Cognition of the Two Truths: Gelug Tenet Systems

[As background, see: The Two Truths: Vaibhashika and Sautrantika. See also: Objects of Cognition: Advanced Presentation]

Shared in Common with Chittamatra and Madhyamaka: Non-Conceptual and Conceptual Cognition

Existent phenomena are equivalent to validly knowable phenomena (shes-bya) and validly comprehensible phenomena (gzhal-bya). All existent phenomena may be validly known – by valid non-conceptual cognition, by valid conceptual cognition, or by either of the two.

Non-conceptual cognition (rtog-med) – namely, bare cognition (mngon-sum) – cognizes its involved object (‘jug-yul) without the medium of a category (spyi, universal) or conception (rtog-pa) of the object. It is “bare” it the sense that it lacks such a medium.

Conceptual cognition (rtog-bcas), on the other hand, cognizes its involved object through such a semi-transparent medium.

Valid non-conceptual and valid conceptual cognition may apprehend more than one involved object at a time. The two types of valid cognition may even occur simultaneously.

Shared in Common: Explicit and Implicit Apprehension

Apprehension (rtogs-pa) of an involved object means an accurate, decisive determination (nges-pa) that the involved object is “this” and not “that.”

• When either of the two types of valid cognition apprehend its involved objects by giving rise to cognitive appearances of them, it explicitly apprehends (dngos-su rtogs-pa) those objects. In other words, in explicitly apprehending an involved object, a valid cognition (tshad-ma) takes on or assumes a fully transparent mental aspect (rnam-pa) that resembles that object, somewhat like a mental hologram.
• When either of the two apprehends its involved objects without giving rise to cognitive appearances of them, it implicitly apprehends (shugs-la rtogs-pa) those objects.

Although all valid cognitions explicitly apprehend an involved object, not all implicitly apprehend an additional involved object. Moreover, a valid cognition cannot implicitly apprehend an involved object without explicitly apprehending another involved object.

• Subsequent cognition (bcad-shes) is an invalid way of cognizing an object. It is asserted by Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Svatantrika, but not by Prasangika. Although subsequent cognition, both non-conceptual and conceptual, may explicitly or implicitly apprehend its involved objects, we shall not discuss subsequent cognition of the two truths in this essay.

Shared in Common: Nonstatic and Static Phenomena

Nonstatic (mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) phenomena include:

• forms of physical phenomena (gzugs),
• ways of being aware of something (shes-pa),
• noncongruent affecting variables (ldan-min ‘du-byed, nonstatic phenomena that are neither forms of physical phenomena nor ways of being aware, nonstatic abstractions), such as a person (gang-zag).

Static phenomena include:

• audio categories (sgra-spyi, sound universals),
• meaning/object categories (don-spyi, meaning/object universals),
• a person’s lack of existence as an impossible soul (gang-zag-gi bdag-med, selflessness of a person, identitylessness of a person). For ease of discussion, let us call this lack of existence as an impossible soul “a voidness,”
• a space (nam-mkha’),
• other absences besides a voidness and a space, such as an absence of flowers in a vase.

Audio categories and meaning/object categories are called “mental exclusions of something else” (blo’i gzhan-sel, mental exclusions). They are the exclusions of everything that is not in a specified category and are implicative negation phenomena (ma-yin dgag, affirming negations). For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to them merely as “categories.”

Voidnesses, spaces, and other absences are called “non-implicative negation exclusions of something else” (med-dgag-gi gzhan-sel). For the sake of convenience, we shall sometimes refer to them merely as “absences.”

[For definitions of implicative and non-implicative negation phenomena, see: Negation Phenomena: Implicative and Non-implicative]

Sautrantika: Deepest True and Superficial True Phenomena

Existent phenomena can be divided into two types of true phenomena (bden-pa gnyis, two truths): deepest true phenomena (don-dam bden-pa, deepest truths, ultimate truths) and superficial true phenomena (kun-rdzob bden-pa, relative truths, conventional truths). In Sautrantika, the two constitute two different sets of items because they have different essential natures (ngo-bo tha-dad). An essential nature (ngo-bo) is the basic type of phenomenon that something is, such as something being a sight, a sound, or a way of being aware of something.

Deepest true phenomena are those items, the mode of existence of which withstands analysis. All nonstatic phenomena, as objective entities (rang-mtshan, individually characterized phenomena), are deepest true phenomena. Objective entities are those phenomena whose existence is not established by their being merely imputable. A hand, for instance, withstands analysis. Upon scrutiny, we discover that it is findable, objectively existing outside the context of our conceptual thinking process. Moreover, deepest true phenomena have substantially established existence (rdzas-su grub-pa). This is because they are able to perform a function (don-byed nus-pa).

Objective, deepest true phenomena can be apprehended explicitly or implicitly by either valid non-conceptual or valid conceptual cognition.

Superficial true phenomena are those items, the mode of existence of which does not withstand analysis. All static (rtag-pa, permanent) phenomena (static abstractions), as metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena), are superficial true phenomena. Metaphysical entities are those phenomena whose existence is established by their being merely imputable. The category hand, for example, does not withstand analysis. Upon scrutiny, we discover that it is not findable, objectively existing outside the context of our conceptual thinking process. Moreover, superficial true phenomena have existence that is not established substantially (rdzas-su ma-grub-pa). This is because they are unable to perform a function.

Metaphysical, superficial true phenomena cannot be explicitly apprehended; they can only be implicitly apprehended and only in the context of conceptual cognition. Conceptual cognition explicitly apprehends only deepest true phenomena, since they are what actually appear (snang) in the cognition.

• The appearing objects (snang-yul) in conceptual cognition are superficially true categories or absences.
• Conceptual mental cognition does not apprehend the superficially true categories, or absences because they are not the involved objects of the cognition. Only the reflexive awareness (rang-rig) that accompanies the conceptual cognition apprehends these superficial true phenomena. It does so, implicitly and non-conceptually, while it simultaneously apprehends, explicitly and non-conceptually, the mental consciousness and accompanying subsidiary awarenesses (mental factors) of the conceptual cognition.

