Basic Points about Voidness and Mental Labeling
- Tsongkhapa studied and debated with masters from all traditions current at his time. He was a revolutionary. Here are some of his unique points about the assertions of selflessness and voidness in the four Indian Buddhist tenet systems, particularly Prasangika.
- He was very much concerned about the breakdown of ethics at his time, especially among the monastic community. To reaffirm the importance of cause and effect and counter the current assertion that conventional truth was totally false, he emphasized the mutual compatibility of the Prasangika view of voidness and dependent arising.
- As he wrote In Praise of Dependent Arising: (18) There is no such thing as a self-establishing nature; also, the entire presentation is reasonable of “this” arising from depending on “this.” As these two (points) are non-contradictory, is there need to mention that they fit together?
- Tsongkhapa uniquely pointed out that Prasangika does have positive philosophical assertions concerning commonsense conventional objects that do not fall to the extreme of absolutism. Other Tibetan traditions asserted that Prasangika does not make any positive philosophical assertions, but just shows the absurd conclusions that follow from discursive conceptual thinking, in order to help practitioners go beyond conceptual thought to non-conceptual realization.
- Many of these other Tibetan traditions asserted Maha-Madhyamaka: Since the four extremes – truly established existence, non-truly established existent, both and neither – are all conceptual categories, then to gain non-conceptual cognition of voidness (emptiness), we need to realize voidness beyond words and concepts.
- Tsongkhapa uniquely asserted it is possible to have non-conceptual cognition of the voidness of truly established existence, which includes the voidness of all four extremes.
- To understand Tsongkhapa’s presentation of the correct view of selflessness and voidness in the tenet systems, we need to understand that voidness is a refutation of an impossible way to establish the existence of something and not a refutation simply of an impossible way in which something exists. Because a certain way of existing is impossible, it is impossible to establish that something exists by claiming it is because it exists in that impossible way. This is significant for correctly understanding Tsongkhapa’s unique presentation of the Prasangika assertion that the conventional existence of all validly knowable phenomena can only be established in terms of the mental labeling of them with categories and the designation of them with words. Otherwise, we may misunderstand his assertion as meaning all conventional phenomena exist only as what are mentally labeled with categories and designated with words. If that were the case, then the absurd conclusion would follow that all conventional phenomena are merely products of the conceptual processes of mental labeling and designation, which is not the intended meaning.
- Further, to understand the Prasangika refutation of self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyi grub-pa, existence established by something’s self-nature, inherent existence) – asserted by the Sautrantika, Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems – we need to understand the distinctions between the imputation of a person on the five aggregates, the mental labeling of the category “person” on the imputation of a person, and the designation of the word “person” on the category “person.”
- Self-established existence is defined within the context of mental labeling with categories and designation with words. These two occur only in conceptual cognition and entail, in the former case, a mental label (btags – an audio category [sgra-spyi] or object/meaning category [don-spyi]), a basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi) and a referent object (btags-chos), and in the latter case a designation (ming – a word or name), a basis for designation and a referent object. These need to be differentiated from the imputation of a nonstatic, noncongruent affecting variable (ldan-min ‘du-byed), such as a person, aging or impermanence (nonstaticness), or a static phenomenon other than a category, such as a space or voidness, on a basis for imputation. In such cases, the imputation phenomenon can be cognized both non-conceptually and conceptually and there is no referent object. Further, mental labels and words need to be labeled or designated by someone through conceptual cognition; imputations do not need to be imputed by anyone. They are just, in a sense, facts about their bases for imputation. Even non-conceptual cognition does not actively impute them: it just cognizes them.
| Imputation (person, impermanence, voidness) [knowable non-conceptually or conceptually] |
– | Basis for imputation |
| Mental label (category) [knowable only conceptually] |
Referent object | Basis for labeling |
| Designation (name or word) [knowable only conceptually] |
Referent object | Basis for designation |
| Referent “thing” (focal support) |
- Self-established existence means existence established by the fact that, in the context of mental labeling or designation, when we search for the referent “thing” (btags-don) – the actual “thing” referred to by a name or concept, corresponding to the names or concepts for something – it is findable as a focal support (dmigs-rten), backing up and, in a sense, holding up the referent object (btags-chos). The referent “thing” is findable on the side of the referent object. Its existence is established there by its self-establishing nature (rang-bzhin) on its own side. In other words, although all validly knowable objects have a self-nature (rang-bzhin), which in many cases is their functional nature; yet with grasping for self-established existence, we grasp at the self-nature of the referent object and mentally fabricate that it exists as a self-establishing nature. This renders the referent object into a referent “thing.”
- Prasangika refutes this with the correct understanding of dependent arising in terms of causes, parts and mental labeling with categories (concepts) and designation with words.
- Lower tenet systems help us to gradually understand the Prasangika position by progressively refuting more.