Background to Aryadeva's Chapters on Emptiness

Now, just as a little bit of background, what I thought to do is to just explain one particular term which is going to appear over and again in the explanation, although we don’t actually find the term in the text itself. Nevertheless, this is the term which is usually translated as “true existence” (bden-par grub-pa). Just as an example, to show how it has different definitions in each of the Indian schools – it doesn’t mean the same, but we will undoubtedly hear this term over again in the explanation. Just one very, very basic difference is that, for the Vaibhashika, Sautrantika and Chittamatra systems, they assert that truly existent phenomena really do exist; “truly existent” does mean what the word says, that things really exist. Whereas for both Madhyamaka divisions – Svatantrika and Prasangika – truly existent existence doesn’t exist at all; we think things truly exist, but they don’t. That’s clearly a very major difference in the usage of the terms.

Within those schools that say truly existent phenomena actually do exist, we also have different definitions of “true existence.” Before we get into that, I think that there is a very important point that we need to understand in order to refine our way of understanding these terms. What they’re talking about in these discussions is not actual existence itself, in most cases; what they’re talking about is what establishes that something exists, what establishes or proves or demonstrates that something exists. Therefore, I like to translate it as “truly established existence” or “non-truly established existence,” and I’ll explain what is meant by this.

Another distinction that we need to understand because this is discussed over and over again, and the term is used over and over again, and I don’t know how it will be translated, but I translate it as “functional phenomenon” (dngos-po) and “nonfunctional phenomenon” (dngos-med). Usually, those two terms are equivalent to “functional phenomenon” being so-called “impermanent” and “nonfunctional” being “permanent.” However, the terms themselves very literally are “phenomenon” and “non-phenomenon,” and so sometimes they’re understood as existent and non-existent things. If the translator translates it as “existent phenomenon” or just “phenomenon” and “non-phenomenon,” please understand that that’s not the level of interpretation that Aryadeva is using throughout the text; he’s speaking more in terms of functional and nonfunctional phenomena. However, for instance, in Shantideva’s text, there are some places where he uses the terms, and they have both meanings and both ways of understanding it make sense in the verses referring to both levels of meaning of the term.

“Functional” and “nonfunctional” basically means to perform a function, which means more specifically, to act as a cause for bringing about a result. It performs a function and brings about a result. It’s something which is – a synonym for it – is usually translated as “conditioned” and “unconditioned” phenomena, although I prefer “affected” and “unaffected.” It means that it is affected (or brought about) by causes, or it’s not affected or brought about by causes and circumstances. “Affected” is a broader term. Thus, a functional phenomenon is affected by causes and conditions – it’s caused by them, brought about by them. Even if it exists, it’s affected by them, and it brings about a result. Because of that, it’s impermanent. In terms of “impermanent” here, remember, I always prefer “nonstatic” – in other words, it’s changing. It changes. It comes about, it does something, it changes. It doesn’t remain static. Whereas a nonfunctional phenomenon is something that is not affected; it’s unaffected or unconditioned by causes and circumstances. It doesn’t do anything, in the sense that it doesn’t produce an effect. It doesn’t produce anything. Therefore, it is permanent, in the sense of being static; it doesn’t change.

Because we always have to remember that when in Buddhism we talk about static and nonstatic phenomena, some of them in both classes last forever, and some of them last for only a limited period of time. A mental continuum lasts forever, but it changes from moment to moment; it’s nonstatic, so impermanent in that sense. This point about an eternal nonstatic phenomenon – like, for instance, the mental continuum of a person – is a good example of why we need to be a bit precise in terms of it being an affected phenomenon. A mental continuum of somebody doesn’t arise from causes – it’s not created by anything – nevertheless, it is affected by circumstances. In other words, the presence or absence of certain objects affects it in terms of what that person is conscious of at any time. It is affected, but it’s not created by anything. That’s why I prefer “affected” or “unaffected” phenomenon. I think it’s a little bit clearer than “conditioned” or “unconditioned,” although “conditioned” and “unconditioned” isn’t so bad. I have no idea how it’s going to be translated at the teachings. However, these are very central terms that are going to appear over and over again. If we don’t understand them, we’re going to be completely lost.