Thus, although superficial true phenomena may be implicitly apprehended, non-conceptually, by reflexive awareness; nevertheless, since this implicit apprehension by reflexive awareness is occurring in a conceptual cognition, it is said that the implicit apprehension here is conceptual. .

When non-conceptual cognitions, such as bare visual cognition, are said to apprehend, implicitly, absences such as the absence of a vase on a table, they do not actually have bare visual cognition of the absences themselves – they do not actually “see” the absences. As metaphysical, superficial true phenomena, absences can only occur in conceptual cognitions simultaneously with the non-conceptual cognitions and be implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies those conceptual cognitions. They are implicitly apprehended without a mental aspect representing the absence appearing in the cognition and without a category absence. Non-conceptual cognitions cannot implicitly apprehend categories or absences.

Sautrantika: Self-Sufficiently Knowable and Imputedly Knowable Phenomena

Among objective, deepest true phenomena, forms of physical phenomena and ways of being aware of something are self-sufficiently knowable phenomena (rdzas-yod). Self-sufficiently knowable phenomena are validly knowable phenomena that, when actually cognized (dngos-bzung), do not rely on actual cognition of or by something else. This means that they can be cognized without the immediately preceding cognition having to take on the mental aspect of another deepest true phenomenon and then, when cognizing these objects themselves, needing, simultaneously, also to cognize this other deepest true phenomenon.

• Actual cognition refers to manifest (mngon-gyur-ba) cognition, either non-conceptual or conceptual, and, when the manifest cognition is a valid cognition, either with explicit or implicit apprehension.
• In manifest cognition with explicit apprehension of a cognitive object, the consciousness of the manifest cognition gives rise to a mental aspect representing the object. The cognitive object appears, through that aspect, both to the person and to the consciousness of the manifest cognition. Both the person and the manifest consciousness cognize the object. Manifest cognition with implicit apprehension of a cognitive object is one that occurs in the context of a manifest cognition with explicit apprehension.
• For example, when seeing or thinking of a hand, we cognize the hand without our visual or mental cognition needing to take on the cognitive appearance of anything other than the hand, such as five fingers, immediately preceding our cognition and then simultaneously with it.

Noncongruent affecting variables and metaphysical, superficial true phenomena are imputedly knowable (btags-yod). Imputedly knowable phenomena are those validly knowable phenomena that, when actually cognized, do rely on actual cognition of or by something else. Cognition of them requires immediately preceding and simultaneous cognition of their bases for imputation (gdags-gzhi).

Consider the example of a nonstatic, noncongruent affecting variable, such as a person:

• When seeing or thinking of a person, we cognize the person only by our visual or mental cognition taking on first the fully transparent mental aspect (cognitive appearance) of a suitable basis for imputation of the person, such as his or her body, Although both the body and the person appear in the cognition on the basis of the body, only the body is the involved object and decisively cognized. As a noncongruent affecting variable, the person is too subtle to be ascertained in this first moment. It can only be ascertained as an involved object with the second phase of the cognition when both the person and the visual form of his or her body are the involved objects of the cognition.
• Even though a separate appearance of a person different from the appearance of a basis for the imputation of him or her does not arise in the cognition, nevertheless we cognize the person, not just a body. Persons are substantially existent, which means they are able to perform functions. Persons do things, such as walk or talk. To say that only a body walks or talks contradicts convention. Therefore, because persons substantially exists, we can see and think of them.

Consider the case of a static absence, such as a space. A space is defined as the absence of any obstructive contact – in other words, the absence of any material object that could be contacted in a location and that would obstruct something being there. Specifically, consider the example of seeing an empty space in a vase. We cannot “see” an absence of any obstructive contact in a vase unless:

• In the immediately preceding moment of cognition, our eye consciousness gives rise to a cognitive appearance (a mental aspect) of the two deepest true phenomena a vase and an “in-between area” (bar-snang) inside it, in between the sides and the bottom of the vase, and apprehends these two deepest true phenomena, explicitly through these cognitive appearances, with non-conceptual visual cognition.
• While non-conceptual visual cognition continues explicitly to apprehend the vase and the in-between area inside the vase, conceptual mental cognition also gives rise to a cognitive appearance of the vase and the in-between area inside the vase, and explicitly apprehends them through the categories “vase” and “in-between area.”  However, the conceptual cognition cognizes this in-between area not only through the medium of the category and cognitive appearance, but also through the additional medium of the non-implicative negation exclusion (the concept) absence of any obstructive contact. A mental aspect representing an absence of any obstructive contact does not appear in the cognition, nor is there present a category absence of any obstructive contact. The categories “vase” and “in-between area” and the non-implicative negation absence of any obstructive contact are implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition.
• While conceptual mental cognition continues to cognize the absence of any obstructive contact in the above manner, the non-conceptual visual cognition continues explicitly to apprehend the vase and the in-between area inside it. It is only roughly speaking that we can say that the non-conceptual visual cognition implicitly apprehends the absence of any obstructive contact in the vase.

In the case of a static category, such as the meaning/object category hand, we cannot think with the meaning/object category hand unless:

• In the immediately preceding moment of cognition, our eye consciousness gives rise to a cognitive appearance (a mental aspect) of a hand and apprehends this deepest true phenomenon (the hand), explicitly, with non-conceptual visual cognition.
• While non-conceptual visual cognition continues explicitly to apprehend the hand, conceptual mental cognition also gives rise to a cognitive appearance of the hand and explicitly apprehends it. However, the conceptual cognition cognizes the hand not only through the medium of the cognitive appearance, but also through the medium of a meaning/object category hand. This is how we recognize this object – which, according to Sautrantika, is objectively a hand – as fitting onto the category hand and not into the category foot or vase. The category hand is the appearing object of the conceptual cognition and is implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition.

[See: Self-Sufficiently Knowable and Imputedly Knowable Objects]

Sautrantika: Cognition of Two Truths When Cognizing Voidness

In the context of Sautrantika, voidness refers to a person’s lack of existence as a coarse or subtle impossible soul – as either a static, partless soul, independent of the aggregates or a self-sufficiently knowable soul. A person is a deepest true phenomenon, while its lack of existence as an impossible soul (its voidness) is a superficial true phenomenon – specifically, a superficially true absence. Here, both truths are imputedly knowable, and they may be imputably knowable with either of two states of mind: total absorption (mnyam-bzhag, meditative equipoise) or subsequent attainment (rjes-thob, subsequent realization, post-meditation).

