Identifying Over-refutations of the Special Features of Prasangika

Identifying the object to be refuted by reasoning is divided into three sections:

1. The Reason Why It Is Necessary to Identify Well the Object to Be Refuted
2. Refuting the Other Traditions That Refute without Having Ascertained the Object to Be Refuted
3. How Our Tradition Identifies the Object to Be Refuted

Just as to be certain, when thinking, “this person is not present,” you need to know that person that is absent, (likewise) to be certain also about the meaning of “the nonexistence of an atman-soul” and “the nonexistence of a self-establishing nature,” you need to have ascertained very well the atman-soul and self-establishing nature that are non-existent. This is because, if a conceptual category of what is to be refuted has not dawned (in your conceptual mind), you will not be able to ascertain, in a non-reversed manner, its refutation at all. 

This is because, as (Shantideva) has said from his Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior:

Without contacting what is conceptually labeled as an existent object, you cannot get a cognitive hold on its being a non-object (i.e. something non-existent). 

In regard to that, even though the specific types of different objects to be refuted are limitless, nevertheless, when their refutation has been made from the root from which all (of these) objects to be refuted emerge, all of them as well become discounted.

Moreover, if you have not discounted the object be refuted from the subtlest points of the ultimate essential points of the object of the refuted, and something more is leftover, you have fallen to the extreme of existence. Then, since you will develop clinging to (seemingly) existent objects, you will be unable to liberate yourself from compulsive rebirth. And if you refute without having held back the extent of what is to be refuted from being absurdly too much, you have fallen to the extreme of nihilism, and, by that very view itself, you will be led to a worse rebirth. Because of that, it is very important to have ascertained very well the object to be refuted, because when you have not become certain about it, you will develop, without a doubt, either an eternalist view or a nihilist view. 

Refuting the other traditions that refute without having ascertained the object to be refuted is divided into two sections:

1. Refuting Those for Whom What Is Identified as the Object to Be Refuted Is Over-Pervasive
2. Refuting Those for Whom What Is Identified as the Object to Be Refuted Is Under-Pervasive

Refuting those for whom what is identified as the object to be refuted is over-pervasive is divided into two sections:

1. Stating the Assertions (of the Over-refuters)
2. Showing That They (the Assertions of the Over-refuters) Are Unreasonable

Most of those who assert Madhyamaka these days say that the reasoning that analyzes whether arising and so on are established or not by the very nature of their reality discount [all four possible ways – existent, nonexistent, both, or neither – in which] all phenomena could be established like that, from form up to omniscience. This is because no matter what you accept as being (real), not even an atom of it can withstand analysis by reasoning. And also, because once you have refuted all four possibilities (concerning arising) – (arising) of something already existent, totally nonexistent and so on – there is nothing that would not have been included [and so there is nothing left that can be asserted]. 

Moreover, (they go on to assert that), since the deep knowing of an arya that sees the very nature of reality perceives arising, ceasing, bondage and liberation and so on as totally nonexistent, then since things must be like how they perceive things to be, there is no arising and so on. 

(They) also (argue), when we assert that there is arising and so on, then when such things are subjected to the reasoning that analyzes their real nature [their reality], they must either withstand the analysis or not withstand it. If they withstand it, then there would be phenomena that can withstand analysis, and so these would become self-established, truly existent phenomena. If they cannot withstand analysis, then how could it be reasonable for something that has been discounted to be something that still exists? 

Similarly, if we assert arising and so on as existent phenomena, then (they ask) does valid cognition establish them or not? If we assert the first, that it does establish them, then since the deep knowing (of aryas) sees arising as nonexistent (there is no arising), then it is not reasonable that that (deep knowing analyzing deepest truth) establishes them. If we assert that cognition by conventionally (existent) eyes and so on establishes them, then because it has been discounted that these are valid cognizers, it is unreasonable that they are valid cognizers for establishing them. 

As The King of Absorbed Concentrations Sutra states: 

The eyes, the ears, and also the nose are not valid cognizers. The tongue and body are also not valid cognizers. If these sensors were valid cognizers, what would the arya paths do for anyone? 

Also, from Chandrakirti’s Engaging in Madhyamaka:

Mundane (cognizers, i.e. non-arya ones) are not valid for (cognizing) anything (rnam-kun) (i.e. any mental hologram-appearances). 

