Meditation on the Lack of an Impossible “Soul” of a Person

The Way to Train Ourselves to Place Our Absorbed Concentration on the Voidness That Is like Space

In general, there are many lines of reasoning (gtan-tshigs, Skt. hetu) to refute true independent existence. Such logical refutations establish or prove that there can be no such things as something that exists truly independently – truly independent of parts, causes, circumstances and the process of mental labeling. As beginners, however, if we search for an insight into voidness by relying on the specific line of reasoning “neither one nor many” (gcig du-bral-gyi gtan-tshigs, Skt. ekānekaviyoga-hetu), we will achieve certainty in our understanding more easily. Therefore, it is this dual line of reasoning that will be explained.

The formal statement of this logical refutation in terms of a sprout, for instance, is as follows. With respect to a sprout, there is no such thing as a true, inherent manner of existence because it cannot be established as either an inherently existing one or many.

From the point of view of mental labeling, a validly knowable object can be referred to correctly by either one or many applicable names. Consider the example of a certain man. His two daughters can both call him “father” or one of them can call him “father” today and also “father” tomorrow, and that would be one valid mental label. His mother, however, will call him “son,” his wife “husband,” and a mosquito will regard him as “lunch.” These are many labels, each valid from the side of the one who is labeling them. Whether this man is referred to by one or many names, either case is correct without any confusion or contradictions.

Now, if this man had true inherent existence from his own side, it must also be the case that he would have to be either one or many subjects. If he were only one object, “father,” for instance, then he would have to be “father” to everyone – his daughter, wife, the mosquito and so forth. He could not be the son of his mother; he could only be his mother’s father. This is absurd.

If, on the other hand, he were many objects from his own side regardless of mental labeling, then he could be any of these to anyone. He could be “lunch” for his daughter, “son” for the mosquito and so forth. This is equally preposterous.

If this man is neither one nor many objects from his own side, what is he? Clearly, he is unfindable and cannot be pinned down from his own side as anything or anyone. The only way he can exist as father, son, husband and lunch, without confusion or contradiction, is exclusively from the side of mental labeling, totally dependent and relative to who is labeling him, what the circumstances are and so forth. He is void of inherent existence from his own side. He has no true identity, neither one nor many.

This refutation may then be extended in terms of this man inherently existing from his own side as both a person and as five aggregate factors, instead of being in terms of some hypothetical man considered in relation to ourselves. It is logically approached by means of a four-point analysis (gnad-bzhi’i dpyad-pa):

1. The point of recognizing the object to be negated (dgag-bya nges-pa’i gnad, Skt. niṣedhya-viniścaya-marma)
2. The point of becoming convinced that the logical argument conclusively negates the object to be negated (khyab-pa nges-pa’i gnad, Skt. vyāpti-viniścaya-marma)
3. The point of becoming convinced that there can be no such thing as something that exists singly as one truly independent solitary unit (bden-pa’i gcig-bral nges-pa’i gnad, Skt. ekatva-viyukta-viniścaya-marma)
4. The point of becoming convinced that there can be no such thing as something that exists plurally as a group of many truly independent solitary units (bden-pa’i du-bral nges-pa’i gnad, Skt. anekatva-viyukta-viniścaya-marma).

[1] The point of recognizing the object to be negated

Shantideva has illustrated this point in Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior, IX.139ab:

When functional phenomena (labeled and) conceptually analyzed are not contacted, the nonfunctional phenomenon of their (nontrue existence) would (also) not be grasped.

To recognize the object to be negated (dgag-bya, Skt. pratiṣedhya), we must be able to see the difference between the conventional “me” and the false “me.” The conventional “me” (tha-snyad-pa’i gang-zag, conventional person) is that which is labeled onto a stream of continuity of aggregate factors of experience, its basis for labeling, and referred to by the name “me.” It does not exist inherently in this stream, nor is it ultimately findable there. Yet, it has the deceptive manner of appearing (snang-tshul) to exist truly independently and, thus, is a superficial truth (kun-rdzob bden-pa, Skt. saṃvṛtti-satya, conventional truth, relative truth). As a superficial truth, this mere appearance, this conventional “me,” is validly knowable; furthermore, its lack of a true independent manner of existence (gnas-tshul) is a validly knowable deepest truth (don-dam bden-pa, Skt. paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth).

Ordinary beings (so-so skye-bo, Skt. pṛthag-jana), lacking an understanding of voidness, do not realize that the conventional “me” only gives the appearance of existing truly independently. They assume that it actually does exist in this way. In fact, all limited beings in their state of unawareness are faced with an automatically arising grasping for truly established existence (bden-’dzin lhan-skyes, Skt. sahaja-satya-grāha). Moreover, certain people may advance intellectual theories to rationalize this innate assumption, resulting in doctrinally based grasping for truly established existence (bden-’dzin kun-btags, Skt. parikalpita-satya-grāha). Therefore, although ordinary beings do perceive the conventional “me” relatively, they assume they are seeing a “me” that is truly independent. Thus, what they assume they are seeing is the false “me,” which does not validly exist at all.

