Further Unique Gelug Prasangika Assertions

Another big difference between the Gelug and non-Gelug assertions concerns what arises during an arya’s total absorption (mnyam-bzhag) on voidness. When we actually attain a non-conceptual cognition of voidness, what arises to our minds? The other schools, the earlier schools, were saying that both deepest truth voidness and pure appearances (dag-snang) arise to the deep awareness of an arya’s total absorption. Pure appearances are not just of sensibilia, but of whole objects, such as Buddha-figures and mandalas. Remember, only sensibilia appear and can be cognized non-conceptually by ordinary beings. During an arya’s total absorption, voidness is more prominent, and during the subsequent attainment (rjes-thob), often translated as “post-meditation,” the pure appearance side is more prominent. Actually, we could never have voidness appearing by itself because voidness beyond words and concepts and pure appearance are inseparable. 

That was the earlier position; whereas Tsongkhapa said that in an arya’s total absorption on voidness, only voidness arises and no appearance arises of conventional objects. No appearance arises at all. There is only the mere absence of self-established existence. The others criticized Tsongkhapa, saying, “How can you separate voidness and appearance? That contradicts the whole discussion of the inseparability of method and wisdom.” Obviously, what Tsongkhapa was saying was based on his own experience, that’s how he experienced it. 

Serkong Rinpoche used to explain with a very nice analogy of why this was not a problem. He said that if we’re sitting inside a room on the ground floor and we look out the window, and somebody walks by, actually, all that we see is the top part of a body going past the window. Now just because all that we see is the top part of a body, that does not mean that there is not a bottom part of the body as well. It’s not that the top part of the body exists by itself. It’s just that we are limited in the point of view from which we’re looking at it. The same limitation is the case with an arya’s mind, because an arya is not a Buddha; only a Buddha can perceive the two truths inseparably. An arya’s mind is still limited and can only have one truth appear to it at a time. 

This fits in with what Tsongkhapa was saying in terms of when we have non-conceptual cognition of conventional truths – the appearances of commonsense objects – they still have an appearance of true existence. Because there is an appearance of true existence when the mind cognizes conventional truths – we see appearances – then we can’t have, with the same mind, an appearance of true existence and an absence of true existence. For that reason, an arya’s mind is still limited, because the only type of appearance of conventional truth that an arya can perceive is one that has an appearance of true existence. So, for that reason, an arya cannot see the two truths simultaneously. 

The non-Gelug traditions assert an inseparability of voidness and appearance and an inseparability of mind or awareness and appearance. This is the case in terms of both conventionally true phenomena and deeply true phenomena. There is no common locus between the two truths, and it is not the case that the two truths pertain to all phenomena. Conventionally true phenomena, including their voidness, appear only to ordinary minds; while the deepest true phenomenon, voidness beyond words and concepts plus pure appearances appear only to the deep awareness of an arya. Even when Sakya asserts inseparable samsara and nirvana, it is asserting that both conventionally true phenomena and deepest true phenomena equally arise from clear light mind.   

Tsongkhapa was unique in asserting that the two truths are two aspects of all phenomena. These two aspects refer to the two essential natures (ngo-bo) that all phenomena have – a superficial essential nature of what they are and a deepest essential nature of how they exist. Neither essential nature is findable, of course, and neither has the power to establish the existence of any phenomenon. Likewise, there are no findable, self-established phenomena or even findable, non-self-established phenomena as the basis for these two essential natures.