Shared in Common: Total Absorption and Subsequent Attainment Cognition

Total absorption is a state of mind having absorbed concentration (ting-nge-’dzin, Skt. samadhi) focused single-pointedly on a voidness that is like space (nam-mkha’ lta-bu’i stong-pa-nyid, space-like voidness).

• The total absorption of an applying pathway mind (sbyor-lam, path of preparation) is with a joined pair (zung-’brel) of shamatha (zhi-gnas, a stilled and settled state of mind, mental quiescence, calm abiding) and vipashyana (lhag-mthong, an exceptionally perceptive state of mind, special insight) and is conceptual.
• The total absorptions of a seeing pathway mind (mthong-lam, path of seeing) and an accustoming pathway mind (sgom-lam, path of meditation) are non-conceptual and are the total absorptions of an arya.

Subsequent attainment is a state of mind having absorbed concentration focused single-pointedly on a voidness that is like an illusion (sgyu-ma lta-bu’i stong-pa-nyid, illusion-like voidness).

• Subsequent attainment is with or without a joined pair of shamatha and vipashyana and can be conceptual or non-conceptual depending on the pathway mind it occurs with, in accord with the same criteria as pertain to total absorptions. Even when non-conceptual, however, the non-conceptual phase of subsequent attainment may be followed by a conceptual phase.
• Subsequent attainment cognition occurs only immediately following total absorption cognition.

Non-conceptual total absorption is with bare yogic cognition (rnal-‘byor mngon-sum). Conceptual total absorption and both conceptual and non-conceptual subsequent attainments are with mental cognition.

• Bare yogic cognition is a valid non-conceptual cognition that arises from the dominating condition (bdag-rkyen) of a state of combined shamatha and vipashyana, and which cognizes either subtle nonstaticness or voidness. It occurs only during the total absorption of an arya. Although it occurs with mental consciousness, it does not arise, in the manner of mental consciousness, from the dominating condition of mental sensors (yid-kyi dbang-po). A mental sensor is an immediately preceding moment of cognition.

Sautrantika: Cognition of the Two Truths during Conceptual Cognition of Voidness

Consider the total absorption phase of conceptual cognition of the voidness of a person.

1.     First, we conceptually cognize a deepest true phenomenon that can serve as a basis for the imputation of a person – for instance, a body – and we do so through a superficially true meaning/object category bodies and a deepest true mental aspect (mental hologram) representing a body.

2.     Then, we add to this conceptual cognition the meaning/object categories persons and persons actually established as impossible souls. Since a person is imputably knowable on the basis of a body, the category persons is also represented by the mental aspect of a body. Since a person actually established as an impossible soul is an interpolation (sgro-‘dogs) on the basis of a  person, it too is represented by the mental aspect of a body.

This conceptual cognition is distorted because its conceptually implied object (zhen-yul), a person actually established as an impossible soul, imputedly knowable on the basis of a person that is imputedly knowable on the basis of a body, is non-existent. Because the cognition is distorted and the reflexive awareness that is part of it does not yet have decisive determination that the cognition is fraudulent, the reflexive awareness is a non-determining cognition (snang-la ma-nges-pa) and therefore does not implicitly apprehend the categories that are the appearing objects of the conceptual cognition.

3.     We then scrutinize, with logical analysis using lines of reasoning, persons actually established as impossible souls.

4.     After scrutinizing, we decisively understand that there is no such thing as persons actually established as impossible souls. Simultaneously with this understanding, the category persons actually established as impossible souls is decisively cut off from the cognition.

5.     Simultaneously with this understanding and this cutting off, we continue to conceptually cognize the body and the person through the categories bodies and persons and a mental aspect representing a body. In addition, we conceptually cognize a nonimplicative negation phenomenon, the voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls (the selflessness of a person), imputedly knowable on the basis of the person.

Because the nonimplicative negation is itself a superficial true phenomenon, the conceptual cognition of it does not require it be through the category voidnesses of persons actually established as impossible souls. Therefore, such a category is not an appearing object of the conceptual cognition.  

6.     The deepest true phenomena a body and a person are now explicitly apprehended with conceptual mental cognition. The superficially true nonimplicative negation phenomenon a voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls and the superficially true categories body and person are now implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition.

Although the conceptual mental cognition itself does not actually implicitly apprehend a voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls; nevertheless, roughly speaking, we can say that the voidness of persons here is implicitly apprehended by the conceptual mental cognition

Consider the conceptual subsequent attainment phase of cognition of the voidness of a person, which immediately follows this conceptual total absorption.

7.     The deepest true phenomena a body and a person continue to be explicitly apprehended with conceptual cognition. The superficially true categories body and person continue to be implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition.

8.     Now, however, the superficially true category persons actually established as impossible souls is present once more as an appearing object of the cognition together with the superficially true categories bodies and persons. But because the reflexive awareness now cognizes that this distorted cognition is fraudulent, it implicitly apprehends all three appearing objects of the conceptual cognition: the categories of bodies, persons and persons actually established as impossible souls.

Sautrantika: Cognition of the Two Truths during Non-Conceptual Cognition of Voidness

During the total absorption phase of an arya’s non-conceptual cognition of the voidness of a person, the first four steps of the sequence are the same as in the analysis of conceptual total absorption cognition of the voidness of a person.

• In the fifth step, simultaneously with the decisive understanding that there is no such thing as persons actually established as impossible souls and the cutting off of the category persons actually established as impossible souls, we explicitly apprehend, non-conceptually, the deepest true phenomena a body and a person.
• Simultaneously with that non-conceptual explicit apprehension of deepest true phenomena, we cognize conceptually the superficially true nonimplicative negation the voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls  imputedly knowable on the basis of the person.
• The deepest true phenomena a body and a person are explicitly apprehended with non-conceptual bare yogic cognition (rnal-‘byor mngon-sum). The superficial true phenomenon the voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls is implicitly apprehended with the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition of the voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls.

