Responses to the Over-refuter Objections That Contradict Madhyamaka

Tsongkhapa then explains that in reply to the objection that if things were devoid of a self-establishing nature, then the causes and effects of samsara and nirvana could not be set, Nagarjuna turns the conclusion back on the objectors. Nagarjuna argues, if things were NOT devoid of a self-establishing nature, then the causes and effects of samsara and nirvana could not be set. Nothing could be produced and nothing could pass away. They think that if something does not have a self-establishing nature that establishes the essential nature of it as this or that, then what does something exist as? Thus, it is clear they do not differentiate between the existence of a sprout and the existence of a sprout being established by its own essential nature [in other words, by its having an essential nature of being a sprout from its own side] Thus, they are asserting that if something exists, its existence is established by its essential nature, and if something does not have existence established by its own essential nature, then it doesn’t exist.

If that were not the case (that they assert like that), then why do they say that the reasoning that refutes existence established by something’s own essential nature refutes mere existence [“mere” implies excluding anything more qualified that just existing] and mere arising and ceasing and so on? So, they say that as long as you assert that sprouts and so on exist, then for that long you need to assert existence established by something’s essential nature, and if there is no such thing as existence established by something’s essential nature, then there is no such thing as existence. Thus, they fall to both extremes – nihilism and eternalism – and are no different from those who assert essentially existent things, the “essentialists.”

Chandrakirti asserts like this in his commentary on Aryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses. He differentiates self-established existence and non-self-established existence from existence and nonexistence. Unless you understand the difference, you will fall to the two extremes and will not understand the meaning of Madhyamaka, the Middle Way, parted from extremes. For you, when something is not established in the slightest by its essential nature, then it becomes not in the slightest existent, and thus you fall to the extreme of nihilism. And as soon as you assert that something exists, then for you it must be accepted as having its existence established by its essential nature. And so for you, when cause and effect lack self-established existence, you cannot come to the position that sprouts and so on nevertheless function LIKE an illusion, and so you fall to the extreme of eternalism [self-established phenomena neither arise nor cease and so are eternal.] 

Therefore, by realizing that all things completely lack even a particle of existence established by their essential nature, you will avoid the extreme of existence. And when the ability of things to perform their functions induces certainty that they have the ability to perform their functions, with their voidness not rendering them as nonexistent and nonfunctional, then you have avoided the extreme of nonexistence. 

[Then a long quote from Chandrakirti’s Clarified Words, basically that the essentialists accuse the Madhayamakas of being nihilists when they assert no self-established existence and therefore that they are denying Buddha’s assertion of the cause and effect of karma. But the Madhyamikas reply that it is because things lack self-established existence that karmic cause and effect function. Madhyamikas agree with the essentialists that if you deny karmic cause and effect, you fall to the extreme of nihilism, but they explain that they do not have that fault. Tsongkhapa says that many people in Tibet who claim to be Madhyamikas actually hold this false position.]

From Chandrakirti’s Commentary to (Aryadeva’s) “Four Hundred Stanzas”: 

We are not asserters of realism [who assert that things really exist on their own], because we are asserters of dependent arising. What is the meaning of dependent arising? It means a total lack of a self-establishing nature. It means no such thing as something having arisen with a self-establishing nature. It means that the arising of things that seem to have a self-establishing nature are LIKE illusions, mirages, images in a mirror, dreams and so on That’s the meaning of voidness and of the nonexistence of an atman-soul.

Therefore, “thing” has two meanings: acting as something with a self-establishing nature and performing a function. For those who assert things as really existent, “thing” only means something with a self-establishing nature. For those who assert no such thing as something that exists, “thing” means something that functions. This is because when Chandrakirti eliminates both, he refutes self-establishing natures [i.e. the first position] and shows the existence of cause and effect being like an illusion [the second position].

The essentialists call Madhyamikas nihilists [the position that there is nothing that exists, that just says there is no form, there is no consciousness, there is no feelings and so on] or annihilationists [the position that annihilates or gets rid of everything existent], supposing that if you refute the self-establishing nature of things, you must certainly also refute cause and effect. The essentialists therefore assert that there must be self-establishing natures, and on this basis, there is cause and effect with self-establishing natures as cause and effect [something inside them which, by its own power, from its own side, makes it or establishes or affirms or proves that it is a cause or an effect]. 

Many Tibetans, however, claiming to be Madhyamikas, agree with the essentialist proposition that if you refute the self-establishing nature of things, you must certainly also refute cause and effect, but then draw the opposite conclusion. They conclude that cause and effect does not exist. They conclude that as the consequence that follows from there being no such thing as cause and effect without self-establishing natures. They draw that conclusion because they equate the lack of a self-establishing nature of things with the lack of any existence at all of things. 

