The Stages for Entering into the Determination of the Nature of Reality

Query: Suppose you wonder, as the very nature of reality is the (non-abiding) nirvana that is to be acquired, what kind of gateway it is, through which to enter into the very nature of reality, that is the method for acquiring that (non-abiding nirvana).  

Reply: [Non-abiding nirvana is] the (Svabhava) Dharmakaya – the very nature of reality and the depletion of all the mental hologram-appearances of grasping for an atman-soul and for what are possessed by an atman-soul. It is the thorough pacification of (1) the appearing of all assorted phenomena, both external and internal, as if they were reality when they are not reality, together with (2) [what gives rise to them] the constant habits [of grasping for an atman-soul]. 

As for the stages for entering into or engaging in that (non-abiding nirvana): having thought about the faults of uncontrollably recurring samsaric rebirth and having become disgusted with it, you need then to generate the wish to get out from it. Then seeing that if you cannot turn back the cause of such [samsaric rebirth], you cannot turn away from [taking such rebirth]; and then, when you research, considering what the cause is, you become convinced from the depths of your heart about the way in which a deluded view toward a perishing network or [its equivalent], misknowing (ignorance), functions as the root of samsara, you will then develop the unfabricated wish to rid yourself of this (root). 

Then seeing that turning back this deluded view toward a perishing network depends on generating the discriminating knowing that apprehends the nonexistence of the atman-soul that is grasped by this deluded view, you see that it is necessary to refute (the existence of) that atman-soul. In other words, find certainty in this [need for refuting it, and in its refutation] by relying on the quotations and logic that discredit the existence of that atman-soul and that establish its nonexistence. If you have interest in liberation, there is no other method.

When you have found the view that is certain that an atman-soul and an atman-soul as a possessor (of the aggregates) lack self-established existence, then by having accustomed yourself to its meaning, you will attain a (Svabhava) Dharmakaya. 

From Chandrakirti’s Clarified Words:

[Qualm:] If disturbing mental factors and karmic impulses and bodies and agents and results – if all of these are unreal, yet even though they are unreal, their presence manifests to infantile beings with a mental hologram-appearance of reality like a city of the celestial musicians and so on, then what is reality here and how can there be any entering into reality?

[Reply:] The extinction of taking internal and external (items) to be truly me and of taking them to be truly mine by means of the absence of perception of (all) internal and external phenomena, without exception [as being self-established] – just that is reality. 

This can be learned extensively from (my) “Engaging in Madhyamaka,” for instance: “Penetratingly seeing with intelligence that (all) disturbing mental factors and faults, barring none, have their origin in the deluded view toward a perishing network, a yogi understands the (voidness of the) atman-soul that is its object and simply renders the atman-soul null and void.” 

So, if yogis wish to enter into reality and wish to rid themselves of disturbing mental factors and faults, they need to investigate what “the root of uncontrollably recurring samsaric rebirth” is. When they investigate, then [they examine like Chandrakirti outlines in “Clarified Words”]: 

Subsequent to seeing that (1) uncontrollably recurring samsaric rebirth is, in fact, something that has as its root a deluded view toward a perishing network, and subsequent to seeing together with that that (2) there is a (true) riddance of the deluded view toward a perishing network with the absence of perception of an atman-soul, and that (3) there is a turning back of all disturbing mental factors [Tib.: and faults] with that riddance, one thoroughly examines for oneself an atman-soul, (asking) [Tib.: just] what is that so-called, “atman-soul” that is the object of taking (external and internal phenomena to be truly) me? Does it have a self-establishing nature of (being identical with) the aggregates imagined to be the object of taking (things to be truly) me or (does it have a self-establishing nature of being) separate from (and a possessor of) the aggregates? 

Although there are lines of reasoning to refute the self-establishing nature of limitless individual phenomena, Buddhapalita explained that when yogis want to enter into (the view of) reality, they meditate in brief on the non-existence of a self-establishing nature of an atman-soul (as identical to the aggregates) and of an atman-soul as a possessor (of the aggregates), and that this is meaning of the eighteenth chapter of Nagarjuna’s Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing.” Chandrakirti follows this.

Qualm: Since you are explaining the way in which Mahayanists enter into the very nature of reality, it is unreasonable that with merely the depletion of grasping for an atman-soul (of a person) and for an atman-soul (of a person) as a possessor, you get to the very nature of reality that is to be attained. 

