You Over-refuters Cannot Cause Us to Lose Our Assertion of Conventional Phenomena by Refuting the Four Parts of the Tetralemma
Objection: Suppose you object, thinking, from the Madhyamaka texts comes the refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma: that things or self-establishing natures exist, do not exist, both or neither of the two. Therefore, reasoning refutes everything, since there are no phenomena not included in those (four).
Reply: Well, as I have indicated before, “things” has two (meanings). Of these two, regarding things (in the sense of things) that are established by their own essential natures, when we refute the assertion that they exist in terms of either of the two truths, this is not a refutation of the conventional existence of things (in the sense of things) that perform a function.
Concerning non-things in the sense of non-functional phenomena, if you assert non-things that are established by their own essential natures, then we refute as well non-things [static, non-functional phenomena] that are like that. Similarly, we refute something that is both such type of thing and non-thing [both functional and nonfunctional, i.e. nonstatic and static], and we also refute something established by its own essential nature that is neither of the two [neither functional nor nonfunctional, i.e. neither nonstatic nor static]. You should know that all methods for refuting the four parts of the tetralemma are like that [they refute all four types of self-established things].
Suppose you refute the four positions of the tetralemma without having the qualification [of self-established existence] affixed to them like that.
When you refute existent things and nonexistent things, you then refute, saying there isn’t anything that is both. [OK, but] if, after that you further refute that there also isn’t anything that is neither of the two, [you have discounted that, because] what you asserted (constituted) a direct contradiction.
But if you stubbornly debate (in this self-contradictory way) saying, “That may be so, but there is no fault in that,” then we won’t debate together with those who stubbornly debate.
Further, when you refute a self-establishing nature or atman-soul that establishes the aggregates as being established by their essential natures, discriminating knowing arises, thinking, “There is no such thing as a self-establishing nature or an atman-soul.”
But if you also refute the object of that discriminating knowing, namely no such thing as a self-establishing nature, then you have lost the assertion of the Madhyamaka view. This is because you have caused yourself to lose the assertion of the object of that discriminating knowing that apprehends the total lack of a self-establishing nature with respect to all phenomena.
Therefore, those who assert losing both positions concerning self-establishing natures, that they exist or that they do not exist (i.e. there are no such things) need to be asked, “Tell me, how can the position of no such thing as self-establishing natures be lost, which is the object of the discriminating knowing that ascertains (with certainty), thinking, “There is no such thing as a self-establishing nature with regard to the aggregates?”
In Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing,” (Nagarjuna) said:
If non-void things had any existence at all, then voidness too would have some existence. But since non-void things do not exist at all, how could voidness itself have existence?”
Qualm: Suppose regarding this line, you thought, since non-void things do not exist at all, then voidness, which is the total absence of self-established natures, does not exist at all.
Reply: Well regarding this, throughout the entire text, from beginning to end, voidness and non-void things mean self-established voidness and (self-established) non-void things (i.e. self-established things). That being so, then since self-established non-void things mean (things) established by their self-natures, then since there is no such thing at all as self-establishing natures, there is nothing more ludicrous than saying, “Voidness as well, which is the total absence of self-established natures, does not exist at all.”
Further, the ascertainment that cognitively takes its object (namely voidness) by thinking, “There is no such thing as a self-establishing nature that establishes the essential nature of things (as this or that)” – (that ascertainment) cognitively takes its object (voidness) by thinking, “There is definitely no self-establishing nature with respect to a sprout.” Although that is so, it does not think, “The absence of a self-establishing exists” or “The absence of a self-establishing nature does not exist.” It doesn’t think either of the two.
So, close your eyes, direct (your attention) inwards and apprehend. It is extremely easy to understand. That being so, it is inappropriate for the absence of self-establishing natures to be taken as something existent (i.e. self-established). Since that is so, then even if using reasoning to refute the (self-established) existence of voidness is something proper in order to turn back taking the absence of self-establishing natures to be (truly) existent, you need to accept that with this other cognition [the one scrutinizing with reasoning] we are refuting the object of the cognition that takes the absence of self-establishing natures to be (truly) existent.
And although that is so, it is extremely improper to refute the object of the discriminating knowing that apprehends the absence of a self-establishing nature with respect to a sprout. When we have refuted a self-establishing nature that establishes the essential nature of a sprout, we ascertain this, thinking, “There is no such thing as a self-establishing nature.” Then although another mind might take (voidness) as its object, thinking, “The total absence of self-establishing natures exists in reality,” reasoning does not refute the object of that mind. But when asserting that that voidness is established by its own essential nature is a refutation (of that, i.e. of a self-establishing nature with respect to voidness).
