Details of Ways of Knowing: 10 Bare Cognition

Extensive Explanation of “Compendium of Ways of Knowing”

Other languages

The Involved and Appearing Objects of Non-Conceptual and Conceptual Cognition

The ways of knowing that take as their appearing objects objective entities and metaphysical entities are, respectively, bare cognition and conceptual cognition.

Objective entities (rang-mtshan) – literally, “individually characterized phenomena” – are mutually inclusive with nonstatic phenomena and are defined as those existent phenomena that are affected by causes and conditions and are able to produce an effect. Included are all forms of physical phenomena, all ways of being aware of something and all noncongruent affecting variables. Metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan), on the other hand – literally, “generally characterized phenomena” – are mutually inclusive with static phenomena and are defined as those existent phenomena that are unaffected by causes and conditions and are incapable of producing any effects. They include audio categories, object categories, analytical stoppings, nonanalytical stoppings, spaces, absences and the two types of selflessness of persons. Non-existent phenomena are also incapable of producing any effect, but because they are not existent, they are not static. The categories of being static or nonstatic are irrelevant with respect to non-existent phenomena.

Further, all cognitions have and take objects continually, both appearing objects and involved objects:

  • Their appearing object (snang-yul) is the direct object (dngos-yul) that arises in the cognition, as if it were directly in front of the consciousness (blo-ngor). 
  • Their involved object (jug-yul) is the main object with which they engage. 

Non-Conceptual Cognition

Sensory bare cognition, mental bare cognition and yogic bare cognition, which are all non-conceptual, also all have a focal object (dmigs-yul), the object at which they are aimed. The focal object is always an objective entity that exists prior to the cognition of it and, in the case of sensory cognition, exists externally to the cognition. This is the case whether the bare cognition is valid, subsequent or, in the case of sensory bare cognition and mental bare cognition, non-determining. 

The focal object casts an aspect (rnam-pa) of itself on the consciousness. This aspect, or mental impression, which is also an objective entity, is somewhat like a mental hologram and is totally transparent. Through it, the focal object appears clearly to the consciousness. The mental hologram is the appearing object of the cognition and is also known as the cognitively taken object (gzung-yul). The mental hologram is the mental derivative (gzugs-brnyan, mental reflection) of the focal object and includes all aspects of it. Because, in the case of the focal object being an external commonsense object, such as a clay jug, these aspects include such noncongruent affecting variables as the jug’s gross impermanence, such a mental hologram itself would be a noncongruent affecting variable. As such, it appears with the form of the aspect cast on the sensory consciousness by the external object that serves as the focal object of the cognition.

Although all aspects and features of the appearing object are cognitively taken, you normally do not pay attention to all of them simultaneously. The aspects and features within the domain of the appearing object that you pay attention to are the involved objects of the cognition. 

When these three types of bare cognition explicitly apprehend their involved object – which is only the case when they are either valid bare cognitions or subsequent bare cognitions – that explicitly apprehended involved object, for instance “this object,” appears as part of the mental hologram that arises in the cognition. When, in addition, they implicitly apprehend another involved object, such as “not that other object,” the implicitly apprehended involved object does not appear. Thus, the explicit portion of a non-conceptual apprehension has an appearing object, while the implicit portion does not have an appearing object.

Bare cognition by reflexive awareness, which is always non-conceptual, also takes as its focal, appearing and involved objects objective entities, but only the primary consciousness and mental factors of the cognition it is part of, when that cognition is a non-conceptual one. This is the case whether the bare cognition by reflexive awareness is valid, subsequent or non-determining. Thus, cognition by reflexive awareness in a non-conceptual cognition has a separate appearing object of its own and does not cognize the appearing object of the non-conceptual cognition in which it occurs. 

