You Over-refuters Cannot Cause Us to Lose Our Assertion of Conventional Phenomena by Refuting Them After Investigating Whether or Not They Arise in Any of the Four Alternative Ways
Objection: If arising is discounted [altogether] by refuting arising from self, from other, from both or from no cause, then, since according to this (Madhyamaka) tradition, there is no arising in these four alternative ways even conventionally, there is no need to add any qualification. But if (arising) is not discounted, then by this refutation of arising from the four alternative ways, arising even from the deepest point of view would not be discounted.
Reply: Since we do not assert the former position that you speak of, I shall explain in answer to your latter position.
Those who accept arising from the deepest point of view must assert that [arising] is able to withstand analysis by the reasoning that analyzes reality. So then, since you would have to have analyzed, with reasoning, arising from the four alternatives – from self, other, and so on – then since you have accepted (the existence of) arising from the deepest point of view, you must have reached certainty in your analysis of which of the four alternative ways [arising occurs from.]
But with (our) assertion of mere arising whereby, depending on these causes and conditions, this arises, we do not accept arising on the basis of a (self-establishing) nature of reality. Since we do not accept that [arising on the basis of a (self-establishing) nature of reality exists], then why, with the reasoning that analyzes the very nature of reality, do we need to analyze from which of the four alternative ways – from self, from other etc. – does arising occur? Because [since we do not accept arising on the basis of a (self-establishing) nature of reality,] we are not required to assert that it can withstand analysis with reasoning.
Further, dependent arising is a refutation of arising from the four alternative ways. This is because, as (Chandrakirti) says in Engaging in Madhyamaka:
Because affected phenomena arise through dependence, and so these conceptions (of arising on the basis of a self-establishing nature of reality) cannot (bear) scrutiny, therefore the myriad webs of wrong views are cut by this reasoning of dependent arising.
By that (verse) Chandrakirti is stating that dependent arising refutes arising from any of the four alternative ways. And so, it seems that by your asserting that if arising does not occur in any of the four alternative ways, then even mere arising does not exist, you are saying the opposite of what Chandrakirti is stating.
Further, (Chandrakirti) says as well from the same text:
Because affected phenomena are not produced from no cause, or from such causes as (the creator god) Ishvara or from self, other or both, they are therefore produced dependently,
Since (Chandrakirti spoke like that,) those like you are saying something that contradicts that. Therefore, since dependent arising, whereby things are produced dependently, is free from the four extremes, do not ask which of the four extremes is the one that is free of the four extremes. Thus, those (who assert like this) have the fault of not differentiating “no such thing as arising on the basis of self-established existence” and “no such thing as arising.”
Objection: If you ask, well then, how is it that from the same text, (Chandrakirti) has said:
The reasoning that is a reasoning (showing that) arising from self or other is unreasonable in the context of (deepest) reality, is a reasoning (showing) it is conventionally unreasonable too?
Reply: Well, here, it shows that if you assert that arising through (phenomena having) substantially established existence means (such phenomena have) existence established by a self-defining characteristic mark, then these reasonings (that refute them from the deepest point of view) also refute them even conventionally. Although that is so, they definitely are not refutations of mere arising.
In (Chandrakirti’s Autocommentary) in connection with this verse, he says:
Suppose you object, saying, “Anything that functions as a cause on the completely deluded side or on the purifying side (true pathway minds and the acquiring of true stoppings) must function to give rise to (results) that have a substantially (existent) identity-nature.” Well, if this were so, then in stating these verbally, not even one mere word (of what you say) would remain left.
If you ask why, this is because, commenting on that, (Chandrakirti) said (in his Autocommentary to “Engaging in Madhyamaka”):
While you might not accept that arising through (phenomena having) self-defining characteristics does not exist in terms of either of the two truths, yet you must accept that.
Therefore, concerning arising on the basis of existence established by essential natures, if you assert that this is arising from the deepest point of view, then it is proper that you also accept it conventionally too. And so that means that just as you refute arising (on the basis of existence established by essential natures) from the deepest point of view, you must refute (it as well from the conventional point of view).