Tsongkhapa also asserted that cognition, whether of an ordinary being or an arya, has two aspects, one each for cognizing each of the essential natures. For both ordinary beings and aryas who are not yet Buddhas, the aspect that cognizes the superficial essential nature of something may be accurate or inaccurate, while the aspect cognizing the deepest essential nature simultaneously with cognizing accurately or inaccurately the superficial essential nature is always inaccurate. It is always false because the accurate or inaccurate appearance of what something is that appears to the minds of both ordinary beings and aryas who are not yet Buddhas is always inaccurate in terms of how it appears to exist. It is always inaccurate because the minds of ordinary beings and of aryas who are not yet Buddhas are limited. Both types of beings are still sentient beings, which means both are still limited beings with both minds and bodies that are limited. To such minds, the conventional truth of all phenomena – the truth of what they are – appears to be self-established from their own sides. This appearance is false and so Gelug agrees with non-Gelug that conventional truth is always false in regard to how it exists. And although non-Gelug masters do acknowledge a difference between accurate an inaccurate conventionally true phenomena, they do not emphasize this difference in their discussions, whereas Tsongkhapa emphasizes this difference greatly.

In any case, when Tsongkhapa asserts that only a Buddha can cognize the two truths inseparably, he is not asserting that to a Buddha’s omniscient mind there simultaneously arises the presence of an appearance of phenomena as being self-established and an absence that is a refutation of all such appearances. Tsongkhapa agrees with the non-Gelug masters that of the two truths, Buddhas cognize only deepest truth. The inseparable two truths that a Buddha cognizes, according to Tsongkhapa, is the single, inseparable, deepest essential nature, the voidness, of the superficial truth and the deepest truth of all phenomena. Although the voidness of the superficial truth and the deepest truth of all phenomena share the same deepest essential nature (ngo-bo gcig), they have different conceptual isolates (ldog-pa tha-dad). The conceptual isolate of the voidness of voidness is voidness and the conceptual isolate of the voidness of superficial truth is mere conventionalities (tha-snyad-tsam; mere conventional phenomena) and not conventional, superficial truths. It is in this way that Buddhas, and only Buddhas, cognize the two truths inseparably, which means that since mere conventionalities do not appear to have self-established existence, Buddhas cognize mere conventionalities – and, in fact, all validly knowable phenomena in each moment – simultaneously with the inseparable voidness of the two truths. 

The equivalent that the non-Gelug traditions asserted was that pure appearances and voidness beyond words and concepts are inseparable, and all aryas, whether not yet Buddhas or already Buddhas, cognize the two inseparably with their deep awareness (ye-shes). Only Buddhas, however, cognize the two equally prominently. Aryas who are not yet Buddhas cognize voidness beyond words and concepts more prominently with their deep awareness during total absorption and pure appearances more prominently with their deep awareness during the subsequent attainment phase of their meditation. Because of this non-Gelug assertion of the inseparability of pure appearances and voidness beyond words and concepts, the non-Gelug traditions assert deepest truth not merely to be voidness beyond words and concepts, but rather they assert that deepest truth is inseparable pure appearances and voidness beyond words and concepts. 

Gelugpa, in contrast, assert deepest truth to be only voidness. Despite mere conventionalities appearing simultaneously with voidness, this does not render mere conventionalities into either deepest truth or superficial truth. 

Please note that when Gelug asserts that when scrutinized with logic, conventional phenomena cannot withstand the analysis and cannot appear, but that when not scrutinizing, mere conventionalities or mere conventional phenomena do appear, this does not mean that ordinary beings or aryas who are not yet Buddhas are able to cognize the mere conventionalities that only Buddhas can cognize. The mere conventionalities that Buddhas cognize do not appear to have self-established existence; they are not conventional truths. The mere conventional phenomena that ordinary beings or aryas who are not yet Buddhas cognize when not scrutinizing or analyzing are still conventional truths, despite being called “mere conventionalities.” They are merely accurate conventional truths and still appear to have self-established existence. However, since they are not being subject to analysis by logic, they can still appear in ordinary beings’ and non-enlightened aryas’ cognition. 

The whole discussion of whether or not an arya’s total absorption on voidness – an arya who is not yet a Buddha – manifestly and explicitly cognizes only voidness non-conceptually and precludes manifest and explicit non-conceptual cognition of appearances of conventional, commonsense objects affects very much the Gelug and non-Gelug assertions of Svabhavakaya, the Essential Nature Corpus (the Nature Body) of a Buddha. 

