Phenomena’s Inability to Be Established by Valid Cognition Does Not Negate Them

As for asserting forms and so on, we do not accept that valid cognition does not establish (prove that there are such things); we accept that valid cognition does establish them. 

Qualm: But suppose you wonder how can we understand Chandrakirti’s Engaging in Madhayamka line, “Regarding all mental hologram-appearances, mundane (cognition) is not valid” as being correct?

Reply: Chandrakirti is refuting that eye, ear cognition and so on of mundane people (non-aryas) is valid with respect to the very nature of reality. He is not refuting their validity with respect to all cognitive objects. 

In his Autocommentary on “Engaging in Madhayamka,” Chandrakirti states: 

Only aryas have valid cognition in their thoughts about the very nature of reality, not those who are not aryas. If we accepted (as true) the arguments of the mundane (people to disprove truly established existence) as they say them, we would have to accept as valid what mundane people see with their analysis of the very nature of reality. And if that were so, then as it says in Engaging in Madhyamaka, if mundane cognitions were valid cognitions, then the mundane (mind) would see reality, and so what need for those who are other (than they), namely aryas, and what need for the arya paths of mind? Therefore, it is not reasonable that foolish people have valid cognition. 

Later in his Autocommentary on “Engaging in Madhayamka,” Chandrakirti says: 

Because mere visual cognition and so on would ascertain the very nature of reality, then it would be fruitless to work hard with ethical self-discipline, listening, thinking and meditating and so on, in order to gain the understanding of the arya pathways of mind. But that is not the case. 

Therefore, in “Engaging in Madhayamka,” Chandrakirti says:

Because regarding all mental hologram-appearanes, mundane (cognition) is not valid, then in the case of reality, the mundane cannot harm it (with their arguments to try to refute it).

Chandrakirti also says in his Commentary on Nagarjuna’s “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning”: 

It is established that the view of them (all validly knowable objects) as simply existing as validly knowable is not the seeing (i.e. with an arya’s total absorption) of reality. Therefore, for the purpose of (seeing) reality, Buddha said that eye, ear, nose (and so on) cognition are not valid. Thus, it is extremely clear that although they are not valid with respect to the special object, namely the very nature of reality, that is not the case with other objects (i.e., the mere existence of conventional objects).

If these statements are not taken like that, then Chandrakirti’s statements would be inconsistent (unrelated to each other). Suppose he meant that since eye cognition and so on are valid for conventional objects such as sights and sounds, then we would have to absurdly conclude that there is no need to seek an arya pathway of mind for gaining the view of the very nature of reality. This would be like saying that since eye cognition cognizes forms, we would have to conclude that ears are pointless for hearing sounds. But if he meant that seeking an arya pathway of mind is pointless for the sake of regarding sights, sounds and so on, then we completely accept that. What is there that can be established as unacceptable?

Qualm:  In Chandrakirti’s Commentary on Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas,” he says: 

It is completely inconsistent, having interpolated sensory consciousness to be bare perception, then to designate it as a valid cognizer of other things. When mundane people see nonfallacious cognition as being valid cognition (i.e. as the definition), Buddha, on the other hand, has said that even consciousness, because it is an affected phenomenon [i.e. affected by habits of grasping for self-established existence and so it appears to be self-established], is false and fallacious, like an illusion. That which is false, fallacious and like an illusion is not nonfallacious, because it is a phenomenon that abides (exists) in one aspect but appears in another aspect. Therefore, it is not reasonable to designate it (sensory consciousness) as a valid cognizer, because then you would have to absurdly conclude that all consciousnesses are valid cognizers. 

So, how do you explain this general refutation of eye and so on cognition as being valid?  

Reply: Unlike the passage that “eyes, ears, nose (and so on) are not valid cognizers,” this quote raises many doubts, and so I will explain it in detail. This quote to refute that eye and so on cognition is valid bare perception is to refute the Logicians (mundane logicians, not necessarily from a tenet system), and so first we need to discuss their system of assertions. 

In Chandrakirti’s Commentary on Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas,” he says: 

Because these logicians are completely untrained (uneducated, impractical) in what makes sense in the world, you must first train (educate) them like mere young children. So, to teach them, you ask them, “What do you assert as bare perception in your system?” They say, “One that is free of conceptuality.” “So, what is conceptual cognition?” “An expert distinguishing that interpolates a name and typology onto an object.” Because they are free of that and because the five sensory consciousnesses engage with the mere inexpressible self-defining characteristic of their objects (implying a findable defining characteristic on the side of the object), they are given the name bare perception. 

