What Do We Know after Negating Something
We have been speaking about affirmations and negations, and we have seen that they’re very important. There are quite a few things that came up from yesterday and some questions that are still there. A negation is one in which there’s an actual previous preclusion, or getting rid of an object to be negated, and that’s done by our minds, by our conceptual mind. So, the question really is, what do we know at the end of that?
I wanted to illustrate this with an example, a very common example. We are surfing through the stations of the television looking for something to watch, or going through a menu. “What do I want to eat?” We look at each item, each channel, each item on the menu. The television is a much better example. We look at each program that’s on, and we see that “this is not what I want to watch,” and we go on to the next, and we go on to the next, flicking from channel to channel. Do we have to know what we want to watch in order to see these programs that are there as “what I don’t want to watch?” When we look at the menu, do we have to know what we want to eat in order to be able to look at various things on the menu and say, “This is not what I want to eat?” At the end of eliminating all the possible stations on the television, do we know what we want to watch? No, we don’t, do we? What are the two possibilities?
You could turn the TV off.
Yes, we could turn the TV off. Stop looking.
Or just go through again and choose something which is of minor quality.
Or make do with something we didn’t really want to watch, but we take it because there isn’t anything else. But it’s a negation, isn’t it? “This is not what I want to watch.”
It’s based on the vague idea of what I want to watch.
That’s very good. It’s based on the general category of what we want to watch, but not on something specific in that category. What we would specifically want to watch within that category will change. We’re talking about a general category of “what I want to watch.” Even that might not be so well-defined because we might find something that we didn’t think we wanted to watch, but actually, it’s quite interesting.
It’s kind of fuzzy.
It’s kind of fuzzy. It’s the same thing as what we want to eat, what we want to do today, what we want to do this weekend. Some things are definitely excluded. We don’t want to fight in Iraq this weekend, for example, that’s pretty definite. We don’t want to die this weekend, but we don’t necessarily know what we do want to do.
Now, we have to get a little bit technical in order to understand more deeply what’s going on here. First, we have to go back to the discussion we already started about specifiers. What is it that I want to do? Well, we can conceptually specify “what I want to do” by the double negative; what I want to do is “not what I don’t want to do,” or we found an easier way of expressing it as “it’s nothing other than what I want to do.” Now “nothing other than what I want to do” is actually an implicative negation phenomenon. The affirmation phenomenon the sound of the words with which it is expressed leaves in its wake is “something I want to do.” However, as we saw, we’re specifying here only the general category “what I want to do” or “what I want to eat” or “what I want to watch on the television.”
Actually, this comes down to “what I like to watch” and “what I like to eat” and “what I like to do.” It’s on the basis of “what I like” that we want to do something, usually. However, let’s not get too far into that distinction here. But when we’re going through choices and making a choice “not what I want to do,” “not what I want to do,” “not what I want to do,” then “not what I want to do” is also an implicative negation. The affirmation phenomenon the sound of its word leaves in its wake is the activity that is the basis for what I don’t want to do, for instance “dying today.” The sound does not leave in its wake the basis for the negation, “something that I want to do” – or, more accurately, something that fits in the category “activities I want to do today.” It is not a specific activity.
If we ask, “How do you specify the possible way of existing?” We would specify it by saying that it is “nothing other than the possible way of existing,” in other words it would be “not what is an impossible way of existing.” As we’ve seen, we don’t have to know absolutely every impossible way of existing in order to specify the possible way of existing. The possible way of existing is that things function and also that things make logical sense. From a Buddhist point of view, that’s the only thing that is possible. How that actually works – that things function and that things make logical sense – that’s a totally different issue. Furthermore, when we talk about excluding what is impossible, obviously, each tenet system is going to agree that what would be impossible would be that things don’t function at all and don’t make any sense. Now, how each system is going to specify a way in which things would not make sense and would not function, that’s going to be different, but all of them would be refuting impossible ways of existing.
When we’re doing voidness meditation, we’re working with one specific way of existing, which happens to be in the category of “impossible ways of existing.” Then, we are negating that with a non-implicative negation, “there’s no such thing,” and the sound of its words doesn’t leave any affirmation phenomenon in its wake – such as what is the specific way of existing that is possible, such as dependent arising. Although the actual way in which things exist is in terms of dependent arising, it’s not that we had to know that before eliminating the impossible ways of existing, and it’s not that we know it after eliminating them. All that we needed to have was some general category of “possible way of existing.” It didn’t need to be defined in a terribly specific way, just as when we spoke about the general category of “what I would like to do” or “what I would like to eat.” So, knowing the equivalency of voidness and dependent arising is not so simple.
