[1] (Objection) If all this were void, there could be no arising or no perishing. Then, through the riddance or cessation of what could nirvāṇa be posited?
[2] (Reply) If all this were not void, there could be no arising or no perishing. Then, through the riddance or cessation of what could a nirvāṇa be posited?
[3] (A state) without having gotten rid of, without having gained, and without having cut off (anything), and without anything permanent, without anything ceased, and without anything arisen – that’s called a nirvāṇa.
[4] Nirvāṇa is not a state of existence, (which, if it were), it would absurdly be characterized by aging and dying. That’s because there is no existence that is without aging and dying.
[5] And if nirvāṇa were an existent phenomenon, then nirvāṇa would be an affected phenomenon, for no unaffected phenomenon is found to exist anywhere in any manner as an existent phenomenon.
[6] And if nirvāṇa were an existent phenomenon that was unobtained from reliance on a basis, how could that be? For a nirvāṇa unobtained from reliance on a basis is not found to exist in any manner as an existent phenomenon.
[7] If nirvāṇa is not an existent phenomenon, then how could it exist as a nonexistent phenomenon? Wherever no existent phenomenon can be found as existing, no nonexistent phenomenon can be found as existing there either.
[8] And if nirvāṇa were a nonexistent phenomenon, then how could nirvāṇa be one unobtained from reliance on a basis? For there is no nonexistent phenomenon that can be found as existing unobtained from reliance on a basis.
[9] Whatever the phenomenon of coming into and going out (of a saṃsāric rebirth might be), either obtained from reliance on a basis or dependently arisen (from causes and conditions) – nirvāṇa is taught to be that which is neither obtained from reliance on a basis nor dependently arisen (from causes and conditions).
[10] And the Teacher proclaimed ridding oneself of (conceptualizing nirvāṇa in terms of) existence or annihilation. Therefore, it is appropriate that nirvāṇa is neither an existent phenomenon nor a nonexistent phenomenon.
[11] If nirvāṇa were both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon, then liberation too would be both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon. But that is not tenable.
[12] If nirvāṇa were both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon, then nirvāṇa would not be something unobtained from reliance on a basis, for both of those are obtained from reliance on a basis.
[13] How could nirvāṇa be both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon? Nirvāṇa is an unaffected phenomenon, whereas an existent phenomenon and a nonexistent phenomenon are both affected.
[14] How could both a nonexistent phenomenon and an existent phenomenon be in nirvāṇa? For the two can never exist together in one and the same place, just as light and darkness (cannot).
[15] The assertion, “Nirvāṇa is neither a nonexistence nor an existence,” would be established only if both nonexistence and existence had themselves already been established.
[16] If nirvāṇa did exist as neither a nonexistence nor an existence, then by whom could it be correctly known as “neither a nonexistence nor an existence”?
[17] It is not conceptually posited that after a final cessation, the Bhagavān exists. Nor is it conceptually posited that he does not, or both or neither.
[18] Even while remaining (alive), the Bhagavān cannot be conceptually posited as existing. Nor can he be conceptually posited as not (existing), or as either both or as neither (of the two).
[19] There is no distinction (regarding is there the Tathāgata) while (remaining) in samsara from while in nirvāṇa, and there is no distinction while in nirvāṇa from while (remaining) in samsara.
[20] As for what the temporal limits of nirvāṇa are and the temporal limits of recurring saṃsāric rebirth – there is not the slightest (distinction) whatsoever between these two.
[21] The (four alternative) views beginning with (the Tathāgata exists) after final cessation and those beginning with (the Tathāgata) is eternal have been grounded in (taking) nirvāṇa as having an end point or a starting point.
[22] When all phenomena are devoid (of self-established existence), what could be without an end, what could have an end, what could (both) not have an end and have an end, and what can neither not have an end nor have an end?
[23] What could be just that, what could be other (than just that), what could be eternal, what could be non-eternal, what could be (both) eternal and non-eternal, and what could be also neither both here?
[24] (Nirvāṇa) is the peaceful auspicious state of the quieting down of all focusing (on objects as if they were findable) and the quieting down of conceptual fabrication. No Dharma whatsoever has ever been taught by Buddha anywhere to anyone.