The Subtle False “Me” Refuted by All Buddhist Tenets

We’ve dealt with the first level of the impossible “me” – the coarse impossible “me” that’s doctrinally based, which is accepted in common as something to be refuted by all the Buddhist tenet systems. Now, let’s go to the subtle impossible “me,” which is something to be refuted as discussed in all the tenet systems except Vaibhashika. Vaibhashika doesn’t speak of this, and we’ll come back to that. As I indicated, in order to go to the next step, we need to take a survey to see what are we left with when we have refuted this coarse impossible “me.”

We are left with a “me” that is: 

• Nonstatic – it changes from moment to moment
• It has parts – it’s not a monolith
• It cannot exist independently of a body and mind. 

We have to understand that even if we become a liberated being – an arhat – or we have become a Buddha, we still have a body and a mind. It might be quite a different type of body and mind than what we have as a limited being, a so-called “sentient being,” before we are liberated; then as an arhat, we have a certain type of body; and then when we become a Buddha, we have yet another type of body and mind, but we still have a body and mind. What is the type of nonstatic phenomenon that changes from moment to moment, that is a person, “me”? What is the self? 

• It is an imputation on a body and mind – or more fully, on an individual continuum of the five aggregates.
• It is something that is neither a form of a physical phenomenon nor a way of being aware of something.

It’s not, for instance, like a forest, a form of physical phenomenon that is an imputation on a group of trees. Also, it is not a way of being aware of something – like with many moments of anger, on which we impute the whole emotion of anger. It is neither of those two.

Understanding Imputation

A person or “me” is a noncongruent affecting variable. This is something that we have to understand; it’s not so simple. There are two levels of understanding imputation. We can speak in terms of the Prasangika, or let’s say the Madhyamaka point of view in general, in which everything is imputably existent. Then, we can also speak on a more common level that is accepted or shared by everybody – all the tenet systems. In terms of that common assertion, that shared assertion, there are two types of phenomena that are imputed. 

• Some are nonstatic – they change from moment to moment 
• Some are static – they don’t change and are not affected by anything. 

Those that are nonstatic – examples of that would be things like time, motion and the conventional “me.” Examples of things that are static and imputed would be categories – the category of “dog,” the category of anger, for example; these are static. They don’t do anything. It’s a category that’s imputed on individual members of a set. Voidness and space also belong to this type of phenomenon because these are basically facts about something that don’t change. No such things as impossible ways of existing – that’s what voidness is talking about – a total absence of that, and that’s just a fact. It doesn’t change. 

Nevertheless, there is a big difference here that we need to understand. Nonstatic, noncongruent affecting variables, like persons, can be validly known both nonconceptually and conceptually. We can see a person. The same is the case with static voidnesses and static space; they can also be validly known in both ways. Static categories, however, can only be known conceptually.

When we talk about the self, we’re talking about one of these imputedly existent phenomena that change moment to moment and can be validly known both nonconceptually and conceptually; it is an imputation on a basis. Let’s give an easier-to-understand example of a noncongruent affecting variable: motion.

What is motion? Well, we have an object which is here and then the next moment, it’s here, and then the next moment, it’s here and here and here and here. What is the imputation on that? The imputation is “motion”; it has moved. In one moment, we don’t see motion, do we? We need more than one moment in order to see motion, but only one moment happens at a time, doesn’t it? However, on the basis of something being in a different position in each moment, there is the imputation “motion.” However, we didn’t make up and project the motion on the object. It’s not that if we did not project “motion” on the object, it wouldn’t move. 

Can we see motion? Isn’t motion something that we can see, that exists? Is it only a concept? No, it’s not only a concept, right? We can see something is moving, but we can’t see motion separately from something moving, can we? So, it is imputedly knowable. It can only be known while the basis is also being known. We agree that we can see motion, and to see it, we’d have to see an object moving, even though it might be very, very fast.

Now, a person. A person is an imputation on aggregates. Remember, we had the five aggregates – body, consciousness, feeling, distinguishing, various emotions and so on. In particular, it is always accompanying mind, consciousness, that seems to be the most prominent thing that it is imputed on. Now, there are various characteristics of the self, of the person, and it is a noncongruent affecting variable, which means that it’s not congruent with a consciousness, a primary consciousness. It doesn’t share five things in common; it shares some things in common but not five things in common. Mental factors, which are ways of being aware of something, do share five things in common with consciousness. The self doesn’t. 