Remember, in order to get rid of our suffering, we have to get rid of the cause of our suffering, which is grasping for true findable existence. We have to negate that in order to get rid of suffering, but that doesn’t imply that we do know, at the end of that negation, how things actually do exist. The negation itself doesn’t toss in its wake (to go back to our technical terminology) the way in which things actually exist.
If I negate “pink elephants,” we have no referent object. Do I know more than before?
When we negate “pink elephants,” what did we know before? The problem is, what is the effect of negating it? The effect is, if we were freaked out and frightened and really upset because of thinking that pink elephants were real, that they were invading us from the fifth dimension, if we realize that, hey, there is no such thing, it would free us from that fear, eventually, when we really became convinced of it. Eventually, it would cause us to stop fantasizing that there were pink elephants because it’s just a habit of believing in pink elephants that causes us to continue not only to believe in them but also to hallucinate them. Remember, the whole point of understanding voidness is to get rid of the causes of suffering. It’s not just an interesting intellectual exercise.
Comparison with the Realization of Nonstaticness
When we refute true existence, are we refuting that things are static and, in the end, we’re left that things are nonstatic, that things are impermanent?
Well, knowing you, and knowing that you come from a strong Theravada (Skt. Theravāda) background, I think that maybe you’re confusing a few things here in the Prasangika (Skt. Prāsaṅgika) system with certain assertions in some of the Hinayana (Skt. Hīnayāna) tenet systems. First of all, if we look at the Sautrantika (Skt. Sautrāntika) system within Hinayana, they say that static phenomena are metaphysical, whereas nonstatic phenomena are objective. You might think that when we’ve refuted metaphysical phenomena, we’re left with objective phenomena, and that’s really what the refutation is all about. If that were the case, then there’s a bit of confusion, because what Sautrantika says is that metaphysical phenomena are non-truly existent and objective phenomena are truly existent. So, it’s a little bit backward here in terms of what you asked about.
It’s like our example of Tenzin, “not my Tenzin,” “not your Tenzin.” We’re not talking about true existence as defined in the Sautrantika tradition. We’re not even talking about true existence as defined in the Chittamatra (Skt. Cittamātra) or Svatantrika (Skt. Svātantrika) systems. We are talking about true existence as defined in the Prasangika system. Which Tenzin then are we talking about? This is why it’s very important to identify the object to be refuted, the object to be negated, so that we are not talking about “your Tenzin,” we’re talking about “my Tenzin.”
All of these types of true existence are impossible ways of existing, but we have to understand what is meant by “impossible” here. “Impossible” is defined in terms of the negation of what we think is possible, and what we think is possible might not be possible. What’s impossible to me is different from you. What I don’t want to eat isn’t what you don’t want to eat, is it? What we need to appreciate is that each school of philosophical tenets really has quite a different idea of what true existence means.
Also, there’s another very fundamental difference between nonstaticness and “no true existence.” According to the Jetsunpa textbooks and definitions, “nonstatic” is an affirmation phenomenon because in satipatthana (close placement of mindfulness meditation), we can observe it. Each moment of physical sensation, and so on, is changing, and from that, we can just observe that it is nonstatic, as you do in Theravada meditation. We didn’t have to have a clear idea of what static was and negate it in order to observe the changing of each moment of our sensations. That’s why it is an affirmation phenomenon, and that’s why there is a big difference between nonstatic and actually thinking “not static,” in which we knew what static was, and then through a line of inference we refuted it, like refuting that sound is permanent, that sound is static. The Mimamsaka (Skt. Mīmāṃsaka) school of tenets says that sound is static because of the sound of the Vedas being eternal and never changing.
Also, as we discussed in our last session, there are two definitions of unawareness or ignorance. Unawareness is a negation phenomenon, but what is it actually negating? Although what unawareness is unaware of is either the four noble truths or karmic cause and effect, unawareness is not a negation of either of those. Unawareness is a negation phenomenon where the object negated is knowing them correctly. Unawareness is a not knowing of them correctly.
There are two ways in which unawareness may be a not knowing of the four noble truths or of karmic cause and effect correctly. Both are types of awareness of them that obstruct and prevent knowing them correctly. According to Vaibhashika (Skt. Vaibhāṣika) and Sautrantika as described by Vasubandhu and Chittamatra as described by Asanga (Skt. Asaṅga), unawareness is an anti-knowing of them – a closed-mindedness that is a mental block blinding the mind from knowing them correctly. It blinds the mind because it doesn’t question misinformation about them. According to Sautrantika and Chittamatra as asserted by Dharmakirti (Skt. Dharmakīrti) and according to Madhyamaka (Skt. Mādhyamaka), unawareness is a misknowing of them. It too blinds the mind from knowing them correctly, but it does this by using faulty logic to question them, which results in knowing them incorrectly.
