Gelugpa and Nyingma on Conceptual Meditation on Emptiness

How to Approach the Voidness Cognized in an Arya’s Total Absorption

Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche II: Now, the biggest debate regarding Prasangika (Skt. Prāsaṅgika) in Sakya, Kagyu, Nyingma and Gelugpa concerns differences in how to approach the voidness that is seen in total absorption. They all agree that in total absorption, there is no conceptual fabrication. There is no jug; there is nothing [appearing]. That’s why we say space-like total absorption (mnyam-bzhag nam-mkha’ lta-bu). Now the debate begins.

Do ordinary, mundane people, beginners who want to gain realization of voidness, start meditating with how space-like total absorption is, or do they have something different in their meditation than what the aryas have? Now, because as beginners we cannot yet meditate like, “This is conceptual fabrication, this is conceptual fabrication,” then all the schools other than Gelugpa will just say, “Even if you say voidness and that you are meditating on voidness, it’s wrong to think that you are meditating on voidness. That is because there is clinging.” That’s what the others say.

But in Gelugpa, we say, “Yes, in retreat we have inferential cognition (rje-dpag) that apprehends voidness on the conceptual level. Tsongkhapa says it apprehends voidness and it has the appearance of a jug. But that is not a kind of obstacle.” The other schools say that this can be an obstacle, because when you have an appearance of a jug during the time of meditation, this kind of a mind is supposed to be a cause and the future result is supposed to be that you have no appearances at all. But how can one mind, which has an appearance of a jug, become the cause of a mind having no appearances?

Dr. Berzin’s Supplement to Fill Out the Discussion

The Prasangika Assertions about Conceptual Cognition Shared in Common by Gelugpa and Nyingma

The voidness cognized with conceptual cognition is a negation phenomenon. A negation phenomenon is one that is validly cognized by conceptually eliminating something previously cognized – namely, an object to be negated (dgag-bya). In other words, to exclude the object to be negated, one needs to have previously cognized the object to be negated. The object to be negated by voidness is:

For Gelugpa, self-established existence as a conceptually fabricated manner of existing of conventional objects – for instance, the self-established existence of a jug.

For Nyingma, conventional objects, all of which are conceptual fabrications and, as such, have one of the four extreme modes of existence – for instance, a jug.

Gelugpa and Nyingma agree that when ordinary people – beginners, those who are not aryas – first start meditating on voidness, they must generate a conceptual cognition of voidness by mean of inferential cognition. Inferential cognition is always conceptual; and being conceptual, it always has:

According to Gelugpa, conceptually fabricated appearances of self-established existence and grasping for self-established existence.
According to Nyingma, conceptually fabricated appearances of conventional objects and grasping for conventional objects.

Recall that “grasping” means both taking something as an object of cognition and taking its manner of appearing to correspond to it manner of existing.

For both Gelugpa and Nyingma, a Prasangika-style inferential conceptual cognition of the voidness of a jug proceeds through stages:

It begins with focusing on a conceptually fabricated jug.
It then considers an absurd conclusion – for instance, [Gelugpa] if a jug had self-established existence, it could not perform its function of holding water; [Nyingma] if there were such a thing as a jug, it could not perform its function of holding water.
Based on understanding the absurd conclusion, the conceptual cognition cuts off the object to be negated (the object to be refuted).
It then focuses on the voidness (the total absence) of the object to be refuted – there is no such thing.

As explained in the previous part of this discussion, conceptual cognition always contains a conceptually fabricated category (spyi), which is the conceptual exclusion (gzhan-sel) of everything that does not fit in a category.

A category is an implicative negation phenomenon (ma-yin dgag), and as such, after excluding its object to be negated, the category tosses in its footprint a negation phenomenon and an affirmation phenomenon.
Voidness, on the other hand, is a non-implicative negation phenomenon (med-dgag). After excluding its object to be negated, voidness tosses in its footprint only a negation phenomenon.

Let us now analyze the components that arise in the step of the inferential cognition of the voidness of a jug in which the conceptual cognition of voidness occurs. The negation phenomena and what they toss that we shall examine are the categories involved in the cognition and not the voidness that is cognized.

The Gelugpa Prasangika Presentation of the Conceptual Cognition of the Voidness of the Self-Established Existence of a Jug

Object Categories

Recall that Gelugpa asserts that the superficial truth and deepest truth of any validly knowable object are cognized by two different facets of any cognition other than an arya’s total absorption, which only cognizes deepest truth. The voidness of what deceptively appears to be the self-established existence of a jug is only negating self-established existence; it is not negating the jug. Thus, the inferential conceptual cognition of the voidness of the self-established existence of a jug is only dealing with the deceptiveness of the facet of the cognition that cognizes the deepest truth of the appearance of the self-established existence of a jug. It does not deal with the facet of the cognition that cognizes the superficial truth of a jug.