Stated more technically, when ordinary beings have bare cognition of the conventional “me,” this “me” is the object appearing (snang-yul) to their consciousness. Its manner of appearance is that it is established as inherently existing from the side where it is labeled to be (btags-sa’i ngos-nas grub-pa, gdags-gzhi’i ngos-nas grub-pa). Fooled by this, they immediately follow this perception with a conceptual cognition (rtog-pa, Skt. vikalpa) in which the appearing object is a mental representation of an inherently existent “me,” a “self-image.” The conceptually implied object (zhen-yul) is an actual inherently existing “me,” findable “out there,” in other words, the false “me.” However, there is no such thing; therefore, this conceptual cognition is distorted (log-shes, Skt. mithyā-jñāna), since its implied object does not validly exist at all, in addition to being deceptive (’khrul-shes, Skt. bhrānti-jñāna) because it confuses what appears to it with what is actually the case. [As cited by Akya Yongdzin in “A Compendium of Ways of Knowing: A Mirror to Clarify What Is to Be Adopted and What Is to Be Discarded” (Blo-rigs-kyi sdom-tshig blang-dor gsal-ba’i me-long).]

What ordinary beings see, then, and what they assume they are seeing are two totally different things. What they see, the conventional “me,” is validly existent; whereas, what they assume they are seeing, the false “me,” has never been validly existent at all. Therefore, the object to be negated is that the conventional “me” exists the way in which the false “me” is assumed to exist.

Unless we recognize what precisely is being negated, we will not be able to recognize the validity of the negative assertion refuting it. If we cannot see the target, we will be unable to hit it with an arrow; and if we cannot recognize who the thief is, we will be unable to capture him. Similarly, we must recognize with certainty the “me” that is to be negated.

The “me” that is to be negated, then, does not refer to our conventional “me” – that which is imputed onto our ever-changing aggregate factors and labeled with the name “me.” The object to be negated is that, on the one hand, our conventional “me” is merely a name referring to nothing whatsoever, which over-refutes it (khyab-che-ba), or on the other hand, that it is a findable self-nature within our aggregate factors that allows us to be labeled with a name, which under-refutes it (khyab-chung-ba). On a coarser level, the object to be negated is that our conventional “me” either is totally nonexistent and imaginary or is something substantial and permanent.

As a superficial truth, our conventional “me” in reference to any or all of our five aggregate factors does give the deceptive appearance of being a truly independent identity. Those who do not understand the actual way in which all things exist do not see that this identity is merely an appearance. They assume it actually to be the “real you” or the “real me,” truly independent, concrete and unchanging. Grasping for the true independent identity of others and regarding that which changes as being our own concrete ego-identity, we and others assume the conventional “me” to exist in the manner of a false “me.” Thus, under the influence of grasping for an impossible “soul” and the first of the deluded outlooks, we wander through samsara, bringing repeated suffering upon ourselves. The object to be negated, then, is that our conventional “me” exists in the way it is naively imagined to exist as some sort of truly independent, concrete ego-identity.

The following example illustrates the object to be negated. We are in a social gathering. Under the influence of our automatically arising grasping for “me” (ngar-’dzin lhan-skyes, Skt. sahaja-ahaṃkāra), we feel self-conscious and are nervous, worrying that the people there will not like us. According to our inclinations, we may perhaps act boisterously, speaking incessantly trying to occupy the center of others’ attention by amusing them. Or we may remain silent, withdrawing into ourselves and trying to be as inconspicuous as possible. If we follow the latter pattern, then with self-pity we may think, “What a shy person I am! Everyone must think I am dull and uninteresting, and they are right. This is the way I basically am; what can I do?”

At the particular moment in this particular situation, we do indeed give the appearance of being a quiet, shy person, and others may indeed label us dull and uninteresting. Not understanding the true way in which all things exist, however, and feeling insecure in our unawareness, we grasp to this mere appearance as being our true identity – the “real me.” Disregarding cause and effect, dependent arising and the process of mental labeling, our outlook is limited. We view ourselves out of context as a genuinely shy individual, and thus we feel lonely and unhappy.

Not considering causes, such as our previous actions that have resulted in our instincts for retiring from society and indulging in self-depreciation, we believe we are inherently shy and that we never have anything interesting to say. Not considering circumstances, such as what we have just done, how we feel, what we are now doing and what company we are in, we believe we are always shy – this is our unchanging nature. Not considering the process of mental labeling, such as what we or anyone else consider interesting, we believe that being a dull, shy person is the very entity of who we are. Thus, because of our own limited outlook, we isolate ourselves from others and from the possibility of change. We are unhappy thinking ourselves to be a shy person, but because we grasp at this independent identity and worry about making it secure, we are compelled to act out this self-imposed role. Thus, not only do we make ourselves miserable, but we also prevent ourselves from being able to think about others and work effectively for their sake.