I think we can also apply these two types of unawareness to nonstaticness. When looking at our face in the mirror, for example, we may not know that our body is nonstatic and that it ages each moment. We may see lines under our eyes and, with anti-knowing, not question what they mean, or with misknowing, think they only indicate that we are tired. In neither case are we negating staticness, which would require knowing what staticness is. Unawareness or ignorance is only a negation of correctly knowing something.
These schools have their own definitions of what they see as true existence.
Correct.
And they are all negating that.
No, they are not all negating true existence. Firstly, they each define true existence differently and except for Madhyamaka, the others accept true existence as meaning “real.” Vaibhashika asserts that all phenomena have true existence, whereas both Sautrantika and Chittamatra assert that some kinds of phenomena have true existence and some don’t. The two Madhyamaka schools, Svatantrika and Prasangika, both say that nothing has true existence.
Meditation on Voidness of the Person in the Sautrantika System of Hinayana
To really appreciate what’s going on in the Buddhist process of trying to get rid of suffering, we need to bring in the background that we’ve covered, in the previous years, of the schools of tenets, because this really makes things a bit clearer. Do you remember we had a discussion of self-sufficiently knowable phenomena and imputably knowable phenomena? Self-sufficiently knowable phenomena can be known without that cognition having to make anything else appear at the same time. Imputably knowable phenomena can only be known with the cognition making something else appear at the same time.
The Sautrantika system, which is one of the Hinayana systems of tenets, asserts that forms of physical phenomena and ways of being aware of something are self-sufficiently knowable. Nonstatic phenomena that are neither of these two, for instance, persons, are imputedly knowable. They can only be known when the consciousness also makes appear the aggregates on which they are imputed. Likewise, all static phenomena are similarly imputably knowable. The absence of somebody from a room can only be known with a room appearing, and similarly, the absence of a static monolithic “self” or “person” that’s separate from the aggregates can only be known on the basis of the aggregates appearing. Sautrantika says that they have to appear at the same time, simultaneously.
The Mahayana (Skt. Mahāyāna) tenets refine this. They say that the Sautrantika assertion is true for nonstatic phenomena that are neither ways of being aware of something nor forms of physical phenomena, such as persons, and for static phenomena other than voidnesses. However, for voidness, whether that’s voidness of a person or voidness of phenomena, the basis for voidness doesn’t appear simultaneously with voidness. But it does have to appear the moment before.
Because of this difference, then there is a great difference in the way in which we meditate on the voidness of a person. I’m using the term “voidness of a person” here to also describe what we are meditating on in the Hinayana systems, like Sautrantika, as a shorthand, rather than saying, “the lack of a static monolithic ‘person’ separate from the aggregates.” In Sautrantika, as well as in the Mahayana tenet systems of Chittamatra and Madhyamaka, the voidness here is a non-implicative negation, “no such thing.”
In the Sautrantika system, during non-conceptual total absorption on the voidness of a person, the person and the aggregates both appear and are explicitly cognized simultaneously, while the voidness of the impossible way of existing of that person is implicitly cognized and does not appear. In the Chittamatra and Madhyamaka systems, it is like the Sautrantika description both in the build-up before entering non-conceptual total absorption on the voidness of a person as well as in the subsequent attainment phase of meditation that follows. But during the total absorption phase, whether conceptual or non-conceptual, only voidness alone is apprehended.
Contrast with the Prasangika System of Mahayana
This is, of course, very different from what I described yesterday, which is basically the Mahayana presentation. I was speaking more particularly about the Prasangika presentation, but it’s true for all the Mahayana systems that the moment before the total absorption on voidness, the basis for voidness appears; however, at the time of the total absorption on voidness, voidness itself is explicitly known and appears explicitly, and nothing is known implicitly. When this cognition of voidness is conceptual, then, although the basis of voidness can appear here, nevertheless, it doesn’t appear and is not known by that same cognition of voidness. It’s either appearing and being known by a separate cognition occurring at the same time according to the Panchen explanation, or it’s being known by subliminal cognition, which is also occurring at the same time and is also a different cognition. However, that cognition of voidness, itself, does not apprehend the basis for voidness, either explicitly or implicitly.
