Variant Indian Buddhist Views of Time

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Are There Common-Locus Objects Extending over the Three Times?

Consider the location of a presently-happening object, such as the “presently-happening-yoghurt in the pot.” For ease of discussion, let us refer to “yoghurt in the pot” simply as “yoghurt.”

Both the “presently-happening-yoghurt located on the table” and the “presently-happening- yoghurt not located in the refrigerator” may be valid phenomena simultaneously. Both cases refer to the spatial coordinates of the same yoghurt at the same moment, merely described and validly knowable from two points of view.

The “presently-happening-yoghurt located on the table” and the “presently-happening-yoghurt located in the refrigerator,” however, cannot both be valid phenomena simultaneously. They cannot both be referring to the same yoghurt at the same time.

On the other hand, the “presently-happening-yoghurt located in the refrigerator” may be followed later by the “presently-happening-yoghurt located on the table.” Both cases also refer to the spatial coordinates in the continuum of the same commonsense yoghurt.

The question is this: Just as there is a “same commonsense yoghurt” that can pass from one spatial location to another, while maintaining its essential nature as “yoghurt” during the temporal interval of the present-happening of yoghurt, is there a “same yoghurt” that can pass from one “temporal location” to another and still maintain its essential nature as yoghurt?

  • We are analyzing, then, whether the yoghurts in the sequence of “not-yet-happening-yoghurt on the table,” “presently-happening-yoghurt on the table,” and “no-longer-happening yoghurt on the table” all refer to a “same commonsense yoghurt” passing through time.
  • We are not speaking about whether the “presently-happening-yoghurt not yet on the table,” “the presently-happening-yoghurt now on the table,” and “the presently-happening-yoghurt no longer on the table” all refer to the “same commonsense yoghurt” passing through time. Gelug analysis accepts that all three do refer to the same commonsense yoghurt.

Perhaps our analysis will be clearer if we consider whether the “not-yet-happening-yoghurt in the pot, at the time of milk in the pot,” the “presently-happening-yoghurt in the pot, at the time of yoghurt in the pot,” and the “no-longer-happening-yoghurt in the pot, at the time of cottage cheese in the pot” refer to different temporal coordinates of the same yoghurt. In technical terms, the question becomes: Do the three items have a common locus?

  • A common locus (gzhi-mthun, common denominator) of three phenomena is something that is an example of all three phenomena, such as yoghurt being a common locus of a food, a dairy product, and a fermented substance.
  • Recall that “presently-happening-yoghurt” is an affirmation phenomenon, while “not-yet-happening-yoghurt” and “no-longer-happening-yoghurt” are negation phenomena.

Similarly, we may analyze whether the “yoghurt in the pot, which is not yet happening at the time of milk in the pot,” the “yoghurt in the pot, which is presently happening at the time of yoghurt in the pot,” and the “yoghurt in the pot, which is no longer happening at the time of cottage cheese in the pot” also have a common locus. Are they referring to the same object?

  • In this case, all three yoghurts are affirmation phenomena.

In more technical terms, the question becomes:

  • Is there a specific validly knowable object “yoghurt in the pot,” or some aspect or individual defining characteristic mark (mtshan-nyid) of such yoghurt, that exists and in some way endures through the future, present, and past as a findable referent “thing” (btags-don) corresponding to the conception of “yoghurt in the pot”?
  • Or is the existence of such “common-locus yoghurt in the pot” established merely as something imputable over the three times, but not as some findable referent “thing” on the side of any of the objects of the three times?
  • Or is there no such thing whatsoever as “common-locus yoghurt in the pot” over the three times, like there being no such thing as a common locus of a turtle and a hairy animal?

Let us make these questions even more direct. If there is such a validly knowable object as “yoghurt in the pot” with three different “temporal coordinates,” what establishes its existence as “common-locus yoghurt in the pot” over the three times?

  • Is it something findable on the side of the yoghurt?
  • Or is it merely the conception of such yoghurt?
  • Or does nothing establish the existence of a temporal characteristic mark, even conventionally, because there is no such thing as a temporal characteristic mark and no such things as this type of “common-locus yoghurt in the pot”?
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