Phenomena’s Inability to Withstand Analysis Does Not Negate Their Existence

The correct analysis of whether phenomena such as form and so on are (findable) “things” through the gateway of whether they are “things” that exist, that do not exist, that arise or that do not arise is known as the line of reasoning that analyzes the very nature of reality or the line of reasoning that analyzes the ultimate. 

Since we do not assert that the arising of forms and so on can withstand analysis with reasoning, we do not incur the logical fault of the absurd conclusion that they have actual truly established existence.

Query: Suppose you think: If they are unable to withstand analysis with reasoning, then how is it reasonable that “things” that are discounted by reasoning are existent? 

Reply: Well, you have made the mistake of conflating into one not being able to and being invalidated (harmed) by reasoning. Many who have made this error claim that we say arising and so on exist even though the reasoning that analyzes reality [meaning what actually conventionally exists] refutes them. This is nonsense and we do not assert that. The meaning of whether or not something can withstand analysis with reasoning concerns whether or not something can be found when analyzing the very nature of reality with reasoning. 

As it says in Chandrakirti’s Commentary on Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas”: 

…because our analysis is intent upon searching for a self-establishing nature. 

In other words, this (analysis) is searching for whether the arising and ceasing of forms and so on exist or do not exist in terms of self-establishing natures.” But, although this (analysis) is searching for whether forms and so on have an arising and a ceasing (as “things”) established by their essential natures, it is not searching for whether they merely arise and cease. This is because the phrase “reasoning that analyzes reality” is an analysis of whether or not arising and ceasing and so on are established in terms of the very nature of reality. 

Thus, when one analyzes or searches with reasoning, the fact of arising and so on not being found even to the slightest extent is what is called, “not withstanding analysis,” but their mere unfindability does not discount their existence.  Rather, if they existed (in the way that they appeared, i.e. with self-established existence), then they must be established (as existing like that, like how they appear) and since, rather than that, they cannot be established (as existing in the way in which they appear to exist), they are discounted (from arising and ceasing on the basis of self-established existence). 

Although the arising and ceasing of forms and so on are established by the cognition of what is conventional, nevertheless despite existing, they cannot be established by a cognition that is a reasoning. But then, how could not finding them discount them (from existing)? For example, it is like the fact that although eye cognition cannot find a sound, that does not discount the existence of the sound.

Therefore, if arising and ceasing and so on were established by their essential natures or established in the very nature of reality, then reasoning should find them. This is because reasoning analyzes in a correct manner whether arising and ceasing of forms and so on, based on existence established by the essential nature of things, exists or not. But since it (i.e. reasoning) does not find arising and so on like that, then it refutes arising and ceasing and so on that are established by their essential natures or established in the very nature of reality. This is because if they were established by their essential natures, they should be found, but they are not found. For example, when someone is making a definitive search to find a clay jug in the east, and when they search in the east, they don’t find it, although this discounts that there exists a clay jug in the east, how could that discount the mere existence of the clay jug?

So, like this example of the clay jug in the east, when you search with definitive Madhyamaka reasoning to find the existence of arising based on the existence of things established by their essential natures and you don’t find them, that discounts the arising of things established by their essential natures, but how could it discount the mere arising of things? Tsongkhapa then quotes Chandrakirti’s Commentary on Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas” to this effect, concerning cognitive sensors, cognitive object and consciousnesses.

Summarizing it, Tsongkhapa says that the great master Chandrakirti repeatedly says that conventionalities such as sights and sounds fit into what exists, but nevertheless when the reasoning that analyzes the very nature of reality or that analyzes whether or not they have self-establishing natures definitely cannot establish the existence of these natures, that does not mean that you apply this analysis with reasoning to the objects themselves. 

Chandrakirti also frequently says that it is those who are unskillful in positing superficial truth (conventional phenomena) who say that the fact that when you analyze such phenomena with reasoning you don’t find them – this demolishes superficial truth (i.e. it demolishes all conventional objects). If the reasoning that analyzes whether or not self-establishing natures existed could refute these (conventionally existent phenomena), then these texts would have to have strongly applied reasoning to investigating (the mere existence) of conventional objects such as forms and feelings and so on. But the texts of this master (Chandrakirti) completely refute this (i.e. such efforts to refute the mere existence of conventional objects). Therefore, it is only those who have strayed far away from the Madhyamaka way who assert that the fact that when you analyze with reasoning whether or not self-establishing natures exist, they cannot be found – that this causes you to lose your assertion of conventional objects. 

