The Ceasing of Conceptual Fabrication: Nyingma Explanation
Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche II: So, now in the commentary, it looks like of the two conceptual fabrications, the first conceptual fabrication is the grasping for truly established existence [as is usually explained in sutra]; it’s not directly said [like Gelugpa asserts] that conceptualization is incorrect consideration. For the second conceptual fabrication, we don’t directly have it as the objects that are grasped at as having truly established existence [as Gelugpa also asserts]. It doesn’t say, “the truly established existence of a jug.” It directly says, “jug.”
So now, let’s read starting from this line in Chandrakirti’s commentary:
Like that, karmic impulses and disturbing emotions, as many as there are, originate from conceptualization.
“What are those conceptualizations?” he says. [According to Nyingma] they are the assorted conceptual fabrication of objects; they are conceptualizations that are the conceptual fabrication of the existence of objects.
So Chandrakirti (Skt. Candrakīrti) says:
and those conceptualizations are, in fact, assorted conceptual fabrications habituated to from beginningless samsara.
Now, he brings in everything: “a cognizing mind (shes-pa) and an object cognized (shes-bya).” So, this is everything.
In the Nyingma tradition, they don’t use “cognizing mind.” I mean they say, “cognizing mind,” but cognizing mind is not used in relation to higher beings. It is for sentient beings. The term “rigpa” (rig-pa; pure awareness) is used in sutra for the arya (Skt. ārya) pathway minds (lam).
They arise from what has the individual defining characteristic mark of a cognizing mind and an object cognized, something spoken and something that speaks, something that does (something) and something done, function and what functions, jug, pillar, cloth, crown, chariot, form, feeling, woman, man, gain, loss, happiness, sadness, fame, disgrace, censure, praise, and so on.
“What has the individual defining characteristic mark” (mtshan-nyid-can) – that refers to grasping for truly established existence. Conceptualization arises from that.
Dr. Berzin: So, here, does “something having an individual defining characteristic mark” mean grasping for existence established by something’s individual defining characteristic mark (mtshan-nyid-gyis grub-pa)?
Yes, yes. They arise from being established as in grasping for truly established existence (bden-par ’dzin-pa’i grub-pa de-las skye-pa). It could be like that.
Dr. Berzin’s Supplement to Fill Out the Discussion
According to Prasangika (Skt. Prāsaṅgika), truly established existence, existence established by something’s individual defining characteristic mark, and self-established existence (existence established by a self-establishing nature) are synonymous. Furthermore:
- For Nyingma, grasping for truly established existence means grasping for conventional objects – both for the appearance of what they are and for the appearance of them as having their existence established by their individual defining characteristic marks.
- For Gelugpa, it means grasping for self-established conventional objects – meaning grasping for the existence of conventional objects as being established by their individual defining characteristic marks.
Both understandings can be derived from the above passage from Chandrakirti.
The original Sanskrit of the passage reads:
Like that, karmic impulses and disturbing emotions proceed from conceptualization. And due to habituation from beginningless samsaric existence, these conceptualizations arise from assorted conceptual fabrications having the individual defining characteristic mark of a cognizing mind and an object cognized, something spoken and something that speaks, something that does (something) and something done, function and what functions, jug, pillar, cloth, crown, chariot, form, feeling, woman, man, gain, loss, happiness, sadness, fame, disgrace, censure, praise, and so on.
The passage has the word “conceptualization” twice and “conceptual fabrication” only once. Tibetan makes the identification of conceptualization and conceptual fabrication explicit, whereas it is only implicit in the original Sanskrit.
In terms of the Nyingma interpretation:
- In the Tibetan version, both “conceptualizations” refer to the conceptual fabrication that is conventional objects. “What has the individual defining characteristic mark” implicitly refers to a second type of conceptual fabrication – namely, grasping for conventional objects.