One question here is in terms of something being eternal, does it mean that something really has no beginning nor end, or does it mean that we can’t show a beginning or an end? This is a point that is raised in the Buddhist texts, and the particular point in which this is discussed is about Brahma. Brahma thinks that he is eternal and the creator of everything because the mind of Brahma is unable to see that things are without a beginning and an end, and so he looks at just his existence and the existence of the universe – this particular universe in which Brahma is born – as being without a beginning and an end. It’s just limited, however, because he can’t see beyond it.

There is that distinction between a limited mind that thinks that something is eternal but is not, simply because the mind makes that mistake, and simply because it’s limited, it can’t see further. Here what I’m talking about is actually no beginning and no end. That’s the mental continuum from the Mahayana point of view. Hinayana says that the mental continuum does have an end when we die in the lifetime in which we achieve liberation or enlightenment, so-called parinirvana, but Mahayana refutes that. Aryadeva, in fact, mentions and refutes that point as well in this text. Again, it says in the Mahayana sutras (or in these Mahayana commentaries) that it’s the arhats who still have limited minds and so they think that, with parinirvana, the mental continuum ends. However, it’s just that their mind is limited; they can’t see beyond that.

Thus, this term which may only be translated as “phenomenon” and “non-phenomenon” is a very crucial term that has a lot of meaning to it. If that’s the only way that it will be translated – and, as I say, I have no idea how it will be translated – please try to fill in some meaning; otherwise, what is explained and translated might sound much too confusing and meaningless.

Truly Established Existence in Vaibhashika

Let’s discuss the term “true existence” or “truly established existence.” For the Vaibhashikas, “truly established existence” is equivalent to the term “substantially established existence.” Please keep in mind that “substantially established existence” is not the same as what we were discussing yesterday – substantially, self-sufficiently knowable. Things might be self-sufficiently knowable or non-self-sufficiently knowable (as well as imputably knowable, those are different terms), and Aryadeva won’t really be discussing that issue. Here when we hear the term “substantially established existence,” for the Vaibhashikas that’s equivalent to “truly established existence,” and everything that exists exists that way, both functional and nonfunctional phenomena. 

For the Vaibhashikas, the definition of “substantially established existence” or “truly established existence” is that it performs a function. What the Vaibhashikas are saying is that both – what I’ve called “functional” and “nonfunctional” phenomena perform a function, in the sense that a static phenomenon may not produce something else, but it performs the function of serving as the object for a cognition of it. In that sense, it’s substantially existent. It doesn’t create anything, and it’s not created by something else, so it’s nonfunctional in that sense; nevertheless, it performs the function of serving as an object of cognition. Of course, Aryadeva smashes them over the head with a hammer concerning the logical inconsistency of that. However, that’s the Vaibhashika position. Everything has truly established existence by this explanation system.

By the way, all of this becomes really quite crucial in Aryadeva’s discussion and in the general debates among all the various non-Buddhist and Buddhist Indian schools, because now they apply all of this to an analysis of such very central metaphysical or philosophical themes such as: what kind of phenomenon is space and time, and the ultimately smallest particles that comprise things? These are the topics about which all of this is discussed. We can see that very quickly it becomes even deeper. For instance, does time do anything? Well, time does do something, in the sense that it may be time for us to have our coffee break. The time causes us to pause. For example, “But now it’s not the time.” “You are out of time.” “I have no time for this.”

Truly Established Existence in Sautrantika

There are two interpretations of true existence, truly established existence, for the Sautrantikas. The Jetsunpa textbook interpretation – this is only in Gelugpa – says that “truly established existence” means the ability to perform a function, and so only functional phenomena have truly established existence, and only they have substantial existence. The Jetsunpa position is held by Sera Je and Ganden Jangtse monasteries, so the geshes who come from there will usually explain this position. Thus, “truly established existence” from this point of view of being synonymous with “substantially established existence” is used in the same way – I mean as synonyms – in both the Vaibhashika and Jetsunpa Sautrantika. Except that the Sautrantikas say that this is limited to only functional phenomena because how can we say that nonfunctional phenomena are nonfunctional. Yet the fact that they serve as an object of the cognition of them counts as actually doing something and so, from that point of view, they are functional. Everybody has problems with Vaibhashika system, in terms of this assertion. For the Sautrantikas (according to Jetsunpa), the so-called nonstatic, impermanent phenomena (functional phenomena) are truly existent; and the static, nonfunctional phenomena (or permanent phenomena) are not truly existent because they don’t perform a function.