Similarly, although the (non-conceptual) total absorption of aryas (on voidness) doesn’t see the arising or ceasing of form and so on, how can it be that it sees that arising and ceasing do not exist? And (likewise), although the reasoning that analyzes the existence or nonexistence of self-establishing natures (like an arya’s total absorption on voidness) is something that does not find arising and so on, it is not a comprehension that arising and so on do not exist. 

Therefore, it appears as though even some earlier scholars, not to mention some present-day ones, have made the mistake of not differentiating into two, but rather taking to be identical (one): 

• Not being able to withstand analysis by reasoning versus being invalidated (harmed) by reasoning
• Arising and ceasing not being seen by the deep knowing of an arya’s total absorption on voidness versus its being seen by it as nonexistent
• A reasoning cognition (a cognition that is a reasoning) that analyzes whether or not self-establishing natures exist – its not being able to find arising and ceasing versus its finding the nonexistence of arising and ceasing. 

Therefore, intelligent people should analyze and differentiate these.

We are not asserting that cognitions of what are conventional are more powerful [in getting rid of misknowing] than valid cognitions of minds that take as their objects what are ultimate, nor are we asserting that cognitions of what are conventional can invalidate (harm) valid cognitions of minds that take as their objects what are ultimate. However, you claim that, when the reasoning that analyzes the very nature of reality analyzes what are conventional, such as forms, feelings and so on and doesn’t find them, reasoning therefore discounts (their existence). But not only does it not discount, but rather valid cognition of what are widely known in the world (i.e. commonsense objects) invalidates minds that would refute them. 

Tsongkhapa then quotes Chandrakirti’s Engaging in Madhyamaka: 

If (you claim that) what the world [considers valid conventions, i.e. what is valid from the point of view of the world] does not invalidate you, then please try to refute what relates to mundane usage [for instance, try to invalidate that this is a dog and not a cat, by asserting that neither dogs nor cats exist]. Please debate this between you and this world, and afterwards, I will entrust myself to whomever is the stronger.

Chandrakirti’s Autocommentary to this says: 

We have endured great hardship in order to turn back what is on the surface for the world [i.e. inaccurate superficial truth, referring to the appearance of self-established existence], but please, you go ahead and try to eliminate what is on the surface for the world [with your annihilationist understanding of the voidness of external existence]. If what the world (considers valid) does not invalidate you, then we will join you, but in fact what the world (considers valid) does invalidate you.

Here, the line “We have endured great hardship in order to turn back what is on the surface for the world [i.e. inaccurate superficial truth, referring to the appearance of self-established existence],” is saying that we have made effort (to generate arya) pathway minds in order to cleanse ourselves of deceptive cognizers, such as in visual cognitions and so on, and the deceptive appearances of objects (they cognize), such as visual forms and so on. And so, we do not assert these as being objects to be stopped (i.e. objects to be negated) by reasoning. We take them to be what are to be stopped by familiarizing yourself with (arya) pathway minds.

The line “but please, you go ahead and try to eliminate what is on the surface for the world (with your annihilationist understanding of the voidness of external existence)” means (if you Chittamatrins) draw the following parallel, saying “You Madhyamikas refute (negate) self-sufficiently knowable dependent phenomena, but we refute with reason what you assert as conventional (i.e. external objects),” then we reply, “If you are able to refute (negate) with reason what are conventional, like we are able to refute the self-established natures of dependent phenomena, then we will go along with you.”

Here by Chandrakirti indicating that if (what are to be refuted) could be discounted by reason, then since we would not need to go through such trouble to meditate with (arya) pathway minds in order to turn them back, we would accept that – he is indicating that what are conventional cannot be discounted by reason. 

Not only does (reason) not discount them, but if you try to refute (negate) them, (Chandrakirti) says, “But in fact what the world (considers valid) does invalidate you.”