- In the original Sanskrit version, the first “conceptualization” implicitly refers to the conceptual fabrication that is conventional objects, while the second “conceptualization” implicitly refers to the conceptual fabrication that is grasping for conventional objects.
To understand how Gelugpa and Nyingma derive their different interpretations of Chandrakirti’s passage, we need to look once more at the earlier commentaries to Nagarjuna’s verse.
The commentary attributed to Nagarjuna reads:
They arise from the conceptual fabrication that has the individual defining characteristic mark of clinging to conventional truth.
The term “clinging” (mngon-par zhen-pa) is related to the term “implied object” (zhen-yul), the object entered into, adhered to, and clung to by conceptual cognition – in other words, the conceptualized object that is being thought of. Thus, “clinging” here can mean “conceptualizing.” Thus, “the conceptual fabrication that has the individual defining characteristic mark of clinging to conventional truth” denotes “the conceptual fabrication that has the individual defining characteristic mark of conceptualizing conventional truth.”
- For Nyingma, the conceptual fabrication is “thinking up” conventional objects.
- For Gelugpa, the conceptual fabrication is “thinking up” the self-established existence of conventional objects.
Conceptual cognition is always accompanied with grasping for self-established existence, whether understood in the Nyingma or the Gelugpa manner. “Grasping” (‘dzin-pa), as explained before, means:
- To cognize the conceptual representation of conventional objects in the case of Nyingma or the conceptual representation of the self-established existence of conventional objects in the case of Gelugpa
- And to take that conceptual representation to correspond to the implied object of the conceptual cognition – actual, findable conventional objects in the case of Nyingma or the actual, findable, self-established existence of conventional objects in the case of Gelugpa.
Thus, “clinging,” in the sense of “conceptualizing,” implies also “grasping for self-established existence” – in other words, “grasping for existence established by something’s individual defining characteristic mark.”
Buddhapalita (Skt. Buddhapālita) says:
Since those having a mind of clinging, thinking that phenomena such as worldly gain and loss, and so on are true, conceptualize that and that,
“A mind of clinging,” then, refers to a conceptualizing mind.
Bhavaviveka (Skt. Bhāvaviveka) repeats Nagarjuna’s phrase:
They are produced from the conceptual fabrication that has the individual defining characteristic mark of clinging to conventional truth.
According to Nagarjuna and Bhavaviveka, then, the conceptualization that gives rise to disturbing emotions and karmic impulses comes from the conceptual fabrication that has the individual defining characteristic mark of conceptualizing conventional truth. “Conceptualizing conventional truth” could be interpreted as meaning conceptualizing and grasping for conventional objects or conceptualizing and grasping for the existence of conventional objects as being established by their individual defining characteristic marks. In either case, the conceptual fabrication refers to a way of being aware of something, as Gelugpa interprets – namely, conceptualizing and grasping.
According to Buddhapalita, the incorrect conceptualization – which could be interpreted in the Gelugpa manner as meaning “incorrect consideration” – that gives rise to disturbing emotions and karmic impulses comes from the conceptual fabrication of mundane people who, with a conceptualizing mind, think that conventional objects are true. The conceptual fabrication of mundane people who think conventional objects are true may be either the conceptual fabrication of the conventional objects themselves as Nyingma interprets or the conceptual fabrication of the existence of conventional objects as being established by their individual defining characteristic marks as Gelugpa interprets.
Based on these previous commentaries, Chandrakirti explains that the conceptualization that gives rise to disturbing emotions and karmic impulses comes from the conceptual fabrication of mundane people that has the individual defining characteristic marks of conventional objects. Taken literally, the conceptual fabrication refers to conventional objects as Nyingma interprets. But, if one fills in the intended meaning of the previous commentaries, then the line reads “the conceptual fabrication of mundane people that has the individual defining characteristic mark of (clinging to) conventional objects.”
It seems, then, that the Gelugpa and Nyingma interpretations of Chandrakirti’s passage derive from an amalgam of the three previous commentaries.