So, they assert that a cognition that is free from conceptuality and non-deceptive is valid cognition. For them, non-deceptive means that since they take (as their object) the self-defining characteristic of their objects as they abide (exist), the five types of bare perception of the sensory cognitions actually meet (or know) the self-defining characteristics of sights, sounds and so on And since that is the case, then since the self-defining characteristics are validly knowable objects for these five types of sensory bare perception, they are asserting that what they (these perceptions) go to as the spot for valid cognition of them is these self-defining characteristics. But, as we shall explain, since this master (Chandrakirti) does not accept existence established by essential nature or established by a self-defining characteristic even conventionally, then how can sense cognition be accepted as valid cognition for self-defining characteristics? Therefore, his refutation that they are valid cognitions is a refutation of their assertion that they are valid cognizers of the self-defining characteristics of the five sensory objects.

But it is the way of refuting (that sense cognition is valid cognition) when Buddha said that the consciousnesses are false and fallacious that is the impediment [to their being valid cognitions]. 

Here, by saying “fallacious,” Buddha has refuted (negated) that they are non-fallacious, which refutes that they are valid cognizers, because non-fallacious is the defining characteristic of a valid cognizer. However, if we wonder what the manner of being fallacious is, Buddha said it is with regard to a phenomenon: that it abides (exists) in one aspect but appears in another aspect. [That’s what is fallacious.] But, as (Chandrakirti) explained: 

Since sensory cognitions make their five objects – sights, sounds and so on – appear as having self-defining characteristics, while in fact they are not established as existing by means of self-defining characteristics, they are not valid cognizers. In short, sensory cognitions are not valid cognitions with regard to the defining characteristics of their objects, because they are fallacious with respect to the appearance of the defining characteristics of their five types of (sensory) objects. For example, it is like the appearance of two moons (when you are cross-eyed). 

This is Chandrakirti’s intended meaning. 

Concerning this point, essentialists assert that sights, sounds and so on that did not have defining characteristics that established their existence by their being self-defining characteristics would be non-things that would be devoid of all abilities to perform any functions. And if bare cognitions of the defining characteristics of the five sensory objects were not valid cognitions, then the five sensory objects would have no place (in them) for valid cognition of them to go. But as the five sensory objects in fact go to (serve for) valid cognition (of them), they assert that it is their defining characteristics that go to (serve for) valid cognition (of them). 

But according to this master (Chandrakirti), if (things) were established by self-defining characteristics [as dog or cat] or established by their essential natures [as a sight, a sound and so on], then since they would then be truly and unimputedly established as such [i.e. totally independent of conceptual labeling], then valid cognition of objects presented as truly and unimputedly established would have to go to be (to serve as) valid cognitions of their self-defining characteristics [established as findable on the sides of the objects]. But, since objects [having findable self-defining characteristics] are false, then it is not necessary that valid cognition of them as they are presented goes to be (serves as) valid cognition of self-defining characteristics of them. 

As Chandrakirti said in his Commentary on Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas”: 

It is not at all reasonable that what mundane (cognition) sees cancels (clears out) the seeing of the very nature of reality. This is because it is valid merely from the mundane point of view (what its objects are) and because its objects are established as false and fallacious phenomena (with respect to how they exist). 

Because of that, then, since by having refuted that they are valid cognitions of defining characteristics, you do not necessarily discount their simply being valid cognitions, this [the statement of Chandrakirti that refutes the logicians’ position] is not a general refutation of cognition of conventional (truth of objects) being valid cognition. If it were not like that, then it would be unreasonable for him to have said, “Non-fallacious cognition is what the world sees as valid cognition,” because if (it were like that), then he would have discounted all cognitions of conventional truth whatsoever as being valid cognition [and not just non-fallacious cognition]. Also, because it would contradict what Chandrakirti said in Clarified Words, “Therefore, it is from four types of valid cognition that one apprehends the objects of the world,” which is presenting as valid cognition bare cognition, inference, authority (lung) and analogy (nyer-’jal, upamana). 

So, although Chandrakirti has refuted that valid cognizers and objects of comprehension are established by essential natures, he is not refuting that valid cognizers and objects of comprehension are dependent arisings that are contingently posited (posited as relying on each other). 