The object to be negated, then, is that our conventional “me” with its seemingly independent appearance actually does exist truly independently as a false “me” would, inherently having a concrete, unchanging ego-identity.

If we have not examined our personal experiences or analyzed our own psychological make-up and are thus uncertain about our false “I” and its supposedly independent ego-identity, we will not be able to grasp with certainty its negation. For instance, if we were intent on catching a thief and someone said that he was a man who was wearing black clothes, unless we had seen him ourselves, we would be unable to recognize him with any certainty. Thus, we would be unable to capture him. Likewise, if we have never been to America ourselves, but have only heard or read others’ descriptions, we will be unable to recognize a valid criticism of it.

Therefore, we should not merely analyze any idea we might have of what a false “me” is, based on reading others’ explanations. We must examine our own personal experiences and, through introspection, investigate our own psychological make-up to see the mental representation we have of ourselves. In this way we will be able to recognize our false “me” and analyze an idea of a false “me” that is based on first-hand experience. 

Our conventional “me” and false “me” are very difficult to distinguish from one another. Our conventional “me” is merely that which is imputed onto our five aggregate factors and referred to by the name “me.” Ultimately, it cannot be found. The false “I,” on the other hand, is what the mental representation would refer to as a truly independent “me” projected onto and confused with this mere imputation of a “me.” Thus, the conventional “me” and the false “me” are in many respects like a screen and a motion picture. Paying so much attention to the motion picture and assuming it to be independent and real, we easily lose sight of the screen upon which it is being projected.

During times of strong emotion or stress, such as anger or fear, the “me” that is to be negated appears vividly. If we were in a crowd, for example, and someone were unjustly to accuse us of being a thief, we would react very strongly: “How dare you accuse me! I am completely innocent.” When we react to such experiences from the viewpoint of a “me” felt at that moment to be completely independent of anything else, this is an excellent opportunity to recognize with certainty the “me” that is to be negated.

If we are not perfectly sure of what it is we are negating, we will confuse the conventional and the false “me”s. Then, no matter how much we might think about the logical arguments proving that there can be no such thing as a “me” that exists truly independently, this may only serve to undermine and destroy our own understanding of and conviction in dependent arising and the law of cause and effect. Thus, we may fall to the extreme of nihilism (chad-ltar smra-ba, Skt. uccheda-vāda). When, through logical refutation, we stop projecting the motion picture of the false “me,” we are still left with the screen of the conventional “me” – although ultimately it cannot be found. If we have not differentiated the two “me”s from each other, however, then our arguments may leave us with nothing, neither the motion picture nor the screen.

If in a crowd someone accuses us unjustly of being a thief, and we relate the accusation to our false “I” rather than our conventional “me,” we feel, “I have just been slandered in front of all these people. What are they going to think of me?” We become very upset and regard the man who has accused us as our inherent enemy.

If, confusing the two “I”s, we nihilistically negate them both, we are left with even more confusion. We dissociate ourselves completely from the incident and deny any connection whatsoever with the man who has accused us. We regard him, in fact, as a madman shouting accusations into empty space.

On the other hand, if we separate our false “I” from our conventional “me” and negate the false “I” conclusively, we will realize that this accusation does refer to something, and, in fact, there are good reasons why this man is accusing us. The name “thief,” like the name “George,” “monk,” “man,” “limited being” and so forth, refers to our conventional “me” – that which is imputed on the basis of our ever-changing aggregate factors. The mental continuum of our aggregate factors is a continuity extending from beginningless lifetimes, propelled in accordance with the laws of dependent arising. 

Whenever a destructive event has occurred in the aggregate factors generated from our mental continuum, we could say in reference to the conventional “me” imputed upon it, “I have committed a destructive action.” Whenever suffering has occurred as a result of such actions, we could likewise say, “I am in pain.” The conventional “me” imputed in these two situations are not identical, but form a continuum connected by cause and effect. Therefore, if we are accused of being a thief, this accusation must refer to our present conventional “me” continuous from a previous one imputed when sometime in the past we had falsely accused a predecessor of this man ourselves. Thus, we are now experiencing the fruit of our actions, and that is why we are being accused. It is not that we have a truly independent “I” to defend, which could never possibly be a thief.

With these realizations we, therefore, feel grateful to our accuser for giving us an opportunity not only to exhaust the negative karmic consequences of our destructive actions in the past, but also to gain a clear look at the “I” to be negated. Instead of regarding this man, then, as an enemy or a madman, we view him as our true friend and guru teaching us patience and voidness. With such an attitude, we avoid destructive or closed-minded reactions and transform a potentially dangerous situation into one in which we can gain insight and develop compassion, remembering the kindness of others.

Therefore, it is indeed worth our while to spend month after month and even year after year meditating on this first point alone of the four-point voidness analysis. We must recognize with certainty precisely what it is that is being negated.