The other interpretation of Sautrantika within Gelugpa, the Panchen system, is followed by Drepung Loseling monastery, and that was what His Holiness was basically trained with; it’s also asserted by Ganden Shartse. Well, His Holiness’s two senior and junior tutors come from those monasteries, so often, His Holiness will explain from this position. According to their definition, “truly established existence” within Sautrantika means that something is established from its own side. Because of that, both functional and nonfunctional phenomena, both static and nonstatic, both permanent and impermanent phenomena have truly established existence. In other words, they really do exist. Jetsunpa agrees that both static and nonstatic phenomena exist from their own side, but they don’t call that “truly established existence.”

Truly Established Existence in Chittamatra

Now, we get into the Mahayana schools in Buddhism. Chittamatra defines “truly established phenomena” (truly established existence) as those phenomena whose existence is established by findable individual defining characteristic marks on the side of the object. That includes both functional phenomena (nonstatic or impermanent phenomena) as well as voidness. They include voidness there, defined in their own way of defining voidness, which is very different from the Madhyamaka ways of defining voidness. They say that voidness, despite being a static, nonfunctional phenomenon, is also truly existent, because its existence is established by the fact that it has individual defining characteristics on its own side.

The existence of voidness is established by an individual defining characteristic (rang-gi mtshan-nyid-kyis grub-pa) on its own side. Other static phenomena, like space, don’t have that on their own side. That sounds like the definition of inherent existence, but let’s not complicate this by getting into further terminology, but “inherent existence” (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa) literally means existence established by something’s self-nature – in other words, self-established existence. Self-nature is something on its own side, an individual defining characteristic. I don’t remember the exact logical pervasions in terms of whether all these schools have these three terms as synonymous: established by individual defining characteristics, by self-nature and from its own side. Let’s not complicate this further. For example, for Svatantrika, existence established by self-nature is not equivalent to truly established existence. For Prasangika, they are synonyms. It gets complicated.

Truly Established Existence in Madhyamaka

When we get to the Madhyamaka schools, Svatantrika and Prasangika, truly established existence is a false way of existing. It doesn’t exist. Nothing can be established truly. Then, Svatantrika and Prasangika define that differently. For both of them, the common aspect here is that truly established existence is unimputedly established. It is established not by the fact that it is imputed on something or labeled onto something but truly established would be unimputed.

Everything is established in terms of what labels or concepts or words refer to. We have a basis, let’s say the aggregates (body, mind, emotions, etc.). Then, there is the word, or concept, or label “person,” and that’s labeled on these aggregates. It refers to something, a person. However, a person is not a word or a label. It refers to something – a person. There is a person, although imputed on the basis of continuity of body and mind. True existence, truly established existence, for Madhyamaka would be something that’s not like that – not just imputed. This would include the whole imputed on the parts.

According to Madhyamaka, nothing exists unimputedly; nothing truly exists. I mean, put it this way, the existence of things cannot be truly established. They’re only established in terms of labeling, mental labeling. However, mental labeling doesn’t create the object. Then, how do we know that something exists? What establishes that it exists? Well, it’s the reference of a word. This last point is an important point that is frequently misunderstood, in terms of mental labeling. My mentally labeling you a “person” doesn’t create you as a person. Whether I mentally label you a “person” or anybody else mentally labels you a “person” is irrelevant. What is a person though? A person is just what the word “person” refers to on the basis of continuity of body and mind; that’s all. That establishes what is a person but doesn’t create a person. It is what the word or concept refers to on a basis. It’s neither the word nor is it the basis.

This sounds as though we’re talking about everything existing in relation to language, and then the question is: if I label you “you,” although it doesn’t create you, is there a you? What am I labeling?

Yes, there is a conventionally existent “you” or a person. This becomes a big further topic of investigation. The Madhyamaka view is not a nihilist view. They are always being accused of being nihilists, but they are not. There is a conventionally existent “me,” but what establishes that there’s a conventionally existent “me”? It is what the word “me” refers to.

Although we’re going a little bit past the time for the tea pause, I’d like to bring in the distinction between Svatantrika and Prasangika, so that we finish this. Otherwise, after the tea pause, we might have forgotten already what was said before. There is a difference between Svatantrika and Prasangika in the context of true existence not existing at all and meaning unimputed existence. Then the Svatantrika says yes, that it’s correct that we can’t establish the existence of something independent of what words and concepts refer to, but there is a findable individual defining characteristic on the side of the basis of labeling that, in connection with mental labeling, allows for a correct mental labeling. It’s not that this defining characteristic by its own power establishes that something exists, or that just the mental labeling itself by its own power establishes that it exists; we need the two of them.

