The Over-refuter Argument That Objects Made of Particles Cannot Be Objects of Valid Cognition Does Not Make Us Lose Our Assertion of Conventional Objects
Furthermore, Chittamatrins say that individual (external) particles are not objects of sensory cognition because they do not appear (to it); and even built-up composites [forms of physical phenomena] having many of these [external particles connected with each other] are not objects of it (sensory cognition), because these (external particles) do not exist as natal sources, like the appearance of a double moon (when cross-eyed).
In answer to this, Bhavaviveka says in his Blaze of Reasons:
If you are establishing (proving) that singularity particles, not built-up (from connected subparticles) are not objects of sensory cognition, then you are establishing something we establish too. And in answer to the latter [assertion, that objects made by amassing unconnected external particles are not objects of sensory cognition], if while not (accepting partless particles) as the causes (of sensory cognition), since an amassing together of the particles of one class [for example, all sight particles to form a whole visible sight] is by means of (these particles) having directional parts – [if while asserting that, which we also accept] you are stating that [objects built up like this by the amassing together of unconnected external particles are not causes of sensory cognition] because these (external particles) do not exist as natal sources, that reason cannot be established.
When particles of the same class but different essential natures [i.e. they are individual items, each with its own essential nature] that are connected together, such that these particles then are the parts of the essential nature of a (whole) object (built up by them), a mind arises having the mental hologram that appears as an amassing of the particles. [Thus, the particles are the natal source of a whole made up by the amassing of them.]
We (Svatantrikas) assert as having their own natal sources even clay jugs and so on, that are objects built up from particles of one class, as is also the case with the particles (that constitute them). Why, because the particles themselves have an identity-nature of being an amassing of eight natal sources.
And just as it is clearly accepted that these (particles) are things that have an identity-nature of being things with their own natal sources, so clay jugs and so on that have an identity-nature of being amassings of these (external particles having their own natal sources) are also things that have an identity-nature of being things with their own natal sources. A singularity (something not having parts as its natal source) is something that cannot be established [and so could never be an object of sensory cognition].
[Tsongkhapa summarizes]: Thus, it seems that (Bhavaviveka) is asserting that the cause for sensory cognition is from each of the built-up particles, and each of these (particles) exists as a natal source, and also that these particles are ultimate. Thus, (Bhavaviveka) is asserting sensory cognition as unmistaken (non-deceptive), unless made fallacious by internal or external causes for deception explained before, and he is also asserting that as conventional objects, these (particles) are the focal conditions [i.e. as external phenomena] for the [sensory cognition of sensory objects made by the amassing of them], in accord with the Sautrantika.
But Chandrakirti explains in his Autocommentary on “Engaging in Madhayamaka”:
You should understand that those who say that what the Sautrantikas state to be deepest (true phenomena) Madhyamikas accept to be superficial (true phenomena veiling deepest true phenomena) speak totally out of obviously not knowing the very nature of reality (found in) the Madhyamaka treatises. Further, those who think that what the Vaibhashikas say are deepest (true phenomena) Madhyamikas (also) accept to be superficial (true phenomena veiling deepest true phenomena) also simply totally misunderstand reality (taught) in the Madhyamaka treatises.
This is because it is unreasonable that supramundane teachings (i.e. Madhyamaka Prasangika) be considered the equal of mundane teachings (like Sautrantika and Vaibhashika, which teach what aryas do not cognize). This tradition (Madhyamaka Prasangika) is unshared. Learned ones should be certain about this.
Thus, (Chandrakirti) does not accept even conventionally partless objects taken by a consciousness and a consciousness that takes them, which are posited by the unshared assertions of these tenet systems. As Chandrakirti says in his Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas”:
It is unreasonable for our (Buddhist) systems to accept substantial particles as the Vaisheshikas do.
Thus, he does not accept partless particles.
(Despite) there being assertions about the phenomena that the two systems (Vaibhashika and Sautrantika) assert as deepest phenomena that Madhyamaka does not accept (even) as superficial truths, since (these deepest phenomena include) partless functional phenomena [namely, particles], this does not indicate that whatever these two systems assert as being true about sights, sounds and so on Madhyamaka does not assert any of them.