Chandrakirti avoids the position. He says we are not nihilists, we eliminate (clear away) the propositions of (absolute) existence and (absolute) nonexistence and thus show the path to liberation. By not saying there is no cause and effect, we eliminate the position of nihilism. If we asserted that there was no cause and effect, then we would be nihilists, but we don’t assert that. What do we assert? By saying or setting that there is no such thing as a self-establishing nature with respect to cause and effect, we eliminate the position of eternalism. 

[Tsongkhapa then explains how cause and effect, as the basis for the absence of a self-establishing nature, is something that dependently arises. 

• Only something that dependently arises can be a basis for an absence of a self-establishing nature. You can’t have something that does not dependently arise be a basis for an absence of a self-establishing nature.
• An absence of a self-establishing nature cannot have as its basis something that has a self-establishing nature – like the assertion that things conventionally have a self-establishing nature, but on the deepest level there is no such thing as a self-establishing nature. 
• So, an absence of a self-establishing nature can only have as its basis something that dependently arises.]

From Chandrakirti’s Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Verses”: 

In answer to the accusation that we Madhyamikas say there is no remembering consciousness that has as its object no longer happenings, we say no, we don’t assert that, because Aryadeva set remembering to be like this: “What is called remembering is merely the arising of something that is the opposite (a consciousness that is the opposite of a self-established one, directed) toward an object that is the opposite (of a self-established one).” 

So, (he is saying that) the focal object of remembering is a phenomenon that is no longer happening [i.e. the opposite of what is happening now]. But if (what is no longer happening) had existence established by its own essential nature  [in other words if it existed when it was happening as something whose existence was established by its essential nature of being itself, all by itself], then remembering it would be focused on an object that (still) existed [i.e. as if something no longer happening was still happening]. 

Because of that, then as we have demolished existence established by something’s essential nature, it follows that when a phenomenon that is no longer happening lacks a self-establishing nature, then a remembering that is focuses on it also lacks a self-establishing nature. [That follows from the principle that if there is no such thing as a self-establishing nature of one thing, there is no such thing as a self-establishing nature of anything.] Because of that, Aryadeva has established that (both the no longer happening object and the remembering of it) are the opposite of something else (log-pa).  

Opposite, then, refers to “lacking a self-establishing nature” and “dependently arising,” and not to any other meaning. Being a nonfunctional (i.e. static or a non-phenomenon) object is not the meaning of the opposite [of being a dependently arising functional object], and it isn’t that a functional phenomenon (a nonstatic phenomenon) that is no longer happening is something that doesn’t exist at all. That’s because (a no longer happening phenomenon) can be remembered and its effects can be seen. So (“opposite” means) it doesn’t have existence established by its own essential nature, because if it did, then it would absurdly follow that it would be permanent (static) and could be explicitly taken as an object of cognition.” 

[Tsongkhapa summarizes Chandrakirti: It isn’t that no longer happenings do not exist at all, and it isn’t that they are established by an essential nature. Although they are opposite or false phenomena (i.e. they lack a self-establishing nature, which would make them concretely “real”), and are dependently arisen, it is not that they are (static) nonfunctional phenomena (like Sautrantika, Chittamatra and Svatantrika assert).] 

Although, when you assert that things are established by their own essential nature, you fall to the position of being an essentialist, i.e. the extreme of existence, nevertheless, when you say that things merely exist, that doesn’t mean that you are a proponent of real or of (concrete) existence. On the other hand, when you assert external and internal phenomena as non-phenomena that are devoid of the ability to perform a function, you fall to the position of being an asserter of there being no phenomena or of the extreme of nonexistence. However, by asserting that there is no self-establishing natures to these (things), we are not falling to the extreme of nonexistence.   

Some (Tibetans who claim to be Madhyamikas), refute falling to the extremes of either existence or nonexistence without differentiating between total nonexistence [never having existed] and the nonexistence of self-establishing natures (non-self-established existence), and between existence established by something’s own essential nature (self-established existence) and mere existence. When they try to do this, they hope that they accomplish this refutation by saying, “Although we do not say that things are nonexistent, it isn’t that they exist; and although we do not say that things exist, it isn’t that they don’t exist.” 

This is nothing but contradictory and cannot be explained even to the slightest degree as the meaning of Madhyamaka. This is because, when refuting others, they refute them by an analysis of whether a self-establishing nature exists or not and, with that, it must be that they are making a decisive either-or cut in terms of a binary value, and yet they assert something that is neither of the two in terms of their own assertion [i.e. a mode of existence that is neither existent nor nonexistent.] 