According to the Gelug presentation, Svabahavakaya is the voidness of the omniscient mind of a Buddha, which is also the voidness cognized by the omniscient mind of a Buddha or, more specifically, the voidness cognized by the Deep Awareness Dharmakaya of a Buddha. Please note that the deep awareness of a Buddha is equivalent to the omniscient awareness of a Buddha. The voidness of the omniscient awareness of a Buddha that is cognized by this omniscient awareness is the single essential nature shared by the two truths which, as we were just discussing, only a Buddha’s omniscient mind can cognize. 

This deepest essential nature shared by the two truths is both a voidness of self-established existence and a true stopping of both the emotional and cognitive obscurations. In other words, that voidness of a Buddha’s omniscient deep awareness has the double purity (dag-pa gnyis-ldan) of being rid of both the constant habits of grasping for truly established existence, which make an appearance of truly established existence, and manifest or subliminal grasping for truly established existence and its tendencies, which give rise to grasping at the appearances and truly established existence to correspond to how everything actually exists. Grasping for truly established existence gives rise to the emotional obscurations (nyon-sgrib) and the constant habits of grasping for truly established existence give rise to the cognitive obscurations (shes-sgrib).

In short, according to the Gelug tradition, Svabhavakaya has two aspects: the voidness of a Buddha’s omniscient mind and the true stoppings on a Buddha’s omniscient mind. According to the Jetsunpa and Kunkyen textbook traditions, this voidness and the true stoppings share one essential nature but have different conceptual isolates. According to the Panchen textbooks, they have separate essential natures. All the Gelug textbooks, however, agree that Prasangika asserts that deepest truth refers to both voidness and true stoppings, but not to mere conventionalities. Let’s leave it at that. This is too complicated to explain any further here.

[See: The Relation between True Stoppings and Emptiness]

The non-Gelug position is that Svabhavakaya is the inseparability of the Form Bodies (Rupakaya) and Dharmakaya. Rupakaya is a corpus of bodies, both Sambhogakaya, Bodies that Make Full Use of the Mahayana teachings, and Nirmanakaya, Emanation Bodies, bodies that are emanations of Sambhogakaya. Dharmakaya refers to the omniscient deep awareness of a Buddha. The Rupakaya bodies are the pure appearances that are inseparable from voidness beyond words and concepts, and both pure appearances and this voidness are deepest truths. 

Therefore, since both Gelug and non-Gelug agree that a Buddha’s deep awareness cognizes only deepest truth, non-Gelug asserts that Svabhavakaya, as the deepest truth cognized by a Buddha’s deep awareness – in other words, the deepest truth cognized by the Deep Awareness Dharmakaya – refers to inseparable Rupakaya and Dharnmakaya. Gelug, on the other hand, asserts that, as the deepest truth cognized by a Buddha’s deep awareness, Svabhavakaya refers to the voidness and true stoppings of a Buddha’s omniscient mind. 

Another point concerning voidness meditation that Tsongkhapa emphasizes is that to gain a valid cognition of voidness, we need to correctly identify the object of refutation, also translated as the object of nullification. We need to correctly identify truly established existence. Tsongkhapa, here, refers back to Shantideva’s discussion of voidness in Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior. Before he refutes the views of the Indian non-Buddhist schools and the lower Buddhist tenet systems, he presents their distorted views. Tsongkhapa describes this way of approaching voidness meditation by saying, “You cannot hit a target with an arrow unless you can first see the target.” Similarly, how can you refute and negate truly established existence if you cannot distinguish and identify truly established existence first? 