According to the Gelugpa analysis, two object categories arise as the appearing objects (snang-yul) in the conceptual cognition of the voidness of the self-established existence of a jug:

The object category “the voidness of self-established existence.” It may be easier to understand if we refer to this as the object category “an absence of self-established existence.”
The object category “an appearance of self-established existence.”

In the case of the object category “an absence of self-established existence,” after conceptually excluding the object to be negated (everything that does not fit in this category), the exclusion tosses in its footprint:

The negation phenomenon “not what does not fit in the category ‘an absence of self-established existence’” – in other words, “nothing other than what fits in the category ‘an absence of self-established existence’” and so “not what fits in the category ‘a presence of self-established existence.’” Such a conceptual exclusion is called a “conceptual isolate” (ldog-pa) or, colloquially a “nothing-other-than.”
An affirmation phenomenon “what does fit in the category ‘an absence of self-established existence,’” conceptually represented in the graphic form of a conceptually fabricated generic blank space.
A second affirmation phenomenon a “jug,” but not in a conceptually fabricated graphic form, as the basis for the voidness (stong-gzhi) that fits in the category “an absence of self-established existence” and also as the locus of this voidness (stong-sa), since what fits in this category only deals with the deepest truth of a jug and not its superficial truth.

The jug that is the basis and locus of this voidness of self-established existence, however, does not have self-established existence. Its existence is established merely by mental labeling, and thus a jug cannot be found even upon analysis of its superficial truth. As mentioned earlier, Tsongkhapa refers to such a jug as a “mere conventionality” (kun-rdzob-tsam).

It is important to understand that this Gelugpa Prasangika assertion of the voidness of the self-established existence of a jug is not the same as the Gelugpa Svatantrika (Skt. Svātantrika) assertion of the voidness of the true, unimputed existence of a jug. Gelugpa Svatantrika asserts that a jug has self-established existence and that the object to be negated by its voidness is true, unimputed existence, which is defined as existence established not merely by mental labeling. For Gelugpa Svatantrika, the existence of a jug is established by its self-establishing nature in conjunction with mental labeling and not, as Prasangika asserts, merely by mental labeling. Thus, for Gelugpa Svatantrika, the category “the voidness of true, unimputed existence” in the conceptual cognition of the voidness of the true, unimputed existence of a jug tosses in its footprint a self-established jug that can be found when analyzing conventional truth and not, as in Prasangika, a jug that is a mere conventionality and cannot be found when analyzing conventional truth.

In the case of the object category “the appearance of self-established existence” in the Gelugpa Prasangika explanation, after conceptually excluding the object to be negated (not an appearance of a mode of existing that does not fit in the category “an appearance of self-established existence”), the exclusion tosses in its footprint:

The negation phenomenon “nothing other than an appearance of a mode of existing that fits in the category ‘an appearance of self-established existence.’”
The affirmation phenomenon “the appearance of a mode of existence that does fit in the category ‘an appearance of self-established existence,’” conceptually represented in a graphic form by a conceptually fabricated generic appearance of self-established existence.

Explicit Apprehension and Implicit Apprehension According to Gelugpa

In accord with the Gelugpa assertion of the cognition of an object having two facets, the inferential conceptual cognition of the voidness of a jug explicitly apprehends (dngos-su rtogs-pa) the deepest truth of a jug and, simultaneously, implicitly apprehends (shugs-la rtogs-pa) its superficial truth. The cognition also implicitly apprehends itself, which accounts for how the cognition can be remembered.

An apprehension (rtogs-pa) is an accurate and decisive cognition of an object. It occurs in both conceptual and non-conceptual cognition.
The conceptual isolate in a conceptual apprehension is called an appearance (snang-ba), although being static, it has no graphic form that appears. “Appearance,” here, simply means “something that arises in the footprint of a negation phenomenon.” “Graphic form” means in the form of an aspect (rnam-pa), somewhat like a mental hologram, that is a form of physical phenomenon that can only be cognized by mental consciousness.

In explicit conceptual apprehension, the explicitly apprehended object likewise “appears” (snang-ba) – meaning “arises” – as a conceptually fabricated generic representation having a graphic form.
In implicit conceptual apprehension, the implicitly apprehended object also “appears”– meaning “arises” – but as an object of cognition that does not appear in a graphic form.