When we see something, and we have concentration on it, and perhaps desire for it – like the piece of cake outside – consciousness is just aware of it as a sight. The concentration and the desire, all the mental factors, are sharing the same focal object; all are arising dependent on the visual sensors, the photosensitive cells of the eyes. All of them – like the way of being aware of something – give rise to the same mental hologram, because that’s how we perceive things; there’s light and the photons fire with the neurons, and then there’s electrical and chemical stuff going on – transmission. Then, there’s the production of a mental hologram, and that is what we actually see, what we experience subjectively. They’re all together giving rise to this mental hologram, the same mental hologram. They are occurring simultaneously. They have the same slant, which means that if, for instance, the desire is something which is a disturbing emotion and destructive, then the whole thing is disturbing.

Now, the self doesn’t share all these five things in common with the consciousness in each moment, although it is an imputation on the consciousness in each moment. The self takes objects; it knows things. Remember, we had in the discussion of Indian philosophy the question: is the self some sort of passive consciousness that uses the brain or the mind, or is it something that has no ability to know anything by itself and then uses the brain and the mind? What is the relationship? Because conventionally, we say “I know something,” “I see something.” The self does take objects and can know things, but it doesn’t give rise to a mental hologram; only a way of being aware of something gives rise to a mental hologram. It’s not the same. The self doesn’t always know what is going on. 

We have something called subliminal awareness. “Subliminal,” underground, is, for instance, when we are sleeping, the sound of the clock is appearing to our ear consciousness; otherwise, we’d never be able to hear the alarm clock in the morning. It is appearing to the ear consciousness but not to the self. If we think of it graphically, the sound waves are coming in, they are hitting the sound-sensitive cells of the ear, so the ear in a sense is hearing it, but I don’t hear it. That’s subliminal awareness. However, if that sound is loud enough as with the alarm clock, then both the ear consciousness and the self will hear it. Subliminal awareness, everybody accepts that, all the tenet systems. 

The self doesn’t share five things in common with the consciousness: 

• It’s noncongruent.
• It’s not a way of knowing.
• It’s not a form of physical phenomenon. 

This is commonly accepted by everybody; those are the characteristics of the self. It can only exist imputedly on a basis, the five aggregates, so very simply body and mind. Now, we have to look at this imputation more carefully in terms of how we establish that such a thing as the self, “me,” exists. This can only be established in terms of mental labeling of the category “me” and designation of that category with the word “me,” and through that category, designation of the conventional “me” – with the word “me.” Let’s just speak first in terms of mental labeling with the category “me,” the static category that we project and through which we conceptually cognize ourselves on the basis of any moment of our experience, whenever we think of ourselves.

With mental labeling, we have three pieces. There is the mental label “me,” the category “me.” We have the basis for labeling it, the five aggregates, and that mental label refers to something. There’s an object that it refers to, which is the actual conventional “me,” an imputation on those five aggregates.

Motion is an imputation, right? It’s an imputation based on an object being in different places from moment to moment. Every time we see something move, we conceptually fit its motion into the category “motion” and what we call it, “motion,” a word, designation. It refers to something, so what does it refer to? It refers to motion, conventionally existent motion that we can see. Likewise, the word “me” refers to something. It refers to the actual conventional “me” that exists as an imputation and can only be validly known on the basis of the five aggregates, just as conventional motion is an imputation that exists and can only be validly known on the basis of the ball being in different positions from moment to moment. Now there’s this moment of experience, then the next moment of experience, and the next moment of experience; all the pieces in that moment of experience are changing at different rates, and the conventional “me” is the imputation on top of that, mentally labeled with the category “me” and designated with the word “me.”

The example that I always use – though I’m trying not to always use the same example – is a movie. Moment to moment to moment, different things are happening in a movie. There’s a designation, the name of the movie. However, the movie is not just the name; the name refers to the movie. The movie is not the same as one moment of it. It’s not the same as all the moments of it, because they couldn’t all happen at the same time, could they? Only one could happen at a time, but is there a movie? Yes, there is a movie. There’s the designation, the name, the basis and what the name refers to on that basis. There’s the conventional “me,” there’s every moment of experience, and the mental label and designation “me” refer to the conventionally existent “me.” We see, we go and we do, on the basis of the body doing things and the mind seeing things and understanding. This everybody accepts. 