In the Mahayana systems, when we talk about how do we know static non-implicative negations, such as the absence of somebody from the room, then the Sautrantika analysis is the case. What does this mean? This means that with a non-implicative negation, when the sound of the words with which it is explressed has negated the object to be negated, it does not imply or leave in its wake any affirmation phenomena knowable to conceptual cognition; nevertheless, an affirmation phenomenon can appear to that mind that is knowing that non-implicative negation.
Let’s look at an example. When we think “Renata is absent,” we’re thinking of a Renata who is absent. This is an implicative negation. What appears to that conceptual cognition is a Renata, and that could be a visual image of Renata or just the sound of her name, and what is implicitly known in that cognition is her absence; the absence doesn’t actually appear. What we have negated is her presence. We could also think of a “room without Renata.” “Room without Renata” would also be an implicative negation. What the sound of those words leaves in its wake is the affirmative phenomenon, the room, and that’s what would appear explicitly. The negation phenomenon, the absence of Renata, would be something that is known implicitly; it doesn’t actually appear, and the object negated here would be a Renata being present. An absence of Renata from the room can’t actually appear because an absence is a static phenomenon; it doesn’t have a shape or a form, and only something that has a shape or form can actually appear. It’s like when we see an empty cup, what do we actually see? The sides of a cup appear, and implicitly, we know there’s nothing in the cup; it’s empty. Actually, that’s the Sautrantika position. There’s a big discussion on this in Chittamatra; it says that an empty space can appear and be known explicitly. Even though it’s a static phenomenon – it doesn’t have any shape or form – it can still be known non-conceptually and explicitly.
However, here let’s talk about a room without Renata. What appears is the room. If we follow the Chittamatra explanation, we would say that an empty space also appears, and what we know implicitly is the absence of Renata. After all, if we saw or thought about a room without Renata and a room without Mary, what appeared would be exactly the same, wouldn’t it? A room and some sort of empty space. Implicitly, we would know, in the one case, that there was an absence of Renata; in the other case, we would know there’s an absence of Mary. That’s why we say this is implicitly known.
What about when we know just the absence of Renata. This is a non-implicative negation. After the sound of the words “the absence of Renata,” has negated the object to be negated, namely the presence of Renata, all that it leaves in its wake is the negation phenomenon “the absence of Renata.” How do we focus on that? We would have to focus on that only implicitly; it couldn’t actually appear. What would appear and would be known explicitly would be something representing Renata, either a mental image of her or just the name “Renata.”
Let’s say we’re thinking, “Renata’s absence from class has occurred many times now.” We can’t think of Renata’s absence or the absence of Renata without actually simultaneously thinking at least the word “Renata.” That’s because the absence of Renata is a static phenomenon, and it is imputably knowable, and so something else has to be known explicitly at the same time as knowing it. In that case, what’s explicitly known and appearing is Renata, or some representation of Renata, or in this case the word “Renata,” and what’s implicitly known is her absence. An absence or an empty space doesn’t actually appear. Still, the absence of Renata is a non-implicative negation; it hasn’t thrown in its wake Renata, the basis for the negation. When the sound of the words “the absence of Renata” has negated the presence of Renata, what does it leave in its wake? It doesn’t leave Renata. It just leaves the absence of Renata, but because the absence of Renata is an imputably knowable phenomenon, it can’t be known without something else appearing simultaneously when we know it. In this case, it would be Renata or something representing Renata, like the word “Renata.”
The same analysis holds true for when we think, “There’s no Renata in the room.” This is also a non-implicative negation. What does the sound of the words, “no Renata in the room” leave in its wake? It doesn’t leave any affirmation of Renata; it doesn’t leave any affirmation of the room; it just leaves in its wake the negation phenomenon, “no Renata in the room.” How do we see that? In other words, what do we see? We see the room and also see an empty space in it, and these are known explicitly; implicitly, we know the absence of Renata in the room. This is also because this absence of Renata from the room, is a static phenomenon and it’s knowable only imputably.
I know that all this is really complicated, and we might think, well, why are we going into so much detail, and what difference does it really make? It does make a difference in terms of how we meditate on voidness; after all, we want to be able to meditate correctly on voidness in order to overcome our suffering and be able to benefit others, as much as is possible, by attaining enlightenment. Let’s look at it again, but this time, let’s restrict ourselves to just the discussion of how we focus on voidness as a non-implicative negation.
