The aggregates are not (the Tathāgata); he is not other than the aggregates. The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in them. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates. What, then, is the Tathāgata here? || 1 ||
If the Buddha’s conventional existence, after obtaining the aggregates (as a basis upon which to rely for making himself verifiable), is not established by means of his own self-established identity, how could he, who does not exist by means of his own self-established identity, exist by means of the self-established identity of something other (than himself)? || 2 ||
It is reasonable that someone who (exists) in dependence on something else being self-established is without an ātman-soul (of self-established existence). But how can someone who is without an ātman-soul (of self-established existence) become the Tathāgata? || 3 ||
If there is no existence established from oneself, how could there be existence established from what is other? Apart from (being someone with) existence established from oneself or existence established from what is other, who could this Tathāgata be? || 4 ||
If there (actually) were some Tathāgata who (first existed as a Tathāgata who) had not obtained the aggregates (as a basis), he could now obtain them (as a basis), and then, having obtained them, he would exist (as a Tathāgata having a basis). || 5 ||
But there is also no Tathāgata who exists without having obtained the aggregates (as a basis), and how could someone who does not exist without having obtained a basis then obtain (a basis) for himself? || 6 ||
There cannot be any obtaining (of a basis) if it is not obtained (by someone), and there can in no way be a Tathāgata without his obtaining (a basis). || 7 ||
When he cannot (be found to) exist, when being sought for (in relation to the aggregates) in five ways – as being them, being other (than them, and so on) – how could the Tathāgata be made verifiable by (reliance on) obtaining (the aggregates as a basis)? || 8 ||
This obtained (basis) does not, in fact, exist from its being self-established (as existent); so, how could that which does not exist by means of being self-established (as existent) exist from being established (as existent) by something other? || 9 ||
Thus, the (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are devoid in every way and so too is the one who obtains them. So, how can (your assertions that phenomena are existent by being self-established) explain that a Tathāgata who is devoid (of being self-established) is made verifiable by means of something (the obtained aggregates) that is also devoid (of being self-established)? || 10 ||
It should not be said that (the Tathāgata) is devoid (of being self-established), or not devoid, or both, or neither. |It is stated, however, for the purpose of making (the Tathāgata) conventionally verifiable. || 11 ||
How could the fourfold alternative of “eternal,” “not eternal,” and so on apply in the case of the Peaceful One? And here too, how could the fourfold alternative of “finite,” “not finite,” and so on apply in the case of the Peaceful One? || 12 ||
Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata by means of the cognitive taking that he solidly exists, self-established as a findable object, would, conceptually discriminating, “He does not exist,” conceptualize (him in this way) even when he has passed completely into parinirvāṇa. || 13 ||
But when this (Tathāgata) is devoid of self-established existence, the thought, “After cessation, the Buddha exists,” or “He does not exist,” simply does not make sense. || 14 ||
Those who conceptually fabricate projections about the Buddha, who is beyond conceptually fabricated projection and is unchanging, are all struck down by conceptually fabricated projection; they do not see the Tathāgata. || 15 ||
Whatever way of existing the Tathāgata has, this world has that same way of existing; the Tathāgata lacks self-established existence, and so this world also lacks self-established existence. || 16 ||