From the same text (Clarified Words): 

These are contingently posited: When it is the case that valid cognitions exist (yod-na), then there are things that are objects of comprehension, and when there are things that are objects of comprehension, then there are valid cognitions. However, neither valid cognitions nor objects of comprehension are established by their essential natures. 

Therefore, unless they are harmed by being adulterated by external or internal causes for deception, such as cataracts, otherwise, when sense cognitions and so on, under the influence of being adulterated with misknowing, are deceived with respect to appearances – where they take their objects as having a self-establishing nature when they lack self-defining natures – they are not harmed with respect to their accuracy (being non-reversed) regarding conventional truth. 

As Chandrakirti says in Engaging in Madhyamaka: 

Falsities that are seen are of two types: Those (perceived) with clear cognitive sensors and those by impaired cognitive sensors. The cognitions of impaired cognitive sensors are accepted as distorted in relation to cognitions of clear sensors. Whatever objects taken by unimpaired sensors are apprehended (with accuracy and certainty) from the mundane perspective are true for the world. The rest are presented as distorted from the mundane perspective. 

Thus, cognizers of conventional truths and their objects are of two types each: those that are reversed in regard to cognition of conventional truths and those that are not reversed.

As for what are the causes of harm (invalidation) to the cognitive sensors, Chandrakirti says in his Engaging in Madhyamaka:

Internal conditions that impair the sensors are cataracts, jaundice and so on and eating datura.

As for the external ones, the same text says:

There are external conditions as well: sesame oil, water [getting these in your eyes], mirrors, sounds spoken in caves etc., and the rays of the sun present at certain times and places and so on. Even without the presence of the internal ones that cause impairment, these become causes for cognitively taking reflections, echoes and mirages as water. One should know that, like this, there are spells and medicines and so on used by conjurers, and so on. As for what causes impairment to the mind (mental cognition), there are those (previously mentioned) and such things as tenet systems proven to be false, and seemingly correct inference (which is actually wrong).

Thus, Chandrakirti is mentioning wrong tenet systems and what seems to be correct lines of reasoning as being causes for adulterating mental cognition. There are also such things as sleep (or sleepiness) as a cause for adulterating the mind with dreams and so on. Therefore, you should not take as a cause for impairment here impairment from being adulterated by misknowing, although as explained below, the object existing as cognitively taken by misknowing does not exist even conventionally.

Qualm: If the five types of sensory cognition are not impaired by causes for deception other [than misknowing, such as impaired by cataracts, hepatitis or drugs] and thus are not deceived conventionally [i.e. deceived or mistaken with respect to conventional truths], then the self-defining characteristics that appear to them would have to exist conventionally, but Chandrakirti does not assert that [there are such things as self-defining characteristics on the side of validly knowable objects]. Therefore, we must accept that they are deceptive [with respect to conventional truth]. That being so, then it is unreasonable that these (sensory) cognitions settle the case that visible forms, sounds and so forth are conventionally (existent). Therefore, you must admit that is so, because they are deceptive with respect to sights and so forth being conventionally (existent).

Reply: The learned (Sautantrika-Svatantrika) master Bhavaviveka asserts that visible sights and so on have an essential nature that is established by means of a self-defining characteristic. This is to refute the Chittamatra assertion that since totally conceptional phenomena (such as categories) do not have an essential nature that is established by self-defining characteristics, they have a total lack of an essential nature of existing with defining characteristics. 

Bhavaviveka refutes as follows: Having investigated totally conceptional phenomena in terms of both the conceptual labeling of them and what is being conceptually labeled by these conceptual labels, if you assert that the sounds and the minds that conceptually label them as having essential natures and properties lack an essential nature of existing with self-defining characteristics conventionally, then you would be repudiating dependent phenomena. Thus, it is clear that Bhavaviveka is asserting that dependent phenomena have an essential nature established by means of their self-defining characteristics conventionally. 

Like this, Bhavaviveka says in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna’s) Root Verses on Madhyamaka, A Lamp for Discriminating Wisdom, commenting on chapter 25: 

Concerning the essential nature of totally conceptional phenomena that are mentally expressed or verbally expressed, if you say they (such self-defining characteristics) do not exist, then you are repudiating conditioned phenomena. This is because you are repudiating what is mentally expressed and what is verbally expressed. 