How to Focus on Voidness as a Non-Implicative Negation
First, let’s look at it in the Sautrantika model. We think of a person, let’s say “me.” We first think of my body, for instance, or name, or something like that. On that basis, we then also think of “me.” “Me,” after all, a person, is something that is only imputedly knowable. That means it can only be known tied to something else. We have to have something else appear and be known explicitly at the same time in order to think “me.” It has to be either our body, our mind, name, or something like that. Anyway, we’re thinking of “me” on the basis of a name, and because of the influence of some doctrinal system, we believe that “me” is static, monolithic entity that can exist separate from the aggregates.
What we want to refute here, what we want to negate, is “a static, monolithic, separate ‘me’.” That’s what is to be negated. In the end, what we want to focus on is “no such thing as a static, monolithic, separate ‘me’.” That’s a non-implicative negation. After we have negated a static, monolithic, separate “me,” all we are left with is the absence of a static, monolithic, separate “me.”
According to Sautrantika, in order to be able to focus on that absence, that “no such thing,” we have to have appear explicitly the “me,” and, of course, the basis of the “me,” which would be the aggregates, a name, or something like that. But what we’re really focusing on here is this absence, this “no such thing,” or voidness (if we want to put it in simple terms), which we only know implicitly with the reflexive awareness (rang-rig) that accompanies the cognition. Reflexive awareness, accepted only by the Sautrantika and Chittamatra tenet systems, accompanies all cognitions and is aware of the consciousness and mental factors in the cognitions, but not their focal objects. Here, however, reflexive awareness is focusing conceptually on “no such thing,” since that absence is not appearing. While we’re focusing on “no such thing as this static, monolithic, separate ‘me,’” what is appearing is a “me,” but that’s not our main focus; we’re focusing on “no such thing.” Now that’s the total absorption. It’s actually more complicated than what I just explained, but this is the basic structure.
Subsequent to that, what we are focusing on is a “me” that is devoid of existing as a static, monolithic, separate “me.” So here, this negation phenomenon is an implicative negation, and our main focus is on “me,” this “me,” and that’s the affirmation phenomenon that is tossed in the wake of the negation. Our main focus is on “me,” and implicitly how it exists; it is without being a static, monolithic, separate “me.” The main focus, then, during total absorption and during subsequent realization is quite different. During total absorption the main focus is on the implicit apprehension and during subsequent cognition on the explicit apprehension. Because the type of negation phenomenon is different in the two, the “me” that is explicitly apprehended during total absorption is not an affirmation phenomenon tossed in the wake of the negation, whereas during subsequent realization it is.
If we look at the Mahayana way of meditating, and for ease of discussion, let’s speak in terms of the Prasangika system, then we would start out the same way as I just described with the Sautrantika system. We would think of “me” and something from the aggregates that would be a basis for imputation of “me,” such as the word “me,” or my body, or mind, or whatever. We would also have an appearance here of true findable existence, and what we would negate is that true findable existence, that there is no such thing as this true findable existence on the basis of the “me.” Once our certitude that there’s no such thing has cut off the object to be refuted, namely true existence, then we just focus (whether conceptually or non-conceptually) on “no such thing.” This is what we are explicitly focusing on. It can be an appearance of a blank space, or something like that; with that thought, “no such thing,” in the case that it’s conceptual, then nothing else is appearing or known by that thought. The basis is not known.
However, subliminally, implicitly or by another cognition, depending on which explanation we follow, we would have an appearance of the basis of voidness here, the “me” on the basis of some sort of aggregates. But that awareness of the basis for voidness that we have at that time would be similar to when we are sitting totally absorbed listening to music; it’s the type of awareness that we would have of our clothing next to our skin, or of the wall in front of us. In other words, this is very, very minimal; we are not really aware of these things, although they are appearing to our subliminal consciousness or this other sense cognition. That’s quite different from the Sautrantika total absorption, when the mind is actually making an appearance of the basis for voidness and, at the same time, implicitly knowing with reflexive awareness, “there’s no such thing as the impossible way of existing that we are refuting.”
Although in the Sautrantika way of meditating, the basis for imputation is not the main focus, our main emphasis and our focus is “no such thing” – it’s the implicitly known negation phenomenon – but that basis is much more prominently known than in the Mahayana way of meditating. As for how we actually meditate during the subsequent attainment, then it’s the same in Mahayana as it is in Sautrantika. So, maybe this is a little bit clearer.
I used the example of focusing on the absence of Renata in the room just to illustrate how we could have something appear at the same time as when we’re focusing on a non-implicative negation. That thing that appears, the affirmation phenomenon, is nevertheless not thrown in the wake of the negation when negation has refuted or negated the object to be negated.