Not only must we recognize the object to be negated, but we must also recognize as well how it is being negated. In general, there are two ways of negating something, that is, two types of negative assertions that we can make about something, about “x” for instance. There is (1) the negative assertion, “this is not x,” and (2) the negative assertion, “there is no x.” Thus, there is the negation “this is not the false me,” and the negation “there is no false me.”

The definitions of these two types of negative assertions are given formally as follows.

• If by the very words of a negative assertion itself, some additional positive assertion is left postulated once the object to be negated has been negated, this is an implicative negation phenomenon (ma-yin dgag, Skt. paryudāsa-pratiṣedha).
• If no additional positive assertion is left postulated, this is a nonimplicative negation phenomenon (med-dgag, Skt. prasajya-pratiṣedha).

There are four kinds of implicative negation phenomena. Once the object to be negated has been negated, additional positive assertions can be left postulated either 

• Directly (chos-gzhan sgrub-pa dngos-su ’phen-pa’i ma-yin dgag). For example, “This is a plain without mountains.” Once we have negated the presence of mountains on the plain, our original negative assertion directly postulates, “This is a plain.” 
• Indirectly (chos-gzhan sgrub-pa shugs-la ’phen-pa’i ma-yin dgag). “The fat man does not eat during the day.” Once we have negated the fat man’s eating during the day, our original negative assertion indirectly postulates, “The fat man eats during the night.” This is because we have stated that he is fat.
• Both directly and indirectly (chos-gzhan sgrub-pa dngos-shugs gnyis-ka-la ’phen-pa’i ma-yin dgag). “The fat man with golden matted hair does not eat during the day.” Our negative assertion, once established, directly postulates, “The fat man has golden matted hair.” In addition, it indirectly postulates, “The fat man eats during the night,” because he is fat. 
• By inference based on prior knowledge (chos-gzhan sgrub-pa skabs-stobs-kyis ’phen-pa’i ma-yin dgag). “Prince Siddhartha is not a brahmin.” If we had prior knowledge that Prince Siddhartha was either of the brahmin or the royal caste, then once we had established that he is not a brahmin, postulated by inference is the positive assertion “prince Siddhartha is of the royal caste.”

There are two kinds of negative assertions of the “there is no x” type. They are  differentiated as to whether or not “x” itself is validly knowable as a superficial truth and the voidness of “x” is validly knowable as a deepest truth.

• Validly knowable (rang-gi dgag-bya shes-bya-la srid-pa’i med-dgag). For example, “There is no vase.” Vases are validly knowable. Therefore, to assert, “There is no vase,” is the same as asserting, “There is no vase present here and now.” Once this negative assertion has been established, however, there is nothing further postulated by the words of the assertion. Another example is space (nam-mkha’, Skt. ākāśa). Space is defined as a nonimplicative negation phenomenon in which there is nothing that can impede motion and be detected by the sense of touch. Tangible things that can impede motion are validly knowable. Once we have established that “there is nothing tangible that can impede motion present here and now,” there are no further positive assertions left postulated about an empty space.
• Not validly knowable (rang-gi dgag-bya shes-bya-la mi-srid-pa’i med-dgag). “There is no rabbit’s horn.” Rabbit’s horns are not validly knowable. To say, “There is no rabbit’s horns,” then, does not mean “there is no rabbit’s horn present here and now.” This is because only if a rabbit’s horn were validly knowable could it possibly be present or absent anywhere at any time. Rather, to assert, “There is no rabbit’s horn,” is the same as asserting, “There is no such thing as a rabbit’s horn.” Moreover, once this negative assertion has been established, there is nothing further left that is postulated.

Lack of an impossible “soul” of a person and voidness are both negative assertions of this last type. However, rather than negating a hypothetical object, such as a rabbit’s horn, they negate hypothetical modes of existence. Lack of an impossible “soul” of a person is the negation that “there is no such thing as a truly independent identity of a conventional me.” Voidness is the negation that “there is no such thing as a truly independent manner of existence with respect to anything validly knowable.” These negative assertions are refuting the possibility that their objects of negation – a truly independent identity of a person and a truly independent manner of existence with respect to anything validly knowable – could ever be validly known. Once their negations are proven, the words of their original statements do not postulate any further positive assertions.

Moreover, just as the establishment that “there is no such thing as a rabbit’s horn” does not prove “there is no such thing as a rabbit,” likewise, the establishment that “there is no such thing as a truly independent identity or a conventional I” does not prove that “there is no such thing as a conventional I.” In a similar manner, the establishment that “there is no such thing as a truly independent manner of existence with respect to anything validly knowable” does not prove that “there is no such thing as anything validly knowable.”

Therefore, it is important neither to over- or under-negate the object to be negated; otherwise, we fall to the extremes of nihilism or eternalism. If we over-negate the false manner of existence of the person, that is, if we over-negate the false “I” – we deny the conventional “me” as well and are left with nothing. If on the other hand, we under-negate it, then in the manner of an implicative negation phenomenon, we are left with an ultimately findable, truly existent conventional “me” as the basis for the negation (dgag-gzhi) and merely have negated a false manner of existence about it. This is the fallacy of the less accurate Buddhist positions. Thus, it is essential to understand how the Prasangika-Madhyamaka refutation is a true middle way, devoid of extremes.

