities, and therefore they cannot perform any function. 

Jinaputra Yashomitra, The Clarified Meaning (Gretil 352, Derge 7B), explains the Sautrantikas’ third reason for rejecting a nonrevealing form as being a substantial entity – “because of its nonexistence as something with the defining characteristic of a form of physical phenomenon.”

As for “(It is) also because it does not exist as something with the defining characteristic of a form of physical phenomenon,” “something existing as suitable for being a form of physical phenomenon” is something having the defining characteristic of a form of physical phenomenon. But because of its (a nonrevealing form) being nonobstructive, it does not exist (as such). Because of it being like that, it does not exist as something that is a substantial entity.   

(Skt.) rūpalakṣaṇābhāvāc ca. rūpyata iti rūpalakṣaṇaṃ. tac cāsyā apratighatvān nāsti. tasmān na dravyato‘'sti. 

(Tib.) /gzugs kyi mtshan nyid med pa'i phyir/ /zhes bya ba ni/ gzugs kyi mtshan nyid ni gzugs su rung ba zhes bya ba yin na/ thogs pa med pa'i phyir de yang 'di la med de de lta bas na rdzas su med do/ 

An obstructive (thogs-pa, Skt. pratigha) form of physical phenomenon is one that blocks the presence or motion of another form of physical phenomenon.

Sthiramati, The Meaning of the Facts (Derge 12B), explains:

Concerning “(It is) also because it does not exist as something with the defining characteristic of a form of physical phenomenon,” as for something existing as a form of physical phenomenon and something existing as suitable for being a form of physical phenomenon, when the defining characteristic of a form of physical phenomena has been stated in terms of being something demonstrative of metamorphosis, then a nonrevealing form, not even being something having metamorphosis, is something nonexistent (as a form of physical phenomenon).  

(Tib.) /gzugs kyi mtshan nyid med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba la/ gzugs su yod cing gzugs su rung ba zhes bya ba ni rnam par gyur pa bstan pa'i sgo nas gzugs kyi mtshan nyid du gsungs na/ rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i gzugs ni rnam par 'gyur ba yang ma yin pa de ni med pa nyid do/ 

A form of physical phenomenon that is “demonstrative of metamorphosis” (rnam-par gyur-pa bstan pa, Skt. vikāranidarśana) is one that exhibits changes in its form – for instance, sights and sounds changing their form every moment.

Vaibhashika, following an unnamed sutra, asserts three types of forms of physical phenomena (gnas-gsum-gyi gzugs, Skt. trividha rūpa). Vasubandhu quotes the sutra in Autocommentary (Gretil 196.08-11, Derge 169A):

Three types of forms of physical phenomena are spoken of in a sutra: “There is an assembly of forms of physical phenomena (consisting) of three types of forms. There is a (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is demonstrative and obstructive. There is a (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is non-demonstrative and obstructive. There is a (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is non-demonstrative and nonobstructive.”

(Skt.) trividhaṃ rūpamuktaṃ sūtre / "tribhiḥ sthānai rūpasya rūpasaṃgraho bhavati / asti rūpaṃ sanidarśanaṃ sapratigham / asti rūpamanidarśanaṃ sapratigham / asti rūpamanidarśanamapratighami"ti /

(Tib.) /mdo las/ gnas gsum gyi gzugs kyis gzugs bsdus pa yin te/ bstan du yod la thogs pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs kyang yod/ bstan du med la thogs pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs kyang yod/ bstan du yang med la thogs pa yang med pa'i gzugs kyang yod do zhes gzugs rnam pa gsum gsungs so/

Jinaputra Yashomitra, (Gretil 352, Derge 8A), elaborates:

There is a (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is demonstrative and obstructive, (such as) the (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is cognizable by eye consciousness. There is a (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is non-demonstrative and obstructive, (namely) those that are the eye-(sensors) and so on. These, then, are the nine cognitive stimulators that are forms of physical phenomena. There is a (type of) form of physical phenomenon that is non-demonstrative and nonobstructive, (namely) a nonrevealing form, cognizable (only) by mental consciousness and gathered (only) in the cognitive stimulator that is (all validly knowable) phenomena. 

(Skt.) asti rūpaṃ sanidarśanaṃ sapratighaṃ. yac cakṣurvijñānavijñeyaṃ rūpam. asty anidarśanaṃ sapratighaṃ. yāni cakṣurādīni. tat punar nava rūpyāyatanāni. asti rūpam anidarśanam apratighaṃ. yan manovijñānavijñeyaṃ avijñaptirūpaṃ dharmāyatanasaṃgṛhītaṃ. 

(Tib.) bstan du yod la thogs pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs kyang yod ces bya ba ni mig gi rnam par shes pas rnam par shes par bya ba'i gzugs gang yin pa'o/ /bstan du med la thogs pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs kyang yod ces bya ba ni mig la sogs pa gzugs can gyi skye mched gang dag yin pa'o/ /bstan du yang med la thogs pa yang med pa ni yid kyi rnam par shes pas rnam par shes par bya ba chos kyi skye mched kyis bsdus pa rnam par rig byed ma yin pa gang yin pa'o/ 

According to Sautrantika, if something is suitable to being a form of physical phenomenon, it must be included among the cognitive stimulators that are forms of physical phenomena (gzugs-kyi skye-mched, Skt. rūpāyatana). Such cognitive stimulators include only the five types of sensory objects, which are both demonstrative of metamorphosis and obstructive of the presence or motion of other forms of physical phenomena, and the five types of sensory cognitive sensors, which are obstructive, but not demonstrative of metamorphosis. Sensory cognitive sensors, such as the photosensitive cells of the eyes, the sound-sensitive cells of the ears and so on, do not transform their appearance with each new cognition the way that a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste or a physical sensation does. Sautrantika does not accept the existence, however, of forms of physical phenomena that are included only among the cognitive stimulators that are all validly knowable phenomena (chos-kyi skye-mched, Skt. dharmāyatana) – namely, nonrevealing forms. 

Jinaputra Yashomitra points out that nonrevealing forms are non-obstructive and therefore disqualified from being suitable to being a form of physical phenomenon. Sthiramati adds that, in addition, they are non-demonstrative of metamorphosis. Thus, nonrevealing forms have both of the defining characteristics of forms of physical phenomena that are included among the cognitive stimulators that are all validly knowable phenomena. Since Sautrantika does not accept the existence of forms of physical phenomena that are included only among the cognitive stimulators that are all validly knowable phenomena, it cannot accept even the existence of nonrevealing forms, let alone the existence of them as forms of physical phenomenon.

Although Sautrantika does not accept the existence of nonrevealing forms, it does accept the existence of vowed restraints and avowed nonrestraints. Let us explore the Sautrantika assertion of them.