And if we assert that they (arising and so on) exist without their being established by valid cognition, they say that this is unreasonable because you don’t even assert that, and it is not logical. And if we accept arising, then they say that since it cannot be accepted in terms of deepest (truth), then it must be asserted in terms of superficial (truth). But that is also unreasonable. 

Chandrakirti also states in Engaging in Madhyamaka: 

Since whatever reasoning (demonstrates) arising from self or from other as being illogical, that reasoning also shows that it is illogical on the conventional level as well, so what (line of reasoning) will make the arising you (assert) something that is the case? 

If you Gelug Prasangikas still assert arising (the arising of things) even though things don’t arise from self, other, both or neither, then if there is a position that would not have been eliminated by refuted with reasoning the four positions for refuting arising on the deepest level, then there should be a type of arising that is none of those. 

And if arising has to be from one of the four positions, and you Gelug Prasangikas don’t accept three of them (born from self, both or neither), then there would have to be arising from something other (which is what Svatantrika and below assert according to Gelug Prasangika), and that is unreasonable, since Engaging in Madhyamaka says, 

Arising from something other does not exist from the mundane (non-arya point of view).    

(The over-refuters) also (assert that), when refuting arising, it is not necessary to add the specification “in deepest truth” to the statement that there is no arising because Chandrakirti in Clarified Words refutes adding “in deepest truth.” Some say that (although in deepest truth) there is no arising, but conventionally it exists, and some say it does not conventionally exist. But both positions do not deny that Chandrakirti’s system refutes a self-establishing nature that establishes the essential nature of things as this or that because he refutes self-established existence in terms of both truths. And if things do not have self-established existence (in terms of both truths), then how else could they exist? So, to specify that there is no arising just in the deepest truth is merely the Svatantrika position.

[Translator’s Note: From this point onwards, only selected passages have been translated and the material in between has only been summarized.] 

Showing that the assertions of the over-refuters are unreasonable is divided into two sections:

1. Showing That the Systems (of the Over-refuters) Contradict the Unshared Features of Madhyamaka
2. (The Over-refuters’) Arguments to Try to Harm Our Position Cannot Cause Us to Lose Our Assertion (of Conventional Phenomena)

Showing that the systems of the over-refuters contradict the unshared features of Madhyamaka is divided into three sections:

1. Identifying the Special Distinguishing Feature of Madhyamaka
2. Showing How the Systems (of the Over-refuters) Contradict (That Special Distinguishing Feature of Madhyamaka)
3. How Madhyamaka Responds (to Those Who Negate the Special Distinguishing Feature of Madhyamaka)

Nagarjuna has said in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning: 

By the constructive force of this, may all beings build up their networks of positive force and deep knowing, and may they attain the two hallowed (Bodies – a Corpus of Enlightening Forms and a Dharmakaya, a Corpus Encompassing Everything) that come about from positive force and deep knowing. 

To attain the two Enlightening Corpuses, Mahayana practitioners need to practice method and discriminating knowing inseparably at the time of the path. 

For this, you need definite certainty about the extent of what exists (conventional truth) in terms of conventional cause and effect – from this cause, this beneficial or this detrimental effect arises. And you need certainty about how things exist, which means certainty about how nothing has a self-establishing nature that establishes its essential nature as this or that. Without certainty about the extent of what exists and how it exists, it is impossible to train with a complete pathway mind. 

Moreover, it is necessary to understand these two (the extent of what exists and how it exists) as non-contradictory. Other than Madhyamikas, all the others see them as contradictory and cannot explain them as non-contradictory. 

Buddha has said over and again that the meaning of voidness, which is a total absence of a self-establishing nature (there is no such thing), is dependent arising. The meaning is not at all a non-phenomenon (a nothing), which is a total absence of the ability of things to perform a function. 

Objections: Those essentialist schools [all of which assert self-established phenomena] do not accept the Madhyamaka view. They say:

• If all things were devoid of any self-establishing nature whatsoever that established their essential natures (as this or that) existent phenomenon, then (1) there would be no ground upon which to set the presentation of samsara and nirvana, with bondage and liberation and so on, and (2) all the teachings on samsara and nirvana would be untenable.
• There would be no arising, no ceasing, no four noble truths. 
• If words lacked a self-establishing nature, then they would not have the ability to refute self-established existence or prove that there is no such thing as self-established existence. 
• Things being produced and things (or persons) producing them, as well as things being refuted or proved and things (or persons) refuting or asserting them would also be untenable. Thus, the reasoning that you use to refute self-establishing natures also refutes all functionality. 