[2] The point of becoming convinced that the logical argument conclusively negates the object to be negated

Previously, we have gained through introspection a clear idea of the self-image we hold and wish either to project to others or keep concealed. We have recognized that the inherently existent false “me” it implies is the object to be negated, not our conventional “me.” Also, we have understood how it is to be negated, namely with the negative assertion that there is no such thing, and how far to negate it, neither too much nor too little. Now we should proceed to the second of the four points of analysis to comprehend the logic that negates it.

In general, from the point of view of mental labeling, anything can be referred to by either one or many names. A person can be referred to simply as “me” or as “me,” “a father,” “a son,” “a student,” “a collection of five aggregate factors” and so forth. There is no third alternative but for one or many.

If this is true from the side of labeling, it should also be true from the side of what is labeled if such things were to exist inherently as findable objects in their own right. Thus, from its own side the object would also have to exist as either one or many things. How else could it exist in that way?

In terms of there being something that is labeled, such as a conventional “me,” and a basis for the labeling, namely streams of continuity or the five aggregate factors, these then could only be one or many. Either they would have to be one identical object, like from the side of labeling, the names “father” and “father” are identically the same, or they would have to be many objects completely distinct and different, like the names “father” and “I.” If neither is the case, and there is no alternative, then we can be sure that there is no such thing as a person labeled on five aggregate factors and forming with it an inherently existent and findable ego-identity, let alone a permanent one. This is the conclusion that must logically follow and to negate the false “I” we must convince ourselves of the validity of this line of reasoning.

[3] The point of becoming convinced that there can be no such thing as something that exists singly as one truly independent solitary unit

Once we have gained (1) a clear idea of an “I” that exists inherently from the side where it is labeled to be and (2) a conviction that if such an “I” labeled onto the five aggregate factors exists validly, it must do so as either one or many with them, otherwise it cannot exist validly at all, we should then proceed to the third point of the four-point voidness analysis.

Our ego-identity is based on labeling our conventional “me” onto any or all of our five aggregate factors, considering all the components involved as truly and inherently existent and identifying what is labeled with the basis for the labeling. If the “I” and the aggregate factors it is labeled on and identified with exist inherently from their own side, the first of the two only possible ways they could do so is as being one and the same object.

If this were the case, it would be impossible for the “I” and our aggregate factors ever to appear separately to our minds as different from each other or for us ever to be able to discern in them distinguishable parts. This is because being an inherently existent single object, they would have to form an indivisible homogeneous unit independent of parts.

Suppose we identified our “I” with our bodies as a whole. If accidentally we cut off our finger, we would be unable to remove it from our identity. What we referred to as “I” would be our entire body. Without this finger, we are no longer the same person. We are no longer “I.” Therefore, to preserve the integrity of our “I,” we would always have to carry this finger about with us, as likewise we would always have to carry with us all the hair and nails that have ever been cut from our bodies. Moreover, there would be no difference between washing our feet or our face – both would be washing our self. Thus, if our feet were dirty, and we washed our face, our feet should become clean.

If our “I” and our aggregate factors exist truly independently as a unit, then they should exist as such independent of causes and circumstances. Thus, our ego-identity would not only be singular and partless, but it would be permanent as well, concrete and unchanging. If we identified our “I” with our bodies as a healthy youth, then when we were sick or grew old, we would no longer be ourselves and no one would be able to recognize us. It would be impossible for us to admit, “I am sick,” or “I am old.” Moreover, if we felt depressed and unhappy, and we viewed this state through the distorting glasses of true independent existence, then there would be no way for us ever to feel happy – our depression would be permanent.

If our “I” forms a unit with our aggregate factors, then since there are five aggregate factors, we would have to say either there are five “I”s or there is only one aggregate. By meditating on these and other examples of absurd conclusions we must draw when we analyze with logic the conception we have of our own false “I” – Do we indeed have a single, specific, concrete, unchanging ego-identity that really does hold true no matter what? – we will see that it is untenable to believe that our “I” and our aggregate factors exist truly independently as one solitary unit to form a truly independent individual.

When we have understood this, we have reached the point of having become convinced that there is no such thing as something that exists singly as one truly independent solitary unit.

[4] The point of becoming convinced that there can be no such thing as something that exists plurally as a group of many truly independent solitary units

If our “I” and our five aggregate factors exist truly independently – and we have already become convinced by the previous line of reasoning that they cannot exist in this way sharing a common identical self-nature – the only alternative left is that they exist truly independently constituting separate individual points of reference of their own. Thus, they should be validly known to exist completely separate from each other as totally independent things. This alternative, however, is also illogical and unacceptable.