As in the case of conceptual total absorption cognition of voidness, no mental aspect representing the voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls appears in the cognition; nor is there present the category the voidness of persons actually established as impossible souls .

Although in an arya’s total absorption on voidness, only the deepest true phenomena are apprehended in the context of a non-conceptual cognition, while the superficial phenomenon is apprehended in the context of a conceptual cognition; the cognition taken as a whole is considered as non-conceptual total absorption cognition of voidness. This is why, roughly speaking, we can say that the bare yogic cognition implicitly apprehends voidness non-conceptually.

During the subsequent attainment phase of an arya’s non-conceptual cognition of the voidness of a person,

• The deepest true phenomena a body and a person are explicitly apprehended with non-conceptual mental cognition.
• Simultaneously, the superficial true phenomenon a lack of existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person is cognized by conceptual cognition and imputedly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition.
• As was the case with non-conceptual total absorption cognition of voidness, roughly speaking we could say that the non-conceptual subsequent attainment cognition apprehends voidness implicitly.
• During the phase of conceptual subsequent attainment cognition that may follow this non-conceptual phase, the structure is the same as that of conceptual subsequent attainment cognition before the stage of an arya.

The difference between the arya and pre-arya states of total absorption and siubsequent attainment is that in the arya states, the grasping for an impossible soul of a person (gang-zag-gi bdag-‘dzin) that occurs is parted from whatever portion of this grasping the uninterrupted pathway mind (bar-chad-med lam) phase of the total absorption has gotten rid of (spang-ba, abandoned).

Chart for Cognition of the Two Truths: Gelug Sautrantika Presentation

	conceptual total absorption	conceptual subsequent attainment	non-conceptual total absorption	non-conceptual subsequent attainment
a body and a person	yes, explicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, explicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, explicit non-conceptual, by yogic cognition	yes, explicit non-conceptual, by mental cognition
a mental aspect representing a body and a person	yes	yes	yes	yes
the categories a body and a person	yes, implicit conceptual, by reflexive awareness	yes, implicit conceptual, by reflexive awareness	–	–
existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person	–	–	–	–
a mental aspect representing existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person	–	yes	–	yes
the category existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person	–	yes	–	–
the lack of existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person	yes, so-called “implicit conceptual,” by mental cognition	yes, so-called “implicit conceptual,” by mental cognition	yes, so-called “implicit non-conceptual,” by yogic cognition	yes, so-called “implicit non-conceptual,” by mental cognition
a mental aspect representing the lack of existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person	–	–	–	–
the category a lack of existence actually established as an impossible soul of a person	–	–	–	–

[As background, see: Types of Phenomena and Existence: Gelug Chittamatra]

Chittamatra: The Lack of an Impossible Soul of Phenomena

As a Mahayana tenet system, Chittamatra asserts not only the same lack of an impossible soul of a person as Sautrantika does, but also asserts the lack of an impossible soul of phenomena (chos-kyi bdag-med, selflessness of phenomena, identitylessness of phenomena).

An example of such a lack is the voidness of forms of physical phenomena, and the valid cognitions that take these forms of physical phenomena as their cognitive objects, deriving from different natal sources (gzugs-dang gzugs-’dzin-pa’i tshad-ma rdzas-gzhan-gyis stong-pa). In other words, the voidness of the existence of forms of physical phenomena as external objects (phyi-don).

Chittamatra: The Three Types of Characterized Phenomena

Further, Chittamatra divides all phenomena into three types of characterized phenomena (mtshan-nyid gsum):

• phenomena characterized as totally conceptional (kun-brtags-pa’i mtshan-nyid, totally conceptual phenomena, imaginary objects),
• phenomena characterized as dependent (gzhan-dbang-gi mtshan-nyid, dependent phenomena, other-powered phenomena, relative objects),
• phenomena characterized as thoroughly established (yongs-su grub-pa’i mtshan-nyid, thoroughly established phenomena, perfect objects).

Totally conceptual phenomena include existent ones and nonexistent ones. Existent totally conceptual phenomena (yod-pa’i kun-brtags) include all static phenomena other than voidnesses (in other words, other than the various types of lack of impossible soul). Nonexistent totally conceptual phenomena (med-pa’i kun-brtags) include turtle-hair and impossible souls (impossible ways of existing).

• Dependent phenomena include all nonstatic phenomena.
• Thoroughly established phenomena include all voidnesses.

Although Chittamatra divides all phenomena into objective and metaphysical entities, it classifies thoroughly established phenomena as objective entities rather than in the way that Sautrantika does: namely, as metaphysical entities.

Chittamatra: The Two Truths

In Chittamatra, the two truths share the same essential nature (ngo-bo gcig), rather than having different essential natures as Sautrantika asserts. In other words, in Chittamatra, the two truths are the same essential phenomenon, but merely scrutinized from two different points of view. When analyzed from the point of view of convention, one finds a superficial truth – something is a dependent phenomenon or a totally conceptional phenomenon. When analyzed from the point of view of deepest truth, one finds a deepest truth – it is devoid of existing in an impossible manner, namely with an impossible soul. That deepest truth is a thoroughly established phenomenon.

Thus, deepest truths (don-dam bden-pa, ultimate truths) are defined as those phenomena that are ultimately (mthar-thug) found by a valid cognition scrutinizing (dpyod-byed, analyzing) what is deepest (don-dam-pa, ultimate). Only thoroughly established phenomena are deepest truths.

Superficial truths (kun-rdzob bden-pa, relative truths, conventional truths) are defined as those phenomena that are found by a valid cognition scrutinizing what is conventional (tha-snyad, Skt. vyavahara). Dependent and existent totally conceptional phenomena are superficial truths.

Thus, in Chittamatra, all nonstatic phenomena are superficial truths. Some static phenomena are also superficial truths: namely, existent totally conceptional ones; and some static phenomena are deepest truths: namely, voidnesses. This contrasts greatly with the Sautrantika system, in which all nonstatic phenomena are deepest truths and all static phenomena are superficial truths.

