[1] The aggregates are not (the Tathāgata); he is not other than the aggregates. The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in them. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates. How, then, is there a Tathāgata here?
[2] If the Buddha’s conventional existence is not established by himself, but is established by obtaining aggregates that are self-established, how could it be that, not being self-established by himself (since that is impossible), his conventional existence is established by relying on something other than himself that is self-established?
[3] (Suppose you reply that) someone whose conventional existence is established in dependence on a self-established “other” is someone who [beforehand] is without an ātman-soul of self-established existence. [Response] How can someone who [beforehand] is without an ātman-soul of self-established existence come to be the Tathāgata?
[4] If there is no existence established from oneself, how could there be existence established from what is other? Apart from being someone with existence established from oneself or existence established from what is “other,” who could this Tathāgata be?
[5] If there were some Tathāgata that (first existed) without obtaining (a basis) from the aggregates and then now he were to obtain (one), he would then exist having obtained (a basis).
[6] But there isn’t any Tathāgata who (first) exists not obtaining (a basis) from the aggregates. And how could someone, not obtaining a basis and so not existing, then obtain (a basis) for himself?
[7] And any obtaining that is by something that [at first] is without (a basis) obtained cannot exist. And so, a Tathāgata [who at first is] without an obtaining (of a basis) does not exist in any way whatsoever.
[8] When he cannot (be found to) exist, when being sought for (in relation to the aggregates) in five ways – being them, being other (than them, and so on) – how could a Tathāgata be made verifiable by (reliance on) obtaining (the aggregates as a basis)?
[9] Even these (aggregates) that are obtained (as a basis) are not seen to establish their conventional existence by themselves. How would they (the aggregates), not established as being conventionally existent by themselves, come to have their conventional existence be established by (being obtained as a basis) by something else?
[10] Thus, the (aggregates) obtained (as a basis) are devoid in every way and so too is the one who obtains them. So, how can (your theories that assert self-established existence) explain that a Tathāgata that is devoid (of self-established existence) is made verifiable by means of something (obtained aggregates) that is (also) devoid (of self-established existence)?
[11] It should not be said that (the Tathāgata) is devoid (of self-established existence) or not devoid, or both or neither. It is only stated for the purpose of making (the Tathāgata) conventionally verifiable.
[12] How could the fourfold alternative “eternal,” “not eternal” and so on (apply) in the case of the Peaceful One? And here too, how could the fourfold alternative “finite,” “not finite” and so on (apply) in the case of the Peaceful One?
[13] Whoever has cognitively taken the Tathāgata by means of the cognitive taking that he solidly exists, self-established as a findable object, would also conceptualize about him even when he has passed into parinirvāṇa, that (now) he does not exist.
[14] But when this (Tathāgata) is devoid of self-established existence, the thought, “After final cessation the Buddha exists” or “does not exist,” simply does not make sense.
[15] Those who conceptually fabricate about the Buddha, who is beyond conceptual fabrication and unchanging, are all overcome by conceptual fabrication; they do not see the Tathāgata.
[16] Whatever manner of existence the Tathāgata has himself, this world has just that manner of existence itself. The Tathāgata lacks self-established existence, and so this world (also) lacks self-established existence.