If this alternative were true, then it would be possible for us to remove our five aggregate factors and still be left with something we could identify as our truly independent “I” – something that had no relation whatsoever to our five aggregate factors. If there were a heterogeneous group made up of three separate animals – a goat, a sheep and a bull – and from this group we removed the goat and the sheep, we would still be left with a clearly recognizable bull. In the same manner, we should be able to remove one by one our aggregate of form, our aggregate of feeling and so on, and still be left with something findable we could refer to as “I.” However, in fact there is nothing left over when we remove our five aggregate factors; there is no truly independent “I” to be found in this way. Likewise, when we step away from a mirror, there is no truly independent image of an “I” that remains in the mirror for others to see.

Thus, we cannot prove that our “I” and our five aggregate factors exist truly independently, on their own, from their specific findable points of reference, separate and independent of each other as well as of everything else. This point is easily demonstrated by the fact that when we burn our hand we feel, “I am in pain.” This proves that there is indeed some relationship between an event occurring in our five aggregate factors and what we refer to as “I” – they cannot be totally dissociated from one another.

When we have understood this, we have reached the point of having become convinced that there is no such thing as something that exists plurally as a group of many truly independent solitary units.

Having formulated a clear mental picture of what is definitely being negated, having placed this at the center of our attention without letting it fade away and having analyzed it with the line of reasoning “neither one nor many” as above, we have now become convinced that neither of these two positions can be validly established. The conventional “me” and the five aggregate factors upon which it is imputed cannot be established as existing truly independently either as one or as many – either singly as one truly independent solitary unit or plurally as a group of many truly independent solitary units. The conclusion we must now draw upon gaining this realization is illustrated as follows.

We think that a bull has wandered down a particular road, which forks and each fork leads directly into an enclosed field. Not trusting someone else’s report that there is no bull in either of these fields, we proceed to look for this bull ourselves. We search for it high and low in each of these two fields but are unable to find it. The inescapable conclusion will then vividly dawn on us that the bull we had in mind to search for never truly existed at all.

A similar thing happens when we apply the four-point voidness analysis to our sense of a truly independent “I.” This so-called truly independent concrete “I,” which has been the implied object of our automatically arising grasping for “me” and which up until now we have assumed we could virtually see with our own eyes and hold in our hands – we are forced to conclude that this “I” never truly existed at all. It was merely like a motion picture hero projected on a screen whom we believed to be real and with whom we identified. When we become vividly convinced, “It was an empty hoax all along; there never was such an “I” that truly existed in this way,” then we have found an understanding of the Madhyamaka theory of voidness. We have understood the lack of an impossible “soul” of a person. What is imputed on our aggregate factors and referred to by the name “I” is not anything truly existent at all. It cannot be ultimately found.

At such a time, intellectual people (dbang-rnon) who gain this understanding from having built up the habit of thinking logically about voidness in meditation feel as if they had found a cherished treasure. More emotionally inclined people (dbang-rtul), on the other hand, who have gained their understanding without having built up such a strong habit of logical analysis experience great fear, as if they had suddenly lost a great treasure. This latter reaction, however, is not a mistake; it is a common occurrence.

There have been occasions in the past of disciples exhibiting great fear upon first understanding voidness. When Tsongkhapa was delivering a discourse on Madhyamaka theories at the hermitage of Sera Choding (Se-ra Chos-sdings), for instance, Gyu Sherab Sengge (rGyud Shes-rab seng-ge) (1383–1445), the founder of Gyume Lower Tantric College (rGyud-smad Grva-tshang), become frightened when he first gained such an insight. When Tsongkhapa noticed him suddenly clutch at his collar, he was very pleased and said to the crowd, “The man from Narthang (sNar-thang) has confirmed the valid existence of the superficial level of truth on his collar.” It is recorded that when Ngulchu Dharmabhadra (dNgul-chu Dharmabhadra) (1772–1851) was giving a discourse on voidness, many of his disciples became very frightened as well. 

[For a further comprehensive discussion of voidness, see: His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, “A Key to the Middle Way” (dBu-ma’i lde-mig).]

When we have become logically convinced that there is no such thing as the object of negation – an inherent manner of existence with respect to our conventional “me” – we should cut our misconception of one like decisively slicing a taut rope. We should then totally immerse our absorbed concentration in the negation phenomenon of the absence of this totally nonexistent object of negation, like plunging a spear into a target.

This total absorption has two distinguishing characteristics. From the side of conviction (nges-ngo), it is a decisive awareness (nges-shes, ascertaining consciousness) that there is no such thing as inherent existence. From the side of appearance (snang-ngo), it is the utter bareness (stong-sangs) of the total absence of the object of negation. Thus, because it has an active aspect of understanding, an exceptionally perceptive state of mind focused on voidness is not blank-minded. And because it has an aspect of bareness, it is not involved with the deceptiveness of conventional appearances. It is focused here exclusively on the deepest level of truth in which the manner of appearance is the same as the manner of existence, namely there is nothing findable. Keeping these two characteristics in mind, then, we should meditate single-pointedly on the lack of an impossible “soul” of our person with great mindfulness so as not to lose either aspect. 

