Refuting Those for Whom What Is Identified as the Object to Be Refuted Is Under-Pervasive
Qualm: Some claim that the object to be refuted is a self-establishing nature, but (only) one that has the following three characteristics:
- Its essential nature (of what it is) has not arisen through causes and conditions
- It does not change in other circumstances
- It is not in relation to something else that is set.
This is because, concerning this, Nagarjuna said in Root Verses on Madhyamaka, Called, “Discriminating Knowing”:
It is unreasonable for a self-establishing nature to be one that arises through causes and conditions. A self-establishing nature that arose from causes and conditions would be something that had been made. How could something called “a self-establishing nature that has been made” still come about? A self-establishing nature, in fact, is something not manufactured and is something that is not in relation to something else.
Reply: Well, in general, if you accept that internal or external phenomena, such as a sprout, are established in terms of a self-establishing nature that’s like that [namely, one that establishes the existence of a phenomenon all by its own power alone], then according to Madhyamaka that must be refuted.
Nevertheless, here when you identify the object to be refuted, you must identify the root object to be identified that, when refuted, generates on your mental continuum the Madhyamaka view that apprehends that a self-establishing nature of phenomena is totally nonexistent.
If it were like they claim, then since our (Buddhist) systems already have established that affected phenomena arise through causes and conditions and change into something else, there is no need to establish that to them as the lack of an (unaffected) self-establishing nature. They as well should have already apprehended that functional phenomena (meaning nonstatic phenomena) lack that (type of) self-establishing nature. As there are these faults, where is there an unshared object to be refuted in that?
As for quotes thrown out (by the opponents to justify their position], such as, “If there were a self-establishing nature that established the essential nature of things, it would have to be something that was not in relation to something else and would not change into something else,” there are many such things in the Madhyamaka texts. Although these are mentioned as faults from the point of view of pervasions, they are not identifying the object to be refuted from the gateway of its essential nature.
Even though existence established as an ultimate phenomenon, perfectly established existence and truly established existence must be taken as things that, for instance, do not arise through causes and conditions, this [namely, being static] is not the meaning of existence established as an ultimate phenomenon.
For example, although a clay jug is pervasive with being nonstatic, nonstaticness (impermanence) is not the meaning of a clay jug. A bulbous container for water must be set as the meaning. Likewise, although if something had existence established as an ultimate phenomenon, and so on, it would have to be a partless phenomenon; nevertheless, we do not assert that partless phenomena are the root object to be refuted.
This is because they (partless phenomena) are held (as an assertion) through mere doctrinal projections as the unshared position of the advocates of a (lower) tenet system [namely, Vaibhashika and Sautrantika], and that is not the root that binds embodied beings to uncontrollably recurring rebirth (samsara). And also, because even if, having decisively determined as the non-existence of self-establishing natures (means the total absence of) these (partless phenomena, which do not exist at all), you then meditated on that, it would not at all invalidate (harm) the cognitive hold of beginningless misknowing (ignorance). And so that being the case, then even ultimate apprehension that had bare cognition of this point about them (i.e., that all phenomena lack a self-establishing nature that establishes them as partless) would not be able to turn back automatically arising disturbing mental factors.
Therefore, when making a decisive determination (of voidness) with a philosophical view, take as the principal (task) decisively determining that there is no such thing as a (findable) “thing” (that corresponds to) the way in which automatically arising misknowing cognizes (objects). Getting yourself to lose the assertion of objects held that are doctrinally based is a subsidiary of that.
But suppose, without knowing this, you discard getting yourself to lose the assertion of the way that automatically arising misknowing takes objects, and then, when refuting an atman-soul of persons, you refute an atman-soul that is static, monolithic, and independent, and when refuting an atman-soul of phenomena, you refute partless particles, partless moments of cognition, primal matter having the three characteristics (rajas, sattva and tamas), and so on. If you do that, you will be refuting what are merely the doctrinal projections of advocates of (lower) tenet systems and that is completely inappropriate. If that were not so, then when making a decisive determination (of voidness) with a philosophical view, if you then meditate without having decisively determined anything other than merely this, you would be meditating on merely this. That is because decisively determining (voidness) with a philosophical view is the meaning of meditation.