The Ceasing of Conventional Objects in Voidness
Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche II: Now Chandrakirti is saying:
Further, these conceptual fabrications of mundane people, without exception, are ceased by means of voidness – in other words, in the voidness of all phenomena by means of the view.
He doesn’t put in and say like “a jug whose existence is established by its individual defining characteristic mark.” He didn’t say like this. He goes like in The Heart Sutra, “Form is void.” It doesn’t go, “A self-established form is void.”
This is their way of understanding. It’s so direct. This is so direct a commentary. The other three traditions, they talk very directly like this. So, there is nothing additional that they put it new. If you look at it, you first have to agree with them.
Dr. Berzin’s Supplement to Fill Out the Discussion
To understand this, again we need to look at Chandrakirti’s commentary in the light of the earlier commentaries.
Nagarjuna says:
Conceptual fabrication is ceased by voidness, because they are ceased by the apprehension of what has the individual defining characteristic mark of the identitylessness of phenomena (chos bdag-med-pa-nyid, Skt. dharma-nairātmya). That indicates that the aggregates enter into the sphere of nirvana without residue.
Buddhapalita writes:
Conceptual fabrication is ceased by means of voidness – in other words, these conceptual fabrications of gain and loss and so on of mundane people are ceased by voidness. One ceases to apprehend (them) in the voidness of the self-establishing nature of phenomena – in other words, they are ceased from apprehending voidness.
Note that Buddhapalita says, “the voidness of the self-establishing nature of phenomena” (dngos-po’i ngo-bo-nyid stong-pa, Skt. bhāva-svabhāva-śūnyatā).
Bhavaviveka has:
If you ask by what can that conceptual fabrication be ceased, conceptual fabrication can be ceased by voidness. In saying that, the words left out are “by the apprehension (of voidness).”
Bhavaviveka doesn’t specify the voidness of what.
The original Sanskrit of Chandrakirti’s line reads:
In reality, in the sight of the voidness of the self-establishing natures of all (phenomena), this and that conceptual fabrication of mundane people is ceased in voidness.
The Tibetan translation reads:
Further, these conceptual fabrications of mundane people, without exception, are ceased by means of voidness – in other words, in the voidness of all phenomena by means of the view.
The original Sanskrit of Chandrakirti’s passage has “the voidness of the self-establishing natures of all (phenomena)” (Skt. sarva-svabhāva-śūnyatā), while the Tibetan translation has “the voidness of all phenomena,” which would translate the Sanskrit “sarva-bhāva-śūnyatā.” The “sva” of “svabhāva” somehow got dropped, perhaps because of a corrupted manuscript used for making the Tibetan translation. The original Sanskrit seems more reliable since it resembles Buddhapalita’s “the voidness of the self-establishing nature of phenomena” (dngos-po’i ngo-bo-nyid stong-pa, reconstructed Skt. bhāva-svabhāva-śūnyatā).
Because of this discrepancy between the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of Chandrakirti’s text, Nyingma interprets the Tibetan as meaning that “these conceptual fabrications” (namely, conventional, commonsense objects) cease “in the voidness of all phenomena” (namely, in the voidness of a jug and so on, not in the voidness of the self-establishing nature of a jug and so on).
Gelugpa, however, interprets the line in accord with the original Sanskrit as meaning the conceptual fabrications of the self-established existence of conventional objects cease in the voidness of the self-establishing nature of all phenomena.
The Nyingma interpretation accords with the literal understanding of the text of The Heart Sutra when it says, “Form is void” and “In voidness, no form, no feeling, no distinguishing, no other affecting variables, no kind of consciousness.” In accord with the Gelugpa understanding of Chandrakirti’s passage, Gelugpa understands The Heart Sutra as meaning “self-established form is emptiness” and “in voidness, there is no self-established form, no self-established feeling, no self-established distinguishing, no self-established other affecting variables, no self-established kinds of consciousness.”