What is to be refuted here? What’s to be refuted is that the conventional “me,” the referent object, is self-sufficiently knowable, that it can be known without the basis for imputation appearing simultaneously. This would be like imagining that we could see motion without seeing a ball when it’s moving. We can’t see the motion that is an imputation on the moving ball separately from seeing the ball, because the motion of the moving ball is imputedly knowable. The ball itself is self-sufficiently knowable in this commonly accepted scheme. We don’t have to see anything else to see the ball. We’re not talking on the more sophisticated level of imputation that we can’t see the ball without seeing the parts of the ball. We’re not talking on that level; we just see the ball. However, we can’t see motion without seeing the ball moving in different places at different times. 

Similarly, we can’t see the self or know the self without a basis also appearing. However, automatically it arises – we don’t have to be taught this – and it seems as though we can know the self self-sufficiently. We say, “I see Yura,” as if we could just see Yura without seeing a body. “I want to call Yura on the phone.” Well, what are we calling? That’s an interesting question, isn’t it? Well, we’re calling a body and a mind and aggregates and so on, and that’s Yura. Or is that Yura? It seems as though we could just call Yura, or we’re hearing Yura on the phone. Well, what are we hearing? We’re hearing the vibration of something inside this mechanical device and labeling that “Yura.” It’s very interesting.

The classic example that I like very much: “I want you to love me for me, not for my looks, not for my intelligence, not for my body, or for my money. I want you to love me just for me,” as if the “me” could be loved separately from some basis of imputation. On the basis for thinking that’s how we exist, then we have automatically arising disturbing emotions. “Nobody loves me, I’m so lonely”; we get angry if somebody ignores “me.” Ignoring “me,” what are they ignoring? The body and the imputation “me” on the body? No, “They’re just ignoring me.” We think that it’s like that, that they are ignoring “me,” as if they could ignore me separately from a basis of “me.” They’re ignoring my body, well, we don’t think that. They are ignoring what? Our emotions, our personality? What are they ignoring? “They’re just ignoring me, and they don’t love me.”

Doctrinally Based and Automatically Arising Disturbing Emotions

These automatically arising disturbing emotions are a whole different level of disturbing emotions, from that spectrum of disturbing emotions that are doctrinally based. “I am eternally young.” I look in the mirror, “That’s not me. It’s an old person.” Or we look at the scale, and it gives a number, and we say, “That’s not me. I can’t possibly weigh that much,” as if there’s this static “me” that’s doctrinally based. Thus, we have doctrinally based unawareness, doctrinally based disturbing emotions and automatically arising ones.

The doctrinally based ones are coming from imagining that we exist as this coarse impossible “me,” and the automatically arising ones arise from believing that we exist as this more subtle impossible “me,” the self-sufficiently knowable one. This automatically arises. Everybody asserts that it automatically arises except the Vaibhashika system. Prasangika comes along and says that actually we could have this misconception about the self doctrinally based if we learned and accepted the Vaibhashika view. We could have this idea of a self-sufficiently knowable “me,” either doctrinally based or automatically arising. To understand this, we have to know the Vaibhashika explanation of cognition that we need to have studied and understood.

How does cognition work? “Cognition” is the most general word for being aware of something. Everybody, except the Vaibhashikas, says that cognition works indirectly. This is a technical term. People use these words “direct” and “indirect” to cover at least three completely different meanings, and then it all gets confused. We need to be much more precise in our use of terminology. Everybody else except Vaibhashika says that cognition works through mental holograms. In fact, that is part of the definition of mind, a more general definition: to know something is to give rise to a mental hologram of something. In moment one, there is contacting awareness, and photons reach the eyes, the photosensitive cells of the eyes. Then there’s a slight time lapse, with the firing of the neurons and the chemicals and so on; then it is somehow translated into a mental hologram, which is what we see, although we can’t actually find the mental hologram inside our head. 

We have a mental hologram of the aggregates – for instance, a body or the sound of a voice, and the mental hologram is actually a composite of that basis with the self imputed on it. Well, can we have a mental hologram of just the self? That’s an interesting question. No, we can’t. That’s very interesting. Can we just think of ourselves without thinking “me,” a mental word that is representing the self, or a mental picture, or a feeling? How can we think of “me”? It’s an interesting question, isn’t it? These are the types of things that one investigates. How do we think of “me,” of myself?