Conceptual Cognition

The appearing object in conceptual cognition that is as if directly in front of the mental consciousness is always a metaphysical entity, namely a category or, in addition to a category, an absence such as a space or the selflessness of a person. This is the case whether the conceptual cognition is valid, such as valid inferential cognition, or invalid, such as subsequent inferential cognition or presumptive cognition. In the case of a category – for instance, “clay jugs” – the appearing object is a static mental derivative of all individual items, all clay jugs, that fit in that category. Being static, the metaphysical entity has no form and therefore cannot actually appear in the cognition. Its presence in the conceptual cognition, however, makes whatever is cognized through it appear unclearly, being partially veiled. Thus, the metaphysical objects that are the appearing objects of conceptual cognition are said to be semi-transparent. 

The static category “clay jugs” arises in the conceptual cognition as a static isolator (ldog-pa), specifically as a conceptual exclusion of everything that does not fit in the category (blo’i gzhan-sel) – everything that is not a clay jug. As an implicative negation phenomenon (ma-yin dgag), in excluding all non-“clay jugs,” it explicitly tosses in its wake (shul) – like the footprint the exclusion leaves – a static generic appearance (snang-ba) representing all clay jugs. But being a static phenomenon, this generic appearance has no form. What actually appears in the conceptual cognition is a nonstatic mental hologram, an aspect (rnam-pa) of the generic clay jug representing what it might look like. This mental hologram, an objective entity, is the conceptually implied object (zhen-yul) and also the involved object of the conceptual cognition.

This conceptually implied object is not an aspect (rnam-pa) cast onto the mental consciousness by some external objective clay jug. Even if an actual clay jug is present and is taken as the focal object of a visual bare cognition, that clay jug does not serve as the focal object of a conceptual cognition that may follow. This is the case even if the visual cognition of the clay jug continues while simultaneously conceptionally thinking something obscure about it, such as its being a nonstatic phenomenon. The external clay jug, whether still seen or not, is merely the basis clung to (zhen-gzhi) by the conceptually implied object. The locus of the conceptual implication (zhen-sa), however, is the static category “clay jugs,” the appearing object. Conceptual cognitions do not have focal objects.

Like a mental hologram in a bare cognition, the conceptually implied object is fully transparent. Thus, if the basis clung to – the external object conceptualized about – is present and simultaneously cognized non-conceptually by a separate visual cognition, the conceptionally implied object that appears in the conceptual cognition does not block the appearance of this external object that arises as the appearing object of the simultaneous visual cognition. Nevertheless, because the partially veiled appearance that arises in the conceptual cognition overlays the appearance that arises in the simultaneous visual cognition, the non-conceptual appearance is not vivid, even if the conceptual appearance accurately resembles the non-conceptual one. The non-conceptually cognized external object, however, is neither the focal object, the appearing object nor the involved object of the conceptual cognition.

In sensory bare cognition, the mental hologram that appears as the appearing object reflects all the aspects and features of the external focal object, although not all of those features are taken as the involved object. Furthermore, both appearing object and involved object are objective entities. In conceptual cognition, on the other hand, the mental hologram – namely, the conceptionally implied object – that appears as the involved object is not the same as the appearing object. Only the mental hologram is an objective entity; the appearing object is a metaphysical entity, a category. Thus, also unlike with bare cognition, the involved object in a conceptual cognition is not also part of the appearing object. The involved object in a conceptual cognition, the conceptually implied object – an object that clings to an external object conceptualized about – only resembles certain aspects and features of that basis clung to. Conceptual semblances of only these aspects and features constitute the involved object.

When the conceptual cognition is an apprehension – which occurs only with valid inferential cognition and subsequent inferential cognition – the conceptual cognition explicitly apprehends its involved object, the objective conceptually implied object. The mental consciousness of the conceptual apprehension does not apprehend the metaphysical entities that are its appearing objects. Only objective entities can be apprehended.