Reply: Then Tsongkhapa gives several quotes by Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti to support this. He cites the presentation of the forward and reverse sequence of the twelve links in chapter 26 of Nagarjuna’s Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called,“Discriminating Knowing,” and chapter 24 on the four noble truths. Nagarjuna asserts that all dependent arisings are only possible because of voidness. Because things dependently arise, they are devoid of self-established existence and vice versa.

Thus, dependent arising does not mean, like you over-refuters say, that you accept only the teachings on voidness for yourself as the correct Madhyamaka view and you assert that dependent arising is only what others assert.

If you ask how samsara and nirvana are possible in a system that asserts voidness, it is because such a system asserts that it is possible because of the reason “things arise dependently on causes and conditions.” 

• If dependent arising is reasonable, then suffering is reasonable, because it arises from causes and conditions. 
• If true suffering is reasonable on the basis of dependent arising, then the true causes from which they arose are reasonable. 
• Then the true stoppings of them are reasonable (by stopping the causes), and true pathway minds are reasonable that bring the true stoppings about. 
• And if the four noble truths are reasonable, then also reasonable are the illuminating knowing of true suffering, the ridding yourself of true origins, the actualizing of true stoppings and the accustoming of yourself to true pathway minds. 
• And if they are reasonable, so are the Three Gems. 

This is stated in Chandrakirti’s Clarified Words: 

…only what dependently arises can be suffering, not what does not dependently arise.  If knowing, getting rid of, actualizing and accustoming yourself to the four noble truths are reasonable, then the results are reasonable. If results are reasonable, then those who abide with those results [on their mental continuums] are reasonable, as are those who enter into attaining those results. 

If it is reasonable that there are those who enter into and abide with these results (the Sangha Gem), then the Dharma Gem (the full attainment of results) is reasonable. And if the Dharma Gem is reasonable, then Buddhas who have this in full are reasonable. Then all mundane [non-arya, samaric] and supramundane [arya] apprehension and beyond [nirvanic] is reasonable. Then what is Dharmic and what is non-Dharmic [i.e. constructive and destructive] and their results are reasonable and all mundane conventions are reasonable. As Nagarjuna has said in chapter 24 of Root Stanzas on Madhyamaka, “For those to whom voidness is reasonable, everything is reasonable; for those to whom voidness is not reasonable, everything is unreasonable. 

You should understand that reasonable and unreasonable mean existent (yod-pa) and nonexistent.

Nagarjuna is very clear that things are devoid because of dependent arising; and even though they are devoid of self-established existence, nevertheless things function – including the words that are used to refute self-established existence. Tsongkhapa cites Nagarjuna’s Refutation of Objections and his auto-commentary to it as stating this.

If you over-refuters assert that dependent arising and dependent ceasing of suffering would have to be self-established if they existed, and since voidness means there is no such thing as self-established existence, and therefore there is no such thing as dependent arising and dependent ceasing, then this is like a god transformed into a mara demon. Dependent arising is the supreme reason for asserting voidness, not for denying voidness. If in your system you have reached certainty that all phenomena lack a self-establishing nature that establishes the essential nature of them as being this or that [and therefore they do not exist at all], this will not be a position that leads you on to certainty about the relation between cause and effect. You will have to assert that the relation between cause and effect is merely the position of others [under the influence of misknowing]. And when you have reached certainty about cause and effect [not existing], this will not be a position that leads you to certainty about the total lack of self-establishing natures. So, you will not have found the correct Madhyamaka view. 

As for the causes for finding the correct view, they are taking as a basis keeping purely whatever level of ethical discipline you have promised and then putting great effort in many ways into building up the two networks and purifying yourself of obscurations, and also having entrusted yourself to a learned master, then putting effort into listening and contemplating. Since being led to certainty about both appearances and voidness so rarely occurs, it is extremely difficult to comprehend the Madhyamaka view. This is what Nagarjuna meant when, in chapter 24 of Root Stanzas on Madhyamaka, Called “Discriminating Knowing,” he said, 

Seeing that it would be difficult for those of limited intelligence to understand the profundity of his teachings, Buddha turned away from giving this teaching. 

