Cognition

The various Tibetan Buddhist traditions differ as to the voidness non-conceptually cognized by each of the three types of practitioners – shravaka, pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva – when becoming an arya.

All Indian Buddhist tenet systems, except Vaibhashika, agree that the validly knowable “me” is not a self-sufficiently knowable phenomenon, it is imputedly knowable.

An overview of the two general positions regarding the main points of cognition theory of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition.

The Gelug explanation of how all our problems come about because of confusion about appearances, how the mind makes appearances and what is arising and engaged with when we talk about mental activity.

A presentation of the Karma Kagyu explanation of how the mind works according to sutra.

This eighteenth century text concerns the mind and the ways in which it knows things, and is written from the point of view of the Gelug interpretation of the True Aspectarian branch of the Sautrantika tenet system of Indian Buddhism.

With non-determining cognition, the involved object of the cognition appears clearly and accurately, but without a decisive determination of it.

Apprehension is an accurate, decisive cognition of its own object. Of the seven ways of knowing, bare cognition, inferential cognition and subsequent cognition are apprehensions.

Existent phenomena are defined as what is validly knowable. In the Sautrantika system, existent phenomena are divided into nonstatic objective entities and static metaphysical ones.

It’s very important to try to understand the various appearances of the mind, how they exist and do they correspond to reality or not.