In his Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas,” Chandrakirti refutes that, in the case of the network (collection) of particles of a cognitive sensor, each individual one is a cause for a sensory cognition (by itself). [Sensory cognition arises on the basis of the whole sensor and the particles that it is objectively tied to]. And further, just as cognitive sensors are the basis (the dominating condition) for (sensory) consciousnesses that – while in fact not being established as either identical with the particles (that constitute them) or as completely something other than them – dependently arise [objectively tied to each other], likewise cognitive objects as well, as objects of sensory cognition, can only exist objectively tied to their own parts as phenomena that dependently arise.
(Chandrakirti) also asserts as definitional bare cognition (i.e. cognition not through the medium of categories) cognitions that are conceptually labeled as bare cognition and its objects [i.e. imputedly established ones, not unimputedly established objects and cognitive sensors]. But although this master (Chandrakirti) and Bhavaviveka are similar in that both assert external phenomena, the way they set cognitive sensors and objects are not similar.
Earlier, when refuting that sensory cognition was valid with respect to self-defining characteristics, (Chandrakirti, in his Commentary to Aryadeva’s “Four Hundred Stanzas,”) said:
This is because, regarding phenomena, the mental hologram of how they abide is other than the mental hologram of how they appear.
Because the sights, sounds and so on in sensory cognitions that appear to be established by self-defining characteristics do not exist even conventionally (by the power of these) self-defining characteristics as they appear to be, this master (Chandrakirti) asserts that they are deceptive (mistaken) even conventionally.
Even though that is so, it is not impossible for sensory cognitions to be valid cognitions that settle the case (like in a legal decision) of their conventionally being sights, sounds and so on as their objects. The reason for them to be set as deceptive (mistaken) is that there is no object that is established by a self-defining characteristic as it appears to be. But concerning this (fact that such objects are nonexistent), it is established (proven) by a reasoning cognition that analyzes whether such a self-nature exists or not. It (a self-establishing nature) is not decisively established (proven to be nonexistent) by a valid cognition of conventional (objects) [which does not analyze them], and so (the sensory cognition) is not deceptive (mistaken) dependent on the fact that it is a cognition of conventional (objects).
Cognitions of the appearance of a double moon and of the appearance of a reflection (in a mirror) and so on, can be established by valid cognition of conventional (objects) as not actually existing as a double moon or a face as the referent thing they appear to be, without needing to depend on a reasoning cognition. Thus, it is reasonable to differentiate the former cases as accurate superficial truths and these as distorted superficial truths.
Qualm: Even if we concede that there is a difference between apprehending that something is deceptive by relying on a reasoning cognition and a valid cognition of conventional (objects), still just as there is no referent thing (corresponding) to what appears (in the mirror) to be a face and so on, there is also no referent thing (corresponding to) what appears to be a self-defining characteristic mark. Likewise, just as forms and so on that are devoid of self-defining characteristics are existent, reflections (in a mirror) that are devoid of being a face are existent. Because of that (lack of a difference), then by relying on an ordinary conventional gullible mind (directed at) them, there would be no difference in what is reversed (from what is true) and what is not reversed.
Reply: Well indeed it is the case that the referent thing (corresponding to) an essential nature (of conventional objects) established by a self-defining characteristic mark and (the referent thing corresponding to) the seeming appearance of (an actual) face (in a mirror) are alike in that neither exist conventionally. And it is the case that visible forms and such and mirror reflections of visible forms and such are alike in that both exist conventionally.
However, as Chandrakirti says in his Autocommentary on “Engaging in Madhyamaka”:
Some things, such as reflections and echoes that dependently arise appear as false even to those who have misknowing (of voidness), and some things such as blue and so on, as well as minds, feelings and so on appear as true. But the actual nature (i.e. the voidness of things) does not at all appear to those who have misknowing. Because of that, that (actual nature) and anything that is false to a mind that cognizes superficial truth (like an actual face in the mirror) is not an (existent) superficial truth.