Question: Suppose you ask how does someone come to take (voidness as their cognitive object), thinking, “The total lack of a self-establishing nature has existence established by a self-establishing nature?”
Reply: Well, in focusing on a sprout’s total lack of a self-establishing nature, you do not establish (this lack) as the sprout’s self-establishing nature. Nevertheless, you could cognitively take (voidness) as your object, thinking, “The total lack of the sprout’s self-establishing nature exists as that (sprout’s) self-establishing nature.” [You could think mistakenly like that.] For example, even though you might not develop the thought that, in the absence of the clay jug, the truth is that the clay jug is present; yet you might develop the thought that the truth is that the clay jug is absent. It is like that.
If you have done that (i.e. if you have thought like that), well, since there is not anything that is not devoid of a self-establishing nature, then it is completely reasonable to say that the voidness that is the sprout’s total lack of a self-establishing nature as well does not have existence established by its essential nature.
In his Commentary on (Aryadeva’s) “Four Hundred Stanzas,” (Chandrakirti) also speaks of refuting voidness’s total lack of being established by its essential nature. He says:
If that which is called voidness had even some existence established by its essential nature, then all phenomena would come to have a self-establishing nature [because voidness would exist inside them as their self-establishing natures.] But that is not the case. Thus, in order to indicate this, (Aryadeva) has explained, saying, “As there is nothing that is not devoid (of self-established existence, i.e. there is no basis that is not devoid of self-established existence), then from what could (voidness) be something that arises? [How can there be a findable basis on which voidness arises as its self-establishing nature?] How can it be that when one doesn’t (truly) exist, there arises a (self-established) opponent (to it)?”
But if, not like that, you refute completely the existence of voidness, which is the total absence of self-establishing natures, then the total lack of self-establishing natures would not exist. In that case, then since self-establishing natures that establish things by their essential natures would be existent, it would be improper to refute self-establishing natures in all regards.
Like that, (Nagarjuna) said as well in his Refutation of Objections:
Suppose you ask, how could the total lack of self-establishing natures turn back self-establishing natures. Well, if it were the opposite of the total lack of self-establishing natures, then this would establish self-establishing natures.
This is because, as (Nagarjuna) explains in his Autocommentary (to “Refutation of Objections”):
Suppose you say, “Just as a sound, such as when saying, ‘Don’t make a sound,’ can turn back sound, so it is that the lack of self-established existence in words can turn back self-establishing natures of phenomena.
Well, this example is correct. Here, the lack of a self-establishing nature in words does refute the self-establishing nature of phenomena. But, if the lack of a self-establishing nature in words refuted the lack of self-establishing natures of phenomena, then because this would be a refutation of the lack of self-establishing natures, then phenomena would come to possess self-establishing natures. And because they possessed self-establishing natures, then they would not be devoid of them.
Therefore, just after the quote from (Nagarjuna’s) Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing” cited above, namely, “How could voidness itself have existence?” (Nagarjuna continues):
The Triumphant One has said that voidness eradicates for certain all views. Anyone who makes voidness into a view, he has said is incurable.
“Making voidness into a view” is not referring to the view with which you think that (all things are) devoid of self-establishing natures. Rather, he is saying that if you take voidness in the voidness of self-establishing natures to be truly existent, then it is an essentialist view.
This is because, as Buddhapalita has said clearly, with an example, (in his Commentary to (Nagarjuna’s) “Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, ‘Discriminating Knowing’”:
To those who insist that phenomena have existence established by their essential natures, you can teach them the voidness of essential natures of phenomena, telling them that voidness means that phenomena, as dependent arisings, are conceptually labeled as phenomena through the power of causes and conditions, and thus do not have existence by means of essential natures. But, for those who insist that voidness is an essentially existent phenomenon, you cannot turn them back from that insistence, no matter what else you (say). For example, if you say to someone, “I have nothing,” and he then says, “Give me that nothing,” how can you make that person understand that you have nothing?”
But if it is not like that, then the example would be inappropriate. Suppose someone says, “Let me have some money,” and I say, “I have no money.” If, at that time, (the person) takes it to mean there is no money, there is no fault. But if that (person) takes “no money” to be (an amount of) money, then there are no grounds for him to develop the certainty that I have no money.
Like that, if, in answer to the question “do phenomena have self-establishing natures or not,” I say that they do not have self-establishing natures, and you then take it to mean they do not have self-establishing natures, what fault is there in that, since I wanted you to develop that understanding of what I said. But if you take that very lack of self-establishing natures of phenomena to be a self-establishing nature, then that is a fault. According to you, when I say I have no money, that means that, even if you take it to mean I have no money, you need to refute that (statement “I have no money”) as well. Since (that is your misconception) it would be wonderful if you relied on what I said.