The Components of the Conceptual Cognition of Voidness According to the Gelugpa Scheme

We are now ready to detail the components of the conceptual cognition of the voidness of the self-established existence of a jug according to the Gelugpa scheme:

In the explicit apprehension facet of the conceptual cognition, there arise:

The object category “the voidness of self-established existence” and the object category “the appearance of self-established existence” as the appearing objects.
The negation phenomenon “nothing other than what fits in the category ‘the voidness of self-established existence’” appearing in the footprint of the object category “the voidness of self-established existence.”
The affirmation phenomenon “what does fit in the category ‘the voidness of self-established existence,’” represented in the graphic form of a conceptually fabricated generic blank space appearing also in the footprint of the object category “the voidness of self-established existence.”
The negation phenomenon “nothing other than an appearance of a mode of existing that fits in the category ‘an appearance of self-established existence’” appearing in the footprint of the object category “the appearance of self-established existence.”
The affirmation phenomenon “the appearance of a mode of existence that does fit in the category “an appearance of self-established existence,” represented in the graphic form of conceptually fabricated generic appearance of self-established existence.
Thus, a conceptually fabricated generic representation of a voidness (an absence) of self-established existence that has an appearance of self-established existence. It appears in the graphic form of a generic blank space that appears to have self-established existence.

In the implicit apprehension facet of the conceptual cognition, there arises:

The affirmation phenomenon “a generic jug” appearing without a graphic form also in the footprint of the object category “the voidness of self-established existence.”

In this way, the conceptual cognition:

Explicitly apprehends the voidness of the self-established existence of a jug – the deepest truth of a jug – depicted in the graphic form of a conceptually fabricated generic blank space that appears to have self-established existence. It explicitly apprehends it through the two categories that are the appearing objects of the conceptual cognition.
Implicitly apprehends a jug – representing the superficial truth of a jug, but not depicted in a graphic form and not through an object category.
Implicitly apprehends itself.

The Common Gelug-Nyingma Presentation of the Non-Conceptual Cognition of Voidness

Common to both the Gelugpa and the Nyingma ways of explaining, in an arya’s non-conceptual total absorption on space-like voidness:

Space-like voidness arises as the appearing object of the total absorption. In the case of Gelugpa, it does not appear to have self-established existence; in the case of Nyingma, it does not appear as a conventional object that, being conventional, would appear to exist in one of the four extreme modes of existence.
Thus, there are no appearances of self-established existence and no grasping for self-established existence, and no appearances of conventional objects and no grasping for conventional objects.
There are no conceptually fabricated representation of voidness and no conceptually fabricated object categories.
There is no basis of the voidness – for instance, a jug in the case of Gelugpa – that is apprehended, even implicitly.
Thus, “nothing appears” in the sense that no mentally fabricated manner of existence, no conventional objects, and no superficial truths appear.
Space-like voidness is cognized simply in terms of its deepest truth.
Except for the Gelugpa assertion that the liberated pathway minds (rnam-grol-lam) of the total absorption have implicit apprehension of themselves, the total absorption does not have implicit apprehension of anything. It only has explicit apprehension of non-denumerable space-like voidness.

The Nyingma Presentation of the Conceptual Cognition of the Voidness of a Jug

Nyingma agrees with Gelugpa that inferential conceptual cognition of voidness is a necessary first step for attaining a non-conceptual total absorption on space-like voidness. The disagreement concerns the object to be negated by conceptually cognized voidness and the scheme for describing the structure of the conceptual cognition. Both affect what a meditator cognizes when conceptually cognizing voidness.

As for the difference concerning the object to be negated, recall that Nyingma rejects the Gelugpa assertion that a cognition has two facets, one each for cognizing each of the two truths. In accordance with the Nyingma emphasis on the inseparability of what something appears to be and how it appears to exist, a cognition has only one facet and it cognizes both facets inseparably. Thus, the object to be negated by both the conceptual and non-conceptual cognition of the voidness of a jug is a jug as a conceptually fabricated conventional object and not, as the Gelugpas assert, the self-established existence of a jug.

The Nyingma objection to the Gelugpa analysis of the conceptual cognition of voidness follows from this difference in identifying the object to be negated. When conceptually meditating on voidness in the Gelugpa fashion, the meditator is implicitly apprehending a jug. From the Nyingma point of view, the Gelugpa meditator has not negated and cut off the object to be negated – a jug as a conceptually fabricated conventional object. Thus, even though a jug arises in the Gelugpa meditator’s conceptual cognition without any graphic form, still the meditator is grasping (‘dzin-pa) and clinging to it. In other words, the Gelugpa meditator is still apprehending a conceptually fabricated jug and taking it to be a conventional object. The meditator is unable to recognize, “This is a conceptual fabrication.”