So, if you say that this distinction is unreasonable that Chandrakirti makes between blue and so on that are set as being superficial truths and mirror reflections and so on that are not set as being superficial truths, then I would reply as follows. Even though both of these (forms such as blue and mirror reflections of them) are alike in that they appear to cognition of conventional (objects), nevertheless because mirror reflections and so on can be apprehended (accurately and decisively) as false by mundane cognition, they are not set as mundane superficial truths. But even though blue and so on are false, yet because they cannot be comprehended as being false by mundane cognition, they are set as mundane superficial truths. I (Tsongkhapa) think it’s like that.
Therefore, regarding those two objects like that (blue and a mirror reflection), while it is reasonable that, in relation to cognition of conventional (objects), one is true and the other is false, it is also reasonable that, regarding the two cognizers, in relation to cognition of conventional (objects), one is reversed, and one is not.
Qualm: If in relation to cognition of conventional (objects), (your cognition) were not reversed, then this contradicts that it is deceptive regarding conventional (objects).
Reply: If you think that, well, there is (1) “conventional” in the sense of the basis for deception that one is deceived about in terms of conventional (objects) and (2) (conventional in the sense of) the cognizer of conventional (objects) that is the cognizer to rely on to set what is not reversed. If you think the two are the same, then there is a contradiction. But since these two (usages of) conventional are distinct, what is the contradiction?
When a self-establishing nature that establishes forms and so on to exist by their essential natures is refuted by reason, it has to be done in terms of conventional (objects) and not deepest (truths).
To the face of the cognition of conventional (objects) like that, sensory cognitions (of those forms) are deceptive. But to the face of just any ordinary cognition of conventional (objects), it is not deceptive.
These are not contradictory. For example, in terms of mundane conventional objects, it is like one can say some people are here and some people are not here, the phrase “some” is the same in both “some” are here and “some” are not here, but the two “some”s are not the same [they don’t refer to the same set of people]. It’s like that. Furthermore, Madhyamikas who set what is nondeceptive (unmistaken) in relation to ordinary mundane cognition do not accept it as nondeceptive (about how a conventional object appears to exist), like what (Chandrakirti) says, “From (the point of view of) the mundane, they are true.”
Because of that, Madhyamikas do not find it contradictory to set these as deceptive and yet to set the objects that it sees as false. But they do find contradictory to assert that an object set as true is set as such by a deceived cognizer. By asserting that all conventional phenomena are like an illusion, then although they are false in terms of being conventional objects, we see no contradiction in setting what is a superficial truth. This is because, as (Chandrakirti says in “Engaging in Madhayamaka,”) “Because misknowing obscures its actual nature, it is the ‘concealer’,” there is no contradiction in something being true on the face of that concealer misknowing and yet false to the face of the concealer (cognition) on whose face is set the refutation of the existence of all phenomena being established by their self-natures.
Thus, although the statement (in Chandrakirti’s “Engaging in Madhayamaka”) that “Anything that is false to a concealer (mind) is not a superficial truth” is to be taken to refer to what valid cognition of conventional (objects) apprehends to be false, it is inappropriate to take it to refer just to whatever is conventionally false.
Like this, there are many ways that Madhyamikas present, in their own traditions, samsara and nirvana in terms of conventional (existence). The way in which the unshared assertions of the essentialists’ own systems refute the conventional existence of referent “things,” however, is fraught with extreme difficulties.
Since that is the case, what they understand to be a non-reversed presentation of the two truths seems to fall to an extreme position regarding existence.
When the assertions of the essentialists refute what exists conventionally, they would have to refute it from having analyzed it with reasoning; and then what rational persons assert or do not assert would be either proved or disproved. This would be the case even with respect to what we ourselves assert as existent, such as what conventionally arises and ceases. So, when they analyze with reasoning, thinking, “I will rely on those who follow reason,” (they believe that) their reasoning equally harms or equally does not harm both what we ourselves have asserted as conventionally existent (forms of physical phenomena, and so on) and what the essentialists themselves consider to be doctrinally based. Because of that, then if they accept that (the creator god) Ishvara and primal matter (asserted in the Samkhya tradition as the source of all phenomena other than the atman-soul) do not conventionally exist, they feel they must assert the nonexistence as well of even forms of physical phenomena and so on And if they (i.e. forms) conventionally existed, then they would have to assert, as well, the existence of even Ishvara and so on. They see these as equivalent.