Therefore, even if, having meditated, you manifested that (realization non-conceptually) and reached the ultimate point of that familiarity, you will have depleted just that much. Having seen as totally nonexistent the two atman-souls (of persons and phenomena) that merely are ones projected by doctrinally based cognition, to then claim that you have turned back the automatically arising disturbing mental factors is extremely absurd.
As (Chandrakirti) has said in Engaging in Madhyamaka:
Suppose when apprehending the nonexistence of an atman-soul (of persons), you rid yourself of (the belief in) an atman-soul that is static. We do not accept that even as the basis that we grasp at as being “me” (self-preoccupation). Therefore, it is extremely astonishing to say that with knowing the nonexistence of (such) an atman-soul, you uproot the view of the atman-soul (of a person) that is in fact the deepest.
Also, in his Autocommentary to this, Chandrakirti has explained (this verse) through an example for this, in order to make the point of irrelevancy totally clear. There he says:
Suppose when someone sees a nest of snakes in a hole in the wall of his home, you tell him, “There is no elephant there” in order to eliminate his fear. You would be a laughingstock to others to suppose that this will get rid of his fear of the snakes.
Although (Chandrakirti) speaks of the nonexistence of an atman-soul of persons, it is similar with respect to the lack of an atman-soul of phenomena. You could add to this:
Suppose when apprehending the nonexistence of an atman-soul (of phenomena), you rid yourself of (the belief in) an atman-soul that is doctrinally based. We do not accept that even as the basis for misknowing. Therefore, it is extremely astonishing to say that with knowing the nonexistence of (such) an atman-soul, you uproot the misknowing that is in fact the deepest.
Qualm: Suppose you ask, “When the master (Nagarjuna) explained as before, saying that the defining characteristics of a self-nature are its not being manufactured and its not being relative to something else [like long relative to something short], was he saying that from having drawn this conclusion after analyzing two possibilities or is there a self-establishing nature that exists like that?
Reply: Well, here, when you speak of something’s actual nature, this can be set as a self-nature. That is not manufactured and is not relative to something else. That exists.
(Chandrakirti) establishes this with what can be known from a sutra in his Autocommentary to “Engaging in Madhyamaka,” where he says:
Suppose you ask, “Is there a self-nature that exists like in the form that the master (Nagarjuna) has specified with those qualifications?” Well, as the Bhagavan Buddha (the Vanquishing Master Who Overcame All) has extensively said, “Whether it is right that Tathagata (Thusly Gone) Buddhas can come about or it is right that they do not come about, this (depends) on the actual nature (the voidness) of things, their abiding nature.
If you ask what an abiding nature is, well, for eyes and so forth, it is their self-nature (i.e. their voidness). And if you further ask what sort of thing their self-nature is, it is that which is not manufactured about them and not relative to something else. It is their own essential natures [i.e. their deepest essential nature, their voidness] that are to be apprehended by cognition parted from the cataracts of misknowing. If you ask does it exist or not, well if it did not exist, then what is the purpose (the aim) for bodhisattvas to meditate on the path of the far-reaching attitudes? It is for the sake of apprehending the actual nature (voidness) that bodhisattvas undergo hundreds of hardships like that.
Qualm: Suppose you think, well didn’t you previously refute, with respect to all phenomena, existence established by a self-nature?
Reply: Well, haven’t we given the answer many times that, with respect to internal phenomena that are not conceptually labeled by the mind, there is not even a mere speck of a self-establishing nature that establishes their own essential natures. Therefore, what need to mention other phenomena as having a self-establishing nature like that? And so even the actual nature (of things), their deepest truth, is not established even to the tiniest extent by that.
From (Chandrakirti’s) Clarified Words:
That which is the nondeceptive, unmanufactured, primordial essential nature of fire throughout, in fact, the three times, that which is not something that arises later from having not arisen before, that which does not turn out to be something that is dependent on causes and conditions like the temperature of water or this side and that side or long and short – that is said to be its self-nature (its voidness).
If you ask how does fire’s own [deepest] essential nature that turns out to be like that exist, well it is neither that it has existence established by its own essential nature (i.e. it doesn’t establish its own self-existence), nor is it that it doesn’t exist at all. Although it is like that, nevertheless, in order to rid shravakas (listeners) of their fears, we can say that it exists on the superficial level in terms of an interpolation.