Further Clarification of Implicative and Non-Implicative Negations
Could you explain a little bit more about the difference between the implicative and the non-implicative negation? It still isn’t completely clear.
The difference is in how the negation is made. A non-implicative one is basically “there is no…,” and an implicative one is something such as “this is not that” or “this without that.” When we focus on voidness, it’s “there is no.” It’s not in terms of a “there is not something that could be here, but it’s not here now.” The focus is on “there is no such thing as….” In addition, there are two types of non-implicative negations, differentiated according to whether the object to be refuted is existent or nonexistent. Then, even within nonexistent, what is nonexistent may be either an object such as rabbit horns or a way of existing. In the case of voidness, the object negated with a non-implicative negation is an impossible way of existing.
“There is no X” is a non-implicative negation, while both “X without Y” and “X is not Y” are implicative negations. With “there is no X,” it doesn’t matter how long a string of words is that defines X – a “Renata in the room,” or whatever – but it’s basically saying, “there is no X,” whatever that expression might be. That’s non-implicative. In the other one, in the implicative one, we’re saying a “Y without X” or a “Y that is not X,” so it’s a different type of negation of X in the expression, in the formula that we write, like an algebraic formula.
Now that’s more clear. In an implicative, you have two variables.
In an implicative negation, we have two kinds of variables; we have Ys and Xs in the expression: an affirmation and a negation. In a non-implicative, all we have is one variable, an X. “There is no X.” That X could be a long expression within parentheses. It doesn’t matter. That’s our X here.
An implicative would be, for example, a self that is not truly existent.
Correct. A self that is not truly existent. That there is no such thing as a truly existent self, that’s not implicative.
The Impossible Way of Existing That Voidness Negates in the Various Buddhist Tenet Systems
What are we negating with voidness meditation in each of the schools of Buddhist tenets? Let’s go through them in accord with the Gelug explanation.
Vaibhashika
Vaibhashika doesn’t accept that there are non-implicative negations; they only talk about implicative ones. What we need to realize is that “the person is not an impossible ‘self,’” that’s an implicative negation. Also, Vaibhashika only asserts a coarse selflessness of a person. A person is not a static, monolithic, independently existing entity. This is because a person is a nonstatic, dependently existent entity imputed, meaning tied, to the five aggregates and thus having parts. Nevertheless, Vaibhashika asserts it is self-sufficiently knowable. It can be cognized without any of the aggregates to which it is tied simultaneously appearing in the cognition.
Although Vaibhashika asserts that the aggregates do not exist as the possession of a static, monolithic, independently existing person, it does not assert a selflessness of phenomena. What do we understand regarding phenomena in Vaibhashika? We understand that there are two types of true phenomena, two truths. Superficially true phenomena such as the body have parts. They conceal deeply true phenomena that do not have parts, such as the partless particles that comprise the body.
Sautrantika
Now, we go to Sautrantika. Sautrantika does accept non-implicative negations. The coarse selflessness of a person is that there is no such thing as a self or person that is a static, monolithic, independently existing entity. Sautrantika also assets a subtle selflessness of a person, which is also a non-implicative negation – there is no such thing as a nonstatic, dependently existent person tied the five aggregates and thus having parts and that can be cognized without one of those aggregates also simultaneously appearing and being cognized in the cognition.
Like Vaibhashika, Sautrantika does not assert a selflessness or voidness of all phenomena. Also, like Vaibhashika, the two truths refer to two sets of phenomena. The two sets in Vaibhashika are not the set of static phenomena and the set of nonstatic phenomena, but rather the set of phenomena having parts and the set of phenomena not having parts. The set of phenomena having parts includes only nonstatic phenomena, but the set of partless phenomena includes both nonstatic phenomena such as particles and static ones such as the selflessness of persons. All phenomena, whether static or nonstatic have true existence or, more precisely, truly established existence. Their existence is truly established by the fact that they all perform functions – at minimum, the function of serving as the object of a cognition of them.
For Sautrantika, the two sets of phenomena are the set of objective entities (rang-mtshan), which includes only nonstatic phenomena, and metaphysical entities, which includes only static phenomena such as categories. According to the Jetsunpa textbooks, only objective entities have truly established existence because only they can perform a function. Only they are “real.” Metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan) like categories are not truly existent, where not truly existent is an implicative negation that tosses in its wake the affirmation phenomenon “falsely existent.” Metaphysical phenomena are “unreal,” but only in the sense that they occur only in conceptual cognitions. Further, they are findable in conceptual cognitions and, there, their existence is established from their own sides. The Panchen textbooks define truly established existence as existence established from the side of the object. Thus, they assert that both objective and metaphysical entities have truly established existence.