According to their system, it is inappropriate to identify anything at all as being this or not this, or to assert anything at all. And they then have the conceited arrogance of thinking (that with this understanding) they have found the very nature of reality (asserted by) Madhyamaka. Then, in accord with that understanding like that, they accept as being meditation on the meaning of the completely perfect view the setting of their minds in a state of not cognitively taking anything.
It appears that there are many like that, but it never appears that those who are like that are spoken of as pleasing the learned ones. This is because, as explained before, it is a completely reversed view when, without (correctly) identifying the object to be refuted by reasoning, the reasoning that refutes a self-establishing nature destroys all presentations of conventional existence, such that the correct view and the distorted view become equal in that if one is mistaken, so is the other, and if one is not mistaken, neither is the other.
Even if you accustom yourself for a very long time to something like that, not only will you not come even a little bit closer to the correct view, but you will also go further away from it. This is because all their presentations of the dependent arising of samsara and nirvana totally contradict the pathway of dependent arising that is the appropriate one in our own system.
Because of that, (Chandrakirti) says in Engaging in Madhyamaka:
That which the non-Buddhist extremists, greatly perplexed and agitated by the sleep of misknowing, ascribe as if having true identity-natures and that which (the Buddhist essentialists) ascribe to be an illusion or a mirage are nonexistent even in the mundane world.
Let me explain this quote that what is ascribed by the unshared assertions of the non-Buddhist extremists and what is ascribed by the unshared assertions of the Buddhist essentialists in their own systems, as I cited before – these are nonexistent even in conventional truth in the way in which they (assert them).
The Three Criteria for Establishing Conventionally Existent Phenomena
If you wonder through what gateway it is that we set what it is that we accept as conventionally existent and what it is that we accept as nonexistent, it is like this: We accept as conventionally existent:
- That which is widely known to cognitions of conventional phenomena
- That which is an object widely known like that, and which other cognitions of conventional phenomena do not invalidate
- That which reasoning does not come to invalidate when it analyzes it accurately in the very nature of reality or whether or not it has a self-establishing nature.
Those (objects) that are the reverse of these (three criteria), we accept as nonexistent.
Objects (don) that are posited conventionally must be established by valid cognition. Nevertheless, although the reasoning cognition that accurately analyzes whether or not they have a self-establishing nature definitely must not invalidate them in any way, yet if that reasoning were to establish them as existent, then since it would establish them as existent by means of their own essential, it would contradict their being conventional objects.
Because of that, then by considering these two as being the same: “not being invalidated by a reasoning cognition” and “being established by a reasoning cognition,” you would have the out-of-place misconception that takes as either being equally true or equally false these two: “happiness and unhappiness come from constructive and destructive behavior” and “happiness and unhappiness come from the creator god Ishvara or primal matter (i.e. a physical cause.”) This is because, even though the two (propositions) “the creator god Ishvara or primal matter bring about happiness and unhappiness” and “constructive and destructive behavior bring about happiness and unhappiness” are equal in that the reasonings that accurately analyze each of them as to whether or not they have a self-establishing nature do not establish either of them, the two (propositions) are not equal in terms of whether or not reasoning harms them.
Consider such totally imaginary, doctrinally based things as partless consciousnesses and objects, an atman-soul, primal matter and Ishvara that are posited by the uncommon assertions of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist essentialists. When they posit them, they do so after analyzing with reason whether such things, established by means of their own essential natures, exist or not, and after having thought that they can be found by it. Since that is the case, they would then have to accept analysis done by others also made with the reasoning that analyzes whether or not these things exist with a self-establishing nature, because they assert that those objects can withstand analysis by reasoning. But if, when analyzed like that, they cannot withstand the load of being investigated with stainless reasoning, then since they cannot be found by reasoning, they would be obliterated. That is because if they existed, they would have to be found.