Thus, after refuting that even this self-nature is established by its own essential nature, (Chandrakirti) is saying that it exists conventionally.
Qualm: Suppose you think that (Chandrakirti) did not actually assert that it exists since he said that he was indicating this in terms of an interpolation in order to rid shravakas of their fears.
Reply: Well, that is not correct. This is because, since what he said, for necessity’s sake, concerning conceptual labeling is the case with other phenomena as well; they too would become nonexistent. As cited before, he has established that (point) by saying that if that were not the meaning, then the absurd conclusion would follow that celibate conduct would be meaningless.
And this is also incorrect (because Chandrakirti) also has said in his Autocommentary to “Entering Madhyamaka”:
It is not just that only the Master (Nagarjuna) asserts this self-nature, but because others as well are able to be brought into accepting it as well, it is presented as something established for both (parties in debate).
Otherwise (if voidness did not exist), then you would have to accept that in the Madhyamaka tradition the attainment of liberation could never happen. This is because having attained nirvana means to have had straightforward (non-conceptual) cognition of nirvana, and that nirvana has in fact been explained as the true stoppings and spoken of as deepest truth. And so, because deepest truth would be nonexistent.
In his Commentary on (Nagarjuna’s) “Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning” (Rigs-pa drug-cu’i ‘grel-ba), (Chandrakirti) has proven with the effort of many (lines of reasoning) that when you have attained nirvana it is necessarily the case that you will have straightforward (non-conceptual) cognition of the deepest (truth, voidness), the true stoppings (of the obscurations).
It being like that, then since affected phenomena such as eyes cannot be established as being self-establishing natures that establish their own essential natures and since they also cannot be established as what are set as the self-natures that are their actual natures (of how they exist), then they (i.e. affected phenomena) cannot be established as any self-nature.
Although that (lack of their being established as a self-nature) and their deepest truth are established as their actual natures (of voidness) that are set as their self-natures, that self-nature set here is not manufactured and [unlike long being relative to short] is not relative to something else. And even though it does not exist even to the slightest degree as a self-establishing nature that establishes its own essential nature (or the essential natures of anything else), it is merely established in terms of conventions.
Something manufactured is something made that newly arises, having not existed before; and something that is not relative to something else is something that is dependent on causes and conditions. Since form and so on (i.e. affected phenomena) cannot be established as either of the two self-natures, it is for the sake of viewing the self-nature that is taken as the self-nature that is the actual nature (of how things exist, namely voidness) that one meditates with the pathway minds. Since that is so, then (Chandrakirti) has said that celibate conduct would in fact not be meaningless, and he has explained that not asserting at all a self-establishing nature that establishes all phenomena’s own essential natures and yet accepting a self-nature that is all of a sudden there (all of a sudden it exists without a cause) are not contradictory.
From (Chandrakirti’s) Autocommentary to “Engaging in Madhyamaka”:
[Objection:] Oh no, in not asserting even to the slightest degree anything as being a self-established functional phenomenon (an essentially established phenomenon) and yet asserting a self-nature that is all of a sudden there, you are saying things that contradict each other.
[Reply:] If (you raise such an objection), what you say is a case of misknowing the intended meaning of (Nagarjuna’s) treatise. The intended meaning is that if the essential nature of being eyes and so on, as something that comes about by dependently arising (from causes and conditions) – which is something that can be grasped by ordinary childish people – if that were their self-natures, their real natures, then because that (kind of) self-nature could be apprehended even by (a mind that) had become reversed, then celibate brahmacharya conduct would be meaningless. Why, because that is not the self-nature that is their real nature. Because of that, celibate brahmacharya conduct for the sake of viewing that would be meaningless.
Moreover, I say that compared to superficial truth, it is something that is not manufactured and not relative to something else. It is reasonable that a true nature that is not something that can be viewed by childish people is the self-nature (that Nagarjuna speaks of), because only that, as a deepest phenomenon that is neither a thing nor a non-thing, is, by self-nature, something pacified (of both extremes).