Should the strength of our mental hold weaken or the clarity begin to fade, we should assess the situation to determine whether or not to lift our absorbed concentration from this fading state. If we do decide to break from it, we should switch to repeating the four-point analysis with discerning meditation (dpyad-sgom, Skt. vicāra-bhāvanā, analytical meditation). Then, when we have gained a refreshed decisive understanding of voidness, having freshly negated inherent existence and absented the object of negation, we should plunge our absorbed concentration back into stabilizing meditation (’jog-sgom, Skt. bhāvanāti-ṣṭhāpanā, fixating meditation) on this state of sharp focus characterized by both conviction and lack of conventional appearance.

This state is referred to as total absorption on the voidness that is like space (nam-mkha’ lta-bu’i mnyam-bzhag). This is because both voidness and space are total absences or vacuums emptied of their respective objects of negation, both being nonimplicative negation phenomena. In the case of space, it is the absence of anything tangible that can impede motion, whereas voidness is the absence of inherent existence. Thus, the former negates something validly knowable, while the latter negates something that does not exist at all. The absence of tangibility and obstructibility allows for objects to obtain in three dimensions, taking up space where they are located, otherwise their existence in space and motion would be blocked. The absence of inherent existence, such that nothing can ultimately be found existing from its own side, allows for objects to function and be known, otherwise everything would be concrete and self-sufficient, as if enclosed within a solid black line, totally unrelatable to anything else. Thus, as there are both similarities and differences, voidness is said to be like space, not the same as space.

During this meditative absorption on the absence of an inherent manner of existence with respect to our conventional “me,” there is no appearance of superficial truths, such as our conventional “me” itself as the basis for this negation. We should not become frightened, however, into thinking that it has become nonexistent or that our meditative awareness is somehow invalid. Our conventional “me” is merely an occluded phenomenon (khegs-pa) in this situation.

When our ear consciousness validly hears a sound but does not perceive a form, this does not mean that it is defective or that the form does not exist. Forms are occluded with respect to it and beyond its sphere, and that is all. Likewise, a valid consciousness perceiving the deepest truth is specific and cannot also cognize a conventional appearance. This requires a separate valid consciousness that perceives superficial truths. Only a Buddha has simultaneous cognition of both levels of truth. Therefore, when we lose sight of our conventional “me” when focused on its voidness of inherent existence, we should not worry, feeling that we must search for it in fear of falling to a nihilist position. Rather, we should proceed to the next stage in developing an exceptionally perceptive state of mind as follows.

The Way to Train Ourselves to Continue This State of Mind Subsequent to Our Total Absorption When All Is like Conjured Illusion

Previously, whenever we perceived the conventional “me” labeled onto our five aggregate factors and an appearance of it as being inherently existent dawned on our consciousness, we then confused it with a mental representation of an inherently existent “I,” our self-image, and projected its implied object, our false “I,” onto the situation. Then in our unawareness and confusion, trying either to defend or assert this concrete “I,” we have caused ourselves and others much unsought suffering. However, now with the four-point analysis we have proven to ourselves that our conventional “me” can have no such thing as an inherent manner of existence, and that there is no such thing as the implied object of this distorted conceptualization. In stabilizing meditation, we have focused on the absence of this false “I” and our conviction in its total nonexistence.

When we arise from our total absorption, during the subsequent attainment (rjes-thob, post-meditation) phase, we again perceive the conventional “me” and again the object that dawns on our consciousness is an appearance of it as being inherently existent. However, this time, with our growing familiarity with being mindful of voidness, we are no longer fooled by it and do not proceed to conceive of it as actually existing in the manner it appears. We realize that our conventional “me” is like a conjured illusion (sgyu-ma, Skt. māyā) in that neither can be found abiding in the place where they seem to exist. Neither exists under their own power from their own side. We are now like the conjurer rather than his gullible audience, because although our magic still appears to us also, giving the illusion of being concrete and real, we know for sure it is not so.

Therefore, now we can have unhampered bare cognition of the conventional “me” validly labeled onto our five aggregate factors. We know that when closely examined, it cannot be found existing from its own side, like an illusion; yet when we stand back and watch, miraculously it functions, like a conjured horse or elephant prancing up and down. It commits constructive and glowing and murky karma and experiences their respective results. And this it all does precisely because it is void of inherent existence. If it were self-sufficient, concrete and real, as it appears to be, it could never function to do anything. It would be frozen into a static, findable object.

Thus, rather than prevent the functioning of cause and effect, voidness is what makes it possible. The superficial level of truth, then, namely the world of appearances, lacks truly established existence (bden-med, Skt. asatya), being deceptive (’khrul-ba, Skt. bhrānta) and concealing (kun-rdzob, Skt. saṃvṛtti) in the sense that it cannot ultimately be found, and its manner of appearance is different from its manner of existence, and the latter is concealed from the valid consciousness perceiving it. Nevertheless, it functions non-fallaciously (mi-bslu-ba), faultlessly (skyon-med) and unmistakably (bsnyon-med). Therefore, in this qualified sense it is a valid level of truth, yet everything of it is like an illusion.