Nyingma questions how a conceptual cognition, in which there arises a conceptually fabricated conventional object such as a jug, can be a cause that results in a non-conceptual cognition in which no conventional objects arise. Similar to the discussion in tantra of meditation on bodhichitta (Skt. bodhicitta) versus meditation on the body of a Buddha-figure as the cause for the attainment of a Form Body of a Buddha, the cause here (conceptual meditation on space-like voidness) also needs to resemble the result (non-conceptual meditation on space-like voidness) more closely.

The Nyingma scheme for describing the structure of the conceptual cognition of the voidness of a jug and meditation in accord with that structure avoids this shortcoming of the Gelugpa scheme and meditation. According to Nyingma scheme of the conceptual cognition of voidness:

The appearing object that arises as if directly in front of the “face of the mind” is a conceptually fabricated absence of conventional objects.
This voidness – a conceptually fabricated absence of conventional objects – lacks any graphic form and, in this sense, “nothing appears” in the conceptual cognition.

Mentally labeled on this absence is the object category “the absence of conventional objects.”
The negation phenomenon “nothing other than what fits in the category ‘the absence of conventional objects’” is tossed in the footprint of this object category.
The affirmation phenomenon “a conceptually fabricated ‘absence of conventional objects’” is also tossed in the footprint of the object category, and it is the appearing object in the conceptual cognition. It lacks any graphic form, such as a blank space, because such a graphic form would be a conventional object.
Because the conceptually fabricated “absence of conventional objects” is apprehended together with the object category “the absence of conventional objects” mentally labeled on it, the conceptually fabricated “absence of conventional objects” is explicitly apprehended. Although this voidness lacks any graphic form, it is not implicitly apprehended.
“The absence of conventional objects” has neither a basis nor a locus. Thus, there are no conventional objects, such as a jug, that are tossed in the footprint of the category “the absence of conventional objects.”

Thus, in the fact that “nothing appears” in the conceptual meditation, the Nyingma style of conceptual meditation on space-like voidness is closer than the Gelugpa style is to the resultant non-conceptual meditation on space-like voidness. Although Nyingma asserts the inseparability of appearance and voidness on the level of conceptually cognized denumerable ultimate phenomena, there isn’t any appearance of a conventional object that arises and is cognized here.

Gelugpa retorts that the fact that a jug is implicitly apprehended in the conceptual cognition of voidness is not an obstacle, because the object to be negated, self-established existence, is absent in both the conceptual and non-conceptual cognition of voidness, and self-established existence is the only object negated by voidness.

The Difference Between Gelugpa & Nyingma on Explicit and Implicit Apprehension

Dr. Berzin: Does Nyingma accept implicit apprehension?

Tsenshap Serkong Rinpoche II: Yes, with inferential cognition there can be implicit apprehension of the jug and explicit apprehension of voidness the same as with the Gelugpas, but this is just refuting the first extreme of the four extremes. It’s the first one. Whether they [Nyingmapas] call this explicit apprehension or implicit apprehension, it doesn’t matter. But they will not consider this to be voidness.

Is what appears to them in inferential cognition a mentally synthesized voidness that is like space?

Yes, but that is just an aspect of voidness, and, at the time of the inferential cognition, there is an appearance of the jug for sure.

But with implicit apprehension, I thought that there shouldn’t be an appearance.

No, no, it appears (snang-ba). Implicit apprehension doesn’t have a strong influence, but there it is.

Apprehension (rtogs-pa) and dawning (shar-ba) are the same thing. It should be somewhere dawning. It’s like when you have explicit apprehension of the impermanence of sound, there is implicit apprehension of sound being devoid of being permanent. It’s an apprehension, but not like there is an emphasis there. No need. It’s there, because this is an apprehension, an implicit apprehension. But the cognition does not emphasize the implicit apprehension.

So here, do we need to understand “appear” or “dawn” like you can see it in your mind, or does “appear” or “dawn” just mean that it arises?

The understanding is there. It’s not like there is the jug there, not like that.

So, the understanding, the implicit apprehension of the jug is there.

Yes, yes, so that’s why it’s not a complete meditation on voidness. That’s something other than voidness, they are saying. Why? Because there is still grasping (‘dzin-pa). That grasping is no other than to this appearance.