Here, existence or nonexistence as a thing, as I explained at the occasion of (refuting) those who assert the two (extremes), are things being existent or non-existent by means of their essential natures. Now, as for the voidness that is devoid of being a self-establishing nature that you have ascertained as not having even merely a particle of the self-established existence of existence established by an essential nature, when a phenomenon – a form of physical phenomenon and so on – is an object of one cognizer mind by means of (that voidness) being an attribute on top of it as a basis for attributes, with the two of them not being contradictory and not distorted into an appearance of duality, that voidness becomes a conceptually labeled deepest truth.
However, by having accustomed yourself to that very view that apprehends (them) as lacking self-established natures, all deceptive appearances that appear to be self-established while not being self-established will be turned away on the face of the (non-conceptual) straightforward cognition of that object (a form of physical phenomenon and its voidness). Then, with that (non-conceptual) straightforward cognition of the actual (void) nature of all things, there will be no focal aim on that form of physical phenomenon having that (void nature) as an attribute. When (you attain that), then because both the phenomenon having (that void nature) as an attribute and (the voidness that is) its attribute are not both on the face of that cognizer mind, then if you want to set the two of them as a phenomenon having (that void nature) as an attribute and (voidness as) its attribute, you will need to set them (like that) from the face of another cognizer mind of conventional (truth).
As that is so, deepest truth is the pacification of all conceptual fabrications of existence established by an essential nature, on top of which is set the mere turning away of all mental fabrications as well of deceptive appearances that appear there while being devoid of a self-establishing nature. Because of that, where is the need for a self-establishing nature of existence established by an essential nature even when having accepted that [as deepest truth]?
From Clarified Words as well:
Whatever identity-nature [namely, voidness] that aryas take as their object of cognition, parted from the cataract of misknowing, in the manner of not seeing a focal object (that appears) by the force of the cataract that makes (seemingly self-established) things cognizable – set that very essential nature as the self-natures of those (seemingly self-established things).
Also:
Non-arising, as the self-nature of (seemingly self-established) things, is devoid of existence established by its essential nature, since [non-arising] is merely a non-object by the fact of its not being (established as) anything. Because of that, even that (non-arising) is not something existent as a self-establishing nature of (seemingly self-established) things.
(Some) maroon (-robed Tibetan monks) and the like, who do not set as deepest truth merely the cutting off of the conceptual fabrications of the two atman-souls and so on as the objects to be refuted, (experience in meditation) a mind that dawns as a non-deceptive object in the manner of it being established by its own power, and that they apprehend according to the tradition that affirms (its existence). Certain of it being existent like that, they assert (what they experience) as being the view that apprehends the most profound object. And they also assert that any person, who apprehends the nonexistence of a self-establishing nature of any external or internal object that has been settled down on as a basis (that is identical to or the possession of) the two atman-souls, has (fallen to) a position that is a deviation from the correct view.
This is (a view) that is outside (the sphere) of all the Mahayana and Hinayana scriptural texts. This is because they (those monks) assert as necessary turning back grasping to an atman-soul as the root that binds all sentient beings to samsaric rebirth, and yet (they think that) the apprehension of the nonexistence of a self-establishing nature of a basis grasped at as being (identical to or the possession of) an atman-soul will not turn back that (grasping). (Instead,) they assert that the apprehension of some other unrelated phenomenon as existing as the (deepest) truth will turn back grasping for an atman-soul.
This does not seem to be any different from the following example. Suppose that, despite there being no snake in the east, you grasp at one as being there and, because of that, you are frightened. And yet for turning back the suffering that has become the suffering from that, you (think that your) grasping for there being a snake will not be turned back by thinking that a snake is not established, even to the slightest degree, as being in the east. (Instead) you say, “Think that in the west there exists a tree, and your grasping for there being a snake and the suffering from that will be turned back.”
Therefore, you who wish good for yourselves, abandon far away (such a view) as that and cross over the ocean of compulsive rebirth by relying on the texts of the spiritual father and his spiritual son, Arya Nagarjuna and Aryadeva. They convey very clearly vast numbers of lines of reasoning that give certainty, on a deep level, in the scriptural texts of definitive meaning, without them being fit to be interpreted as having any other meaning concerning the methods for causing the assertions to be lost that posit the manner in which misknowing takes it objects, which is the root of all troublemakers that bind you to samsaric rebirth.
As these refutations of distorted concepts concerning the object to be refuted are extremely important to cut off as positions that make you deviate from finding the Madhyamaka view, I have laid them (all) out and then explained.