The non-Gelug argue that since truly established existence does not exist, how can it be identified. It’s absurd. What we need to do is go beyond such a concept as truly established existence; we need to go beyond words and beyond concepts in order to attain the non-conceptual cognition of voidness. However, then Gelug could reply, “Well, even to go beyond something, you have to identify what it is that you’re going beyond.” Gelug doesn’t assert that truly established existence, which they agree doesn’t exist at all, can actually appear. But we can accurately distinguish and cognize true existence through an appearance that resembles true existence, and such an appearance arises in each moment of our cognition other than when non-conceptually focused on voidness. After all, Chandrakirti accepted as a valid way of knowing valid cognition through an analogous example (nyer-‘jal tshad-ma), as in validly cognizing voidness through the analogy of it being like an illusion.

When we study debate, it is helpful to see the logical reasoning behind the positions of each of the opponents. Sometimes, for training, we need first to defend one side and then defend the other side of a debate. When we do this, then we start to really understand what makes the most sense, because what others assert and argue are not stupid views. Serkong Rinpoche always emphasized: “Don’t be so arrogant to think that these people who asserted the non-Prasangika views were dummies. They were very intelligent people who came up with very intelligent answers to deep questions, but some of the answers make more sense than others. 

We need to really understand cognition theory in order to deal properly with this question of how to identify an object to be refuted if that object doesn’t exist. Remember, we cognize phenomena, whether non-conceptually or conceptually, through mental representations, which are somewhat like mental holograms. According to the Gelug position, what appears with the mental representation is an aspect of a conventional, commonsense object. Two aspects appear simultaneously, an appearance of its superficial essential nature of what it is – and that may be accurate or inaccurate – and an appearance of its deepest essential nature of how it exists. The appearance of how it exists is always false, because except during an arya’s non-conceptual cognition of voidness when conventional, commonsense objects don’t appear at all, whenever conventional, commonsense object appear in our cognition, they arise with an appearance that resembles truly established existence and that’s always false. 

The mental representation, this mental hologram, is totally transparent, both in non-conceptual and conceptual cognition. If the appearance of the object’s superficial essential nature of what it is corresponds to what it actually is, as corroborated by valid cognition of superficial truth, then the cognition of this aspect of the mental hologram is accurate. Through the mental hologram, we also cognize the actual conventional, commonsense object that has dependently arisen and functions accordingly. With accurate conceptual cognition, even when the conventional, commonsense object is not present, we are cognizing an aspect of a dependently arisen functional object through the transparent mental representation of this aspect.

The appearance of the object’s deepest nature which is an appearance that resembles truly established existence is false. It does not correspond to how the dependently arisen, functional, conventional, commonsense object actually exists. Therefore, through the transparent mental representation, we do not cognize the actual way in which the object exists. Nevertheless, we can accurately distinguish and cognize this false appearance of what resembles truly established existence as being just that – a semblance of truly established existence. This is how we correctly identify the object to be refuted by voidness.

[See: The Appearance and Cognition of Nonexistent Phenomena] 

According to the non-Gelug False Aspectarian position, conventional, commonsense objects only appear in conceptual cognition. They are merely conceptual constructs. Non-Gelug does not assert that they have two essential natures, and so the difference is not so significant between an accurate appearance and an inaccurate appearance of what any conventional, commonsense object is. This is because conventional, commonsense objects do not actually exist as “this” or “that.” They only appear to truly exist as “this” or “that” and both appearances as “this” or “that” are false. There are no conventional, commonsense objects that are established as “this” or “that,” that can be cognized non-conceptually by sensory cognition, and that cast an aspect of themselves as a mental representation in conceptual cognition. The conceptual representations of conventional, commonsense objects are, in fact, opaque.  

As opaque conceptual constructs synthesized from sensibilia cognized by sensory non-conceptual cognition, conventional, commonsense objects appear to have truly established existence as actual commonsense objects that can be cognized non-conceptually by sensory cognition, but there do not exist any conventional, commonsense objects that can be cognized non-conceptually by sensory cognition, let alone truly existent ones. Even the negation of truly existent commonsense objects by conceptual logic appears to be truly existent and a truly existent negation phenomenon, voidness, also is nonexistent. Rather than identifying and refuting truly established existence, then, non-Gelug asserts that we need to eliminate all conceptual cognition and even all non-conceptual sensory cognition and simply have the deep awareness of an arya that cognizes voidness beyond words and concepts inseparable from pure appearances. Within the context of the non-Gelug assertions, then, it makes no sense to try to identify a non-existent object, since non-existent objects do not exist as a “this” or a “that” that can be identified.