There are several differences, however, between the conventional “me” and a conjured illusion. The five aggregate factors are a fit basis for what is labeled with the name “I,” whereas a conjurer’s magic is not a fit basis for what is thought to be “a real live horse.” The conjured illusion of a horse is a distorted superficial truth (log-pa’i kun-rdzob), like a mirage, an image in a mirror, a hallucination or a dream. Even without an understanding of voidness, an ordinary person can realize that such a horse does not exist the way it appears. The conventional “me,” on the other hand, is an accurate superficial truth (yang-dag kun-rdzob). Only with an understanding of voidness can we realize that its appearance and its actual manner of existence are not the same. Moreover, the conventional “me” experiences the effects of its actions, whereas an illusory horse does not. Therefore, all conventional phenomena are like conjured illusions, not the same as conjured illusions.

Thus, in addition to our previous understanding of the voidness that is like space, we will come to see that all things as mere appearances do function conventionally in terms of dependent arising and that cause and effect does operate without any obstacles. We will be able to understand voidness while at the same time keeping the conventional operation of dependent arising in view.

Dependent arising, in a coarse sense, refers to how everything arises through dependence on a process of twelve links ranging over several lifetimes. On a subtle level to say that everything is dependent arising, however, means that all collected phenomena arise dependent on causes and circumstances, and on a subtler level that everything validly knowable, whether nonstatic or static, arises dependent on parts, and on an even more subtle level they all arise dependent on mental labeling. All knowable phenomena are merely what labels, not necessarily verbal ones, refer to on the basis of a valid basis for labeling, and nothing can ultimately be found existing from the side where it is labeled to be.

Thus, because all things are dependent arising, in other words, because they are merely what labels refer to, they are void of inherent existence. Because they are void and do not exist from their own side, they are merely what names refer to as dependent arising. Thus, while appearing, everything is void; and while being void, everything appears. However, even further than that: because of appearing, everything is void; and because of being void, everything appears. To understand this is known as the “dawning of voidness in the sense of dependent arising” (stong-pa rten-’byung-gi don-du shar-ba). It is the significance of the well-known line from the Heart Sutra, “Form – voidness; voidness – form. Form not separate from voidness; voidness not separate from form.”

[See: The Heart Sutra]

By cultivating seeing in total absorption the voidness that is like space and afterwards everything like conjured illusion, we will eventually be able to overcome our doctrinally based and automatically arising grasping, and finally their instincts, so that we can perceive the two together at all times whether or not in meditation. Having practiced both discriminating awareness and skillful methods, completed the networks of deep awareness and positive force, and developed both deepest and conventional bodhichittas in this way, we will have simultaneous realizations of the two truths. This comes only with the attainment of enlightenment.

A Buddha has neither gross nor subtle mind. It is in this sense that he has no ordinary mind (sems, Skt. citta) and is not a limited being (sems-can, Skt. sattva, sentient being). A Buddha has only the subtlest level of mind, which is so fine there can be no appearance to it of inherent existence. Thus, as a Buddha we see everything non-conceptually with omniscience and, unlike an arya or an arhat during his subsequent attainment, phenomena will not even appear to us as inherently existent, let alone do we feel that this appearance corresponds to reality. To work up to this state, however, we should practice as above, seeing everything as conjured illusion after arising from total absorption on voidness. 

Tsongkhapa has said in The Abbreviated Points of the Graded Path, 23:

Having meditated both on space-like voidness during total absorption and on illusion-like voidness as the subsequent realization, combining them into a joined pair as awareness and method is acclaimed as “going to the far shore of bodhisattva behavior.” From realizing it’s like that, being discontent with (achieving) a one-sided pathway of mind is the tradition of those with good fortune (to attain enlightenment).

The ennobling, impeccable Lama has practiced like that. Let me, too, who strives for liberation, cultivate myself in the same way.

The lack of an impossible “soul” of a person that exists by mental labeling alone can be understood on two levels. Thus, there are understandings of gross and subtle lack of an impossible “soul.” Gross lack of an impossible “soul” (gang-zag-gi bdag-med rags-pa) refers to the fact that the conventional “me” imputed on the aggregate factors is void of an ego-identity having a substantial basis that can exist independently completely on its own, as something that lords over the aggregate factors. This is as much as the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas can understand. Although this is not the most profound understanding, it is still correct.

Subtle lack of an impossible “soul” (gang-zag-gi bdag-med phra-mo) refers to the fact that the conventional “me” imputed on the aggregate factors is void of existing by its own definition, which is the same as saying that it is void of existing inherently from its own specific self-nature. Of the four Buddhist schools of theories, only the Prasangika-Madhyamikas can understand this. The fact, then, that the aggregate factors of experience and so forth are also void of existing by their own definition is the subtle lack of an impossible “soul” of all phenomena.