By saying this, he means that since seemingly correct reasons like these (reasons of yours) are invalidated by cognitions of what are conventional, then we assert that the latter are more powerful.

Therefore, although essentialists apply analysis by reason to refute what are conventional, such as external objects, then although reason does not find them, it doesn’t discount (their existence).

Objection: When we say what is conventional, such as forms and so on, are not negated, we mean that they are not negated (stopped, refuted) in the eyes (what actually appears to the face) of (ordinary) mundane people such as shepherds. Nevertheless, they are negated by the reason that analyzes the real nature of reality.”

Reply: This is completely unreasonable, because, although reflective people (those who investigate and reflect) may have doubts whether or not (what is conventional) are negated through reason that analyzes the real nature of reality, nevertheless there is no doubt that they are not negated to the face of (to the eyes) of those whose minds have not been turned by tenet systems. 

This is also because if reason that analyzes the real nature of reality could negate them [i.e. conventional objects], then that refutation (or negation) would (itself) have to be in terms of conventions (such as words and logic). 

Chandrakirti also clearly states that the reasoning that analyzes the real nature does not negate all arising. From his Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas”: 

[Paraphrase]: We don’t assert that analysis negates all arising of affected phenomena (compounded phenomena), because if we did, then we wouldn’t say that affected phenomena are like an illusion. We would say that they are like the children of barren women, which would incur the absurd conclusion that affected phenomena did not dependently arise and that they could not perform any functions. By stating that they are like illusions, there are no such contradictions. Also, Aryadeva is speaking about arising in general, he does not add the qualification that he is refuting arising in terms of self-established entities.

Then another quote from Chandrakirti’s Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas”: 

[Paraphrase]: Some criticize Madhyamaka by saying when you assert that eyes and so on are not valid items, how can you then say that they have the essential nature of being ripenings of karma? But we don’t say that eyes are not valid items. We are examining to find a self-established nature of eyes and when we do not find any, then we are negating that eyes have a self-establishing nature and that their existence is established by a self-establishing nature (on their own side). We are not negating that they are ripenings from karma and that they dependently arise. You must differentiate the object to be negated (self-established existence) from the basis for the negation (what are conventional). Aryadeva states clearly what reasoning does negate and what it does not negate. 

Further, not only does Madhyamaka not negate cause and effect, but with Madhyamaka reasoning, you must accept cause and effect. 

As Chandrakirti’s Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas” goes on to say:

[Paraphrase] The learned do not subject the objects of the world [what the world accepts as conventional objects] to the same analysis as is used to see voidness. Rather, they accept the ripenings of karma as being inconceivable, and all the conventionalities of the world in the manner of emanations arising from emanations [emanations from karma arising from tendencies that are also emanations of karma].

Objection: So, if the reasoning that brings you to a decisive ascertaining of the deepest (truth) that you present in your assertion of the two truths invalidates what you present as superficial truth, then the presentation you set for the two truths is internally contradictory. Since that is the case, then how could the learned masters who are outstanding in their presentations of the two truths find these acceptable? Therefore, if there is not the slightest internal contradiction in a presentation of the two truths, then it is a contradiction to claim that the reasoning that brings you to a decisive ascertaining of the deepest (truth) causes you to lose your assertion of superficial (truth) [i.e. if it argues against it].

Reply: Tsongkhapa then quotes Chandrakirt’s Clarified Words, which he paraphrases and explains that although Chandrakirti is refuting proponents of tenets that deviate from superficial (truth), he is not refuting what is superficial. It is those who are unskilled in deepest and superficial truths who apply analysis with the reasoning that analyzes the real nature of reality and who, in doing so, destroy what is superficial (i.e. conventionalities). It is not the intention of this master to refute with reason forms and so on that are superficial (truths). 

In short, in the traditions of the Indian Buddhist tenet systems that present the two truths, not only Madhyamaka but in others of our Buddhist fold, although it is appropriate that they try to find contradictions in others’ presentations of the two truths, I say there are none among them that assert that reason on the side of the deepest truth in their presentation of the two truths causes them to lose their assertion of the superficial truth of objects.