Everybody except Vaibhashika says that this process of cognition is indirect because there’s a mental hologram. That word that I am translating as “mental hologram” is usually translated as “aspect.” When we read the word “aspect,” we have no idea what it’s talking about. However, that’s what it’s talking about – a mental hologram. Vaibhashika does not assert mental holograms. It asserts that cognition works just directly, not through a mental hologram. We just see the object; it’s not represented by a mental hologram, because when we see a person, we don’t actually see all the five aggregates that the person is imputed on. Therefore, we can see a person directly, self-sufficiently. That’s the Vaibhashika position. If we believe that – we’ve learned and believe that – then this misconception about a self-sufficiently knowable “me” is doctrinally based. 

For everybody other than the Prasangikas, doctrinally based unawareness, ignorance, is just talking about what we learned from the non-Buddhist Indian systems. Prasangika says that we can also have doctrinally based disturbing emotions and unawareness based on the less sophisticated Buddhist schools as well. This self-sufficiently knowable “me,” the belief in that, and the disturbing emotions that come from that, according to Prasangika, can be either doctrinally based or automatically arising. Whereas the doctrinally based unawareness and disturbing emotions and so on, that one in terms of the static, partless, independently existing self, is only doctrinally based. That’s referring to the whole package – a whole package of a self, an atman, that is static, partless and can exist when liberated all by itself. 

We had to learn that whole package. However, even in this lifetime, if we haven’t studied that, we could have little pieces of it left over that are manifest. I’m explaining this because there could be a lot of confusion about that. These little pieces of it would fall into the category of “incorrect consideration,” which is not a disturbing emotion but is another mental factor of how we consider things either correctly or incorrectly. For example, correctly would be that the body is nonstatic; incorrectly would be that it’s static – it never changes. That we could have doctrinally based or automatically arising, that little piece. Or, the body actually is suffering of old age, sickness, etc. Nevertheless, we incorrectly consider it as happiness – the body is beautiful, so wonderful; we worship the body. That little piece could be doctrinally based from advertising or whatever, or it could automatically arise. 

The body is actually tainted; it’s impure. What’s inside the stomach, what’s inside the intestines, what happens when we put food in our mouth and chew it a few times and spit it out? The body is actually a machine for producing urine and feces. Put food and liquid in, and the body manufactures urine and feces out of it. Nevertheless, incorrectly we consider it as so clean and wonderful, and that could be either doctrinally based or automatically arising. The whole package with the self, which is static and has no parts and can exist independently of a body and mind, that is only doctrinally based. Don’t get confused here about this doctrinally based thing here and think, “I’m forever young,” and these problems that we have.

Let’s take a moment to just digest this self-sufficiently knowable “me.” “I want to take time out to get to know myself,” as if we could know ourselves independently of knowing the body or our personality or whatever. “I want to know myself,” “Now I know myself.” This automatically arises. Nobody had to teach us that. However, that type of “me,” we understand that it is nonstatic, it’s changing from moment to moment, it has parts and it can’t exist separately from a body or a mind. We understand this, but nevertheless, we still think that it can be known by itself. That’s this more subtle level. 

This is what I’m trying to emphasize and teach: to just think and refute a self-sufficiently knowable “me” trivialize this point. It’s already quite sophisticated even on this trivialized level, but what we are really talking about here is a nonstatic self that is made of the parts, imputed always on a body and a mind, which can, nevertheless, be self-sufficiently known. It is much more subtle. It is what is left over after we have refuted the coarse impossible “me,” and then refuting something more subtle with what’s left over. That’s the object to be refuted. 

If we don’t understand it, we have not done the first point of the four-point analysis of what is the object to be refuted. It may take time to identify it – it should take time to identify it – in our own experience, but we can’t really understand and identify this subtle self to be refuted unless we have worked with the coarse one and refuted that one. If we skip that first point, then our understanding is very superficial, and it tends to trivialize the whole refutation. Take a moment to digest that.

[Meditation]

All of this discussion is within the context of the general Buddhist principle, which is that we know things through exclusion. In other words, to specify something, know it precisely, the way that we do that is by narrowing in. It’s not this, so we exclude that; we see what’s left, and then within that, well, it’s not this, so we exclude that; it gets more precise, and then we exclude something that’s wrong in that. That way, we narrow down to be able to specify exactly what it is by excluding what it’s not. That is the general principle here, the general approach.