Prasangika says, “No such thing.” There is no findable defining characteristic mark; there’s nothing on the side of the object that establishes its existence through its own power. Now, existence established from the side of the object (rang-gi ngos-nas grub-pa), by its own power, is the same as inherent existence that is established by a self-nature. For Svatantrika, that by itself doesn’t establish it; it has to be in combination with mental labeling. For other schools, it could establish it by itself – this individual defining characteristic. That’s the basic difference. I’ll give an example of this that perhaps will make it a little bit clearer.

Let’s use the example of the color orange. The universe doesn’t exist with colors, all by itself – for instance, light existing with orange light, yellow light, red light and so on. What establishes that there is such a thing as orange, yellow or red? Well, it’s the words “orange,” “yellow” and “red.” We can’t have, from the side of the universe, a meaning of a word independent of their being words. The meaning of a word only exists in relation to a word. So orange, yellow and red, their existence is established in terms of what the words “orange,” “yellow” and “red” refer to, on a basis of light. Then the question is, what’s the definition? Are there defining characteristics on the side of the light or not?

Svatantrika says yes, that wavelength from this to that point is orange, and that wavelength from that to that point is red, and so on. In combination with that, with that findable defining characteristic by its power in connection with the power of a mental label “orange,” “red,” or “yellow,” we establish the existence of something.

Prasangika says, “Hey, wait a second. That can’t be so.” Defining characteristics were made up by somebody who wrote in the dictionary that orange is from this wavelength to that wavelength, and red is from this wavelength to that wavelength. That’s a mental label as well. It isn’t that, from the side of the object, there are boundaries, and there’s the little mark that we find on a graph of the wavelength. There’s a certain phenomenon and we’ve called it a “wavelength”; somebody made up the concept of a wavelength to refer to this. Even within that, there are the measurements and so on. All of that is based solely on concepts and words. In terms of establishing its existence, there’s nothing on the side of anything that we can find.

When they talk about “you can’t find anything,” they’re talking about that. We can’t find, on the side of an object, something that either by its own power, totally independently, or in conjunction with mental labeling, establishes or makes something what it is. Even words aren’t truly established. Some people took meaningless acoustic patterns and decided that was a word and gave it a meaning. There’s nothing inherent in this pattern of sounds. Let alone the fact that we imagine that no matter how it’s pronounced, what volume and what voice, all of it is the same word. That’s also pretty weird.

These are the topics that are behind the word “truly existent,” and what’s usually translated as “inherent existence” and “functional phenomenon” or just “phenomenon” and “non-phenomenon.” These words will just be thrown out like that in the discussion, in the explanation, and it might sound completely beyond our ability to deal with and meaningless. However, when we have all this background that can be filled in, and we’re familiar enough with that background so that we can apply it very, very quickly, then we understand the profundity of this text and the discussion. With this type of background, even just an introductory talk, it at least gives us an idea of what is needed in the process of being able to approach a meaningful study of this type of text. It’s a very advanced text.

Being “findable” means that when we investigate – either from the point of view of the conventional truth of what things are, or the deepest truth of what things are, that we can actually point to something that’s sitting there on the side of light itself, for example, that has some power to establish the existence of something. What is a vibration? Well, a vibration of light is made up of many little nanoseconds. At one nanosecond, we can only point to one. Then, at another nanosecond, we point to another. We’re measuring things and so on. I mean, there isn’t anything that we can actually point to that’s there. And this energy. Well, what is energy? What are we pointing to? Or is it a particle?

His Holiness uses all these different terms which are very descriptive and sometimes they are not really translated. They’re all translated as the same thing – “inherent existence” or “findable existence.” However, His Holiness uses very descriptive terminology. “As if there was something establishing the existence, on the side of an object, that you could point your finger to,” for example. That there is a place that the finger points to; that something is established from the place that the finger points to. This is the type of terminology that we find in Tibetan. It’s not so easy to translate in an elegant way.

The person, the finger and all these things, do they conventionally exist?