The example that I often use to simplify the discussion of non-existent manners of establishing the existence of something, such as truly established existence, is that objects having truly established existence are like objects in a children’s coloring book. In a children’s coloring book, the existence of objects is established by thick lines enclosing blank spaces. The enveloping lines appear to be establishing solidly established objects, but objects with thick lines around them do not actually exist. There is nothing findable corresponding to how things appear to exist in a coloring book. Even if we color in the objects – like coloring in qualities like “good” and “bad” in what seem to be truly existent objects – that still does not correspond to how things actually exist. 

The mental representations of commonsense objects that appear to us are like these depictions of objects in a children’s coloring book. Just because they appear in the coloring book doesn’t mean that they correspond to anything real. Nevertheless, when we cognize anything, it appears like something in a coloring book and we color in what appears with what seem to be self-established qualities. We think, “That person over there is really a nasty person. I don’t like them.” We deceptively cognize “nice person,” “pretty person,” “my table,” “my car” as if they all had thick lines around them, separating each from everything else and establishing their true, independent existence, and we grasp for them to actually exist in that impossible way. 

We do, in fact, cognize conventional, commonsense objects through mental representations, which are mental aspects of them somewhat like mental holograms. According to the True Aspectarian interpretation, the mental holograms are fully transparent. Through them, whether in non-conceptual or conceptual cognition, we cognize actual conventional, commonsense objects. Sautrantika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika and Prasangika each agree that such objects have external existence, though the manners of established their existence are very different from each other. 

Consider the case of the cognitive process that occurs when we look at a conventional, commonsense table, for instance, and let’s limit ourselves to the Sautrantika-Svatantrika and Prasangika discussions, since Sautrantika accepts truly established existence. In seeing a commonsense table, a mental representation of a truly existent table arises in valid visual cognition. The aspect of our sensory cognition that cognizes the superficial essential nature of the representation of the table accurately sees the external commonsense table through the representation. Sautrantika-Svatantrika asserts that this externally existent table has self-established existence and is therefore findable; Prasangika asserts that it lacks self-established existence and is therefore unfindable. 

But although this mental representation of a table appears with what represents truly established existence, the aspect of our sensory cognition that cognizes the deepest essential nature of the representation does not see the truly established existence of the external table, because there is no such thing as this impossible manner of the existence. Let me repeat: The aspect of the visual cognition that cognizes the deepest essential nature does not see truly established existence through and on the other side of this mental representation of truly established existence. This aspect of the visual cognition is like a hallucination, but because, like a hallucination, it appears in our cognition, we can identify it. In identifying it, however, we are not actually identifying true existence itself because truly established existence does not exist at all. Our identification of this object to be refuted by voidness is a valid cognition – namely, a valid cognition through an analogous example.

To repeat even more simply, we experience these transparent mental representations and aspects in our cognitions, and we can see through them. Through them, we can see the table, for instance. The table conventionally exists. However, looking through the mental representation of true existence, we don’t see true existence. There is no true existence. It is like a hallucination. We can identify the mental representation of true existence, but in doing so, we are identifying it only through an analogy. It is not that we are identifying true existence itself somewhere out there, because there is no such thing as truly established existence.  

The non-Gelug traditions, on the other hand, say that rather than trying to refute how things appear in a coloring book, just throw the coloring book away. It doesn’t matter if how a table appears in a coloring book is an accurate depiction or not, it is just nonsense.  