Like that, by analyzing whether or not bases (i.e. phenomena that are bases for values and qualities) have a self-establishing nature, you must accept that you need to be able to make a decisive either-or cut [in terms of the binary value of either self-establishing natures exist or do not exist, like either true or false.] If there were a third possibility not included in these (two), then it would be unreasonable to analyze whether which one is it: do self-establishing natures exist or not exist. It would be like, for instance, the proposition, if a color exists, does it exist as blue or does it exist as yellow?

Like that, the decisive either-or cut in terms of the binary value (the validity of either-or logic) regarding whether self-establishing natures exist or do not exist derives from the decisive either-or cut in terms of the binary value regarding whether or not in general some knowable object exists or does not exist. It is like, for example, concerning true phenomena (or truths), the fact that there is either a singularity or multiplicity of true phenomena relies on the decisive either-or cut in terms of the binary value “singular or multiple” in general. Like that, since when you have a decisive either-or cut in terms of a binary value, the two values must form a mutually exclusive dichotomy that excludes there being a third possibility that is other than one of these two, then just leave it at rest [Don’t analyze further and] make any attempt to assert something that is neither of the two, because, as Nagarjuna says in Refutation of Objections: 

If the nonexistence of self-establishing natures were refuted, then the existence of self-establishing nature would be proven. 

Further, as for those who assert (a third possibility), because they have no way to formulate a list of which phenomena fit in which mutually exclusive dichotomous category that excludes there being a third possibility that is other than one of these two, they will always have nothing but indecisive wavering. That is because when they preclude one alternative, such as whether something exists or does not exist, they will be unable to conclusively decide that it is the other. 

(Their problem arises) because if you accept that there is no third possibility in some cases such as “is” and “is not”, then it is exactly the same with regard to existence and nonexistence (and they don’t understand that. Their mistake comes) because of their confusion about statements in the Madhyamaka texts, such as “is not existent and is not nonexistent,” (which they have taken over-literally). Because if their assertion is that it is improper to say that things have either existence or nonexistence, it is improper as well to say that things are neither existent nor nonexistent, because that alternative was stated like that in the context of the tetralemma. 

Tsongkhapa sums up his explanation of how the Madhyamaka position replies back to the mistaken position of the so-called Madhyamikas, who equate the existence of self-establishing natures with mere existence and no self-establishing natures with total nonexistence. He does this by quoting Nagarjuna’s Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing”: 

Saying “things exist” is grasping for eternalism and saying “things do not exist” is the view of annihilation. Therefore, the learned should not make their position be either things exist or do not exist. 

Thus, it is clear that Nagarjuna is saying that accepting that phenomena are established by their self-natures becomes the views of eternalism and annihilation. Chandrakirti explained Nagarjuna’s position on this in Clarified Words that if you hold that the existence of phenomena is established by their self-natures, then phenomena would all be permanent and last forever. Since they could never become nonexistent, they could never turn away from having their existence still being established by their self-natures. And if you hold that what existed before now are totally nonexistent, then this becomes the view of annihilation, because if what existed before were established by their self-natures, but now when they are no longer happening, they don’t exist at all, then they have been annihilated. 

Thus, Chandrakirti calls eternalism the view that the existence of things is established by their self-natures and calls annihilationism the view that previously the existence of things was established by their self-natures, but now they don’t exist at all. He does not call mere existence and merely having perished “eternalism” and “annihilationism.” Buddhapalita also agrees.

If you misunderstand and think that if things did not have existence established by self-natures, then they would not exist at all and so “no such thing as self-establishing natures” cannot be the meaning of voidness, and so you assert a different meaning for voidness, then you have forsaken prajnaparamita (far-reaching discriminating knowing) and thus forsaken the Dharma. If you do that, then, as Nagarjuna says in Precious Garland:

Having the arrogance to think you have understood voidness correctly, when in fact you have not, you ruin yourself and fall to the deepest hell rebirth. 

Objection: Suppose you say that if we had asserted that previously there were phenomena and then, later, they became nonexistent, then that would have become nihilism. But we do not assert that there were ever phenomena, so how could we have the view of annihilationism? Afterall Nagarjuna said in his Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing”: 

If you say that what arose before now is nonexistent, this becomes the absurd conclusion of annihilation. 

Chandrakirti said as well in Clarified Words: 

Yogis realize that there is the lack of a self-establishing nature in conventional truth and that (the appearance of such a self-establishing nature) arises merely from misknowing (ignorance). And then when they understand voidness as having the defining characteristic of the deepest truth, they do not fall to the two extremes. Such yogis think, how could something that has become nonexistent now have existed then? Because they do not focus on a self-establishing nature of phenomena previously, they do not think that later in fact they became nonexistent. 