Superficial versus Mere Superficial
Dr. Berzin: So, for Nyingma, is superficial truth (kun-rdzob bden-pa) only for mundane, ordinary people and just what is known by unawareness, ignorance?
Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche II: You could say that, yes.
And Gelugpa?
It is also the same for Gelugpa. For superficial (kun-rdzob), Gelugpa puts so many terms, like the “mere superficial” (kun-rdzob-tsam) or “mere conventional” (tha-snyad-tsam), and they do not refute that.
Nyingma says there are things conventionally (tha-snyad-du yod-pa), but there aren’t things ultimately (don-dam-du med). They say that according to the point of view of sentient beings, so as not to mix everything up. This is why they are saying this. But according to Buddha’s total absorption, then they say there is like this, nothing.
Dr. Berzin’s Supplement to Fill Out the Discussion
The Nyingma position is not that of Svatantrika (Skt. Svātantrika). According to Svatantrika, the superficial truth of conventional objects is their self-established existence as findable conventional objects. Their deepest truth is their voidness of true, unimputed existence.
Nyingma does not accept self-established existence at all, not even as the superficial truth of conventional objects. Nevertheless, Nyingma does accept that to the minds of mundane, ordinary people there appear to be conventional objects. Because of their unawareness, their ignorance, however, they do not know that this is a false appearance, and they take it to be true. In deepest truth, there are no such things as conventional objects. Nyingma accepts that there are objects conventionally like this so as to help prevent mundane, ordinary people from repudiating karmic cause and effect.
Gelugpa asserts that the superficial truth of conventional objects is their appearance to the minds of mundane, ordinary people as having self-established existence. Because of their unawareness, their ignorance, however, they do not know that this is a false appearance, and they take it to be true. In deepest truth, there is no such thing as self-established existence. Karmic cause and effect, then, does not function on the basis of self-established conventional objects. It functions on the basis of mere superficialities, or mere conventionalities.
The Inseparability of the Two Truths
Dr. Berzin: How does Nyingma understand the inseparability of the two truths (bden-gnyis dbyer-med)?
Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche II: For Nyingma, the question is more like from the point of view “How does Buddha know superficial truth?” That is the question. So, the first answer is that it’s not important for the Buddha to know superficial truth for himself. It is important for the Buddha to know superficial truth to communicate with us.
Yes, but how does a Buddha know karma and its results, past lives, and the big, long list of the many types of deep awareness (ye-shes) of a Buddha listed in Filigree of Realizations (mNgon-rtogs-rgyan, Skt. Abhisamayālaṃkāra). There have to be not-yet-happening, presently-happening, and no-longer-happening phenomena that a Buddha knows when it says that a Buddha knows the three times.
Yes, so this is what they’re saying, there is the knowing of all this according to the texts that describe our way to reach Buddhahood [like Filigree of Realizations]. But it’s more like when you reach the university level, you don’t need the kindergarten level anymore. But in order to reach the university level, you need to go to kindergarten.
So, Buddha doesn’t have these 21 categories of untainted deep awareness (zag-med ye-shes sde-tshan nyer-cig)?
They have all these deep awarenesses, but this is not a Buddha’s pure awareness (rig-pa). That is what they are saying. It’s very clear from the sutra point. For instance, it never says that Buddha doesn’t have individualizing reflexive deep awareness (so-sor rang-rig-gi ye-shes). This Buddha has.
What is individualizing reflexive deep awareness?
Individualizing reflexive deep awareness is somewhat like the reflexive awareness (rang-rig) asserted in Chittamatra (Skt. Cittamātra). But here it is the mind that knows the voidness of itself. Buddhas have that.
Does Gelugpa also use that term?
Yes, they do; they do.
Dr. Berzin’s Supplement to Fill Out the Discussion
According to Gelugpa Svatantrika, the inseparability of the two truths is established on the side of phenomena. Their conventional self-established existence and their voidness of true, unimputed existence are inseparable and findable on the side of objects.