Well, this is the whole point. The non-Prasangika schools say, “Hey, you’re nihilists. The consequence of what you’re saying is that nothing exists.” This is not at all the Prasangika position. The Prasangika position is that there is the conventional existence of things; there is convention, and words do refer to something – this is why Gelugpa says Prasangikas actually are saying something, asserting something. Then the others will accuse them, “Well, if you say they refer to something, then you mean that there is something findable.” Then, they accuse Prasangikas of going to the other extreme.

This gets into the whole next topic, which I didn’t really plan to go into at all, and I don’t want to go into it because we don’t have time, which is “everything is like an illusion.” However, what does that actually mean? Things that don’t exist, like truly established existence, from a Madhyamaka point of view, are an illusion; they don’t exist at all. Conventionally existent things are like an illusion; they appear to exist in a way in which they don’t actually exist. That’s an important distinction to keep in mind. Because some schools will say that everything is an illusion, which is referring to the appearance of true existence, that true existence is an illusion; it doesn’t exist at all. Some non-Gelugpa schools will speak like that. Gelugpa always says “like an illusion,” there’s a deceptive appearance. The conventional truth of something, the actual conventional truth of something, appears to exist in a way in which it doesn’t exist, like an illusion does. However, let’s not go further into this discussion.

As I said, we can’t guarantee how deeply and how profoundly His Holiness will discuss all of this. If we can project from previous discourses of His Holiness, he likes to go into extreme, complicated depth about all of this. Since he loves his discussions with the scientists so much, he might bring in quantum physics, which is very much related to this whole topic of the interaction of a mind that is measuring or observing things, and the actual existence of things. Be prepared that His Holiness might speak on an incredibly high level.

Let’s go briefly through the content of the eight chapters on voidness. As I said, mostly what Aryadeva does is refute, by showing the absurd conclusions that would follow from them, the various assertions of this wide variety of non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools that we mentioned. I just chose some of the points in each of these chapters to give you a little bit of an idea. There really isn’t any time to explain any of them in depth, and I doubt that His Holiness will do that either. If I can extrapolate from previous discourses of His Holiness, he is likely to give a detailed explanation of voidness itself – a little bit like what I was doing, although maybe not going into the various schools, just sticking to Prasangika. Then, go quickly through the verses without explaining each of the points, and maybe just explaining a few here and there that he finds of interest. However, by going through some of these examples of the points raised in the verses here, at least I think you’ll get some idea of the scope of topics that Aryadeva addresses.

This chapter deals with the whole issue that there can be certain things which are static, yet nevertheless can do something, can produce an effect. This is asserted by various schools in different ways and concerning different things that they consider to be both static and functional. In addition, with truly established existence, Aryadeva doesn’t use the word “truly established existence” in the text, but when it’s explained, what will be behind the explanation is, in addition to everything that all of these non-Prasangika schools say, they are asserting everything on the basis of truly established existence the way that Prasangika defines it.

(9.1) All (functional phenomena) arise as a fact of being the result (of a collection of causes and circumstances). Therefore, there’s no such thing as a static (functional phenomenon that is causeless and truly existent). Except for the Thusly Gone Able Sage (Buddhas), there isn’t anyone (who can simultaneously cognize, nonconceptually,) just how functional phenomena (are both nonstatic and devoid of true existence).

Aryadeva says functional phenomena arise from causes and circumstances – that’s the definition of functional phenomena – and cannot be static with truly established existence.

(9.2) Whatever (functional phenomena there are) do not exist just at any place or at any time without relying (on causes and circumstances). Therefore, there is no such thing whatsoever as a (functional phenomenon that is) static, anytime, anywhere.

They depend on causes and circumstances, and they don’t just exist anywhere at any time.

(9.3) There is no such thing as a functional phenomenon without a cause, and no such thing as something static having a cause. Therefore, concerning (a static functional phenomenon) established from no cause, it is said that such indeed cannot be established (as an object of valid cognition even) by the Omniscient One.

No functional phenomenon exists without a cause, and therefore it’s impossible to have a static one.

The example for this that Aryadeva has in mind – he doesn’t say it explicitly – is the whole assertion of a creator God. For example, this is asserted by the Nyaya school, a non-Buddhist school. They assert that there is a creator God who is static, not affected by anything, but nevertheless creates, so a functional phenomenon. They say that there can’t be such a static functional phenomenon like a creator God, because anything that’s functional arises from causes and conditions.

(9.4) (Suppose you Vaisheshikas say the criterion for knowing something to be) nonstatic is from seeing that it has been produced, while if (you can) not (see it) has been produced, (that makes it) static. (Well then,) from seeing that it has been produced, (you merely know something to be) existent. (Therefore, not seeing an atman or “soul” as having been produced) makes (such a so-called) static object nonexistent.

