Assertions and Refutations of Self-Established Existence
The next verse states:
(IX.5) Functional phenomena are seen by the (common) world and conceptualized to be absolutely existent, and not like an illusion. It’s in this regard that there’s dispute between the yogis and the (common) world.
The ordinary, common world sees things, such as fire and so on, as having self-established natures of being hot and so on. They see functional phenomena, such as fire, as being true, because they explicitly see them. Because those who assert truly established functional phenomena directly see, with bare cognition, seeds giving rise to sprouts, they conceptualize that they are absolutely existent and accept that. But when you ask them do they comprehend the voidness, like an illusion, of what they take to be truly existent, then this is what the Madhyamikas and those who assert truly established functional phenomena debate about.
Both Madhyamikas and those who assert truly established functional phenomena accept what appears before their minds: fire having a nature of being hot and seeds giving rise to sprouts. Those who assert truly established functional phenomena, however, do not comprehend the voidness, like an illusion, of what they take to be truly existent, whereas Madhyamikas comprehend it. Because of that, there’s dispute between the yogis and the common world. The dispute is about it being like an illusion that things appear not to be established merely in terms of names.
The text goes on to refute the Sautrantikas and below, and then, on top of that, specifically to refute the many assertions of the Chittamatrins. Then it presents the Madhyamaka assertion of the pathway mind that apprehends voidness as being without need or ability to be disputed. After that, the text goes on to explain in terms of these three points: to be able to generate an arya pathway mind, the necessity for the discriminating awareness that apprehends no such thing as truly established existence; then the method for generating the discriminating awareness that apprehends voidness, the very nature of reality; and then making effort in that method.
Shantideva goes on:
(IX.6) But even form and so on, (as perceived by) straightforward cognition itself, is (established only) by popular consensus and not by valid cognition; and that’s false, like the popular consensus that what’s unclean and so forth is clean and so on.
Chittamatra and the tenet systems below – Sautrantika and so on – are called “those who assert truly established functional phenomena.” They say that if the existence of things is not self-established – if it is not established by inherent, self-establishing natures – then straightforward, bare cognition of sights and so on would not work. Prasangika, in contrast, asserts that the existence of things is not self-established, right? And so even though sights and so on are perceived with straightforward, bare cognition, Prasangika says they are established merely by popular consensus and are just conventions.
The others don’t accept that. They say that if things did not have self-established existence, then sights and so on – the five types of sensory objects – would not appear; they would not be seen. They can be seen only because they have inherent, self-established existence. Thus, they say that the reason why sights and so on can be perceived is because they have self-established existence.
Prasangika replies that even though sights and so on are seen, it is just by the popular consensus of the world that they are seen. That is all that can be said about them. Seeing them is valid cognition only from the point of view of surface, conventional truth, but it is not valid cognition from the point of view of voidness, the very nature of reality.
To repeat, they say that if sights and so on did not have self-established existence, they could not be seen. We say that there isn’t this fault, so their assertion needs to be refuted. Their perception of what appears is only valid from a conventional point of view, but not from the point of view of the actual nature or reality. This is the meaning of it being established only by popular consensus and not by valid cognition.
If perceiving self-established existence is an invalid cognition, then cognizing that there is no such thing as self-establishing existence is a valid cognition. But straightforwardly cognizing no such thing as self-establishing existence is what an arya’s total absorption cognizes. So, if straightforward, bare sensory cognition of self-established sights and so on validly cognized the actual way in which they exist, then there would be no need for an arya’s total absorption.
When sights and so on are perceived, they appear to have self-established existence, and this is what is seen with straightforward, bare sensory cognition. But that cognition is only valid by popular consensus in terms of what appears; it is invalid in terms of its cognition of what appears as actually being self-established. Straightforward, bare sensory cognition is a valid cognizer of only surface, conventional truth, but not of deepest truth.