Chittamatra
Now, we get to Chittamatra, and it’s only with Chittamatra, which is Mahayana, that a selflessness or voidness of all phenomena is asserted, and it is exclusively a non-implicative negation. Chittamatra asserts that to attain liberation we need to understand merely the non-implicative negation that is the selflessness of persons, the same as Sautrantika asserts it. However, to attain enlightenment and become a Buddha, we also need to understand the non-implicative negation that is the selflessness of phenomena.
The selflessness or voidness of phenomena that is a non-implicative negation is in reference to nonstatic phenomena, called “dependent phenomena” (gzhan-dbang, other-powered) in Chittamatra. Their coarse voidness applies to when they are objects of sensory cognition; their subtle voidness applies to when they are objects of conceptual cognition. When they are objects of sensory cognition, their existence is devoid of being established as coming from a natal source different from the natal source from which the ways of being aware of it come in that cognition. There is no such thing. The dependent phenomenon and the ways of being aware of it both come from the same natal source, a karmic tendency or seed on the foundation consciousness, the alayavijnana (Skt. ālaya-vijñāna).
When dependent phenomena are objects of conceptual objects, although they have individual defining characteristic marks that establish them as validly knowable phenomena, they are devoid of having individual characteristic marks that can serve as bases on which names or attributes for them can be set. That is the subtle selflessness or voidness of phenomena. There are no such things. Names, such as Alex, Alexander and Dr. Berzin and attributes such as young or old are merely imputed on a person when thinking about them. Imputed, here, means projected and tied to the phenomenon. There is no defining characteristic of “Alex” or “old” on the side of the person, which, when thought about, establishes them as “Alex” or “old” in conjunction with those imputed names and attributes.
In addition to dependent phenomena, there are totally conceptional phenomena (kun-brtags) (namely, all static phenomena other than voidness, such as categories, as well as nonexistent phenomena such as externally established existence) and thoroughly established phenomena (yongs-grub) (namely, voidness). Each of these three type of phenomena has a specific lack of essential nature (ngo-bo-nyid med-pa). These lacks of essential natures are implicative negations. They negate that this type of phenomenon is like one of the other types with regard to a certain feature.
For example, both dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly existent. Truly existent phenomena in the Chittamatra system are ultimate phenomena, which means phenomena that appear to an arya (Skt. ārya). When an arya is about to enter total absorption on voidness, first a dependent phenomenon, as the basis for voidness, must appear and then only voidness appears. But dependent phenomena lack an essential nature of existing like thoroughly established ones do because they arise from causes and conditions, whereas thoroughly established ones, being static phenomena, do not arise from causes and conditions.
Totally conceptional phenomena, such as categories, lack an essential nature of existing as ultimate phenomena like dependent phenomena and thoroughly established ones do. Dependent phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena have individual defining characteristic marks on their sides that establish them as ultimate phenomena and as truly existent. Although totally conceptional phenomena have defining characteristic marks that establish them as individual validly knowable phenomena, they lack the defining characteristic marks that establish them as ultimate phenomena and truly existent. They are merely imputedly existent.
Thoroughly established phenomena, namely voidnesses, lack an essential nature of existing as ultimate, like dependent phenomena do, in the sense that unlike dependent phenomena, they do not arise from causes and conditions.
The Chittamatra system is very different from Sautrantika. In Sautrantika, categories and voidnesses are both metaphysical entities; they are static and lack true existence because they are not functional. In Chittamatra, although categories and voidnesses are both static phenomena, categories lack true existence while voidnesses are truly existent because Chittamatra takes truly existent phenomena to be ultimate phenomena.
Svatantrika
Then, we go to Svatantrika, and Svatantrika says that not only totally conceptional phenomena are imputedly existent like Chittamatra asserts, but all phenomena are imputedly existent. Their existence is established by their being the referent objects of words and concepts mentally labeled on a basis for labeling in conjunction with a defining characteristic mark findable on the side of the basis. The voidness of all phenomena is their lack of true existence, and this is a non-implicative negation.
For Svatantrika, true existence is existence established either unimputedly or by mere conceptual labeling and not in conjunction with a defining characteristic mark findable on the side of the basis. Unlike Chittamatra, Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, there isn’t anything that has true existence, because there is no such thing as truly established existence. As for the selflessness of persons, Svatantrika asserts it the same as does Chittamatra and Sautrantika.