Another big area of really radical change that Tsongkhapa made was in terms of what is abandoned or gotten rid of on the bodhisattva stages of the path. Tsongkhapa said that Prasangika actually does make assertions, not just like the others who say that all it does is refute all conceptual assertions and negations to help us go beyond conceptual thought. And so among the Gelug assertions of Prasangika is an entirely different presentation of what we rid ourselves of when we attain a bodhisattva path of seeing and develop a seeing pathway of mind and what we rid ourselves of as we progress through the bhumi-stages of the bodhisattva path of meditation with an accustoming pathway of mind. 

The Prasangika and Svatantrika presentations of what are gotten rid of are quite different from each other, Tsongkhapa said. The others said that the Svatantrika presentation of the bodhisattva paths is valid for Prasangika as well. It is valid for Madhyamaka as a whole. It was only several centuries after Tsongkhapa that the Eighth Karmapa accepted some of what Tsongkhapa said on this point about the distinction between Svatantrika and Prasangika, but neither Sakya nor Nyingma ever accepted any of Tsonghapa’s assertions concerning this difference and the Eighth Karmapa only accepted part of it, not the whole explanation of these stages of the bodhisattva path. 

Let’s focus on the differences between the Sakya and Nyingma assertions on the one hand, and the Gelugpa ones on the other and only mention the main points without going into detail, otherwise it really gets too complicated. Mahayana asserts that there are the two sets of obscurations. There’s one set that prevents liberation, the emotional obscurations (nyon-sgrib), and one set that prevents omniscience, the cognitive obscurations (shes-sgrib). In order to gain liberation, we need to attain a true stopping of this first set and to gain omniscience, Buddhahood, we need to attain a true stopping of both. Sakya and Nyingma follow Svatantrika in asserting that shravakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas each have different understandings with which the attain liberation; whereas Tsongkhapa asserted that according to Prasangika they all require the same understanding to attain liberation. 

Both Svatantrika and Prasangika accept that the emotional obscurations include the disturbing emotions and attitudes, plus their tendencies. According to Svatantrika, when we talk about unawareness or ignorance, we need to distinguish between unawareness about how persons exist and unawareness about how all phenomena exist. Unawareness about how a person exists is a disturbing emotion and so is included in this first set of obscurations, the emotional ones. The unawareness about how all phenomena exist is included only among the cognitive obscurations that prevent omniscience and it is not a disturbing emotion. It’s only a nominal disturbing emotion; it’s not really a disturbing emotion. 

Sakya and Nyingma accept this classification scheme as valid for Madhyamaka as a whole. Tsongkhapa asserted that it is only what Svatantrika asserts. Prasangika asserts that the subtlest unawareness of how persons exist and how all phenomena exist is the same unawareness, both are disturbing emotions, and both are included among the emotional obscurations preventing liberation. Grasping for the true existence of all phenomena is also an emotional obscuration. It is the constant habits of grasping for the true existence of all phenomena that constitute the cognitive obscurations, since they give rise to the appearance of truly established existence, which is what prevents omniscience.

Sakya, Nyingma and Svatantrika assert that arya bodhisattvas begin to attain true stoppings of both sets of obscurations with the attainment of the path of seeing and a seeing pathway of mind. Gelug Prasangika asserts that arya bodhisattvas begin to rid themselves of the cognitive obscuration only once they attain a true stopping of all the emotional obscurations and thus attain liberation with their attainment of a liberated seventh-bhumi level accustoming pathway of mind on the path of meditation. They work to attain true stoppings of the cognitive obscurations only with the eighth through tenth-bhumi levels of mind. 

Let me repeat. Tsongkhapa said that according to Prasangika, both the unawareness about persons and about phenomena are included among the emotional obscurations preventing liberation. He dismissed this distinction between actual disturbing emotions and nominal disturbing emotions. Both types of unawareness are disturbing emotions. The only thing that’s included in the cognitive obscurations preventing omniscience is the habit of grasping for true existence. Grasping for the truly established existence of persons and of all phenomena are both the same thing; both are just grasping for true existence. The only thing that’s included in the cognitive obscurations are the habits of that grasping, which make the appearance of true existence. The grasping for truly established existence to correspond to how things actually exists is in the first set of obscurations, and then the mind making the appearance of true existence is in the second set. 