As for how the phenomena included among the two truths may be apprehended (whether non-conceptually or conceptually, whether explicitly or implicitly):

• Superficially true dependent phenomena and deepest true thoroughly established phenomena may be apprehended in the same ways and in the same types of cognition as Sautrantika explains for deepest true nonstatic phenomena.
• Superficially true existent totally conceptional phenomena may be apprehended in the same ways and in the same types of cognition as Sautrantika explains for superficially true static phenomena.

Chittamatra: Self-Sufficiently Knowable and Imputedly Knowable Phenomena

As in Sautrantika, nonstatic noncongruent affecting variables (better translated as “nonstatic abstractions” or, more precisely, “nonstatic phenomena that are neither forms of physical phenomena nor ways of being aware of something” in the Chittamatra context) and static phenomena are imputedly knowable, while nonstatic phenomena are self-sufficiently knowable. Thus, imputedly knowable phenomena include nonstatic abstractions, existent totally conceptional phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena. Chittamatra, however, makes a distinction between how, on the one hand, nonstatic abstractions and existent totally conceptional phenomena are imputedly knowable and how, on the other hand, thoroughly established phenomena are imputedly knowable.

• Actual valid cognition of nonstatic abstractions and of existent totally conceptional phenomena requires reliance on both immediately preceding as well as simultaneous actual cognition of their bases for imputation.
• Actual valid non-conceptual cognition of thoroughly established phenomena requires reliance only on immediately preceding actual cognition of their bases for imputation. It does not require simultaneous actual cognition of these bases. Therefore, once the basis for imputation of a voidness has actually been cognized, the voidness imputedly knowable on it can actually be cognized immediately after that, but only non-conceptually, without the basis for the voidness also being cognized in the cognition.

Chittamatra: Cognition of the Two Truths during Conceptual Cognition of Voidness

Consider the case of conceptual total absorption on the voidness of the existence of a form of a physical phenomenon, for instance a hand, as an external object that derives from a different natal source than the valid cognition cognizing that form. For short, let us refer to this voidness as “a voidness of existence as an external object.”

• First, we explicitly apprehend the superficially true phenomenon a hand through a mental aspect representing a hand. Simultaneously with that explicit apprehension, we distortedly cognize, on the basis of the hand, a mental aspect representing existence as an external object. If all of the preceding is with conceptual cognition, the explicit apprehension of the hand is also through the medium of the superficially true meaning/object categories hand and existence actually established as an external object. Both categories are implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition.
• We then scrutinize, with logical analysis, existence as an external object. At this point, the cognition must be conceptual, since logical analysis relies on lines of reasoning and therefore is always conceptual.
• After scrutinizing, we decisively understand that there is no such thing as existence as an external object. Simultaneously with this understanding, the mental aspect representing existence as an external object and the category existence actually established as an external object are decisively cut off from the cognition.
• Simultaneously with this understanding and this cutting off, the mental aspect representing the hand and the category hand also disappear from the cognition. The mental aspect that now appears in our conceptual cognition is one that represents the deepest true phenomenon a voidness of external existence. We explicitly apprehend voidness of external existence through the medium of this mental aspect as well as through the medium of the superficially true category voidness of external existence. The category is implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition. Simultaneously with the explicit apprehension of a voidness of external existence, the conceptual cognition implicitly cognizes the hand. No mental aspect representing a hand appears in the cognition. Nor is there the category hand present in the cognition.

Consider the conceptual subsequent attainment cognition of the voidness of the hand’s existence as an external object, which immediately follows this conceptual total absorption.

• Once again, the superficially true phenomenon the hand appears in the conceptual cognition through the medium of a mental aspect representing the hand and the category hand. In addition, an aspect representing existence as an external object also appears and is cognized through the category existence actually established as an external object.
• Simultaneously with the explicit apprehension of the superficially true hand by the conceptual cognition, the conceptual cognition implicitly apprehends the deepest truth about it: its voidness of external existence. The conceptual cognition implicitly apprehends this voidness without a mental aspect representing this voidness appearing in the cognition and without the category voidness of external existence.

Chittamatra: Cognition of the Two Truths during Non-Conceptual Cognition of Voidness

The steps involved in an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption cognition of a hand’s voidness of existence as an external object are basically the same as those for the conceptual equivalent of this cognition. The only difference is that in the fourth step, the explicit apprehension of the voidness of existence as an external object is by non-conceptual bare yogic cognition and is through the medium of only a mental aspect representing that voidness. The category voidness of external existence is not present in the non-conceptual cognition.

As for an arya’s non-conceptual subsequent attainment cognition of a hand’s voidness of existence as an external object, which immediately follows this non-conceptual total absorption:

• Once again, the superficially true phenomenon the hand appears in non-conceptual mental cognition through the medium of a mental aspect representing the hand. In addition, an aspect representing existence as an external object also appears and is cognized.
• Simultaneously with the explicit apprehension of the superficially true hand by the non-conceptual mental cognition, the non-conceptual mental cognition implicitly apprehends the deepest truth about it: its voidness of external existence.
• During the phase of conceptual subsequent attainment cognition that may follow this non-conceptual phase, the structure is the same as that of conceptual subsequent attainment cognition before the stage of an arya. The difference is that the grasping for an impossible soul of phenomena (chos-kyi bdag-‘dzin) that occurs here is parted from whatever portion of this grasping the uninterrupted pathway mind phase of the total absorption has rid the mind of.