[In other words], when you merely come to a decisive conclusion about the lack of the self-established existence of an atman-soul (of a person) and of an atman-soul (of a person) as a possessor, you have not come to a decisive conclusion about the lack of a self-establishing nature of phenomena. Because of that, it is unreasonable that this is a pathway-understanding for entering into the very nature of reality [a Svabhava Dharmakaya]. 

Reply: There is no fault. That is because: (1) there are two (kinds of) complete depletions of all mental hologram-appearances that you grasp at to be an atman-soul (of a person) and an atman-soul (of a person) as a possessor (of the aggregates). Of these (two kinds), one is a definitional riddance of them such that disturbing mental factors never arise again – even Hinayanists [namely, Shravaka and Pratyekabuddha Arhats holding a Prasangika view] have that (kind of depletion). [The other kind of depletion of all mental hologram-appearances is] the riddance (of them) with which you never perceive any defining characteristic mark of a mental fabrication of (self-established) external or internal phenomena – that (kind of depletion) is the (Svabhava) Dharmakaya.

Also, because (2) when you ascertain the lack of a self-establishing nature of an atman-soul (of a person), you turn back as well grasping for the self-established existence of the aggregates that are its parts, like when you burn a wooden chariot, the wheels and so on that are its parts are also burned. 

Chandrakirti’s Clarified Words explains this: 

Those seeking liberation examine (an atman-soul – which), in fact, is merely conceptually labeled dependent (on a basis – to ascertain (1) whether it is) something existing as a platform for the clinging to an atman-soul of those filled with misknowing and reversed (views) and (2) (whether it) manifests as an obtainer (of samsaric rebirths) with  five aggregates. Having subjected it to examination in all ways as to whether it has the defining characteristic mark of (being identical with) the aggregates or the defining characteristic mark of not (being identical with) the aggregates, those seeking liberation do not perceive it, because it does not have the self-nature of an existent thing. [As Nagarjuna said in “Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called Discriminating Knowing”:] “When, it is the case that their atman-soul does not exist, how at all can there be an atman-soul possessor (of the aggregates as ‘mine’)?”

Because of the absence of perception of an atman-soul, then a so-called “possession of an atman-soul,” [i.e. a rebirth] something obtained with five aggregates that is tied to an atman-soul, is clearly not perceived. 

Just as in the case of a chariot that has been burned, it parts are not perceived because of their state of having (also) been burned, likewise when yogis realize the nonexistence of an atman-soul, they necessarily also realize the nonexistence of an atman-soul of the components of the five aggregates as being what an atman-soul possesses.

This is saying that when you apprehend that an atman-soul (of a person) lacks a self-establishing nature, you apprehend that an atman-soul of the aggregates as well, which are (conceived of as being) the possessions of an atman-soul (of a person), also lack a self-establishing nature. 

Also, from Chandrakirti’s Autocommentary to “Engaging in Madhyamaka”: 

Because when you focus on a form and so on as if having a findable essential nature, your cognition is reversed, you have not apprehended the nonexistence of an atman-soul of the person. That’s because you are focused on the aggregates that are the basis conceptually labeled as the atman-soul. 

As Nagarjuna says [in “Precious Garland”], “As long as you have grasping for the aggregates, for that long you will have grasping for a me.” 

That’s because, as he (Nagarjuna) is saying, when you do not apprehend that the aggregates lack a self-establishing nature, you have not apprehended the lack of a self-establishing nature of the atman-soul of a person (conceptually labeled on the aggregates).

Qualm: If the intelligent mind that apprehends a person as lacking a self-establishing nature itself is the very one that apprehends the aggregates as lacking a self-establishing nature, there would be the fault that the two intelligent minds that apprehend two lacks of a self-establishing nature become one. But since the two – a person and the aggregates – are (each) individual items, the two intelligent minds that apprehend the two as lacking a self-establishing nature are also (each) individual items, like the intelligent minds that apprehend a clay jug and a pillar as being nonstatic (impermanent). 

(On the other hand), if the intelligent mind that apprehends a person as lacking a self-establishing nature itself is the very one that does not apprehend the aggregates lacking a self-establishing nature, then how can (Chandrakirti) claim that when the intelligent mind that apprehends a person as lacking a self-establishing nature, it apprehends the aggregates as lacking a self-establishing nature?