We work to get rid of the obscurations preventing liberation first. We don’t even touch these obscurations preventing omniscience until we get rid of all these emotional obscurations first – until we get rid of grasping for true existence. That would be at the end of the seventh bhumi of progressing through the ten bhumi-level minds on the way to enlightenment. At the end of the seventh one, we get rid of the emotional obscurations preventing liberation, so that’s when we achieve liberation as a bodhisattva. Only then, with the last three bhumi-level of minds do we work on ridding our minds of the constant habit of making the appearance of true existence. In other words, we first have to stop believing that these appearances correspond to reality, and only when we have stopped believing in them can we finally work on getting our minds to stop fabricating these appearances and projecting them. Those are the stages of the path for becoming a Buddha. Obviously, this must have been the way that Tsongkhapa experienced it, and that’s why he explained it that way. 

[See: Ridding Oneself of the Obscurations: Nyingma and Sakya and The Five Paths: Advanced Presentation]

I think that what is really quite significant in trying to appreciate what Tsongkhapa did was that over these various points – we haven’t covered all of them, by any means – but all of these various stages of reformulation of Prasangika that Tsongkhapa made were based on his experience and logic. He depended on scripture, logic, and meditation. It wasn’t that he figured it out piecemeal – it all hangs together; it all fits together. He was so brilliant that he was able to analyze his experience and fit it in with logic and scripture and so on. I mean, it’s hard to say, did he do that with logic and scripture first, and then experience? Probably, yes. It’s amazing that it can be a whole system like that, totally integrated, with every piece fitting together. When we have some understanding of all the unique points that Tsongkhapa taught, then we really start to appreciate his genius. 

Tsongkhapa also reformulated the distinction among Buddha’s teachings between words of definitive meaning (nges-don) and words of interpretable meaning (drang-don). Making this distinction is an important device for analyzing the scriptures containing what Buddha said. Before Tsongkhapa, they said that this distinction has to do with whole sutras. The definitive ones are the ones that can be taken literally, while the interpretable ones cannot be taken literally – we have to interpret them. This distinction referred to whole sutras. Tsongkhapa said, “No. The definitive teachings are only talking about voidness as understood in Prasangika and the interpretable ones are about everything else. We can’t divide Buddha’s teachings into whole sutras like that. The distinction concerns only passages within the sutras being definitive or interpretable, rather than whole sutras.” 

Then, when we talk about the three rounds of transmission of the Dharma, the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma, earlier they said that this was a distinction made according to when Buddha taught. Tsongkhapa said, “No. It’s a distinction in terms of the subject matter of what Buddha taught.” If we look at what’s in these three rounds, then everybody agrees that the first round concerns the four noble truths and the second round is prajnaparamita – the teachings on voidness and stages of the mind for cognizing voidness. The non-Gelug schools said that the third turning was about Buddha-nature. Tsongkhapa did not accept that; he said the third turning was about the Chittamatra school – so the second turning was Madhyamaka, the third turning was Chittamatra. 

For Tsongkhapa, it’s the second turning, Madhyamaka, that’s definitive; it talks about voidness and how we should accept it. It’s the third turning about Chittamatra, Mind-Only, that’s interpretable. In contrast with that, some of the others had said that the second turning concerned voidness, Madhyamaka, and the third concerned Buddha-nature, so both of them are definitive. 

In addition, some Karma Kagyu masters say that the second turning is interpretable, and only the third turning is definitive. This is referring to the second turning as teaching only the voidness that is known conceptually, while the third turning taught the voidness that is beyond words and concepts. If we define the second and third turnings like that, then we get this Karma Kagyu presentation that only the third turning is definitive. 