In his Explanatory Commentary to (Bhavaviveka’s) “Lamp for Discriminating Knowing,” Avalokitavrata said: 

Here, (what Bhavaviveka) is indicating is that, regarding the essential nature of totally conceptional phenomena (such as categories), the Yogacharins say that they lack an essential nature of existing with self-defining characteristics. If, by this they are saying that (1) such an essential nature of conceptual thoughts that are mental expressions of the essential nature of things (a dog) and their individual characteristics (big) and (2) such an essential nature of conventional labels (of sounds) that are verbally expressed as words (for them) – if they are saying that such essential natures do not exist as essential natures, in the sense of a lack of an essential nature of existing with self-defining characteristics, then this is improper because it is a repudiation of dependent phenomena conventionally.

Thus, [Tsongkhapa summarizes]: (This is improper) because (Bhavaviveka) is saying that if you (Chittamatrins) assert that dependent phenomena gathered under the aegis of sounds (of words) and of (conceptual) minds lack an essential nature of existing with self-defining characteristics conventionally, this is a repudiation (i.e., a denial of what exists). 

Here, “self-defining characteristics” in the expression “lack of an essential nature of existing with self-defining characteristics” means the presence of self-defining characteristics or the presence of a self-establishing nature. Although Chittamatrins assert the nonexistence of such a thing in reference to totally conceptional phenomena; nevertheless, dependent phenomena have such defining characteristics and thus have self-establishing natures. However, since dependent phenomena arise from other (phenomena), and so lack an essential nature of arising from themselves (i.e. self-arising), they are asserted as lacking an essential nature. 

Having explained like this in Sutra Unraveling the Intended Meaning, Buddha said that the lack of an essential nature of all phenomena has (a deeper) intended meaning (behind it). 

The [Yogachara-Svatantrika] Master Kamalashila said that by this sutra indicating the intention behind the three types of lack of essential nature, it is indicating very well the lack of the two extremes (interpolation and repudiation) of the Madhyamaka middle path [the way Svatantrika asserts it]. Because of that, Buddha was setting this as a text of definitive meaning only. He (Kamalashila) asserted that it (the assertion in the text) indicated the meaning of the Madhyamaka middle way in that (1) since an essential nature of dependent phenomena as being ultimate is a totally conceptional phenomenon that is an interpolation, dependent phenomena lack such an essential nature, but yet (2) it (the assertion in the text) eliminates the repudiation of them because they do have self-defining characteristics conventionally. Thus, this master (Kamalashila) also asserts that, conventionally, they (dependent phenomena) have self-defining characteristics. 

However, Chandrakirti in his Autocommentary to “Engaging in Madhyamaka,” says: 

Just as, concerning a snake, its being a snake is totally conceptional, but its being an actual snake is thoroughly established (as an object of cognition of a Buddha’s omniscience); similarly a self-establishing nature (like a rope) is totally conceptional with respect to dependent phenomena (like the snake) that have arisen dependently, nevertheless as for their being an object of cognition of a Buddha, they are set as thoroughly established. The presentation of the three natures, understood to have been presented like this, is to be explained as the intention of the sutra.

This is a commentary to the line:

Any sutra with a meaning explained as not being reality is said to be of interpretable meaning. When you have understood this, then it is to be interpreted.

Thus, it is clear that he (Chandrakirti) is asserting the presentation of the three natures in The Sutra Unraveling the Intended Meaning as being of interpretable meaning. In our (Prasangika) tradition, totally conceptional phenomena are taken to be self-establishing natures existent in dependent phenomena; and we do not assert that dependent phenomena conventionally have self-natures that establish their existence by self-defining characteristics. But the Chittamatra system does not assert, except in the case of totally conceptional phenomena, a lack of an essential nature of existing with self-defining characteristics with respect to the other two types of phenomena: dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena. Rather, it (Chittamatra) asserts that those two types of phenomena have self-defining characteristics that establish their existence by their essential natures, or that they have self-establishing natures. Since that is the case, it appears as if this is the main point of The Sutra Unraveling the Intended Meaning; and because of that, it asserts [the Chittamatra position as being] that these two (dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena) are established ultimately. 

The (Prasangika) Masters Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti (both being Prasangikas), however, assert that if they [dependent phenomena and thoroughly established voidnesses] had essential natures that established their existence by means of self-defining characteristics, they would have truly established existence; whereas the (Sautrantika-Svatantrika) Master Bhavaviveka asserts that merely being that [i.e. merely being conceptually labeled] does not make them to be established ultimately.