When the reflexive awareness that is part of the conceptual apprehension non-conceptually and explicitly apprehends the mental consciousness and mental factors of the conceptual cognition as its involved object, it implicitly apprehends also as its involved objects the metaphysical entities that are the appearing objects of the conceptual cognition. The reflexive awareness apprehends them because the metaphysical entities in a conceptual cognition share the same essential nature (ngo-bo) as the consciousness and mental factors of the cognition. 

For example, in the apprehension of the empty space that you can walk through between the two doorposts of an open door, first you have visual bare cognition explicitly apprehending the two doorposts and the in-between area (bar-snang). Note that the in-between area is an objective entity like the two door posts. Then, you have a conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends the conceptually implied object, a mental hologram resembling the doorposts and in-between area, through three metaphysical entities as the appearing objects: the object category “doorposts,” the object category “in-between area” and a space (the absence of anything tangible that would obstruct an object occupying this in-between area). 

The reflexive awareness of this conceptual cognition implicitly apprehends these three metaphysical entities with bare cognition while explicitly apprehending the mental consciousness and accompanying mental factors of this conceptual cognition. Although the conceptual cognition is deceptive, the implicit non-conceptual apprehension of the empty space by reflexive awareness is not deceptive. It does not cognize the empty space through either the object category of an empty space or a mental appearance of an empty space. 

Then, once more you have the visual bare cognition explicitly apprehending the two doorposts and in-between area while simultaneously also having the conceptual cognition of the two doorposts, in-between area and empty space that you can walk through. With the visual bare cognition and simultaneous conceptual cognition considered as a whole, it can be said that the visual bare cognition explicitly apprehends the door post and in-between area and implicitly apprehends the empty space.

You can apprehend another metaphysical entity, the absence of a clay jug on the tabletop, a static nonimplicative negation phenomenon, in a similar manner, implicitly, with the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition of the tabletop and empty space on top of it following visual bare cognition of these two objective entities. 

Distorted Non-Conceptual Cognition

Non-conceptual cognition includes valid, subsequent, non-determining and distorted varieties:

  • Non-conceptual sensory cognition and non-conceptual mental cognition have all four varieties
  • Non-conceptual yogic cognition and non-conceptual cognition by reflexive awareness lack distorted varieties
  • Non-conceptual yogic cognition lacks a non-determining variety as well. 

All varieties of non-conceptual cognition take objective entities as their focal objects. The appearing objects in the undistorted ones are also objective entities, namely mental holograms that are accurate reflections of all aspects of their focal objects. But what about the appearing objects in the distorted varieties?

Consider first distorted non-conceptual sensory cognition, for example the visual cognition that focuses near-sightedly on an objective entity, such as a clay jug. Although the focal object, the clay jug, is an existent objective entity, the manner of cognitively taking it (dzin-stangs) is deceptive, since the appearance of a blurred clay jug as the distorted cognition’s “own object” is not an appearance of the next moment of the external clay jug; it does not correspond to objective reality. 

A blurred jug is not an objective entity; nevertheless, the mental hologram of a blurred jug, which is the involved object of the distorted cognition, is an existent objective entity and therefore is the appearing object of this cognition. The same analysis applies to the hallucination of a mirage of water in the desert. Although the hallucinated water does not exist, the mental hologram of water that arises in the distorted cognition does objectively exist as the involved object and is also the appearing object. 

In summary then, just as the appearing object of all valid, subsequent and non-determining non-conceptual cognitions are objective entities, so too are the appearing objects of all distorted non-conceptual cognitions. Thus, when the text says, The ways of knowing that take as their appearing objects objective entities … are… bare cognition, this is merely a general statement and not one of mutual inclusion. Bare cognition and the appearing object being an objective entity are a one-way pervasion. If it is a bare cognition, it is pervasive that the appearing object is an objective entity. But since bare cognition does not include distorted non-conceptual cognition and since the appearing object of distorted non-conceptual cognition is an objective entity, it is not pervasive that if an objective entity is the appearing object of a cognition, it is the appearing object of a bare cognition. It could be the appearing object of a distorted non-conceptual cognition. 

Top