Chart for Cognition of the Two Truths: Gelug Chittamatra Presentation

	conceptual total absorption	conceptual subsequent attainment	non-conceptual total absorption	non-conceptual subsequent attainment
a hand	yes, implicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, explicit conceptual, by mental cognition	–	yes, explicit non-conceptual, by mental cognition
a mental aspect representing a hand	–	yes	–	yes
the category hand	–	yes, implicit conceptual, by reflexive awareness	–	–
existence actually established as an external object	–	–	–	–
a mental aspect representing existence actually established as an external object	–	yes	–	yes
the category existence actually established as an external object	–	yes	–	–
voidness of existence actually established as an external object	yes, explicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, implicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, explicit non-conceptual, by yogic cognition	yes, implicit non-conceptual, by mental cognition
a mental aspect representing the voidness of existence actually established as an external object	yes	–	yes	–
the category voidness of existence actually established as an external object	yes, implicit conceptual, by reflexive awareness	–	–	–

Chittamatra: The Appearance of Voidness when Explicitly Apprehended

Chittamatra asserts that phenomena lack two types of impossible soul. Although they do not differentiate the two as coarse and subtle, since both are subtle, let us use the terms "coarse" and "subtle" in reference to them for ease of discussion.

The voidness of the existence of a form of a physical phenomenon as an external object that derives from a different natal source than the valid cognition cognizing that form is the coarse lack of an impossible soul of all phenomena (the coarse voidness of all phenomena – “coarse voidness,” for short). Coarse voidness pertains only to dependent phenomena, because only the nonstatic phenomena in a cognition derive from a natal source. Static phenomena are unaffected by causes and conditions. Thus, there is no such thing as the coarse voidness of coarse voidness itself. This means that even during conceptual total absorption on coarse voidness, the conceptually explicitly apprehended coarse voidness does not appear to have existence as an external object.

In Chittamatra, the subtle voidness of all phenomena is the voidness of forms of physical phenomena having existence established by individual defining characteristic marks as foundations on which affix the sound of the words “forms of physical phenomena.” Subtle voidness pertains to all phenomena, including thoroughly established ones. Thus, during conceptual total absorption on subtle voidness, the conceptual mental cognition that explicitly apprehends subtle voidness makes an appearance of it as having existence established by individual defining characteristic marks as foundations on which affix the sound of the words “subtle voidness.” This is because conceptual cognition always makes an appearance of its explicitly apprehended object as having existence established in this impossible way.

The conceptual total absorption cognition explicitly apprehends this appearance of an impossible way of existing through the medium of the category existence established by individual defining characteristic marks as foundations on which affix the sound of the words for that object and that category is implicitly apprehended by the reflexive awareness that accompanies the conceptual cognition. The conceptual total absorption, however, does not apprehend and does not even cognize the impossible way of existing itself, because such a mode of existence does not exist at all. In technical terms, the conceptually implied object (zhen-yul, implied object) of the conceptual cognition of the impossible way of existing is a nonexistent totally conceptional phenomenon.

• Likewise, during conceptual total absorption on coarse voidness, the conceptual mental cognition that explicitly apprehends coarse voidness makes an appearance of it as having existence established by individual defining characteristic marks as foundations on which affix the sound of the words “coarse voidness” and cognizes it through the medium of the category of this impossible way of existing.
• During non-conceptual total absorption on either coarse or subtle voidness of all phenomena, however, the bare yogic cognition does not make an appearance of the voidness as having existence established by individual defining characteristic marks as foundations on which affix the sound of the words “voidness.” This is because non-conceptual total absorption on a voidness does not make any appearance of a superficial truth. In the Mahayana sutra traditions, if a cognition makes an appearance of a superficial truth, it is an appearance of that superficial truth with an impossible mode of existence.

Chittamatra: Implicit Apprehension by Total Absorption Cognition

According to the Jetsunpa textbook tradition, although neither conceptual nor non-conceptual total absorption cognition of a hand’s voidness of existence as an external object implicitly apprehends the hand, nevertheless either of the two types of cognition may implicitly apprehend something else. While explicitly apprehending the hand’s voidness of existence deriving from a different natal source than the valid cognition of itself, the total absorption may implicitly apprehend the hand’s existence as deriving from the same natal source as the valid cognition of itself. Conceptual and non-conceptual total absorption on the lack of an impossible soul of a person, however, does not implicitly apprehend anything.

Svatantrika-Madhyamaka is divided into Yogachara-Svatantrika and Sautrantika-Svatantrika.

• The Yogachara-Svatantrika system asserts cognition of the two truths in the same manner as does Chittamatra. Thus, it accepts reflexive awareness and rejects external existence. The only major difference is that, in this system, subtle voidness of phenomena is the voidness of truly established existence (bden-par grub-pa, true existence) – namely, the voidness of existence established from the side of an object’s own uncommon manner of abiding, without also being set by the power of something additional from the mind (namely, imputation). It rejects the subtle voidness of phenomena asserted by Chittamatra.
• The Sautrantika-Svatantrika system does not accept the existence of reflexive awareness and asserts external existence. Thus, it asserts only one level of voidness of phenomena, namely the same voidness as Yogachara-Svatantrika asserts as subtle voidness of phenomena. It rejects the coarse voidness of phenomena that is asserted by Chittamatra and Yogachara-Svatantrika, as well as the subtle voidness asserted by Chittamatra. Within the parameters of its own assertions of voidness of phenomena, Sautrantika-Svatantrika accepts the explanation of cognition of the two truths much in the same way as Prasangika-Madhyamaka asserts. However, it asserts valid bare cognition (mngon-sum tshad-ma) in the same way as do Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Yogachara-Svatantrika – namely, it asserts that it is always non-conceptual.

[As background, see: Ways of Cognizing the Two Truths: Gelug Prasangika]

Prasangika: Self-Sufficiently Knowable and Imputedly Knowable Phenomena

Prasangika accepts the common division scheme between self-sufficiently and imputedly knowable phenomena as asserted by Chittamatra, but considers imputably knowable, in this shared sense held in common with Chittamatra, as coarse imputedly knowable.

From the subtler point of view, however, all phenomena are imputably knowable, dependently arising from reliance on a basis for imputation. This does not mean, however, that we need to cognize the basis for imputation first and then we cognize, simultaneously, both the basis and the referent object (btags-chos, imputed object, labeled object) of the imputed label or concept. It simply means that the referent object cannot be cognized without its existence being established merely by its depending on a basis for imputation.

Except for the case of voidness, the referent object and the basis for imputation need to be cognized simultaneously. In the case of voidness, although the voidness, as the referent object of the imputation voidness, does not exist independently of a basis for its imputation, it can be explicitly apprehended, non-conceptually, without simultaneous apprehension, either explicitly or implicitly, of its basis for imputation.