Then, Aryadeva goes on to refute the logic of other faulty systems. The Vaisheshikas argue that if something is produced, it’s impermanent, and if something is not produced, then it is permanent and static. By this line of reasoning, they say since an atman (or a “soul”) is not produced, that means that it is permanent – it is static. Aryadeva refutes this by arguing that if something is produced, it exists; however, if something is not produced, it’s not pervasive that it exists as static because nonexistent things are also not produced.

Here we have an actual line of reasoning that is being used: Just because something is not produced by causes and circumstances, doesn’t mean that it exists as static; this is because nonexistent things are also not produced. So, your line of reasoning for proving that the atman or “soul” exists is a faulty line of reasoning. We shall not go into deep discussions in arguing about the validity of the logic on either side of this. Also, please be aware that general Indian logic does not follow the exact same rules and structure as Aristotelian logic. That also is a very deep and extensive topic of study which we have no time to go into.

(9.5) Space and so forth are understood to be static (and substantially existent, because they perform the function of serving as objects of the cognition of them, only) by ordinary folk (such as you Vaibhashikas, who do not correctly understand Buddha’s texts). The wise do not see such things as objects (of valid cognition), even on a worldly (conventional level).

Then Aryadeva goes on to speak about static space. He says that it can’t be considered substantially existent based on the argument that it performs the function of acting as an object of cognition of it (which is the Vaibhashika assertion), because static things can’t do anything. To say that serving as an object of the cognition of it, therefore, proves that it is substantially existent – because it does something – is faulty.

(9.6) Directional (space), such as (that of the eastern) direction, does not abide everywhere. Because of that, it’s extremely clear that directional (space) indeed has directions and other (divisions such as parts. Thus, it cannot be a static functional phenomenon in the way you Vaisheshikas define it as being both all-pervasive and partless).

Also, static space can’t be all-pervasive and partless, as Vaisheshika asserts. Vaisheshika asserts, and a lot of schools assert this, that space is all-pervasive (it’s everywhere) and static, of course, and it doesn’t have any parts. The reason why this is illogical is because there are always directional parts: we can always divide it into east, west, south and north.

(9.7) And any (type of time) that exists, allowing either the occurrence or prevention of a functional phenomenon to be seen (at its proper time) must, (in order to function as a cause), come under the influence of other (factors). Therefore, it itself becomes a result (and thus cannot be static as you Vaidantikas claim).

The next point concerns time. It’s also contradictory for time to be both static and to allow functional phenomena to appear now or not to appear now, as Vedanta asserts. In other words, there’s a certain time, let’s say it’s spring, and it allows for flowers to appear. Or it’s winter, and it doesn’t allow flowers to appear. It says that this is contradictory because, again, we would be asserting that something static, namely time – because they assert that time is static – would be performing a function.

Are time and the seasons two different things? I don’t know. A season is a certain time. Like, it is 12 o’clock; it’s time for lunch. It allows for us to eat. Or it’s 1 o’clock; it’s time for lunch. Or it’s 10 o’clock; it’s not time to eat. A point in time, we’re talking about, would allow something to happen or not. 

As I said, I don’t think we have time to go into depth or discuss all these individual arguments. Obviously, I think you get the idea that with each of them, one could spend an entire class on this topic, if not more than one class.

(9.12) (Consider the ultimately smallest particles, which you Vaisheshikas say are static and partless. How can they form an object?) Any (such particles) that had certain sides, (which when they met) were the cause (for an object’s forming, and certain sides, which were not the cause), would (therefore) have various (parts). How is it logical for that which has various (parts) to be static (by your definitions)?

Then, concerning ultimately smallest particles: they can’t be both static and also constitute objects, as Vaisheshika asserts. This is because the meeting of such particles functions as a cause for material objects. The Vaibhashikas even say that as well, and for them such particles are functional phenomena. Vaibhashika does assert that various objects are made up of these ultimately smallest particles. How can they be static if their coming together causes the material object?

What about Sautrantika?

Well, no. This gets to the next point. In the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika system, the ultimately smallest particles are nonstatic. They’re not asserted as static.