There’s [also] like a grasping for nonexistence (med-pa ‘dzin-pa). So, they are saying that in order to have a good knowing of voidness, there should be no appearance at all, like neither existence nor nonexistence (yod-pa ma-red med-pa ma-red).

So, voidness that is beyond conception, incommunicable, unimaginable, and inexpressible?

Yes, yes.

If nothing arises, isn’t that the extreme of blank-minded meditation on nothingness (ci-yang med-pa)?

No, there is a big difference.

Dr. Berzin’s Supplement to Fill Out the Discussion

The Definition of Explicit and Implicit Apprehensions

Apprehension (rtogs-pa) is the accurate and decisive cognition of an object. The apprehended object may be either explicitly or implicitly apprehended.

According to the Gelugpa master Kedrub Je (mKhas-grub dGe-legs dpal-bzang):

In the explicit apprehension of an object, ascertainment (nges-shes) of the object arises from the awareness (blo) in the cognition facing toward that object and an aspect (rnam-pa, a mental hologram) of the object dawning.
In the implicit apprehension of an object, even though at the time of the implicit apprehension the awareness is not facing toward that object and an aspect (a mental hologram) of the object is not dawning, nevertheless, afterwards, ascertainment of the object arises merely by turning the attention to it.

According to the Nyingma usage:

In the explicit apprehension of an object, the object is the main one cognized and cognition of it is emphasized.
In the implicit apprehension of an object, the object is the secondary one cognized and cognition of it is not emphasized.

Despite the differences in the definitions, both Gelugpa and Nyingma agree that in the inferential conceptual cognition of the impermanence of sound, the sound’s impermanence is explicitly apprehended and its not being permanent is implicitly apprehended.

Further, Nyingma accepts that inferential conceptual cognition of the voidness of a jug can be made in accordance with the Gelugpa scheme and, in such a cognition, there would be implicit apprehension of a jug. When Nyingma applies its own definitions of explicit and implicit apprehension to such a conceptual cognition, the cognition has its main emphasis on the explicitly apprehended conceptual representation of voidness in the graphic form of a generic blank space. It has secondary emphasis on the implicitly apprehended jug that arises without any graphic form. However, Nyingma does not consider meditation with this type of conceptual cognition of voidness to be proper conceptual meditation on voidness.

The Nyingma Objection to the Gelugpa Style of Conceptual Meditation on Voidness

In the Gelugpa analysis of the conceptual cognition of voidness, there appear two conventional objects – a conceptually fabricated generic blank space in graphic form and a jug not in graphic form. Note that the Tibetan word “snang-ba,” translated as “to appear” and “appearance,” means “to arise” and “something that arises” or “to dawn” and “something that dawns.” That “something” that dawns, arises, and appears does not need to do so in a graphic form.

This Gelugpa style of conceptual cognition of voidness grasps at these conceptual objects that appear in it. It grasps at them in the sense in that it apprehends them as conventional objects and takes them to exist in the way that they appear. Nyingma faults this type of conceptual cognition of voidness, saying that the appearance of conceptually fabricated conventional objects and grasping to them in the cognition is an obstacle to the non-conceptual cognition of voidness in which there are no such conceptually fabricated conceptual objects appearing and no such grasping. This obstacle is avoided in the Nyingma style of conceptual meditation on voidness and in the conceptual cognition of voidness gained in it, in which no conceptually fabricated conventional objects appear – “nothing appears” or is grasped.

Meditation in which there is this type of conceptual cognition, however, is not the extreme of nihilism and blank-minded meditation on nothingness. Even though nothing appears, it is still an apprehension of the voidness (the total absence) of conventional objects. This apprehension appears in the conceptual cognition, in the sense that it arises, so the cognition is not blank-minded. It is just that there are no conventional objects arising and appearing as apprehended objects. “Blank-minded” means not only that no conventional objects appear, but that also no apprehension or understanding arises.

Nyingma points out another shortcoming that pertains to even the Nyingma conceptual cognition of voidness. It is has grasping to non-existence (med-‘dzin). Although the conceptual cognition does not cognize and grasp for the existence of conventional objects, which are all mere conceptual fabrications, it cognizes and grasps for the non-existence of conventional objects.

Thus, of the four extremes (mtha’-bzhi) – existence, non-existence, both or neither – the conceptual meditation on denumerable voidness has just negated and gone beyond the first extreme, the extreme of existence (yod-mtha’). But now it has gone to the second extreme, the extreme of non-existence (med-mtha’). It is still not the complete cognition of voidness beyond conception, incommunicable, unimaginable, and inexpressible, which only comes with an arya’s non-conceptual cognition of space-like voidness.