However, concerning forms, sounds and so on, we merely posit them as they are widely known to the cognition of conventional (truth) that is not harmed by external or internal causes for deception. Although (we posit them like that), it is not that we accept them after having placed them in a system in which, after analyzing, wondering whether they are merely conventional or whether their manner of existence (actually) is established as it (appears), you find a self-establishing nature that establishes them by their essential natures. Since that is so, they are not to be analyzed with the reasoning that analyzes [in terms of deepest truth] whether or not they have a self-establishing nature, because we do not accept that these objects can withstand analysis by reasoning. For example, it is like if someone claims this is a sheep, it is inappropriate to analyze whether it is a horse or an elephant.
Even though something may be an object that has been widely known in the world with no beginning, if it is harmed by reasoning [analyzing deepest truth], then it does not exist even conventionally. This includes the objects of such things as the interpolation of a self-establishing essential nature made by essentialists through misknowing; the cognition, by a deluded view, settled on a network (of aggregates), of an atman-soul (that is identical to them) or of an atman-soul as a possessor (of them) that are self-established by their essential natures; and the cognition of yesterday’s mountain as today’s mountain. Thus, Madhyamaka does not accept as conventionally (existent) all objects that are widely known in the world.
Some have asserted that the reason for the nonequivalence of forms, sounds and so on and the imaginings of the non-Buddhist extremists regarding whether or not they exist conventionally is due to the former being widely known to the entire world, whereas the latter are well known only to those who assert philosophical tenet systems. Those who claim this have not made the division (between the two) correctly. Otherwise, there are many (unwanted implications), such as, conventionally, forms and so on could not be like an illusion, but rather they would have to exist (conventionally) by means of a self-establishing essential nature.
Also, as Chandrakirti says in his Commentary to (Nagarjuna’s) “Sixty Reasonings”:
Reversed (cognitions) are those that take things to have the nature of happiness and so on (static, clean, having a self), because even conventionally, phenomena do not abide in such natures. Non-reversed (cognitions) take things to have the nature of suffering and so on (nonstatic, impure, lacking a self), because these phenomena exist conventionally with these natures.
Thus, as he (Chandrakirti) has said, although the four: static and so on, are widely and commonly known in the world, taking things (to be in those natures) is explained as being reversed; whereas although the four: nonstatic and so on, are not widely known in the world, taking things (to be in those natures) is not reversed.
Thus, [according to Prasangika], although a conceptual cognition that takes the aggregates to be nonstatic is deceptive (mistaken) with respect to its appearing object, yet because its manner of taking this with certainty (that the aggregates are nonstatic) is not harmed by valid cognition [of the aggregates as being nonstatic], it is said to be non-reversed and non-deceptive. Sensory cognitions are also deceptive with respect to their appearing objects, but since they do not have any other part that is non-deceptive, we do not say that they are unmistaken.
Although sensory cognitions are all alike in being deceptive (mistaken) about what appears to them, nevertheless through the criteria (gateway) of whether an object exists or not in accord with what appears to the face of mundane people, sensory cognitions of appearance such as mirror images are distorted conventional (cognitions), and sensory cognitions other than these that are not harmed (by this criteria) are correct conventional (cognitions). The objects existing as cognitively taken (equivalent to the implied object) in the conceptual cognition that takes the aggregates to be static and so on do not exist conventionally and therefore can be refuted. Nevertheless, since the objects (in the conceptual cognition that) takes them to be nonstatic and so on do exist conventionally, they cannot be refuted.
Just as the four: static and so on that are ultimately existent or existent by their self-establishing essential natures are not valid phenomena, likewise the four: nonstatic and so on that constitute their counterparts also are not valid. Therefore, from the point of view of reality regarding whether they are reversed or non-reversed, there is no difference in taking any of these eight to exist.
With this intention, Buddha said [in the Sutras on Far-reaching Discriminating Knowing]:
As for forms, no matter what you are experiencing them as, whether static or nonstatic, happiness or suffering, having a self or not having a self, you are experiencing them as having a (self-establishing) defining characteristic mark.