In terms of Buddha-nature, this brings us to the topic of mind, and mind is explained differently by Tsongkhapa than by the earlier masters. Earlier, they said that the mind is static – unfortunately translated as “permanent,” which is quite misleading because everybody accepts that individual minds have no beginning and no end. However, the others were saying that the mind is static, whereas Tsongkhapa said that it’s nonstatic. 

We have to understand the difference here. The others said it was static in the sense that the mind is not created anew; it has no beginning and no end – so it’s eternal and its conventional nature never changes. In that sense, it’s static. Tsongkhapa said, “It’s better not to use the term static in this meaning because static means that it never changes in any aspect, which is not the case.” So, Tsongkhapa asserted that mind is nonstatic, which means that every moment mind cognizes a different object. If we look at the definitions of how they’re using the terms, everybody would agree with each other that the conventional nature of mind never changes but the objects that mind cognize change in every moment, but the terms are the exact opposite. Non-Gelug says the mind is static; Gelug says it’s nonstatic. 

In terms of Buddha-nature traits, there are two types: evolving and naturally abiding Buddha-nature traits. The evolving ones are the ones that we need to develop more and more, and the naturally abiding ones are the ones that are always there. The others said that mind, meaning the conventional nature of the mind, is always there and always the same, so it is a naturally abiding trait. The conventional nature of the mind as an ordinary being and as a Buddha is the same and so the conventional nature of the mind as an ordinary being accounts for the fact that the mind has that same nature as a Buddha. 

Tsongkhapa didn’t agree with this classification. He said that the conventional nature of the mind is an evolving Buddha-nature trait, in the sense that its capacity to cognize objects needs to be worked on so that it goes from where it is now, being limited, to being omniscient. This point, by the way, supports Tsongkhapa’s deep emphasis on always studying and working to develop our minds more and more.

Just a few very short points about tantra. There are certain styles of practice that differ. The old style is when we do the preliminaries of repeating certain practices a hundred thousand times, we usually do them all at once – it becomes a big event – before we get into serious tantra practice. Whereas the style that developed in Gelug is that they’re done whenever it fits in; we do them during the course of our practice as well as when we study, and there’s no need to make a big event out of it in doing them all together. 

Similarly, three-year retreats in the other traditions are often a training ground for doing rituals both in the monasteries and for the lay community. During the three-year retreat, they do successive small retreats of each of the major deities practiced in their tradition and learn the rituals of each. It is only after practitioners have completed this initial three-year retreat that they can then do another three years of retreat focusing on one practice. Gelugpas do these short retreats on each of the different deity systems separately when they fit into their schedule. The three-year retreat in the Gelug tradition is a three-year retreat on only one deity practice. 

The last point, which is not such a profound point but an interesting point, is that Gelugpa monks chant in an extremely deep voice that includes chanting overtones that sound like chords. The monks in the other traditions don’t chant with that type of voice. That is only found in the Gelug tradition. 

We can see from this survey that Tsongkhapa really was quite a revolutionary. He’s sometimes called a reformer, but I don’t know if “reformer” is such a nice word here. In any case, he really was very courageous to go beyond the understanding of the masters of his time, including even his own teachers, and to have this new formulation, almost all of it in connection with Prasangika. 

When following Tsongkhapa’s tradition, then, it’s important to appreciate Tsongkhapa’s unique assertions and also to understand how they differ and why they differ from the assertions of the other traditions. So when we hear teachings from a Gelugpa master, especially about cognition theory and the tenet systems, particularly Prasangika, we need to avoid thinking that these assertions are held by all the Tibetan Buddhist traditions. They don’t, not at all. If we at least appreciate that, then we won’t get confused when we read books or hear lectures from teachers from other traditions. The other three traditions have far more in common with each other than with Gelug. Gelug is really quite separate in terms of many of its assertions. All of the general teachings however– the four noble truths, compassion and love, all these sorts of things – are the same in all the Buddhist traditions.