Also, since in Clarified Words, (Chandrakirti) also speaks about clinging to voidness as a real “thing,” this is not a refutation of voidness, nor is it a fault that one’s mere view is voidness.
As it is like this, then as it says in The Verse Summary (of “The Sutra on Far-Reaching Discriminating Knowing in Eight Thousand Verses”):
A bodhisattva who thinks, “These aggregates are void,” is conducting (his behavior) in terms of self-defining characteristics and does not have belief in abiding in non-arising.” And also, as (Nagarjuna) said as well in his Precious Garland, “The Great Able Sage (Buddha) turned away from both the view of self and of no self.”
Although it is said in these and other scriptures and commentaries that it is inappropriate to have as a “view” voidness and the non-existence of an atman-soul [i.e. it is wrong to make them into a self-established view], you need to understand this as I have explained above. If it were not like that, then it would contradict many quotations, such as (from the “Heart Sutra”), where, in answer to Shariputra asking Avalokiteshvara how someone needs to train, who wishes to conduct his or her behavior in profound and far-reaching discriminating knowing, he says:
He or she needs to keep in view, fully and in detail, the five aggregate factors of his or her experience and those as devoid of a self-establishing nature.
And from The Verse Summary (of “The Sutra on Far-Reaching Discriminating Knowing in Eight Thousand Verses”):
One who fully knows that all phenomena lack a self-establishing nature is conducting himself in supreme far-reaching discriminating knowing.
And from Chandrakirti’s Engaging in Madhyamaka:
Therefore, a yogi views the voidness of the self and of the self as a possessor and thus becomes liberated.
Therefore, the root of all torments is the misknowing that interpolates self-establishing natures. To uproot it through the gateway of directly contradicting it and its way of taking an object, there is only one singular way: the discriminating knowing that apprehends voidness or the lack of a self. If you lose your assertion of that way of taking an object (namely, as lacking a self-establishing nature), then even if you don’t want to, you have to accept that you have refuted the view of the very nature of reality (voidness).
When (Aryadeva says in his “Four Hundred Stanzas”):
There is no second gateway to peace.
(Chandrakirti) says in his Commentary on “Four Hundred Stanzas”:
The complete extinction of attachment is the cause for the attainment of nirvana. Except for the view of the non-existence of self-establishing natures, there is nothing else that can be the cause for completely extinguishing attachment. Because of this fact, there is no second gateway to peace other than the nonexistence of an atman-soul, which has the defining characteristic of the nonexistence of a self-establishing nature. For being able to enter the citadel of nirvana, this is the one and only gateway; there is nothing that matches it.
Even if there are the three gateways to liberation – voidness, no defining characteristic mark (of a self-established cause) and no hope (of a self-established result) – only the view of the nonexistence of an atman-soul is the principal one. If you know all phenomena, without exception, as lacking an atman-soul and have thus extinguished attachment to all phenomena, without exception, how could you have interest in anything or be focused on anything as having a characteristic mark (of being a self-existent cause for attachment to arise)? Therefore, this nonexistence of an atman-soul is the only gateway to peace, and there is no second.
Because of that fact, Nagarjuna has explained in his Assemblage for Enlightenment (Byang-chub-gyi tshogs), “Since (phenomena) lack a self-establishing nature, they are devoid; and being devoid, what could being without a characteristic mark (of being a self-established cause) come to do? And because of being turned from all characteristic marks (of being self-established causes), what could the learned have hopes for (something to be a self-established result)?
Thus, by getting rid of there being any contradictions in the explanation of the three gateways to liberation and the explanation of the singular view that is the view of the voidness of self-establishing natures as being the gateway to liberation, Chandrakirti has established through scriptural authority and reasoning that that very (voidness) is the gateway to liberation.
So, why should the mere cutting off of self-establishing natures cause us to lose our assertion of the objects (that are the bases for voidness, namely conventionally existent phenomena)? This is because, while apprehension (of voidness) like this is the opponent for grasping for a self-defining characteristic mark to be the two atman-souls (namely, an atman-soul of persons and an atman-soul of phenomena), there isn’t even a trace left of grasping for a self-defining characteristic mark. If you regard as faulty even the conceptual thought like that, then by refuting any conceptual thought whatsoever, whether an excellent conceptual thought or a bad conceptual thought, then it is clear that you want to set up the system of the Chinese abbot Hoshang.