Prasangika does not accept self-sufficient knowability on this subtler level of analysis because it does not assert substantially established existence. Rather, all phenomena have existence established by their being merely imputable by conceptual cognition. There is no substantial essence findable on the side of an object that establishes its existence.

Prasangika: No Reflexive Awareness

Prasangika does not assert reflexive awareness. All conceptual apprehensions have implicit apprehension of themselves and of the categories that occur in them. As for non-conceptual apprehensions:

• The Jetsunpa textbook tradition asserts that they all have implicit apprehension of themselves.
• The Panchen (Pan-chen) and Kunkyen (Kun-mkhyen) textbook traditions follow Kedrub Je (mKhas-grub rJe dGe-legs dpal-bzang) on this point. They assert that the uninterrupted pathway mind (bar-chad med-lam) phase of an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption on voidness does not have implicit apprehension of anything, including itself, while it has explicit apprehension of voidness. All other non-conceptual apprehensions have implicit apprehension of themselves. The Panchen textbook tradition was founded by Panchen Sonam Dragpa (Pan-chen bSod-nams grags-pa) and is followed by Drepung Loseling (‘Bras-spungs Blo-gsal-gling) and Ganden Shartse (dGa’-ldan Shar-rtse) Monasteries. The Kunkyen textbook tradition was founded by the Second Kunkyen Jamyang Zhepa (Kun-mkhyen ‘Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa rdo-rje II, dKon-mchog ‘jigs-med dbang-po) and is followed by Drepung Gomang (‘Bras-spungs sGo-mang) Monastery.

Prasangika: The Voidness of All Phenomena

Prasangika asserts only a subtle lack of impossible soul of all phenomena – in other words, only a subtle voidness of phenomena. This is the voidness of truly established existence, but defined differently from the way that the other tenet systems define it. According to Prasangika, truly established existence is existence established from atop an object on its own side, without being satisfied that it is merely imputable by conceptual cognition. Within the parameters of the voidness of true existence, however, Prasangika asserts external existence.

Prasangika: The Two Truths and the Three Types of Characterized Phenomena

In general, Prasangika defines the two truths in the same way as does Chittamatra. Deepest truths are those phenomena that are findable by a valid cognition scrutinizing what is ultimate (mthar-thug). Superficial truths are those phenomena that are findable by a valid cognition scrutinizing what is conventional. Thus, the deepest truth about any phenomenon is its voidness and the superficial truth about it is its cognitive appearance – what the basis for voidness is and how it appears to exist.

In these definitions, “findable” does not imply that the scrutinizing valid cognitions find, on the side of the scrutinized phenomena, the referent “thing” (btags-don) corresponding to the name or label for the phenomenon. If the scrutinizing valid cognitions could find such a referent “thing,” the phenomenon would fulfill the definition of having existence established by its self-nature (rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa, inherent existence). Prasangika is unique among the tenet systems in asserting that nothing has its existence established in this impossible way. “Findable” here in the definitions of the two truths simply means that the scrutinizing valid cognitions take the phenomena as their involved objects and explicitly apprehend them.

In terms of the three types of characterized phenomena, dependent phenomena refer both to nonstatic phenomena as well as to existent static phenomena other than voidnesses. “Dependent” here means dependently arising based on imputation by names and concepts, not simply dependent on causes and conditions. Totally conceptional phenomena refer only to nonexistent ones – specifically, to impossible ways of existing. Thoroughly established phenomena are voidnesses, in which the objects nullified (dgag-bya, object to be refuted) are the totally conceptional phenomena.

As in Chittamatra, totally conceptional and dependent phenomena are superficial truths, while thoroughly established phenomena are deepest truths.

[See: The Appearance and Cognition of Nonexistent Phenomena]

Prasangika: Impure and Pure Superficial Truths

There are two types of superficial truths:

• The appearances of dependent or thoroughly established phenomena as existing in the manner of totally conceptional phenomena constitute impure superficial truths (ma-dag-pa’i kun-rdzob).
• The appearances of dependent or thoroughly established phenomena as lacking existence in the manner of totally conceptional phenomena constitute pure superficial truths (dag-pa’i kun-rdzob).

• Only non-conceptual clear light (‘od-gsal) cognition with the subtlest level of consciousness makes appearances of pure superficial truths and cognizes them. Achieving such cognition is not possible in the sutra systems. The attainment of clear light cognition of the two truths is the exclusive domain of anuttarayoga tantra. Any other type of cognition that makes a cognitive appearance of a superficial truth makes a cognitive appearance only of an impure superficial truth.

When a cognition makes an impure appearance of true existence, it is not that first clear light cognition makes a pure appearance of non-true existence and then, based on that, other types of cognition superimpose an impure appearance of true existence on the basis of the pure appearance. Moreover, it is also not the case that a validly knowable phenomenon exists with a pure appearance established from the side of the object. The pure and impure appearances arise simultaneously, indistinguishably mixed like milk and water, dependently on the appearance-making activity of mind. Thus, although an appearance of true existence is imputedly knowable, it is not the case that first the basis for imputation of it is cognized by itself and then the basis together with the imputed true existence are cognized simultaneously.

Except for yogic cognition and non-conceptual clear light cognition, all other cognitions, both conceptual and non-conceptual, give rise to mental aspects representing true existence imputably knowable on the basis of all other mental aspects that it makes appear.

Prasangika: Conceptual Cognition

Unlike the other Buddhist tenet systems, Prasangika does not assert that what we have been translating as “valid bare cognition” (mngon-sum tshad-ma) is always non-conceptual. Prasangika defines this type of cognition as a valid cognition that does not arise by directly depending on a line of reasoning. Thus, in the Prasangika context, it is better to translate the term for this cognition as “valid straightforward cognition.”

Because of this change in definition, Prasangika asserts that valid straightforward mental cognition may be either conceptual or non-conceptual. Consequently, there are two types of valid conceptual cognition of voidness. One directly relies on a line of reasoning. This is valid inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma). The other, valid conceptual straightforward cognition, does not directly rely on a line of reasoning, but is still through the medium of the category voidness.