Do you understand this position of the Vaisheshikas? It’s the assertion that there’s a certain number of particles in the universe, and that’s it. They come together to form this object or that object, and then they come apart, and then the same particles come together again and form some other object and then come apart. Actually, there’s just a certain number of particles; they’re static and don’t change. That’s the position. This is self-contradictory because if they come together and actually constitute and form an object, they’re doing something. We can’t say that they’re nonfunctional and static.

(9.13) (The objects that would be) the result of (the meeting of such static particles, which as) a cause are round, do not have (this same round shape and size). Therefore, it is (also) unreasonable for (such) particles to join with their entire natures (merging on all sides all at once to form an object).

(9.14) (Suppose you said that they do not actually merge on all sides, since) you do not accept that the place occupied by one particle can also be (occupied) by another. Well then, because of that, (you are forced to say that in order to build up a gross, visible object, they must meet with at least some sides not joining, since) it cannot be accepted that (each of) the causal (particles) and the resultant (objects they form) are both equal in size. (But then, if some sides join and some do not, these particles cannot be partless.)

Then, Aryadeva goes on to say that such particles cannot be partless either, as Vaisheshika asserts. Because if they were partless, they couldn’t meet on one side. For them to meet, they have to meet on one side.

Shantideva repeats this last argument in refutation of the Vaibhashika assertion of ultimately smallest particles that are partless but are functional phenomena. The same argument can be used to refute either static nonfunctional partless particles or nonstatic functional ones. If they constitute something, they have to meet at one side. Shantideva gives many, many arguments in terms of this, and so does Aryadeva, actually. This is an important point in terms of science as well. Can we find the ultimately smallest particle or the ultimately smallest constituent of matter, energy, etc.? Buddhism says no – that no matter how small it gets, we can still divide it into parts.

(9.22) At the time of liberation, when there is parting from craving, if (the atman or “self”) had (a nature of) consciousness (as you Samkhyas assert), what point would there be (to this, since according to you there would be no objects for it to perceive). And if it were to exist then and not be conscious, this amounts to what is clearly not so (according to your system, since you assert that the “self” with the nature of consciousness is static and permanent).

Aryadeva goes on to refute as illogical both the Samkhya and then the Nyaya positions concerning liberated “self,” or truly existent permanent liberated “self.” He’s not talking here so much about such a “self” doing something, but just the concept in general. The Samkhyas say that a self is “conscious” (has awareness of things); the Nyaya says that it doesn’t, in general.

In terms of a Samkhya position, when we achieve liberation, then that “self” becomes totally removed or isolated from all of the universe, yet it still has consciousness. Aryadeva says this is ridiculous. We cannot have consciousness without being conscious of something, and so the assertion of a liberated permanent “soul” that is conscious but not conscious of anything is contradictory.

(9.23) If a “self” that was liberated had (true) existence, then (even if) it existed (in this condition) as having (only) the potential for consciousness, (this would still be unreasonable, since by not actually being conscious, it contradicts your definitions). And if (a truly existent “self”) did not exist (with consciousness when liberated), it wouldn’t be (reasonable) for it ever to have thought about (becoming released from) recurring samsaric existence, (since being truly existent and static, it could never have been conscious at all).

The Nyaya position is that the “soul” or “self” doesn’t have any consciousness, whether it’s liberated or not. It is just some sort of little thing that comes into somebody’s head and then activates a brain, and activates things, and uses that in order to know anything.

Aryadeva says, well, if you’re talking about a “soul” that in itself has no consciousness, then how could it ever have the thought to work to gain liberation? It couldn’t do anything, couldn’t have that type of thought, because you are asserting that it could exist all by itself, independent of any mind or any brain.

We have to understand that he is actually talking here about assertions of a static “self” that nevertheless is doing something. According to the Samkhyas, the static “self” when liberated still has consciousness. If there’s consciousness, the consciousness must be doing something; it has to be knowing something. If it’s not knowing something, then your assertion is absurd. For the Nyaya position, he’s saying – “You say that a ‘soul’ or an atman doesn’t know anything, and it can be liberated and not know anything.” How can you say that the “soul” knows or is conscious that “I want to work toward liberation”? To say that the “soul,” by itself, doesn’t know anything, and then we connect it to a mind, and a mind knows or wants to gain liberation, that’s ridiculous. You’d have to say that the mind wants liberation and not the “soul” wants liberation. Thus, you can’t have a “soul” that does anything, like wanting to gain liberation, and yet is static.

These are the major points in chapter nine.