Reply: Tsongkhapa says this is unreasonable, because if it were the case that for some position to be a view of annihilation it had to assert that there was a previous (existent) phenomenon that was later annihilated, then the absurd conclusion would follow that the Lokayatas would not have the view of annihilation, because they do not say that previously there existed past and future lives and karmic causes and effects and that later they became nonexistent. They never claimed that they existed at all. 

Tsongkhapa then explains that in the case of self-establishing natures, Madhyamikas never asserted that they existed before and then became nonexistent. So, actual Madhyamikas do not have that type of view of annihilation, but they have not eliminated all views of annihilation by saying that we never asserted that phenomena themselves existed before and then became nonexistent. 

So, both actual Madhyamikas and these so-called Madhyamikas who are making this objection have discounted the view of annihilation in the sense that both say they never asserted the existence of something before that was annihilated later. However, the actual Madhyamikas assert this with respect to self-established existence, whereas the so-called Madhyamikss assert it with respect the existence of phenomena in general. But actual Madhyamikas are not like Lokayatas who assert that they never claimed that past and future lives or karmic cause and effect existed before and then were annihilated in the present. 

Madhyamikas say that for the reason that karmic cause and effect are dependently arising phenomena, they therefore lack self-establishing natures. The nihilists say that karmic cause and effect are not dependently arising phenomena, so they don’t give that as a reason. Instead, they say that beings present now (in this lifetime) are not seen arriving from a previous life or going into a future life, and for that reason, past and future lives don’t exist. So, there is a big difference. 

This is supported by a quote from Chandrakirti’s Clarified Words. In this long quote, the point is that actual Madhyamikas assert that past and future lives and karmic cause and effect are established by dependent arising (as in the case of causality in general), whereas Lokayata-style so-called Madhyamikas say that they do not dependently arise. They say that what we focus on in this present life is just focused upon through their having the nature that they are (merely) happening now (without a cause) (naturally existent). So, they repudiate other phenomena that are similar to (resemble) phenomena that we focus on in this life [as in the case of memories].

Objection: Even though Madhyamikas and annihilationists give different reasons, their views of no such thing as self-establishing natures is the same because they both have similar understandings that there are no such things as self-establishing natures that establish the existence of karmic cause and effect and past and future lives by their essential natures.

Reply: They are not at all similar, because the annihilationists assert that a lack of self-establishing natures means total nonexistence, and so they do not assert them (karmic cause and effect and past and futures lives) as either of the two truths, but Madhyamikas assert them as superficial truths as what do exist. 

Chandrakirit in Clarified Words asserts the difference, that Madhyamikas do assert existence in terms of superficial truth. Thus, those so-called Madhyamikas who do not accept the existence of karmic cause and effect and of past and future lives even conventionally are no different from Lokayatas.

Chandrakirti does not say that the difference between us and the annihilationists is because they have assertions, whereas we do not, [which is what some say distinguishes Prasangikas from other schools]. It is not that they assert that things do not exist, whereas while not saying that things do not exist, we assert that it is not that they do exist [i.e. the position of neither-nor]. We say that things lack self-establishing natures and for the reason that they dependently arise, we assert the conventional existence of karmic cause and effect and past and future lives.

Objection: Both you and the annihilationist are still similar because both of you say there is no such thing as self-establishing natures. 

Reply: Tsongkhapa says this is totally unreasonable and quotes Chandrakirti Clarified Words: 

There is a big difference between someone who did not see who stole the jewels and points to someone and out of animosity toward that person says that he stole the jewels, and someone who saw the thief steal the jewels and correctly points him out. Even if they both point to the same person, they are not the same, since the former is speaking based on a lie (that he knows who stole the jewels), whereas the other is speaking the truth (he actually knows). So, the one who lies opens himself up to infamy and disgrace, but not the one who speaks based on the truth. So likewise, the Madhyamikas make their assertions by speaking on the basis of comprehending how the essential natures of things are established (i.e. dependently, and not by a self-establishing nature) and the annihilationists make their assertions by speaking on the basis of no comprehension. 

In short, some people, when they understand there are no self-establishing natures, understand that this line of reasoning refutes such things as karmic cause and effect, and so karmic cause and effect have no place in their systems. So, although they are completely reversed with regard to conventional existence on the side of appearances, they have come to an unmistaken view with regard to the side of voidness. 

So, don’t think that voidness means phenomena are devoid of the ability to perform their functions. Although things lack self-establishing natures, they must still have an existence (mere existence) that provides a way for setting (positing) the dependent arising of cause and effect. 

Tsongkhapa then quotes from Chandrakirti’s Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas” and Buddhapalita to substantiate that voidness does not negate the dependent arising of cause and effect and that cause and effect conventionally exist. Tsongkhapa concludes that it is therefore essential to distinguish the lack of self-established existence from total nonexistence and mere existence from existence established by self-establishing natures.