 Reply: We do not assert (like) the first (part of your) question [that the two minds are one mind], therefore I shall explain the latter (part of your) question. The intelligent mind that apprehends a person as lacking a self-establishing nature itself does not hold the thought that the aggregates lack a self-establishing nature. Even so, yet since, without relying on anything else, it has the ability to induce the decisive knowing that is certain about the aggregates lacking a self-establishing nature, it is able to cut off the interpolation that interpolates a self-establishing nature on the aggregates. Because of that, he (Chandrakirti) says that when you apprehend a person as lacking a self-establishing nature, you apprehend also the aggregates as lacking a self-establishing nature.

Furthermore, as Buddhapalita said: 

When what is called “an atman-soul” is called “an atman-soul as a possessor,” and that atman-soul is invalid, then, with that atman-soul not existing, how can it be proper that this (set of aggregates) is called “something possessed by this (atman-soul)?” 

It should be known like that because, for example, when you are certain that the child of a barren woman does not exist, then even though that intelligent mind does not hold (the thought) that there are no such things as ears and so on of that (child), nevertheless it is able to cut off the interpolation that holds its ears and so as being existent. Like that, when you are certain of an atman-soul as being unreal, you turn back holding that its eyes and so on exist in reality  

Qualm: Suppose you say that essentialists from our own (Buddhist) traditions accept that a person only exists and is only knowable objectively tied to a basis. But since they do not accept that a person has existence established as an ultimate phenomenon [because when a person is searched for, its defining characteristic and self-nature are not found in a person], that should mean that they, in fact, apprehend that an eye and so on lacks a self-establishing nature [because it too is objectively tied to a basis, its own parts].

Reply: If you think that by (Svatantrikas) accepting that gross phenomena such as an eye and a sprout are (only) knowable tied to a basis, they apprehend that they lack a self-establishing nature, that contradicts the (Svatantrikas’) own assertions [that an eye and a sprout are self-sufficiently knowable and self-established.] 

Also, [if essentialists did apprehend that an eye and a sprout lack self-establishing natures], then it would be unnecessary [for Prasangikas] to prove to them that a sprout and so on lack a self-establishing nature.

And since a complete pathway of a constructive or destructive karmic impulse forms a continuum, then if [Svatantrikas] accepted that a continuum lacked a self-establishing nature, it would have been pointless [for the Svatantrika master Haribhadra] in his commentary [on “Filigree of Realizations”] to try to refute the [Prasangika] Madhyamaka assertion that (a continuum), like a dream, lacks truly established existence [existence established in the context of conceptual labeling merely by the power of conceptual labeling.]

[Haribhadra said:] 

If (the continuum of a pathway of a karmic impulse) were like a dream, then since there would be no such thing as the ten destructive actions or generosity [meaning they would have no results] and so on, wouldn’t the state of not having woken up from a dream in fact be like the state of having woken up from a dream? 

However, what the essentialists assert in their own system as being established and not being established as superficial and as ultimate and what (Prasangika Madhyamikas) assert as being established and not being established as superficial and as ultimate are totally incompatible. That being the case, then, when what they (the essentialists) assert as superficial, (Prasangika) Madhyamikas) regard as established as ultimate, and what they (the essentialists) assert as ultimate, (Prasangika Madhyamikas regard) as established as superficial, how could they not be completely the opposite? Therefore, they need to be differentiated. 

Furthermore, although “conceptually knowable (only) tied to a basis” (as asserted) by them [the Svatantrikas] and “conceptually knowable (only) tied to a basis” (as asserted) by this learned master [Chandrakirti] have the same names, their meanings are not the same. This is because this learned master [Chandrakirti] asserts that they [the Svatantrikas] do not have the view that apprehends (accurately and decisively) the nonexistence of an atman-soul of persons. This is because he [Chandrakirti] asserts that not apprehending the nonexistence of an atman-soul of phenomena is not apprehending the nonexistence of an atman-soul of persons. 

Therefore, since this learned master [Chandrakirti] asserts that so long as they do not give up the tenet position of the self-sufficient existence of the aggregates, they are still grasping for the self-sufficient existence of persons, therefore they [the Svatantrikas] have not apprehended persons as not (being established) as ultimate phenomena.