Gelugpa Prasangika refutes that the two truths are established inseparably and findable on the side of phenomena, since phenomena all lack existence established from their own sides. It also refutes that the two truths are set from the point of view of the mind that cognizes them – a mind when obscured by either both the emotional and cognitive obscurations or just by the cognitive ones and a mind free of obscurations. It is not the case that the mind in both states is cognizing the same findable object.
According to Gelugpa Prasangika, the inseparability of the two truths means they have the same essential nature but are different conceptually isolated items (ngo-bo gcig ldog-pa tha-dad). They have the same essential natures as voidness, but in terms of different conceptually isolated items – one is the voidness of superficial truth and the other is the voidness of deepest truth. To cognize that, you need to be omniscient and cognize all conventional phenomena so as to be able to focus simultaneously on the voidness of them all. But what one is focusing on is just voidness – the voidness of all phenomena and the voidness of voidness.
Nyingma Prasangika also asserts that the inseparability of the two truths means they have the same essential nature but are different conceptually isolated items.
- In terms of superficial truth when explained in the context of the mind of ignorance, the impure appearance that constitutes conventional objects and its denumerable voidness of self-established existence are inseparable and have the same essential nature but are different conceptually isolated items. Although they are inseparable, they cannot be cognized simultaneously, only consecutively.
- In terms of deepest truth when explained in the context of rigpa (pure awareness), pure appearance and non-denumerable voidness are inseparable, with both being beyond conception, incommunicable, unimaginable, and inexpressible. They have the same essential nature but are different conceptually isolated items. A Buddha cognizes both simultaneously with omniscience, but for aryas before attaining Buddhahood, pure appearance is not prominent in their total absorption on voidness.
Here in Nyingma, the inseparability of the two truths from the points of view of superficial truth and deepest truth is set from the point of view of the minds that cognizes them – the mind that is under the influence of the obscurations and rigpa that is free of the obscurations. However, the mind in each state is cognizing something different – conventional objects and denumerable voidness versus pure appearances beyond all conventional objects and non-denumerable voidness. It is not that they are cognizing the same self-established things.
Reflexive awareness (rang-rig) in the context of the Sautrantika (Skt. Sautrāntika) and Chittamatra tenet systems is a way of being aware that accompanies all cognitions and takes as its object only the consciousness and mental factors in the cognition that it accompanies. Individualizing reflexive deep awareness, on the other hand, is an awareness of its own void nature.
As part of Dharmakaya (Skt. Dharmakāya), both Nyingma and Gelugpa assert that a Buddha has individualizing reflexive deep awareness. Nyingma interprets this as the deep awareness of not just its own void nature, but as the deep awareness of the inseparable two truths, since voidness is inseparable from appearance. Individualizing reflexive deep awareness of the inseparable two truths, then, has two aspects:
- Rigpa, pure awareness – the deep awareness of the inseparable two truths in terms of deepest truth – namely, pure appearance and non-denumerable voidness, with both being beyond conception, incommunicable, unimaginable, and inexpressible.
- Individualizing reflexive deep awareness, when distinguished from rigpa – the deep awareness of the inseparable two truths in terms of superficial truth – namely, impure appearance (equivalent to conventional objects) and denumerable voidness, both of which are conceptual fabrications.
The individualizing reflexive deep awareness taken in terms of superficial truth includes the 21 categories of untainted deep awareness, such as the deep awareness of the past and future lives of all limited beings. It is on the basis of this deep awareness that a Buddha communicates with limited beings, which requires speaking in terms of conventional objects. A Buddha doesn’t need to have these categories of untainted deep awareness for themselves. They are only for the sake of limited beings.
Communicating with limited beings in terms of conventional objects is what a bodhisattva does before reaching enlightenment. Thus, from the perspective of the rigpa of a Buddha, such communication is like what one does in kindergarten.