Objection: Concerning the manner with which misknowing takes its object by interpolating a self-establishing nature on phenomena, these two statements are contradictory:
- Reasoning causes you to lose the assertion of this (object – the phenomena with a self-establishing natures), and yet
- It (i.e. reasoning) does not refute the conventional objects.
[They are contradictory, you claim,] because Chandrakirti has said in Engaging in Madhyamaka:
Because naivety obscures its actual nature, it is the “concealer.” Therefore, whatever artificialities appear to it as true, the Sage has said they are truths for a cognizer of superficial truths.
And so Chandrakirti says that it is through the power of misknowing that forms, sounds, and so on, are set as truths for cognizers of superficial truths.
If you object like that, there is no fault. The truth of forms, sounds and so on that is set as truth for cognizers of superficial truths is a truth (set) through the power of a thought. Since that thought must in fact be taken as a grasping for truly established existence, they are truths to the face of the misknowing that interpolates a self-established nature (on them).
But it is in reference to the two types of arhats (shravaka and pratyekabuddha) who have rid themselves of the misknowing that is associated with the disturbing mental factors and bodhisattvas of the eighth level bhumi mind and above, that (Chandrakirti) says:
Although the appearances are those of a self-establishing nature, which is artificial, they are not truths (to them), because they do not have the conceited arrogance of taking them as truths.
It is for this reason that (Chandrakirti) says they are mere conventionalities for those who do not have grasping for truly established existence.
Because of that, although the truth of forms, sounds and so on is (posited) from the perspective of face of misknowing, the forms, sounds and so on (themselves) are not settled as being forms and so on (to settle a case, like in a legal decision) by misknowing. For example, even though to the face of the distorted cognition that takes a rope to be a snake, the rope is a snake, nevertheless that distorted cognition is not what settles the case of it being a rope. The gullible minds that settle the case of something being a form or a sound and so on are the six types of cognition of the eyes and so on, when they are unimpaired. Since that is so, and since the objects established by them exist conventionally, reasoning does not refute them.
However, they do not exist even conventionally in the way that misknowing takes them. This is because this (misknowing) is interpolating a self-establishing nature on phenomena that establishes them by their essential natures, and a self-establishing nature like that does not exist even conventionally. Because of that, reasoning also refutes that (essential nature) conventionally, because if reasoning did not discount it, then conventionally phenomena could not be established as being like an illusion.
Since longing desire and hostility then come to arise, and they interpolate differences of attractiveness or unattractiveness and so on onto the self-establishing natures interpolated by that naivety [i.e. by misknowing], reasoning is able to cause the assertions of their manners of taking their objects to be lost as well.
Concerning that as well, Chandrakirti says in his Commentary on (Aryadeva’s) “Four Hundred Stanzas”:
Because longing desire and so on, are things that interpolate differences such as attractiveness and unattractiveness onto only the self-establishing natures of phenomena interpolated by naivety, they (these disturbing mental factors) are set as being things that are not apart from naivety and that are supported on naivety. This is because of naivety being principal.
Although disturbing mental factors like these are automatically arising, having abided (with the mental continuum) with no beginning, nevertheless, since reasoning is able to cause the assertions of their manners of taking their objects to be lost, their conceptually implied objects do not exist even conventionally. Because of that, there are two types of objects of automatically arising gullible minds – those that can be refuted and those that cannot be refuted. Since the objects of the automatically arising valid cognitions of conventional phenomena that settle them as being forms, sounds and so on conventionally exist, reasoning does not refute them.
That being so, then since in the tradition of Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti self-establishing natures that establish (phenomena) by their essential natures are refuted, it seems like it is extremely difficult to settle conventional objects (i.e. settle them as being conventionally this or that). But if you do not know how to set them well, without invalidating them, then since you won’t correctly find certainty regarding the side of practice (compassion, skillful methods, etc.), it seems like you will come to have a view that is almost one of repudiating (everything). So, those with intelligence need to master the way that these traditions settle what are conventionalities. Since I fear being too verbose here, I will not elaborate any further than just this much.