• Valid straightforward sensory and yogic cognition, however, is only non-conceptual. This is because sensory and yogic cognition can never be conceptual.

Prasangika: Cognition of the Two Truths during Conceptual Cognition of Voidness

Consider conceptual total absorption cognition of a hand’s voidness of truly established existence:

• First, we explicitly apprehend the superficially true phenomenon a hand through a mental aspect representing a hand. Simultaneously with that explicit apprehension, we distortedly cognize a mental aspect representing true existence imputably knowable on the basis of the hand. If all of the preceding is with conceptual cognition, the explicit apprehension of the hand is also through the media of the superficially true meaning/object categories hand and truly established existence. Both categories are implicitly apprehended by the conceptual cognition itself.
• We then scrutinize true existence. At first, our scrutiny must start by depending directly on a line of reasoning, and our conceptual cognition of voidness begins as an inferential cognition. From the second moment onwards, that cognition becomes conceptual straightforward cognition of voidness. With sufficient familiarity with this inferential cognition, we eventually are able to achieve conceptual straightforward cognition of voidness immediately. We merely apply our previously gained understanding of voidness, without needing to go through a line of reasoning in our meditation.
• After scrutinizing, either with or without direct reliance on a line of reasoning, we decisively understand that there is no such thing as true existence. Simultaneously with this understanding, the mental aspect representing the hand and the category hand, as well as what was imputedly knowable on the basis of them – namely, the mental aspect representing true existence and the category truly established existence – are decisively cut off from the cognition. All of these are cut off simultaneously because conceptual cognition cannot make an appearance of anything without making it appear as if having true existence.
• Simultaneously with this understanding and this cutting off, we explicitly apprehend only a deepest true phenomenon a voidness of true existence. We explicitly apprehend this voidness with conceptual mental cognition through the medium of both a mental aspect that represents that voidness and the superficially true category voidness of true existence. Moreover, the conceptual cognition gives rise to a mental aspect representing true existence, imputed on the voidness of true existence, and cognizes it through the medium of the category truly established existence. Moreover, simultaneously with the explicit apprehension of voidness, the conceptual cognition implicitly cognizes the hand. No mental aspect representing a hand appears in the cognition. Nor is there the category hand present in the cognition.

Consider the conceptual subsequent attainment cognition of the voidness of the hand’s true existence, which immediately follows this conceptual total absorption.

• Once again, the superficially true phenomenon the hand appears in the conceptual cognition through the medium of a mental aspect representing the hand and the category hand. In addition, an aspect representing true existence also appears, imputed on the hand, and is cognized through the category truly established existence.
• Simultaneously with the explicit apprehension of the superficially true hand by the conceptual cognition, the conceptual cognition implicitly apprehends the deepest truth about it: its voidness of true existence. The conceptual cognition implicitly apprehends this voidness without a mental aspect representing this voidness appearing in the cognition and without the category voidness of true existence.

The steps involved in an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption cognition of a hand’s voidness of true existence are basically the same as those for the conceptual equivalent of this cognition. The only difference is that in the fourth step, the explicit apprehension of the voidness of true existence is by non-conceptual bare yogic cognition and is through the medium of only a mental aspect representing that voidness. The category voidness of true existence, as well as a mental aspect representing true existence and the category truly established existence are not present in the non-conceptual cognition.

• According to the Jetsunpa textbook tradition, the non-conceptual total absorption cognition of voidness implicitly apprehends this total absorption. It also has subliminal (bag-la nyal) cognition of the hand, subliminal conventional bodhichitta, subliminal compassion, and, within each of these accompanying subliminal cognitions, subliminal grasping for the truly established existence of the involved objects of those cognitions.
• According to the Panchen textbook tradition, non-conceptual total absorption on voidness does not implicitly cognize anything, nor does it have any subliminal cognitions. Conventional bodhichitta, compassion, and grasping for true existence are present merely as latencies (bag-chags, habits).
• Note that all cognitions other than non-conceptual total absorption on voidness give rise to appearances of true existence. Only conceptual cognition, however, has manifest (mngon-gyur-ba) grasping for true existence. Jetsunpa asserts that during non-conceptual cognition – whether sensory, mental, or yogic – grasping for true existence continues in a subliminal form. Panchen asserts that it continues merely as a constant habit.

[See: Dormant Grasping for True Existence: Gelug Madhymaka]

As for an arya’s non-conceptual subsequent attainment cognition of a hand’s voidness of true existence, which immediately follows this non-conceptual total absorption cognition:

• Once again, the superficially true phenomenon the hand appears in non-conceptual mental cognition through the medium of a mental aspect representing the hand. In addition, an aspect representing true existence also appears, imputed on the hand, and is cognized.
• Simultaneously with the explicit apprehension of the superficially true hand by the non-conceptual mental cognition, the non-conceptual mental cognition implicitly apprehends the deepest truth about it: its voidness of true existence.
• During the phase of conceptual subsequent attainment cognition that may follow this non-conceptual phase, the structure is the same as that of conceptual subsequent attainment cognition before the stage of an arya. The difference is that the grasping for true existence that occurs here is parted from whatever portion of this grasping the uninterrupted pathway mind phase of the total absorption has rid the mind of.

Chart for Cognition of the Two Truths: Gelug Prasangika Presentation

	conceptual total absorption	conceptual subsequent attainment	non-conceptual total absorption	non-conceptual subsequent attainment
a hand	yes, implicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, explicit conceptual, by mental cognition	–	yes, explicit non-conceptual, by mental cognition
a mental aspect representing a hand	–	yes	–	yes
the category hand	–	yes	–	–
true existence	–	–	–	–
a mental aspect representing true existence	yes	yes	–	yes
the category true existence	yes	yes	–	–
voidness of true existence	yes, explicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, implicit conceptual, by mental cognition	yes, explicit non-conceptual, by yogic cognition	yes, implicit non-conceptual, by mental cognition
a mental aspect representing the voidness of true existence	yes	–	yes	–
the category voidness of true existence	yes	–	–	–