Therefore, since the statements of this master (Chandrakirti) are pure (perfect and hallowed), you must not assert arising on the basis of existence established by essential natures even conventionally, since as he said in Engaging in Madhyamaka:
The birth of a son of a barren woman by means of his identity-nature does not exist in (deepest) reality and does not exist even in this world. Likewise, all these affected phenomena do not arise by means of their essential natures either in this world or in (deepest) reality.
Concerning those who hold that the nonexistence of arising by means of a self-establishing nature or the nonexistence of a self-establishing nature of arising is pervasive with no such thing as arising, and who therefore argue that arising by means of dependence and the nonexistence of arising by a self-establishing nature are contradictory, (Chandrakirti) has said (in his Commentary on [Nagarjuna’s] “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning”):
They have no ears and no heart.
In saying that they have no ears, his intended meaning is that when we say “self-establishing nature” in saying “the nonexistence of arising by a self-establishing nature,” then without hearing that, they hold that it was the nonexistence of arising (that we said.) And in saying “they have no heart, his intended meaning is that (if they did hear it,) the meaning of the term “self-establishing nature” was incomprehensible to them.
Thus, in comment on (Nagarjuna’s) line in Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning:
The Supreme Omniscient Knower of Reality has said that dependent arising is no arising.
(Chandrakirti) said:
When you see dependent arising, you do not focus on affected phenomena as having self-establishing natures. This is because whatever dependently arises does not arise (on the basis of) self-establishing natures. But then, if you object, saying, “Isn’t it the case that anything that dependently arises cannot just merely arise, and so how can you utter the words, ‘They [i.e. dependently arising phenomena] do not arise?’
If you say they do not arise, well then you shouldn’t say they dependently arise. Therefore, since these two contradict each other, your (assertion) is unreasonable.”
If you object like that, well oh dear, you are still debating even with no ears and no heart. In this situation, we have fallen to a difficult position. When we say that whatever dependently arises does not arise on the basis of a self-establishing nature, like a reflection in a mirror, at such a time how is there a chance that our opponent (in the debate) can understand?
Therefore, cherish making these distinctions.
Also, the Questions of the Naga King Anavatapta Sutra says:
Whatever arises from conditions does not arise; it does not have a self-establishing nature of arising. Whatever depends on conditions is explained as being devoid. Whoever knows voidness is someone who takes care.
After having stated in the first line, “Whatever arises from conditions does not arise,” Buddha, with the second line, indicates the manner in which it does not arise: “It does not have a self-establishing nature of arising.” Thus, adding the qualifier to the object to be refuted, (Buddha is saying that) things do not arise by means of a self-establishing nature. Some people who hear these words and do not know it to be like that and say that it is only in terms of arising itself that there is no arising and only in terms of dependence itself that there is no dependence.
In aggressively speaking a mass of contradictions in this manner, it seems that they are taking this [annihilationist position of theirs] to constitute a high, advanced view.
This is also stated very clearly in the Decent into Lanka Sutra, as quoted by (Chandrakirti) in his Clarified Words:
Oh Mahamati, when I (said) all phenomena do not arise, my intended meaning was they do not arise by means of a self-establishing nature.
Even though this answers the question as to whether or not the qualification “from the deepest point of view” needs to be added to the refutation of arising and so on, I will give an answer to that in more specific detail later.
These (points explained above) show that all these attempts to cause us to lose our assertion (of conventional phenomena) cannot cause us to lose it when we settle the case of cause and effect and so on as lacking a self-establishing nature.
In general, the extreme height of what seems to be an argument that causes an opponent to lose his or her assertion (but which fails) is one in which just as the analysis refutes the opponent’s position, it likewise leaves nothing left of the argument as well.
Since that is so, what you have presented is the extreme height of what is just seemingly an argument to cause us to lose our assertion (of conventional phenomena). This is because when analyzing whether reasoning validates or invalidates (conventional phenomena) and so on, (the arguments you use to) refute your opponent can be turned against you and be used in the same way to refute, as well, the reasoning you use to cause (your opponent) to lose (his or her) assertion.
Objection: Suppose you object, thinking, “By asserting the existence of forms and so on, then when you analyze them, you place them in some ontological position. But with our tradition analyzing by means of not falling to any side, we do not place them in some ontological position.”
Reply: Well, what you say cannot avoid these fallacies [of self-contradiction]. But I will explain this later at the occasion of settling (the difference) between Prasangika and Svatantrika.