Nagarjuna wrote similarly in Precious Garland. 

Some people mistakenly understand the texts that, when analyzing with the line of reasoning that a clay jug is neither identical to nor totally different from its parts, conclude that there is no such thing as self-established existence. They think that when you analyze whether a clay jug is any of its parts and cannot find a clay jug, that this leads to certainty that there is no clay jug. Similarly, when they cannot find a person analyzing this, they think there is no person analyzing. And when they do not find an analyzer, then they wonder, who is it that knows that there is no clay jug. Then they conclude, through a seemingly correct reasoning, that such a person neither exists nor does not exist [since obviously they are thinking this]. 

If coming to this false certainty were a case of finding the correct Madhyamaka view, then it would be too easy. This is too simplistic. Thus, intelligent ones should rely on scriptural texts of definitive meaning and correct Madhyamaka texts that explain their intended meanings and develop unshakable certainty that the meaning of voidness comes down to the meaning of dependent arising. This is the distinguishing feature of Madhyamaka, as explained by Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti.

Nagarjuna’s system is that there is nothing that has even a speck of a self-nature that establishes the existence of anything by its essential nature, and that if things were established by their self-natures, then the entire presentation of samsara and nirvana could not be made, i.e. it wouldn’t work, it would be untenable. And since it is untenable for that presentation not to be made, the entire presentation of samsara and nirvana and so on has to be made [there has to be an assertion of samsara and nirvana], and therefore you must accept with certainty that there is no such thing as self-established existence. 

Objection: But you essentialists assert that when it is the case that there is no such thing as self-established existence, then what alternative is there?

Therefore, when negating bondage and liberation, arising and ceasing and so on, there is no need to add the qualification “on the deepest level,” because by the reasoning that negates (there being any such thing as) self-established existence, they (bondage and liberation) are negated [as also there being no such things]. 

Reply: If you assert this, then please think about how the total absence (med-pa, nonexistence) of self-established existence doesn’t negate or refute the tenability of the presentations of bondage and liberation and arising and ceasing. 

Objection: Suppose you object and say that Chandrakirti holds that bondage and liberation are things that occur conventionally, and we assert them as well as being conventional, and so we are without any fault.

Reply: Well, this is illogical. You also accept that Chandrakirti asserts that even conventionally, phenomena lack a self-nature that establishes their existence by their essential natures. And when that is the case [that you accept that statement, then your assertion is untenable] because (1) the reasoning that refutes such a self-establishing nature (rang-bzhin) would also necessarily refute that kind of self-establishing nature conventionally too. And because (2) you assert that the reasoning that refutes a self-establishing nature negates, as well, bondage and liberation [in other words on all levels], and so it is clear that (even in your system, this reasoning) also would refute bondage and liberation conventionally too. 

In short, if you claim that the (1) total absence of self-establishing natures and (2) bondage and liberation, and arising and ceasing and so on are contradictory, then in the context of voidness that is a voidness of self-establishing natures, it would be unfitting for the entire presentation of samsara and nirvana to be reasonable in terms of either of the two truths, and so you would be denying the unique feature of Madhyamaka.

And if you claim that (1) voidness and (2) samara and nirvana are not contradictory, then you have no reason at all to assert that the reasoning that refutes self-establishing natures refutes (any existence of) arising and ceasing, bondage and liberation and so on without the need to add any qualification to the object to be refuted. 

Therefore, if the reasoning that refutes self-established existence refutes (the existence at all of) cause and effect, then you would be asserting that arising and ceasing were unfitting in the absence (the voidness) of self-established existence [which means they are only fitting and possible if they had self-established existence]. Then it is very clear that there would be no difference between you and the position argued by those who assert truly established phenomena as mentioned by Nagarjuna in chapter 24 of Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing”:

If all of this were devoid [of self-established existence, both on the deepest and conventional levels as you Prasangikas claim], there would be no arising and no ceasing [at all, which is what we assert] and then the nonexistence of the four noble truths would absurdly follow for you (Prasangikas) [which would contradict your own assertions.]

And in Nagarjuna’s Refutation of Objections, 

If a self-establishing nature of all phenomena did not exist in anything at all, then your words would also lack a self-establishing nature and so they would be unable to turn back self-establishing natures [and so words and so on, need to have self-establishing natures.]