Svatantrika also asserts that all phenomena have self-established existence (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa), also translated as inherent existence. This is existence established by a self-establishing nature (rang-bzhin) on the side of an object that makes them findable as the referent “thing” that correspond to the words and concepts for them. Referent “things” (btags-don) are not real, but they are imagined focal supports (dmigs-rten) holding up the referent objects (btags-chos) of words and concepts.
Prasangika
What does Prasangika say? What’s the object to be negated and the basis of the negation in Prasangika? The object to be negated is self-established existence, which for them is equivalent to true existence, and its basis is all phenomena. This is the selflessness of both persons and all phenomena. Prasangika also negates with a non-implicative negation a defining characteristic mark findable on the side of the basis for labeling that, in conjunction with conceptual labeling, establishes the existence of phenomena. Prasangika asserts that the conventional existence of all phenomena is established merely by conceptual labeling alone.
Svatantrika asserts that all phenomena have imputed existence and that they are all findable. They all have self-established existence. Prasangika refutes that imputed phenomena are findable, not simply that all phenomena are findable. That’s why it’s so important to work through the tenet systems, because otherwise we don’t identify clearly the object to be negated and the basis of the negation. What we think are findable imputed objects are devoid of being findable. Now, what are we left with? What we’re left with is that they are merely imputed. That’s dependent arising. They are only imputed without being findable.
According to Gelug Prasangika, there is nothing findable, then, on the side of any object or phenomenon that has the power, either by itself or in conjunction with a word conceptually labeled on it, to establish that it exists. The only thing that can establish that it exists is that it is the referent object that words and concepts conceptually labeled on them refer to. But there is no referent “thing” behind that referent object holding it up, as it were.
Non-Gelug Madhyamaka
The non-Gelug Madhyamaka schools refute this. They assert that because the referent objects of conceptual labeling are purely conceptual and appear to have unimputed existence, they are unreal. Conventional objects are not merely like an illusion, they are an illusion and, in fact, as The Heart Sutra literally says, “There are no eyes, no ears, etc.” Just as Gelug says that all conditioned phenomena dependently arise and function on the basis of mere conceptual labeling, non-Gelug says that dependent arising and karmic cause and effect function on the basis of there being no conventional objects.
The non-Gelugpas then argue that the Gelug Prasangika view, in asserting referent objects of conceptual labeling, goes to the extreme of absolutism even though these referent objects are non-findable. To attain non-conceptual cognition of voidness, you need to go beyond conceptual labeling and beyond existence established merely by conceptual labeling. You even need to go beyond the logical refutation, which is conceptual, that negates existence, nonexistence, both or neither. The Gelugpas argue back that the non-Gelug Madhyamaka view falls to the extreme of nihilism. And if you non-Gelugpas say that your assertion is correct because that is what aryas see in non-conceptual cognition of voidness, then you sound like Chittamatra.
Each school says that you cannot attain a true stopping of samsara (Skt. saṃsāra) based on what the other schools assert, so their aryas aren’t real aryas. This is like the long discussion Shantideva has about how tenet shravaka (Skt. śrāvaka) arhats are not really liberated. I must say this is a very difficult thing to settle, but I think that this shows us an overview of how important the tenet systems are.
Concluding Remarks
What I have been trying to do in these weekend seminars on voidness is to emphasize that we always have to look at what’s left over after the negation, because that becomes the basis of the refutation of the next level. After we’ve refuted and negated some level of an impossible way of existing in reference to some object, for instance the self of a person, we need to see what is still left over of the person. If there’s something impossible that is still left, then we haven’t taken away enough, so we have to negate and take away more.
The problem is, when have we taken away enough? What the Gelugpas are accusing the non-Gelugpas of is that you’ve over-negated. You’ve taken everything away and there is no self that is left. Gelug Prasangika says that things exist as what words and concepts refer to, that’s all. Can you find what the words and concepts for them refer to? No. Is there something findable holding them up? No. All you can say is that they are what the words for them refer to. It doesn’t mean that you can only know them by words and concepts. Be satisfied with that and don’t go off into some mystical realm. Just get back to the practical Gelugpa position of helping people. Then the non-Gelugpas rely that the help you give to people works only on the basis of there being no people; you just help.
In summary, I hope that you can see from this material how important it is to understand these negation phenomena because it is with this understanding of negation phenomena that we actually gain liberation and enlightenment, and because voidness is a negation phenomenon and almost all the realizations that we gain on the path are likewise in terms of negation phenomena. We’ve only started to deal with the topic; there’s a tremendous amount more to the topic, but I hope that this introductory weekend gives you some incentive to go deeper and deeper into the topic of negation phenomena.